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Abstract 
 
Indonesia’s cooperation in maritime security initiatives is vitally important because half of 
the world’s trading goods and oil pass through Indonesian waters including the Straits of 
Malacca, the Strait of Sunda and the Strait of Lombok.
 
Consequently, Indonesia’s active 
engagement in maritime cooperation is a matter of some import for the international 
community. However, Indonesia’s varying participation across maritime cooperation 
arrangements is puzzling. Indonesia has joined some of these cooperation initiatives and 
opted out of others despite the presence of United States leadership. This thesis addresses 
this puzzle by carrying out a comparative analysis of 26 cooperation arrangements using 
government documents and elite interviews in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and New 
York.   
 
In addition to addressing an empirical puzzle, this thesis also contributes to the theoretical 
debate on international cooperation. The International Relations literature on cooperation 
tends to focus on great power bargaining. Whether, why and how middle powers decide to 
join international initiatives over which they have little influence has been overlooked.  
The implication of this study suggests that neither the calculation of relative gains as 
argued by neorealists, the constructivist expectation regarding the importance of shared 
identity, the neorealist or the neoliberal argument on the role of hegemonic leadership nor 
the bureaucratic politics approach emphasis on competing government actors’ preferences 
can explain the variation in Indonesia’s engagement with cooperation initiatives. I argue 
that Indonesia’s decision to cooperate is formed by the calculation of absolute gains. 
Indonesia cooperated as long as the benefits of cooperation exceeded the costs. 
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Chapter 1. Indonesia’s Puzzling Participation in International Maritime Security 
Cooperation?  
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Indonesia is a critical state in maritime security. Almost half of the world’s traded goods 
and oil passes through the key Indonesian straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok.
1
 These 
strategic sea routes are threatened by possible maritime terrorism attacks and armed 
robbery against ships. Indonesia participates in a number of international cooperative 
endeavours to deal with maritime terrorism and sea robbery, for instance the World 
Customs Organization SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global 
Trade (WCO SAFE Framework), and has even actively initiated a selection of measures 
and convened multiple meetings to improve maritime security cooperation, such as the 
Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) agreement among others.
2
 Yet it has also refrained from 
participating in a number of other cooperative arrangements, such as the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention), also designed to tackle maritime terrorism and sea robbery. Given 
Indonesia’s rigorous response towards some cooperation initiatives to address maritime 
terrorism and armed robbery against ships, but not others this thesis poses the question: 
Why does Indonesia join or not join a cooperation agreement?  
 
The prevailing arguments in the literature on Indonesia’s cooperation in maritime 
arrangements cannot account for Indonesia’s varying participation across cases. There are 
three main explanations set out in the literature, but they are limited by generalizing from 
individual instances of success or failure. These are the functional motivations, the 
sovereignty concern and the economic disinterest arguments. The functional motivations 
argument claims that Indonesia is willing to cooperate in various initiatives to address 
problems related to potential maritime terrorism and sea robbery attacks.
3
 This argument 
can explain Indonesia’s cooperation in some arrangements, but cannot account for 
Indonesia’s non-participation in some others. The argument regarding Indonesia’s 
                                                          
1
  Carana (2004:14);  U.S. Department of Homeland Security (20 September 2005) 
2
  Singapore  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (2 August 2005);  Jakarta Post (9 September 2005); 
Interview IG05  
3
  B.K. Sondakh (2004: 3-26; 2006:79-90); N. Wisnumurti (2009: 333-352); H. Djalal (2004: 419-440; 
2007b:51-58; 2009d: 315-332; 2009a: 8-26); T.E. Purdjianto (2009:27-42); K. Anggoro (2009: 59-80); R.A. 
Nasrun (2009: 115-133);  
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concerns over sovereignty infringement explains that Indonesia is reluctant to join some 
cooperation agreements if it perceives that it may compromise its sovereignty.
4
 This 
argument can only explain Indonesia’s non-participation in some cooperation agreements 
but cannot explain Indonesia’s willingness to join some others. The third line of argument 
on economic disinterest points to Indonesia’s lack of economic interest in seaborne-trade 
as the main source of Indonesia’s rejection of maritime security cooperation.5 The 
economic disinterest argument underplays the benefits of cooperation for Indonesia and, 
therefore, falls short in accounting for Indonesia’s engagement in some cooperation 
agreements. Taken as a whole, the three arguments cannot explain why Indonesia joins 
some cooperation initiatives, but not others.  
 
This thesis argues that Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join a cooperation agreement 
is informed by the absolute gains calculation. Indonesia signed agreements only if it 
anticipated that the benefits of cooperation would exceed the costs.  Indonesia is seeking 
core benefits such as burden sharing, equipment, access to maritime training and exercises 
to improve the country’s maritime security measures; and it is seeking ancillary benefits, 
including agreement from its cooperation partners to negotiate other treaty or assistance to 
develop its undeveloped areas. In assessing the costs of cooperation Indonesia takes into 
account the sovereignty costs that refer to the degree of limitation that an agreement poses 
to national autonomy, and the implementation costs that point to the costs incurred in 
implementing the cooperation requirements. This finding is consistent with the neoliberal 
emphasis on the importance of absolute gains and contradicts the neorealist expectation 
that relative gains matter, particularly when cooperation concerns security. Neorealism, 
due to its emphasis on relative gains concern, would expect that a middle power such as 
Indonesia would be more likely to cooperate with larger or smaller states and avoid 
cooperating with its near-peers. In contrast to this expectation Indonesia cooperated with 
larger, smaller and near-peer states.  In addition, this thesis shows that in contrast to the 
constructivist argument on the role of shared identity in influencing cooperation Indonesia 
had refused to participate in cooperation arrangements that exclusively involved other 
ASEAN states and those that included non-ASEAN states. This thesis also demonstrates, 
contrary to the neorealist and neoliberal emphasis on hegemonic leadership in fostering 
                                                          
4
  V. Huang (2008:93);  M. J. Valencia (2006b:89); T.R. Shie (2006:178); S. Bateman (2007; 2009); 
Bradford ( 2005:73-75; 2008:489); B. Bingley (2004:363-364); T.M. Sittnick (2005: 752, 754); M. Murphy 
(2007: 169, 174) 
5
  Huang (2008:91); J.N. Mak (2006: 135-136, 152,156-157 ); J. Mo (2002:351); J. Ho (2009b:734); 
Raymond (2007:88); C.M. Stryken (2007:139) 
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cooperation, leadership by the United States was neither necessary nor sufficient to explain 
Indonesia’s participation in cooperation arrangements. Further, this thesis shows that the 
variation in Indonesia’s participation in security cooperation cannot be explained by 
competition among government actors, as suggested by some foreign policy analyses, 
because of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was the dominant actor in all of the 
cooperation arrangements and there is no evidence of competition among other 
government actors. This model of MFA dominance prompts questions about whether the 
bureaucratic politics account of foreign policy ‘travels’ to Indonesia.  By analyzing why 
Indonesia did or did not join a cooperation agreement this thesis contributes to theoretical 
debates on cooperation in international relations by bringing in discussion of middle power 
participation in international cooperation.   
 
This thesis also makes a valuable empirical contribution by offering a comprehensive 
account of the measures being taken by Indonesia to address two serious threats to 
maritime security: maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships. As Indonesia is an 
important player in maritime security, and as the security of Indonesia’s sea lanes are 
crucial to global trade, this is worthy of our attention.  This thesis covers a much broader 
set of Indonesia’s unilateral measures and maritime cooperation arrangements. There are 
no works that systematically explain Indonesia’s varying participation across all maritime 
security cooperation. Some works that provide detailed accounts of Indonesia’s national 
measures and cooperation to deal with maritime terrorism and sea robbery concentrate 
mainly on successful cooperation cases and give no attention to Indonesia’s non-
cooperation.
6
 Others that noted Indonesia’s non-participation in some arrangements do not 
aim specifically to explain the way Indonesia responded to maritime security cooperation.
7
 
These works tend to focus on broader Southeast Asia or South China Sea maritime security 
and they only explain Indonesia’s non-participation in certain cooperation arrangements in 
passing. By covering all maritime security arrangements, therefore, this thesis provides a 
comprehensive portrayal of Indonesia’s response to the two problems that is currently 
lacking. 
  
                                                          
6
  Y.D.H. Purnomo (2004: 27-40);  Sondakh (2004:1-26); Purdjianto (2009:27-42);  Anggoro (2009: 
59-80); Nasrun (2009: 115-133); Djalal (2007b:51-58; 2009) 
7
  Bingley (2004: 353-383); Huang ( 2008);  Valencia (2006b:89); Shie (2006); Bateman (2007; 
2009); Bradford (2004; 2005; 2008); Sittnick (2005: 752, 754); Murphy (2007: 169, 174); B.Desker (2007: 
14-18) 
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The next section explains issues and cooperation cases cover by this thesis. The third 
section reviews the existing literature on maritime cooperation and Indonesia’s 
engagement in this cooperation and reveals how it fails to explain the observed variation in 
Indonesia’s engagement in international maritime security cooperation. This section 
considers the plausible explanations suggested by the competing International Relations 
(IR) theories and the bureaucratic approach to foreign policy analysis. The fourth section 
provides the analytical framework of this thesis. It identifies and operationalizes the key 
independent and dependent variables that are analysed in this thesis. The fifth section 
explains the sources used and the scope of primary research conducted for the thesis. The 
final section of the chapter provides an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
 
 
1.2 Issues and Cases 
This thesis compares Indonesia’s participation in all maritime security cooperation to 
address maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships. In total there are twenty six 
cooperation arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships 
capturing both cooperation and non-cooperation (see Table 1.1). These two issue areas, 
maritime terrorism and security and armed robbery against ships, are worth studying for 
two reasons. First, cooperation in both policy areas is important because the two issues 
have become the focus of international maritime security cooperation. Armed robbery 
against ships is not a new security concern for either Indonesia or the international 
community. It has been a recurring maritime security challenge in Southeast Asia since 
A.D. 414.
8
 Although armed robbery at sea is not new, this issue has received a lot of 
attention since 9/11. Similarly, concern over maritime terrorism attacks began to rise as an 
international security concern only in the wake of 9/11. Consequently, there is now 
extensive regional and multilateral cooperation on both issues including in the Association 
of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
 
Second, maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships have the potential to 
significantly impact the international economy and security. If the three international Sea 
Lanes of Communication (SLOC) that overlap with Indonesian territory - the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore, the Strait of Lombok and the Strait of Sunda - were closed, the 
                                                          
8
  P. Chalk (1998a: 87) 
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additional transport costs for detouring around Australia would cost an extra US$ 8 billion 
per year based on 1993 trade flows in these straits.
9
 The closure of adjacent ports in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia that are located around the three SLOCs would impede 
the transport of cargo worth around US$ 232 billion.
10
 Acts of maritime terrorism and sea 
robbery would bring devastating consequences, not only in terms of economic and 
financial damage to affected countries and industries, but also in human losses.
11
 Acts of 
maritime terrorism carried out by the Abu Sayaff Group on board the MV Super Ferry in 
the Sulu Sea, the Philippines, caused the death of 116 of the 900 passengers and crew.
12
 
Concerns have been raised over the possibility of terrorists hijacking a super tanker in a 
busy sea lane.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
  J.H. Noer and D. Gregory (1996:47) 
10
  Noer and Gregory (1996:47)  
11
  J. Ho (2006: 563)  
12
  T.G. Monje (25 January 2013) 
 18 
 
Table 1.1 Population of All Cooperation Cases 
  
 Subject of Cooperation 
Outcome Maritime Terrorism Parties 
Cooperation The U.S.-Indonesia Defence Framework Arrangement, 10 June 
2010 
Indonesia and the U.S. 
The Indonesia-Japan Joint Announcement on Fighting against 
International Terrorism, 24 June 2003 
Indonesia and Japan 
Three Bilateral Arrangements with Australia Australia (MoU on 
Counter-Terrorism,7 February 2002; Lombok Treaty, 13 
November 2006; and the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, 5 
September 2012) 
Indonesia and Australia 
The Brunei Darussalam- Indonesia- Malaysia- The Philippines 
East ASEAN Growth Area MoU on Sea Linkages, 2 November 
2007 and the MoU on Transport of Goods, 25 June 2009 
Indonesia, Brunei Malaysia 
and the Philippines 
The Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of 
Communication, 7 May 2002. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines 
The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, 13 January 
2007 
ASEAN member states (10 
states) 
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 
12 December 2002 
148 states who are contracting 
parties to the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS) Convention 
including ASEAN and non-
ASEAN states 
The World Customs Organization SAFE Framework of 
Standards (WCO SAFE Framework), 23 June 2005 
164 out of 179 WCO member 
states including ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN states 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Trade Recovery 
Programme (APEC TRP), 9 September 2007 
7 ASEAN member states  and 
14 extra-regional states 
Non 
Cooperation 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), 10 
March 1988. 
6 ASEAN States  and 155 non 
ASEAN states 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 31 May 2003 3 ASEAN states and 69 others 
extra-regional states 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI), 20 January 2002 3 ASEAN states and 33 extra-
regional states 
Outcome Armed Robbery against Ships Parties 
Cooperation Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol Arrangement, 8 July 
1992 
Indonesia and Singapore 
Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol Arrangement, July 
1992. 
Indonesia and Malaysia 
Indonesia-the Philippines Defence Agreement, 27 August 1997 Indonesia and the Philippines 
Indonesia-India Defence Agreement, 11 January 2001. Indonesia and India 
The MoU on Maritime Cooperation between Indonesia and 
China, 25 April 2005. 
Indonesia and China 
The Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) Agreement, 21 April 2006. Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore 
Two ASEAN Initiatives (The ARF Statement on Cooperation 
against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, 17 June 
2003 and the ASEAN Maritime Forum, 23 July 2005) 
ASEAN member states and 
16 extra-regional states 
including the U.S., China, 
European Union and Australia 
 
Non-
Cooperation 
Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore, 27 April 2007 Indonesia and Singapore 
The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), November 
2004. 
It was intended to include all 
20 countries in East Asia and 
Pacific. 
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 11 November 
2004. 
ASEAN member states  
(excluding Malaysia and 
Indonesia) and 11 extra-
regional states 
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1.3 Literature Review: Limits of the Existing Literature 
The burgeoning literature on Indonesia’s maritime security cooperation can be categorized 
into two groups. The first group of literature is largely descriptive; focuses on Indonesia’s 
efforts to secure its sea lanes (notably the Straits of Malacca and Singapore);
13
 and is 
fragmented, considering only one or a few cases of cooperation arrangements at a time. 
The second group of literature touches on International Relations (IR) theories on 
cooperation - including constructivism, neoliberalism and neorealism - as well as the 
bureaucratic politics explanations of different motivations and constraints on international 
cooperation. 
 
The explanations suggested by the descriptive literature for Indonesia’s participation in 
cooperation in the existing literature can be grouped into three categories: functional 
motivations, concerns about sovereignty costs, and economic disinterest.   
 
The, usually implicit, functional argument describes the presence of maritime terrorism 
and sea robbery threats and identifies a series of policy responses. This group of scholarly 
works focus on the maritime security problems to be solved. They explain that Indonesia 
has been involved in bilateral, trilateral and regional maritime cooperation to secure key 
waterways, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Indian Ocean.
14
 
These descriptive works of Indonesia maritime cooperation elaborate the existing maritime 
security threats, policies to deal with these issues and the limitations and constraints faced 
by the country.
15
 They only focus on successful cases of cooperation. Implicitly, these 
works show how Indonesia assesses the costs and benefits of cooperation. Their argument 
overstates the benefits of cooperation relative to costs suggesting that Indonesia should 
always cooperate. Therefore, the functional motivations argument cannot offer a 
satisfactory explanation on Indonesia’s non-cooperation in a number of cases such as the 
SUA Convention and the ReCAAP.  
 
Those that focus on non-cooperation overstate sovereignty costs. Bradford, Huang, 
Valencia, Shie, Bateman, Hassan, Bingley, Sittnick and Murphy point to concerns over 
                                                          
13
    Y.D.H. Purnomo (2004: 27-40); B.K. Sondakh (2004:1-26); T.E. Purdjianto (2009:27-42); K. 
Anggoro (2009: 59-80); R.A. Nasrun (2009: 115-133); H. Djalal (2007b:51-58; 2009) 
14
   Sondakh (2004: 3-26; 2006:79-90); Wisnumurti (2009: 333-352); H. Djalal (2004: 419-440; 
2007b:51-58; 2009d: 315-332; 2009a: 8-26) 
15
  Purnomo (2004: 27-40);;  Wisnumurti (2009: 115-133); Purnomo (2004: 27-40); Sondakh (2004:1-
26); Purdjianto (2009:27-42); Anggoro (2009: 59-80); Nasrun (2009: 115-133);  
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sovereignty infringement as the reason underpinning Indonesia’s non cooperation in a 
number of agreements including the RMSI, the ReCAAP, the SUA Convention, the CSI 
and the PSI.
16
 The notion of sovereignty in their works refers to government’s concern and 
sensitivity over potential breaches of sovereignty, which they do not specify. Their works 
highlight the possibility of U.S. warships patrolling Indonesian waters as the main source 
of sovereignty concern generated by the RMSI.
17
 The placement of U.S. officials in foreign 
ports under the CSI and the PSI’s interdiction activity against ships suspected of carrying 
WMD materials are cited as the main sovereignty concerns raised by the two U.S. led 
initiatives.
18
 These works implicitly point to the way Indonesia calculates its costs and 
benefits. However, by over emphasizing sovereignty concerns, these scholarly works 
overstate the importance of the costs of cooperation and neglect the benefits. As a 
consequence, they overlook Indonesia’s willingness to participate in maritime security 
cooperation including those that involve cross-border sea and air patrols and provide to 
other states access to its port facilities, airspace and land territory.  
 
The third line of argument found in the descriptive literature argues that Indonesia’s lack of 
economic interest limits its willingness to join maritime cooperation. Raymond, Mak, 
Huang, Mo, Ho, Desker, and Stryken explain that Indonesia’s interest in pursuing 
international cooperation to secure the straits is the lowest among the three littoral states 
that border the Straits of Malacca. They argue that this is because in comparison to 
Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia has a smaller economic stake in the Straits of Malacca 
because it is the least dependent on seaborne international trade.
19
 These works pay 
attention to how Indonesia weighs costs and benefits but they have understated the benefits 
of cooperation and implied that Indonesia should always be less cooperative. As a result, 
they can only explain Indonesia’s non-cooperation. 
 
These descriptive works, therefore, cannot explain why Indonesia cooperates sometimes, 
but not others. They are, nonetheless, a valuable resource for this thesis because they 
provide a detailed account of various international agreements including those which 
Indonesia chose to join and not to join, how they were established and what Indonesia 
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could receive in exchange for participating in these initiatives. I, therefore, use the 
descriptive literature on Indonesia maritime cooperation as a point of departure.  
 
There is also a more analytically informed literature on Indonesia’s cooperation that draws 
inspiration, at least implicitly, from International Relations accounts of  international 
cooperation (constructivism, neoliberalism and neorealism) and foreign policy analysis 
(the bureaucratic politics approach).  
   
A number of works on Southeast Asia have echoed the constructivist explanation on the 
origin of cooperation. Ball, Acharya, and Johnston point to the role of the so called 
“ASEAN spirit” or “ASEAN way” norm that mainly relies on discussion, consensus and 
accommodation at the high political level in solving disputes among member states and 
advancing security-cooperation among them.
20
 The “ASEAN way” that is embraced by 
Southeast Asian states can explain the growing cooperation and the avoidance of inter-state 
conflict in the region. As Acharya explains, the dense networks of regional military-
security cooperation in Southeast Asia were started from bilateral border security 
arrangements that have evolved into “an overlapping and interlocking network” of a 
regional security system.
21
 Ball, Acharya and Johnston advance the constructivist argument 
that states that share similar identities are more likely to cooperate with each other.
22
 They 
develop a collective identity that refers to positive identification with the well-being of 
others.
23
 Collective identity provides an important foundation for cooperation by 
increasing willingness for states to diffuse reciprocity and act on the basis of “generalized 
principles of conduct, that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of 
actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic 
exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”24 According to this line of argument, 
Indonesia should be more likely to cooperate with ASEAN member states. 
 
Narine, Bradford and Kerr invoke a different constructivist argument, contending that the 
legitimacy of an international institution informs states’ willingness to join it.25 As 
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legitimacy is important to a state a constructivist would expect states which seek to 
enhance their international reputation or are insecure about their international status to 
endorse new international institutions most enthusiastically and thoroughly.
26
 International 
institutions that have a large number of member states, and therefore, status as “institution 
approximating universality” will be more legitimate, in comparison to those with fewer 
members.
27
  Narine, Bradford and Kerr fail to explain why the burgeoning numbers of 
maritime institutions, various consultation mechanisms and cooperation organizations at 
international level do not mobilize Indonesia to participate in all maritime security 
cooperation including those that promoted by international institution that include a large 
number of states. 
 
The role of shared identity and legitimacy in informing states’ cooperation are two of many 
core features of constructivism. Constructivism focuses on diverse features including the 
role of values, norms, and ideas, epistemic communities, security communities, and 
regional/community building.
28
 For constructivists the role of norms, values and ideas as 
ideational factors not only regulate behaviour but also constitute actors’ social identity and 
interests.
29
 Constructivism provides a rich explanation on the diffusion of norms, ideas and 
political change, and the significant impact of cooperation in building familiarity and 
creating patterns of institutionalized habits.
30
 Constructivists would expect that the dense 
networks of maritime cooperation in the world that involved the overlapping system of 
bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation would have generated a greater concern for 
cooperation to deal with sea robbery and maritime terrorism threats. The development of 
the cooperative norm to deal with transnational security issues such as piracy, sea robbery 
and maritime terrorism is expected to generate a significant impact to the way states 
cooperate in the maritime security sector. However, despite Jakarta’s acceptance of armed 
robbery against ships and maritime terrorism as security threats and years of participation 
in the dense networks of maritime cooperation, not all cooperation arrangements in counter 
armed robbery against ships and maritime terrorism are readily acceptable for Indonesia. 
The variety in Indonesia’s cooperation persists across cases. This implies the need to look 
for a plausible explanation elsewhere. 
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Many constructivists have explored the involvement of epistemic communities in 
disseminating new ideas and enabling cooperation.
31
 Epistemic communities can 
decisively influence states’ participation in cooperation by taking part in decision making, 
acting as advisors or sources of information, adding new issues to domestic or international 
agendas, or changing how existing issues are defined and approached.
32
 As these epistemic 
communities “decisively influence the conceptual framework in which every policy 
process takes place, and play a significant role in the day to day policy process,” they act 
as powerful instruments for social construction of cooperation narratives.
33
 Although 
constructivist research programmes on epistemic communities offers explanations on the 
influence of ideas on security cooperation, it is less useful in explaining Indonesia’s 
participation in maritime arrangements. As Haas, King and Howorth argue the real limits 
to epistemic communities persist as such communities are able to influence policy only if 
they can convey their ideas and convince key politicians to champion these ideas.
34
 A 
state’s national administrative design can inhibit the process of learning and diffusion of 
new ideas from epistemic communities.
35
 In Indonesia maritime security policy is 
formulated within a very restricted community. Only a handful of government agencies are 
responsible for deciding Indonesia’s participation in maritime cooperation. With the 
exception of ASEAN maritime initiatives, where epistemic communities were invited by 
the Indonesian government to participate in designing cooperation proposals, they were not 
consulted and therefore, less able to influence the government’s decision in other cases of 
maritime cooperation. The Indonesian government retains a high degree of control in 
assessing each cooperation agreement, forming Indonesia’s position, ensuring favourable 
outcomes and enforcing rules. In most cooperation cases there were no attempts to discuss 
Indonesia’s policy related to maritime security agreements with epistemic communities. 
 
Constructivists, such as Adler and Barnett have examined the role of security communities 
as new forms of political organization that enable peaceful cooperation.
36
  This thesis, 
however, does not use security communities as an independent variable for two reasons. 
First, this thesis explains the reasons underpinning Indonesia’s participation or non 
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participation in maritime security agreements. This thesis does not intend to explain the 
process of community building and changes that it can bring.
37
 The constructivist concept 
of the security community focuses on processes and interactions in community formation 
to understand changes in security practices.
38
 A security community, however, does not 
provide much explanation about states’ cooperation in international agreements beyond the 
security community. Second, it is unnecessary to treat security communities as an 
independent plausible explanation. Security community as a concept is too broad to 
explain the likelihood for a state to join a cooperation agreement. The existing literature on 
security communities unpacks this concept “into its most important normative, ideational 
and behavioural component.”39 The literature points to the closely inter-related nature of 
security communities and shared identity concepts. Scholars argue that the two concepts 
should not be seen as isolated variables.
40
 The notion of cooperation within a security 
community is “deeply embedded in a collective identity.”41 Scholarly work that touches 
upon the issue of ASEAN as a security community would make reference to “ASEAN 
spirit” or “ASEAN way” as the shared identity and norms governing regular interaction 
among Southeast Asian states.
42
 Community building in ASEAN involves the creation and 
manipulation of symbols and habits that led to the creation of symbols and habits that in 
turn promoted the development of shared identity.
43
 The “prominent symbol” in the area of 
security cooperation “is the so called ASEAN spirit” or the ASEAN Way.44 Given the 
importance of shared identity in explaining ASEAN community building, this thesis uses 
shared identity as a plausible explanatory variable and the ASEAN Way as a proxy for 
identity. 
 
The existing literature does not provide much insight on the neorealist conception of 
relative gains. To find plausible explanations for Indonesia’s participation in international 
cooperation this literature review proceeds with the neorealist account of the role of 
relative gains. According to neorealism, states are preoccupied with their survival and 
uncertainty about other states’ future intentions and actions. This circumstance compels 
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states to emphasise relative gains in cooperation.
45
 States not only consider how much they 
gain in the deal, but also how much they obtain in comparison to the other side.
46
 Giving 
serious attention to the gains of cooperation partners addresses the concerns about survival 
and uncertainty as states can achieve a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of 
distribution of benefits and capabilities.
47
 A state will refuse to join, will leave, or will limit 
its commitment to a cooperation agreement if it deems that partners are achieving 
relatively larger gains.
48
 The lack of neorealist accounts in the existing literature on 
maritime cooperation is surprising given that neorealism claims to explain security 
particularly well.
49
 
 
Given Indonesia’s status as a middle power, neorealists would expect Indonesia to 
cooperate with either much larger or smaller states because the vast power inequality 
between Indonesia and these states would be less detrimental for Indonesia’s survival.50 In 
contrast, Indonesia would be expected to refuse to cooperate with its near-peer competitors 
due to the insignificant power disparity between them. If a cooperation arrangement brings 
greater gains for its near-peer competitors the competitor would be in a position to 
challenge and threaten Indonesia.
51
 
 
The concept of relative gains is not the only underlying theme of neorealism. Neorealism 
builds upon the central characteristic of international anarchy, the security dilemma and the 
combination of common and conflicting national interests.
52
 This thesis does not 
incorporate the concept of national interest as an independent variable and uses relative 
gains as a plausible explanation for two reasons. First, neorealist predictions of the 
likelihood for cooperation focus on the calculation of relative gains.
53
 The relative gains 
consideration tells statesmen and analysts how much leverage one state has over another 
and vice versa.
54
 It provides states with a clear picture about the distribution of capabilities 
and benefits.  This is important because the distribution of capabilities and benefits for 
neorealists is the most important issue in power-oriented analysis since it determines 
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cooperation outcomes and states’ behaviour.55 As Krasner puts it, “distribution of power in 
international system and the place of a given state within that distribution” is the basic 
explanation for states’ behaviour towards cooperation.56 States are only willing to 
cooperate if such cooperation can provide them with a more favourable distribution of 
benefits that can help them to enhance their relative power capability.
57
 Second, neorealism 
treats states as “positional, not atomistic, in character.”58 In the pursuit of national interest, 
states always measure “their performance...in terms of the performance of others.”59 As 
states protect their national interest they “concentrate on the danger that relative gains” 
may benefit their cooperation partner and, therefore, assist the development of a potential 
enemy in the future.
60
 Since states’ pursuit of national interest is informed by relative gains 
concerns, therefore, this thesis uses the relative gains consideration as a plausible 
explanation. 
 
A group of works have implicitly made reference to the neoliberal absolute gains 
argument.
61
 For neoliberals it is absolute gains rather than relative gains that matter for 
states.
62
 States will cooperate if they would be better off than if they had not cooperated.
63
 
The costs and benefits of cooperation are influenced by the institutional design of each 
agreement. Bradford and Sato draw attention to the importance of the calculation of 
aggregate costs and benefits in informing Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the ReCAAP. 
They claim that Indonesia did not join the ReCAAP because of low perceived benefits and 
high costs of cooperation.
64
 This literature only mentions the costs and benefits in passing 
and tends to overemphasize sovereignty costs without specifying why the agreement 
brought high sovereignty costs or assessing the institutional design of the ReCAAP 
agreement. Nevertheless, the expectation would be for Indonesia to join a cooperation 
arrangement only if the aggregate benefits provided by the agreement outweigh the costs. 
 
The literature on Indonesia’s maritime cooperation does not make any reference to the 
neoliberal concept of interdependence or transnationalisation in their analysis. The concept 
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of interdependence provides a useful explanation regarding classical problems of political 
bargaining in international cooperation as it suggests that the actions of states and non state 
actors will impose costs on other members in the international system.
65
 Keohane and Nye 
explain that asymmetries in dependence provide states with a source of power in dealing 
with one another.
66
 States that are less dependent can use the interdependent relationships 
as a source of influence in bargaining over certain issue and maybe to affect other issues.
67
 
Less dependent states can make compromises at lower costs than more dependent states 
and can also manipulate the relationship to gain its goals not just in the area of the issue but 
also to obtain side payments in other issue areas.
68
 Under conditions of interdependence 
states will try to link their own policies in certain issues with other states’ policies on other 
issues to gain favourable outcomes.
69
 Linkage strategies in political bargaining can be used 
both by states with strong economic and military powers and those that can be categorised 
as weak states to gain concessions or side payments from cooperation partners.
70
 The 
concept of interdependence, however, offers no explanatory purchase to explain why a 
middle power such as Indonesia would choose to join cooperation over which it has little 
influence. In various maritime security arrangements including the ISPS Code, the WCO 
SAFE Framework, the SUA Convention, the PSI, the CSI and the RMSI Indonesia was not 
involved in the bargaining process to design the terms of arrangements. In these 
cooperation cases Indonesia was only faced with two options: to participate or not to 
participate. Under such conditions linkages among issues and asymmetrical 
interdependence as a source of bargaining power as encapsulated in the neoliberal concept 
of interdependence cannot explain Indonesia’s varying participation across cooperation 
initiatives. 
 
Neoliberals suggest that transnational interactions that involve diverse non-state entities 
(individuals, groups, companies, non-governmental organizations or tribunals) increase the 
sensitivity of societies to one another and therefore, influence states’ relations.71 The 
neoliberal transnationalisation concept offers the most valuable explanation to understand 
major effects of transnational relations- contacts, coalitions and interactions- in impinging 
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small, middle and even great powers’ policies.72 These effects include changes of 
behaviour, the linking of national interest groups in transnational structures, increases in 
the limitations imposed on states through dependence and interdependence, improvement 
in the ability of certain governments to influence others, and the emergence of autonomous 
private actors.
73
 However, the neoliberal concept of transnationalisation cannot explain the 
reasons underpinning a middle power varying participation across different agreements. 
Keohane claims that in coping with constraints brought by transnationalisation small or 
middle power states “may well be able to make their decisions solely by considering the 
costs and benefits of various alternative policies to themselves, taking into account, of 
course, the probable reactions of other states.”74 Given the emphasis on the role of the 
costs and benefits calculation this thesis uses the neoliberal absolute gains rather than the 
transnationalisation concept as a plausible explanation.   
  
A number of studies also touch upon the theme of neorealist and neoliberal hegemonic 
leadership. The hegemonic leadership concept suggests that the presence of a hegemon is 
sufficient to affect other states’ preferences to cooperate.75 King, Byers, Stryken, 
Rosenberg and Chung discuss the United States (U.S.) efforts to promote new maritime 
security cooperation including the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism, the PSI, 
the CSI, and the RMSI.
76
 Some authors point out that the U.S. was willing to enforce the 
PSI and the CSI rules by interdicting vessels suspected of carrying WMD and placing U.S. 
CBP monitoring teams in foreign ports, and therefore, bear the enforcement costs of 
cooperation.
77
 Authors also note that the U.S. was willing to provide selective incentives - 
in the form of equipment and capacity building assistance - to other states in order to 
encourage participation.
78
  In the case of maritime security cooperation, it is arguable that 
the U.S. is willing to gain less relative to others in order to secure its objectives of 
establishing and promoting maritime security initiatives, as suggested by U.S. offers to 
bear enforcement costs and provide selective incentives. This literature, however, focuses 
exclusively on what the U.S. did, not how it influenced the considerations of other states.  
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Nonetheless, the expectation would be that states are more likely to participate when there 
is hegemonic leadership. 
 
Some scholarly works have used bureaucratic politics to understand Indonesia’s foreign 
policy making.
79
 Although these works do not refer to the influence of bureaucratic politics 
in informing Indonesia’s maritime security policy, they provide useful insight on 
bureaucratic politics accounts of Indonesia’s foreign policy more generally.80 Liddle, 
Jackson, Suryadinata and Emmerson, for instance, claim that during Suharto’s rule (1966-
1998) the military, particularly the army, held the most power in the decision making 
process and carefully controlled those parts of the bureaucracy connected to security 
including the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of 
Information, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
81
 Nabbs-Keller 
draws attention to the important role of the Indonesian MFA in formulating Indonesia’s 
foreign policy and redefining Indonesia’s image as the “world’s third largest democracy” 
following political reform in 1998.
82
 This suggests that bureaucratic politics may explain 
Indonesia’s decisions to cooperate, but this proposition has not been systematically tested. 
This thesis seeks to address that gap. 
 
The bureaucratic politics approach to the analysis of foreign policy, first introduced by 
Allison, focuses on assessing interaction among governmental actors in bargaining 
games.
83
 Bureaucratic politics focuses on the process of formulation and reformulation of a 
policy decision through the interaction of various actors’ competing preferences.84 Each 
actor is involved in the “deadly serious games” of bargaining to advance their conception 
of national, organizational, group and personal interests.
85
 Therefore, the bureaucratic 
politics approach suggests that cooperation is most likely to occur when it serves the 
interests of governmental actors that prevail in the internal decision making process.  
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Among government ministries the Indonesian MFA plays a central role in foreign policy 
formulation. Nabbs-Keller explains that the Indonesian foreign ministry is the main actor 
responsible in formulating foreign policy, managing Indonesia’s external relations and 
carrying out country’s diplomacy.86 Ruland confirms that despite much reform, the 
Indonesian foreign ministry views treaty-making as an executive prerogative.
87
 In the 
Reform Era the government issued a series of laws that provides the MFA with the 
authority to formulate and implement national policies in the field of foreign policy.
88
  In 
this context, the MFA is the leading institution in international maritime security 
diplomacy, although other ministries have input.
89
 The MFA organizes inter-ministerial 
meetings to settle Indonesia’s decision towards international security cooperation.90 The 
inter-ministerial meetings involve other government agencies including the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD), Navy, Ministry of Transportation (MoT), the Ministry of Marine and 
Fisheries, Customs and Excise and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs.
91
 As is often the norm with maritime security when international 
cooperation concerns activities that fall under the remit of this ministry the MFA shares 
leadership, both in representing the government internationally and in discussing them 
domestically.
92
 The MFA would likely share leadership with other relevant government 
institutions if a cooperation initiative covers technical matters for instance regulation of 
security in ports or on board vessels registered under Indonesian flags, interdiction at sea, 
customs laws or naval patrol coordination.  
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The existing literature does not pay attention to other approaches in contemporary security 
studies such as the Copenhagen School (CS) securitization theory and the English School 
(ES).  The CS aspires to present a security studies framework based on a wider agenda that 
will incorporate the traditionalist position.
93
 The CS begins by broaching the topic of 
international security in a traditional military milieu. “Security is about survival.”94  The 
security-survival proposition then expanded to the five sectors of security: military, 
environment, economic, societal and political.
95
 This process of staging something as an 
existential threat is what the CS called as speech act. The CS concept of the speech act 
suggests that “it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is 
done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).”96 For the CS, security is perceived as 
a self-referential practice, since “it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue 
- not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as 
such a threat.”97 What is essential from the speech act is not the utterance of the word 
“security,” but the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or 
special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience that 
defined the speech act.
98
 
 
The securitization approach is useful in explaining the framing of issues such as migration, 
intrastate conflict and transnational crimes into recognized new security threats through 
speech-acts.
99
 As Emmers explains, securitization theory guides us to the construction of 
security conceptualization where threats can occur in many different areas.
100
 Therefore, 
the CS securitization theory would be useful to explain the social construction of armed 
robbery against ships and maritime terrorism as security threats. This theoretical approach 
however, offers no explanatory purchase to examine why Indonesia chose to join some 
cooperation arrangements but opt out of others similar agreements. 
 
There is no reference made to the English School (ES) literature in the existing works on 
Indonesia’s maritime cooperation. The ES theorists develop a new frame of reference that 
recognizes the presence of the elements of international system, international society and 
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world society in international politics.
101
 Bull defines the international system as a system 
composed of two or more states who are linked by contact and interaction between them, 
and their interactions have a significant effect towards each other’s decision.102 A society 
of states (or international society) exists when a group of independent political 
communities perceive themselves to be bound by a common rules and common 
institution.
103
 The ES theory is most useful in explaining change from a society of states to 
a world society of individuals. World society here refers to a political system where states 
are not the main actors in international relations, political activities are mainly centred 
upon individuals and normative progress is defined in universal terms.
104
 The ES explains 
how change occurs, the normative desirability of such change and the normative agenda 
inherent within it.
105
 Similar to the way an international system comes into being as states 
develop significant interactions and they accept one another’s presence, change to world 
society emerges “when established mechanisms and institutions of international society 
have to take into account processes, institutions and normative critiques rooted in global 
practices and conceptualizations.”106 The ES is useful in explaining the interface between 
international society and world society, particularly the debate about humanitarian 
intervention. Notions like humanitarian intervention and cosmopolitan ethics link to 
“debates about sources of changes that may lead to world society.”107 They propose 
institutions and ideals that are incompatible with the notion of international society and its 
basic assumption on the existence of sovereign states.
108
  
 
Despite the ES strength in explaining changes in international relations, this theory does 
not provide a useful explanation to explain why a middle power state chooses to join some 
cooperation agreements but refuse others. This is for three reasons. First, causation is not 
the centrepiece of the ES theory.
109
 To quote Buzan, “the main thrust of the English 
School’s work has been to uncover the nature and function of international societies, and to 
trace their history and development.”110 The ES explains the nature of change and 
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transformation in society of states particularly well.
111
 However, major ES scholars do not 
present their work in causal form.
112
 Finnemore argues that “most ES work does not fit 
well into the independent/dependent variable language” nor does it make causal 
arguments.
113
 Bull’s anarchical society, for instance, explains various institutions within 
international system including balance of power, diplomacy, international law and war 
without explaining causal connections between them.
114
 Second, the ES explanation of 
rules, institutions and standards of civilization is essentially Eurocentric.
115
 Although 
current ES scholars have sought to break the Eurocentric limitations of this approach, most 
of their works focuses on major power relations, particularly between China and the United 
States. They offer no explanation on the reasons underpinning emerging middle power 
participation in international cooperation. Third and finally, due to its focus on 
international society the ES has overlooked a range of important questions about “state, 
community, nation that could never be satisfactorily addressed solely from the perspective 
of the society of states.”116 One of the fundamental questions that has been largely ignored 
by the ES is why an aspiring middle power participates or not in cooperation arrangements.   
 
In conclusion there are five plausible explanations offer by constructivism, neorealism, 
neoliberalism and the bureaucratic politics approach.  
 First, following the constructivist argument on collective identities Indonesia would 
be more likely to cooperate with other ASEAN states.  
 Second, in line with the neorealist argument on the importance of relative gains 
consideration Indonesia would likely refuse to cooperate with its near-peer(s) and 
agree to cooperate with larger and smaller states.  
 Third, according to the neoliberal claim on the role of absolute gains calculation 
Indonesia would only join a cooperation arrangement where the benefits of 
cooperation outweigh the costs.  
 Fourth, the neorealist and neoliberal idea of hegemonic leadership implies that the 
presence of a hegemon would increase the likelihood that Indonesia would 
cooperate.  
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 Finally, the bureaucratic politics approach suggests that Indonesia is most likely to 
cooperate when the arrangement benefits key government actors. 
 
 
1.4 Analytical Framework 
This thesis examines Indonesia’s participation in maritime security cooperation; the 
dependent variable. It does so by considering all arrangements dealing with maritime 
terrorism and armed robbery against ships both formal and informal arrangements. 
Cooperation in formal arrangements is determined from the signing of an agreement. 
Cooperation in informal arrangement is established from the implementation of 
cooperation programmes or activities. Cooperation materializes when Indonesia joins a 
cooperation initiative and non-cooperation takes place when Indonesia refuses to join a 
cooperation initiative.  
 
This thesis tests the explanations suggested by the literature including the calculation of the 
overall costs and benefits of cooperation, the relative gains calculation, shared identity, 
hegemonic leadership and government actors’ preferences to assess the reasons 
underpinning Indonesia’s participation in international maritime security cooperation. 
 
As the role of the absolute gains calculation is important for neoliberal theory, this thesis 
treats the consideration of overall costs and benefits as a possible explanation of 
Indonesia’s participation in maritime cooperation. The term benefit in this thesis is defined 
as the net advantage obtained by a participant from cooperation.
117
 As extensively 
explained in the literature on maritime security, some benefits gained from cooperation 
arrangements contribute directly to Indonesia’s counter maritime terrorism and sea robbery 
efforts. These benefits include burden sharing with neighbouring countries to secure 
important sea lanes, opportunities to gain maritime capacity building training and new 
equipment from others cooperation partners.
118
 The existing literature also acknowledges 
the existence of some side benefits, such as developing undeveloped border areas, 
facilitating negotiation of other treaties and developing the country’s military industry.119 
The benefits of cooperation are categorized as high or low. High benefits emerge when the 
incentives of cooperation are tangible/concrete and are not available elsewhere. In contrast, 
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low benefits occur when there are no identifiable benefits or if the benefits of cooperation 
are available elsewhere.  
 
As argued by some IR scholars the costs of cooperation are constituted by the sovereignty 
and implementation costs.
120
 The sovereignty costs are symbolic and material costs that are 
associated with the lessening of national autonomy.
121
 In assessing sovereignty costs this 
thesis groups sovereignty costs into two categories: high and low. Under the condition of 
high sovereignty costs states have to accept external authority over significant decisions 
making or in more extreme conditions external authority interference in the relations 
between state and its citizens or territory.
122
 The cooperation agreement may explicitly or 
implicitly insert international actor to participate in national decision procedures or may 
require states to change domestic legislation and structure of governance.
123
 In this regard, 
in assessing sovereignty costs the degree of costs are considered high if the cooperation 
agreement explicitly limits state rights to govern its territory, delegates authority to settle 
disputes to an international tribunal or places a third party to monitor Indonesia’s 
compliance to a cooperation arrangement. Under the condition of low sovereignty costs 
Indonesia is not required to make significant legal and governance changes at domestic 
level or accept external authority in its decision making process.
124
  
 
The second component of costs that need to be considered is the implementation costs. 
This type of cost is incurred in “the process of putting international commitments into 
practice: the passage of legislation, creation of institutions (both domestic and 
international) and enforcement of rules.”125 Accordingly, implementation costs are 
measured into two categories: high and low. High implementation costs occur when 
Indonesia needs to carry out extensive policy changes, create new legislation and 
institutions at domestic level and therefore, exhausts economic resources to meet 
cooperation requirements. Low implementation costs takes place under a circumstance 
where an international commitment is already compatible with Indonesia’s current 
practice. Thus, adjustment is “unnecessary and compliance is automatic.”126 
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This thesis also treats the neorealist argument regarding the role of relative gains concerns 
as a plausible explanation for variation in Indonesia’s participation in cooperation 
arrangements.  In assessing relative gains concerns this thesis looks at Indonesia and its 
cooperation partners’ position in the power spectrum.127 Indonesia’s cooperation partners 
will be categorized into three categories: larger, near-peer and smaller states. Following 
convention, this thesis uses military spending as a proxy for power.
128
 (see Table 1.2).  
 
Table 1.2 Category of Cooperation Partners Based on Comparison of Defence 
Expenditure 
Larger States Near-Peer States Smaller States 
United States Singapore the Philippines 
China Malaysia Brunei 
Japan Thailand Cambodia 
India  Lao 
South Korea   
Australia   
Source: Military Balance (2013: 548-554) 
 
Note: 
1. Larger states are countries that in the world’s top 15 defence budgets in 2012. The 
defence budgets of these states are at least 300% higher than Indonesia’s defence budget. 
2. Near-Peer states are countries with defence’s budget that deviate by either plus or minus 
50% of Indonesia’s total defence budget. 
3. Smaller states are countries that defence’s budget deviates by more than minus 50% of 
Indonesia’s total defence budget. 
 
In order to incorporate the constructivist argument on the reason affecting state’s 
willingness to cooperate this thesis considers ASEAN membership as a proxy for the 
independent variable of shared identity.  
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In line with the existing literature,
129
 this thesis assesses hegemonic leadership by whether 
the U.S. advanced and promoted cooperation initiatives; was willing to bear enforcement 
costs; or provided incentives such as providing training and equipment to encourage 
participation.
130
 Hegemonic leadership is considered high when the U.S. proposes and 
promotes a maritime security initiative, bears the enforcement costs and/or offers selective 
benefits. Low hegemonic leadership takes place when the U.S. does not carry out much 
action in a cooperation initiative that involves it.  
 
The final point to consider is governmental actors’ preferences. As explained earlier the 
assessment of government actors’ preferences is based on the literature on Indonesia’s 
bureaucratic politics which highlights the importance of leading governmental actors in 
informing Indonesia’s decision.131 Governmental actors’ preferences are clustered into two 
different categories: first, “in favour,” and second, “not in favour.” The first category, “in 
favour” means that the government actors leading the negotiation at the international level 
and deliberations at national level stated their support for the cooperation initiative and 
carried out programmes to promote Indonesia’s participation in it. The second category, 
“not in favour,” means that the government actors that are assigned with principal tasks as 
leading agencies stated their opposition to Indonesia’s participation in a cooperation 
initiative. 
 
There is variation across all of the independent variables and the dependent variable across 
the range of cases. This enables me to identify absolute gains as the key consideration and 
to rule out the causal significance of the other plausible explanations. 
 
 
1.5 Research Methods 
My data gathering concentrated on the information I needed to evaluate my variables as I 
have operationalized them. I relied on qualitative and quantitative types of information 
from primary and secondary sources. 
 
As part of my data gathering I conducted two periods of field work to gather both 
quantitative and qualitative data related to Indonesia’s participation in maritime security 
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cooperation. The first field work was carried out in Jakarta, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur 
from June to September 2010. The last field work was in Jakarta and Surabaya from 
August to December 2011. During my field work I carried out 63 interviews. Interviews 
were conducted with ASEAN officials, Indonesian officials, Indonesian NGOs 
representatives, Indonesian industry representatives, third country officials, foreign policy 
and maritime security experts based in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 
representatives of international organizations dealing with armed robbery against ships and 
piracy and third country industry representatives. Interviews with Indonesian officials, 
former officials, and representatives of NGO and industry were carried out in the 
Indonesian language.  
 
I interviewed Indonesian active-duty and retired officials dealing with maritime security 
from the key bureaucratic actors in the field of maritime security: the MFA, the MoD, the 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board, the Navy, the Coordinating Ministry of Political, 
Legal and Security Affairs, the National Development Planning Agency, the Marine 
Police, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Trade and Customs. I identified officials in 
these institutions from their writings, newspaper articles, discussions with other 
interviewees, and consultations with lecturers at the Department of International Relations, 
Universitas Indonesia, who facilitated my fieldwork in Indonesia. I tried to interview 
representatives from the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, Jakarta and the Southeast 
Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur but could not gain access. I 
managed to get one reply from one of the representative of the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce but he was unable to allocate his time during my visit to Jakarta. In regards to 
the Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism they were unable to speak with me because of 
concerns over security and confidentiality. During both periods in the field in-depth 
interviews were conducted to seek the views of public and private stakeholders involved in 
counter maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships control. Interviews used a 
semi structured interview method where a combination of general and more specific 
questions related to interviewees’ area of expertise in maritime cooperation was used.  
 
This thesis also uses the texts of agreements, Indonesian government documents, official 
speeches, and company reports. Some of these materials are only available in Indonesian 
language. This thesis draws on over 220 primary documents. The government documents 
used include transcripts of official speeches, annual ministry accountability reports, 
defence white papers, draft legislation, meetings reports, inter-ministerial correspondence, 
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national and regional development blueprints, transcripts of parliamentary meetings, and 
notes and guidelines published by government ministries.  I also used statistics on defence 
expenditure, trade, maritime transportation and armed robbery against ships published by 
the Indonesian government and by international organizations including UN bodies and the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Some of these documents can be accessed online, 
while others are available from the Indonesian MFA and the Coordinating Ministry of 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs libraries in Jakarta. For documents that are not made 
available publicly this thesis has benefited from the generosity of some of my interviewees 
who granted me access. Due to the sensitivity of some cooperation texts I did not manage 
to gain access to the texts of two coordinated patrol agreements between Indonesia-
Singapore and Indonesia-Malaysia, and the two defence arrangements with Australia. 
Therefore, analyses of these agreements are based on interview results, articles written by 
government officials and newspaper articles. Claims that officials and industry 
representatives made were corroborated by the documentary record.  
 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis  
The next chapter emphasizes the main question of this thesis and provides detailed 
background for the chapters that follow. It establishes the importance of Indonesia in 
maritime security and describes Indonesia’s unilateral policies, including the allocation of 
resources, to address maritime terrorism and sea robbery. It also details the various 
maritime threats faced by Indonesia to contextualize maritime terrorism and armed robbery 
against ships against wider issues that Indonesia faces.  
 
Chapter three explains Indonesia’s participation in cooperation initiatives to address 
maritime terrorism. This chapter aims to explain Indonesia’s efforts to address maritime 
terrorism in detail. By discussing all available cooperation channels for Indonesia, this 
chapter provides evidence of Indonesia’s willingness to cooperate in counter maritime 
terrorism initiatives. This chapter argues that Indonesia’s decision to join cooperation 
arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism was consistent with the neoliberal account 
of the calculation of absolute gains. This chapter highlights that the neorealist relative 
gains consideration cannot explain Indonesia’s participation in cooperation arrangements. 
Indonesia was willing to cooperate not only with larger and smaller states but also with its 
near-peers. It highlights that the constructivist argument on shared identity cannot account 
for Indonesia’s participation in maritime arrangements. Indonesia cooperates with ASEAN 
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member and non-ASEAN members. It also shows that bureaucratic politics analysis does 
not offer an alternative explanation, as Indonesia’s governmental actors’ preferences were 
not informed by self-interest. Rather, their preferences were consistent with the calculation 
of costs and benefits. This chapter demonstrates that Indonesia participated in bilateral, sub 
regional and regional counter maritime terrorism cooperation because the benefits of all 
these initiatives outweighed the costs to join.  
 
Chapter four focuses on the instances of cooperation on maritime terrorism in which 
Indonesia chose not to participate including the SUA Convention, the PSI and the CSI. 
This chapter argues that Indonesia chose not to participate because the costs outweighed 
the benefits. The neorealist relative gains consideration cannot account for Indonesia’s 
non-participation in these U.S. led initiatives. In contrast to the neorealist expectation for 
Indonesia to cooperate with the U.S. as a “larger state” Indonesia chose not to join these 
arrangements. Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the SUA Convention, the PSI and the CSI 
conforms to the constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity only insofar 
as the U.S. as the leading state and the majority of participating states in these three 
initiatives are non-ASEAN states. However, as explained in Chapter Three, since 
Indonesia also agreed to cooperate with non-ASEAN states (for instance in the case of the 
WCO SAFE Framework) shared identity cannot offer a useful explanation across cases. 
The chapter highlights that U.S. leadership was not enough to change Indonesia’s 
calculation of gains sufficiently for it to cooperate. The chapter also suggest that, in 
contrast to bureaucratic politics theory, Indonesian governmental actors’ preferences were 
not informed by the benefits for their own agencies but instead by the consideration of 
costs and benefits for the entire nation.   
 
Chapter five provides a detailed discussion of Indonesia’s participation in maritime 
cooperation to address armed robbery against ships. It explains not only Indonesia’s 
enthusiasm to participate in these various cooperation channels but also Indonesia’s role as 
a leading actor in initiating and convening various initiatives. The objective of this chapter 
is to provide a comprehensive explanation of alternative avenues for cooperation that 
Indonesia has embarked upon to address sea robbery. It also accounts for substantial 
resources that Indonesia has invested in this cooperation. In doing so this chapter 
challenges the scholarly argument which points to Indonesia’s hostility to anti-sea robbery 
cooperation and Indonesia’s lack of seriousness in dealing with the issue. This chapter 
highlights that Indonesia’s participation in cooperation arrangements was in line with the 
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neoliberal argument on the absolute gains consideration. The presence of substantial 
incentives across most initiatives helps to explain Indonesia’s keenness to join 
arrangements dealing with sea robbery discussed in this chapter. In contrast, the neorealist 
argument on relative gains calculation cannot explain Indonesia’s participation in counter 
sea robbery cooperation. Indonesia cooperated with both larger and smaller states as well 
as near-peer states. This chapter shows that Indonesia’s participation in cooperation 
initiatives dealing with armed robbery against ships cannot advance the constructivist 
argument on the role of shared identity in influencing states’ willingness to cooperate. 
Indonesia joined cooperation arrangements that exclusively involved ASEAN members 
and those that included non-ASEAN states. The evidence presented in this chapter also 
shows that Indonesian governmental actors’ preferences were not informed by self-
interests. Contrary to the bureaucratic politics theory that emphasizes on the “pulling and 
hauling” among self-interested actors, Indonesian governmental actors’ preferences were 
informed primarily by the calculation of costs and benefits for the entire nation.   
 
Chapter six deals with arrangements to counter armed robbery against ships that Indonesia 
refused to participate. The discussion focuses on Indonesia’s rejection to join the defence 
agreement with Singapore, the ReCAAP and the RMSI. This chapter examines the same 
five variables as discussed in the previous chapters informing Indonesia’s decision to join 
or not to join a cooperation arrangement. It argues that Indonesia’s non-cooperation across 
the three cases was in harmony with the neoliberal conception of the calculation of 
aggregate costs and benefits. The evidence shows that Indonesia’s decision not to 
participate in the three arrangements dealing with sea robbery corresponds with the 
absolute gains consideration across cases. Indonesia did not cooperate in either the defence 
agreement with Singapore, the ReCAAP or the RMSI because the aggregate incentives to 
cooperate were low. This chapter points out that the neorealist argument on the role of 
relative gains in affecting cooperation is unable to explain Indonesia’s rejection of these 
three arrangements. Indonesia refused to cooperate both with larger states - including 
Japan and the U.S. in the context of the ReCAAP and the RMSI - and its near-peer in the 
case of the defence agreement with Singapore. The findings presented in this chapter point 
out that the constructivist argument on shared identity cannot explain Indonesia’s refusal to 
join all three agreements. Indonesia chose not to join a cooperation arrangement involving 
only another ASEAN member state as well as those which involved extra-regional states. 
This chapter shows that hegemonic leadership cannot explain Indonesia’s non-participation 
in counter sea robbery initiatives. Although the U.S. designed, initiated and agreed to bear 
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the costs of the RMSI, Indonesia refused to cooperate. The analysis of Indonesia’s 
bureaucratic politics in this chapter also shows that competing governmental actors’ 
preferences did not inform Indonesia’s policy decision. Governmental actors’ preferences 
were primarily shaped by the costs and benefits calculation for country as a whole.  
 
Chapter seven brings together the threads of argument and main findings presented in the 
core chapters. This chapter reiterates the place this research has in the current literature and 
its contribution both to the IR literature on cooperation and the middle power literature. It 
then proceeds with a section for identification of areas for future research. This section 
explains both the contribution of this thesis to the IR discipline, maritime security and 
Indonesian studies. 
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Chapter 2. Indonesia and Maritime Security Threats 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As explained in Chapter One the most important question to pose in this thesis is why, 
despite its keenness to address maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships through 
national efforts and participation in some international cooperation arrangements, 
Indonesia is reluctant to partake in some others. This chapter presents empirical data 
regarding the importance of maritime security for Indonesia and the nature of maritime 
terrorism and armed robbery against ships threats. This chapter also emphasizes the 
underlying puzzle of this thesis and provides detailed background for the chapters which 
follow.  
 
It sets out to meet three objectives. First, this chapter establishes the importance of 
Indonesia to maritime security and the importance of maritime security for Indonesia. It 
establishes the significance of potential maritime terrorism and armed robbery against 
ships issues both for Indonesia and the world.  
 
Second, it explains how both Indonesia and the international maritime community view 
maritime security threats, focusing in particular on the two areas which are the focus of the 
thesis: maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships. It identifies how Indonesia 
prioritizes its security threats and notes that Indonesia’s prioritization differs from that of 
the international community. It contextualizes maritime terrorism and armed robbery 
against ships against wider issues that Indonesia faces as well as the development of 
maritime security after 9/11. This discussion of Indonesia’s perception of threat and its 
security priority will provide the basis for analyzing Indonesia’s participation in maritime 
security cooperation which will serve as a focus in the following chapters. 
 
Third, this chapter maps changes in Indonesia’s response and the engagement of the 
international community in dealing with potential maritime terrorism and sea robbery. 
There are two key changes, first, throughout the time Indonesia has adopted more rigorous 
measures and displayed a more flexible approach in cross-border pursuit of criminals. This 
chapter shows that at national level Indonesia takes the problem seriously and allocates 
resources to deal with both maritime terrorism and sea robbery. Second, in regards to the 
response of the international community, despite a general acknowledgment of the threat 
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of armed robbery and the potential of maritime terrorist attack prior to 9/11 there had been 
limited concerted international cooperation to address the two issues. Most maritime 
security cooperation initiatives were launched a few years after 9/11.   
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section two explains the importance of Indonesia for 
international maritime security. Section three discusses two maritime security issues, 
maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships, which the international community 
focuses on and which are ultimately are the focus of maritime security cooperation. It 
explains the trends of maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships. The term trends 
used in this chapter refers to patterns and changes in maritime terrorism and sea robbery 
incidents. This section also examines the changes in the Indonesian policy and the way the 
international community engages with these two issues overtime. Section four maps a 
number of other maritime issues that take place in Indonesian waters. It analyzes 
Indonesia’s perception of each security issue and compares it with Indonesia’s perception 
of threat posed by maritime terrorism and sea robbery. The concluding section highlights 
key points to take away from this chapter. It points out that the development of maritime 
security cooperation does not coincide with Indonesian concerns over maritime terrorism 
and sea robbery. The concluding section also draws attention to Indonesia’s national 
efforts to deal with maritime terrorism and sea robbery. 
 
 
2.2 The Importance of Indonesia in Maritime Security 
Indonesia has always been important in international maritime security. Almost half of the 
world’s trading goods and oil supply pass through key Indonesian straits including the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Strait of Sunda and the Strait of Lombok.
132
 This 
largest archipelago state in the world which comprises of 17,480 islands, with a maritime 
territory measuring close to 6 million square kilometers, is located between the two key 
shipping routes of the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and between two continents, Asia and 
Australia.
133
 It also sits at the crossroads of busy maritime traffic between Europe and the 
Far East, between Australia and Asia, and between the Persian Gulf and Japan.
134
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Three major sea-lanes in Southeast Asia overlap with Indonesia’s maritime jurisdiction.135 
These are the archipelagic sea-lanes I, II and III (see Figure 2.1 below). Archipelagic sea-
lane I facilitates navigation from the Indian ocean through the Sunda Strait to Natuna Sea 
and eventually reaches the South China Sea.
136
 Archipelagic sea-lane II assists the flow of 
maritime transport from the Indian ocean through the Lombok Strait to the Makassar Strait 
and then finally to the Sulawesi Sea and the Pacific Ocean and Philippine waterway.
137
 
Finally, sea-lane III links the Timor Sea and Arafuru Sea to the Pacific Ocean through the 
Sawu Sea, the Banda Sea, the Seram Sea and the Moluccas Sea.
138
  
 
The region’s major sea-lanes are centred on key straits such as the Malacca, the Singapore 
and the Lombok Straits.
139
 Of these three straits the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the 
most important trading route. The majority of Middle-East oil exports to Asia and most 
commerce between Asia and Europe pass through this 610 mile long strait.
140
 At least 600 
ships navigate through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore every day.
141
 This includes 72 
per cent of super-tankers and other vessels plying between the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
making these Straits the busiest Sea-Lane of Communication globally.
142
 Most of the 
imported oil for Asia-Pacific countries, including around 80 per cent of Japan’s and 
China’s imported oil originating from the Persian Gulf transits through the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore.
143
 This is because this sea-lane is the shortest sea route between 
the Middle East and Asia.
144
 Currently, 45 per cent of the world’s annual merchant fleet 
tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Sunda Strait and the 
Lombok Strait.
145
 The total value of goods transported via these waters reaches US$ 1.3 
trillion annually.
146
 Indonesian waters also serve as an important sea-lane of oil trade. Half 
of the world’s oil navigates through Indonesian waterways.147 The significance of 
Indonesia’s sea-lanes was clear in July 2007 when the supply of tankers decreased on all 
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major shipping routes because of limited cargo availability the Indonesia-Far East route did 
not experience any decline.
148
  
 
Figure 2.1 
Map of Indonesia 
 
Source: J.G. Butcher. (2009). “Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda 
Declaration of 1957 and the Struggle to Gain International Recognition of the 
Archipelagic Principle,” in Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an 
Archipelagic State. Cribb, Robert & Ford Michele (eds).  Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, p. 29 
 
As the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Lombok and the Strait of Sunda overlap with 
Indonesia’s maritime jurisdiction, Indonesia has great importance in securing these 
maritime passages. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) the responsibilities for security and safety of navigation lie within the purview 
of Indonesia as a coastal state.
149
 The UNCLOS Part III Article 34 (1) provides a legal 
basis for sovereignty and jurisdiction of the coastal states bordering straits used for 
international navigation.  This article states as follow:    
The regime of passage through straits used for international 
navigation established in this Part shall not in other respects 
affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or 
the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their 
sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air 
space, bed and subsoil.
150
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Indonesia’s status as coastal state not only implies Indonesia’s responsibility to secure its 
waterway but also suggests international community expectation for Indonesia to take up 
the responsibility seriously. 
 
Indonesia’s importance in maritime security also lies in its role as a flag state. Indonesia is 
amongst the 35 flags of registration with the largest registered deadweight tonnage.
151
 
Indonesia’s position as one of the largest states of registration or flag state indicates three 
important points. First, Indonesia’s status as flag state provides legal and diplomatic 
leverage for this archipelagic state since the flag state has pre-dominant, or even exclusive, 
jurisdiction over all vessels flying its flag on the high seas.
152
 Consequently, the 
international community expects Indonesia to exercise its jurisdiction thoroughly to 
improve maritime security, including for interdiction of suspected vessels in the high seas. 
The UNCLOS Part IX Article 92 stipulates flag state jurisdiction over a vessel flying its 
national flag.
153
  
 
Second, the flag state is also the primary enforcer of international standards.
154
 The flag 
state’s role to ensure ships compliance with international rules at different levels, sub 
regional, regional and global is clearly articulated in the UNCLOS Article 94 on duties of 
the flag state.
155
 As a result Indonesia is a key state in the success of the implementation of 
maritime security initiatives. Third, Indonesia’s position as one of the main flag state in the 
world suggests that there are strong economic interests to participate in maritime security 
cooperation. In addition to a significant proportion of vessels registered under Indonesian 
flag, Indonesian shipowners also have significant control of world merchant fleet. Out of 
the total world merchant fleet of 1.12 billion deadweight tons (dwt) in 2008, shipowners 
from Indonesia control 7.3 million dwt.
156
 This implies the presence of economic interests 
for Indonesian government to address sea robbery and maritime terrorism.  
 
                                                          
151
  UNCTAD (2008:46) 
152
   S. Suchharitkul (2006: 415) 
153
  Article 92 (1) of the UNCLOS1982 states that : Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, 
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be 
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while 
in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry. 
154
   J.E. Vorbach (2001: 34) 
155
  Suchharitkul (2006: 420); Article 94 of the UNCLOS on duties of the flag state 
156
   UNCTAD (2008:44) 
 48 
In conclusion, the importance of Indonesian waterways as routes of global trade and oil, 
and its right and responsibility both as coastal and flag state have established Indonesia as 
a key player in international maritime security. The role that Indonesia plays in 
international maritime security arrangements, therefore, can be seen as a key to the success 
of maritime regulations and significant achievement for the protection of international 
maritime domain.  
 
 
2.3. Maritime Terrorism and Armed Robbery against Ships 
Sea transportation plays a major role in the economic growth and development of 
Indonesia. Most of the state’s domestic (88 per cent) and international trade (90 per cent) 
are transported via waterways.
157
 Nonetheless, the transport of goods by sea is not trouble 
free. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks maritime terrorism and sea robberies have 
received greater worldwide attention and generated a number of international 
arrangements. The increase of armed robbery against ships in Indonesian waters and the 
potential for maritime terrorism in this archipelagic state have become the main concern 
for international businesses and foreign governments as these illicit activities posed 
dangers to the safety and security of navigation. These two issues became the focus of this 
thesis because of the amount of attention given by the international community and the 
various maritime security initiatives developed to counter potential maritime terrorism 
attacks and armed robbery against ships incidents. This section will elaborate the definition 
of maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships, Indonesia’s response and 
perception on maritime terrorism and sea robbery issues, and the discrepancy between 
Indonesia and other international maritime stakeholders in viewing these two issues.  
 
 
2.3.1 Maritime Terrorism  
Maritime terrorism is a recently developed concept.
158
 A common legal definition of 
maritime terrorism does not yet exist.
159
 Despite the absence of an agreed definition, 
Tiribelli defines maritime terrorism as “the systematic use or threat to use acts of violence 
against international shipping and maritime services by an individual or group to induce 
fear and intimidation on a civilian population in order to achieve political ambitions or 
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objectives.”160 The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) at their 
working group on maritime cooperation in 2002 has provided another broad definition of 
maritime terrorism as follow: 
the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the 
maritime environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed 
platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their 
passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or 
settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port 
towns or cities.
 161
  
 
Both definition of maritime terrorism explicitly points to the use of violence that can take 
place in vessels, ports and coastal facilities to serve the perpetrators political objectives.
162
 
 
 
2.3.1.1. The Trends of Maritime Terrorism 
The first incident which generated international attention on the danger posed by maritime 
terrorism occurred in 1985. Four Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Italian flag cruise ship 
Achille Lauro with 454 passengers in Egyptian territorial waters.
163
  The terrorists initially 
had planned to attack the Israeli port of Ashdod but later decided to change their plan when 
a crew member discovered them.
164
 They demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners 
detained by the Israeli government.
165
 The terrorists killed one American passenger in this 
incident before surrendering to the Egyptian authorities.
166
 Fifteen years later, in October 
12
th
, 2000 an attack on the USS Cole brought maritime terrorism back to the world’s 
attention. Two suicide bombers used a small boat to come alongside the Navy warship 
which was calling at the Yemeni port of Aden to refuel and later detonated a high 
explosive bomb killing six and injuring 36 U.S. sailors.
167
 Although these two maritime 
terrorism attacks were widely reported by the media it was only after the 9/11 attacks that 
this issue began to draw international attention.
168
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Although a maritime terrorist attack having never taken place in Indonesian territory, 
terrorism is not a new security issue.
169
 Since the hijacking of the Indonesian airplane 
registered under the Garuda Airline in its flight from Jakarta to Bangkok in 1980, a number 
of terrorist attacks had taken place in Indonesia.
170
 At least 34 bomb attacks had happened 
in Indonesia since the resignation of Suharto in May 1998.
171
 Despite Indonesia’s 
experience of a long history of terrorist incidents, only after 9/11 did governments around 
the world began to highlight the possibility of terrorist attack in Indonesian waters. 
Although in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks international attention focused on 
the security of air transport, however, soon after it began to turn to the vulnerability of port 
facilities and marine transport to terrorist attacks.
172
 The United States (U.S.) began to 
express its concern that “Muslim extremist in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand” as a possible threat to world trade navigating through Southeast Asian 
waterways.
173
  
 
Parallel to this the U.S rapidly embarked on a global campaign against terrorism. 
Identifying and intercepting maritime terrorist threats way before they reach the U.S. 
becomes the goal of the U.S. maritime strategy in the war on terror.
174
 Thus, under this 
extensive global campaign, the U.S. promoted a number of international cooperation 
arrangements to improve the security of maritime transport including the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Each of these 
initiatives will be explained in more detail in Chapter Four. A number of the U.S. led cargo 
security initiatives that require direct government involvement were introduced one to two 
years after 9/11. The CSI was launched in 2002 and the PSI was introduced in 2003. 
Although there was no long delay between 9/11 attacks and the launching of international 
maritime arrangements, nevertheless by the end of 2002, mainly as a response to the 2002 
Bali bombing, Indonesia already had a number of anti terrorism measures in place and they 
started to show positive results.
175
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After the 2002 Bali bombing that killed 202 people Indonesia adopted numerous counter-
terrorism measures at national level to prevent terrorist attacks over its key ports and 
offshore facilities, and to improve the security of its maritime supply chains.
176
 Currently 
there are 141 ports and over 1000 special terminals which mainly serving mining and oil 
drilling companies involve in both domestic and export- import activities.
177
 By May 2003 
as a result of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts, the arrest of the bombing suspects and 
members of the JI (Jamaah Islamiyah) had reached thirty-three people.
178
 By 2008, the anti 
terrorism coordinating body, the Desk Koordinator Pemberantasan Terorisme reported 
that 325 terrorists had been detained, 200 of them had undergone legal process, 5 persons 
had received the death sentence, 85 suspects were freed and one was killed.
179
 At present 
the Indonesian government has arrested 750 terrorist suspects and successfully prosecuted 
500 of them.
180
  
 
As the level of threat posed by terrorism has fallen there has, from the Indonesian 
perspective, been a corresponding fall in the benefits of cooperation. The benefits of 
cooperation for Indonesia are further reduced because although the issue of maritime 
terrorism attracts international attention Indonesia has been struggling to deal with other 
maritime issues. An Indonesian official confirmed this as he characterized the threat of 
terrorism as not the major security threat to Indonesia.
181
 There are four maritime issues 
that sit at the top of national security priorities list.  These issues are highlighted in almost 
every government documents and government official’s statements.182 These are illegal 
fishing, border disputes, illegal seaborne migrants, and smuggling. An Indonesian Navy 
official named maritime terrorism as the fifth most dangerous threat to Indonesia’s 
maritime security, following illegal fishing, illegal migrants, potential border disputes and 
smuggling.
183
 The government officials’ claim over the nature of maritime terrorism is also 
reflected in Indonesian shipowners’ statement. The chairman of Indonesian shipowners 
association suggested that “as long as there are sovereign littoral states surrounding the 
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strategic waterways like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore such incidents would never 
materialize.”184  
 
Adding to the puzzle of this thesis, a number of interviews carried out with international 
shipping lines, international chamber of commerce, international marine insurance and re-
insurance companies corroborated the Indonesian government and businesses perception of 
maritime terrorism. For instance, a chief executive of a Singapore-based international 
chamber of commerce claimed that “regional governments have improved the ability to 
work together. The threat [of maritime terrorism] is real, yet there is the ability of 
government to contain it.”185 This is also confirmed by a senior marine underwriter of an 
international re-insurance company. As he put it: “the littoral states have been active to 
mitigate the threat of maritime terrorism. The threat becomes minimal and at reasonable 
level.”186 The Indonesian government and businesses perception of maritime terrorism as 
elaborated above show that there has been a discrepancy not only between Indonesia and 
the international community but also among various stakeholders within the international 
maritime community. For the shipping lines, shipping operators, insurance and re-
insurance companies, and non-governmental organization that concern with shipping 
issues the risk poses by maritime terrorism is not the highest level risk.
187
  
 
For the shipping businesses the issue related to the safety of navigation is deemed as more 
immediate concern because the risk of collision, grounding, and near misses particularly at 
the shallow and narrow Straits of Malacca and Singapore are higher than potential 
maritime terrorist attacks.
188
 This shows a disjuncture between the perception of maritime 
terrorism within the shipping businesses and the U.S. that puts maritime terrorism high on 
its security agenda.  
 
 
2.3.1.2 Responses to Maritime Terrorism Problem 
Indonesia’s preoccupation with other maritime issues as mentioned above does not suggest 
that Indonesia denies the existence of a maritime terrorism threat or does nothing to 
prevent it. The government has not discounted the possibility of maritime terrorism. A 
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Navy official claimed that although “there is only a small possibility for maritime terrorism 
attacks in Indonesian waters. Nevertheless, Indonesian authorities remain cautious.”189 A 
particular concern is on the security and safety of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the 
world’s busiest sea-lane. Around 60 to 70 per cent of vessels plying through the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore are tankers carrying oil from Middle East to East Asia.
190
 A 
terrorist attack on a tanker navigating through this water would have a devastating impact 
harming Indonesia’s inter-islands and international supply chains. The Indonesian 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board and the Navy have anticipated a number of worst 
scenario maritime terrorism incidents that may take place in Indonesian key waterways.
191
 
These include: sea robbery and hostage taking carried out by terrorist groups to generate 
funding, terrorists hijacking and exploding a super tanker to block the key Strait or to use it 
as a floating bombs to be directed at a nearby port city or sunk at the Strait of Malacca’s 
narrowest part, the destruction of undersea pipelines and communication cables, and the 
spreading of sea mines in Indonesia’s strategic waterways.192  
 
In terms of responses this section highlights two main points: First, Indonesia has shown 
its willingness to address this issue. Second, there has been a disjuncture between the U.S. 
approaches to maritime terrorism and Indonesia’s understanding of threat posed by 
maritime terrorism.  In terms of willingness to take action Indonesia’s policies to address 
maritime terrorism comprise five important aspects: first, the establishment of a new 
security structure and policy; second, the issuance of new legislation; third, the 
institutionalization of counter-terrorism training exercises; fourth, the implementation of 
container security programmes; and finally, the launch of counter-terrorism operation. 
These now will be discussed in more detail. 
 
First, Indonesia’s efforts to improve its counter-terrorism ability can be seen from the 
establishment of new institutions. To deal with terrorism, Jakarta established an Anti-
terrorism Task Force that comprises of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney General’s 
                                                          
189
  Interview IG05 
190
  Dewan Maritim Indonesia (2007c:25) 
191
  B.K. Sondakh (2004:7); Bakorkamla (2004:5); DKPT (2008:11); Bakorkamla (2010: 99) 
192
  Sondakh (2004: 7); Bakorkamla (2004:5); for explanation of a number of worst scenario maritime 
terrorism incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore see also M. Richardson (19 January 2004) and 
United States Energy Information Administration (22 August 2012) 
 54 
Office, the Armed Forces, and the National Intelligence Agency.
193
 The purpose of the task 
force is to coordinate action and information sharing from intelligence units of various 
government institutions. Parallel with the establishment of the Task Force, the government 
strengthened the Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Bakorkamla) to coordinate the 
country’s maritime security policy. The Coordinating Board serves as a focal point to 
coordinate government institutions involved in maritime security including the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Marine and 
Fisheries, the District Attorney, the Armed Forces, the Police and the National Intelligence 
Agency.
194
  
 
Figure 2.2 The Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Board 2005-2011 Budget 
(Percentage of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
Budget) 
 
Source: Adapted from Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas) (2005-2011) 
 
A high government official responsible in determining security budget claimed that there 
has been a significant increase in the government allocation of funding to deal with 
terrorism since 9/11.
195
 As Figure 2.2 shows, the government has allocated substantial 
resources for the development of Bakorkamla from 2005 to 2011. By 2011, the allocation 
of resources for this institution increased by more than 99 per cent.
196
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Second, Indonesia’s response to maritime terrorism can also be traced from the launch of 
new legislation. Following the Bali bombing, Jakarta promulgated a Presidential 
Emergency Decree on the Prevention of Terrorism, and implemented a new anti-terrorism 
law.
197
 Although the legislation does not empower the Indonesian central government to 
the same degree as Singapore’s Internal Security Act, it enables the security personnel to 
detain suspected terrorists for twenty days, which could be extended for another six months 
based on preliminary evidence reported by intelligence services.
198
 In addition, the 
government legislation 1/2002 and 2/2002 on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism deals 
with maritime terrorism related issues including the proliferation of WMD and acts of 
terrorism on Indonesian flagged ship.
199
 The Article 4 of the 2002 anti-terrorism legislation 
empowers the Indonesian central government to detain terrorists that carry out attacks on 
board of ships that fly Indonesian flag.  
 
Responding to the bombing of parliament building on July 14
th
, 2006, the Ministry of 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs issued the Ministry Instruction on Prevention, 
Detection and Prosecution of Acts of Terrorism in Indonesia.
200
 The Ministry Instruction 
highlights two important points. First, it points out to the need to improve the security of 
government premises and public facilities including ports and monitoring of weapons and 
explosive devices. Second, the instruction underlined the importance of cooperation 
between Police, Intelligence agency, Immigration, Customs and local government, 
particularly in Central Java, Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi.
201
 The Ministry 
Instruction highlighted that cooperation between these agencies is deemed crucial as 
terrorists are likely to begin their operation by entering main gateways such as ports.
202
 As 
part of government efforts to safeguard its territory, Indonesia has also introduced the 
Shipping Law Number 17/2008. Article 276 of the shipping law provides a legal basis for 
the establishment of the Sea and Coast Guard. The new agency will assist the Navy in port 
security, naval counter intelligence and coastal patrol and in protecting the country’s 
offshore facilities.
203
 Currently, Indonesia is still in process of establishing its Sea and 
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Coast Guard. The Ministry of Transportation has been assigned with a task to form this 
new institution.
204
 
 
Third, the government has been conducting counter-terrorism training exercises to improve 
government agencies capabilities in responding to terrorism threat. The training exercises 
include intra-agency training and combined exercise. The combined exercise involves a 
number of government agencies including the Marine Police, Navy, Customs, MoT, 
Search and Rescue Unit, and Immigration agency.
205
  
 
Fourth, as part of the government efforts to safeguard its maritime supply chains, Indonesia 
also has introduced container security policies including harmonization of advance 
electronic cargo information and adoption of a risk management approach. First, to achieve 
the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information Indonesia has adopted the 
WCO Data Model for its customs clearance system.
206
 Indonesia’s advance electronic 
information programme requires all ships carrying import goods bound for an Indonesian 
port to provide manifest information 24 hours prior to their arrival.
207
  
 
Second, in terms of employing a risk management approach Indonesia has developed a 
database of importers, exporters, customs brokers, criminal records and transport units.
208
 
Through this database Customs developed a profiling system for shippers, customs brokers 
and forwarders.
209
 The Indonesian Customs simplifies customs’ procedures for economic 
actors that have a good record of compliance with Customs regulations. The risk 
management principles adopted in the inspection of import and export cargo, packages 
delivered through mail service, passengers’ goods, post clearance audit, as well as the 
inspection of ships and other vehicles.
210
 In terms of risk profiling system the government 
issued the Decree of the Director General of Customs and Excise No:P-11/BC/2005 
concerning Priority Line and the Decree of the Director General of Customs and Excise 
NoP-24/BC/2007  concerning MITA (Mitra Utama) to improve the security of maritime 
trade.
211
 The Priority Line and MITA risk profiling systems are determined by the 
                                                          
204
  Interview IG02; Interview IG03; Interview IG13; Indonesian DGST (2010d:1-3) 
205
  Interview IG02; Interview IG05; Interview IG30; Supriyadi (2010:48-49) 
206
  APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs  (2011:19) 
207
  APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs  (2011:27) 
208
  APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs (2011:21) 
209
  APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs (2011:21) 
210
   APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs (2011:20) 
211
  M. Polner (2010:33) 
 57 
shippers’ previous track record, the nature of commodity, the nature of their business and 
the Customs intelligence information.  
 
To complement these risks profiling systems Indonesia also uses non intrusive cargo 
inspection devices including Hi-Co, Gamma and X-Ray scanners in its major international 
ports. Non intrusive devices such as X-Ray scanners have been used in a number of major 
ports before 1990.
212
 In 2009-2010 Indonesia installed more advanced instruments to carry 
out inspection. These include a number of new Gamma Ray and Hi-Co Scan devices. An 
Indonesian official claimed that Indonesia allocates their national budget to purchase this 
equipment.
213
 Indonesia currently has six Gamma Ray devices. These devices are installed 
in three international ports including Tanjung Priok, Tanjung Emas and Tanjung Perak.
214
 
In comparison to other type of scanners, Hi-Co devices provide a more accurate scan 
result. Indonesia purchased four of this item and operated them in Tanjung Priok and 
Tanjung Perak ports. These two ports are Indonesia main international gateways. Tanjung 
Priok port alone is responsible for managing 65 per cent of Indonesia’s export and import 
activities.
215
 The X-Ray devices are used to scan imported cargos. Gamma Ray scanner 
that has higher accuracy in comparison to X-Ray scanner is used in export cargo 
inspection. 
 
Finally, in the operational domain the government also has been undertaking a thorough 
investigation to unravel terrorist activities. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts has been 
low key and largely focused on intelligence operations.
216
 For counter-terrorism operation 
the government has equipped and set up counter-terrorism units from the Armed Forces 
and Police. The specialist counter-terrorism units include Detachment 81 of the Army Elite 
Force, Detachment Jala Mengkara of the Navy, Detachment Bravo Paskhas of the Air 
Force and Detachment 88 of the National Police.
217
 Indonesia has also responded quickly 
to international warnings on possible maritime terrorism attack as exemplified in the 
March 2010 incident. In early March 2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) had 
sent out warnings to Indonesian maritime authorities noting that Islamic extremists in 
Indonesia plan to carry out attacks on two petroleum super tankers and five Very Large 
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Crude Carrier (VLCC) vessels, which pass through the Strait of Malacca.
218
 Responding to 
the IMB warning on the possible terrorist attacks, Indonesia has increased the security and 
step up patrols in that area.
219
 This provides a counter argument to the widespread 
perception that Indonesia has not done enough in the war against terrorism.
220
 
 
The economic costs for the national counter-terrorism initiatives are high. Indonesia has 
allocated substantial resources to support its policies.
221
 An official in charge of the 
country’s foreign and security policy budget claimed that concern over maritime terrorism 
has an impact on state’s allocation of resources.222 She explained: “we do not know 
whether terrorist only use maritime gateways to operate. Nevertheless, we identified that 
there are indication that they are travelling through maritime passages to enter our territory. 
The budget for countering-terrorism is currently on the increase.”223 The costs incurred 
cover the expenses to improve counter-terrorism institutions including the Indonesian 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board and the Anti Terrorism Desk that later become the 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Body (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme), 
enhance the existing institutions, purchase new inspection devices such as X- Ray, Gamma 
Ray and Hi-Co scanning devices, and improve its risk management system through the 
implementation of MITA. The government bears the costs to finance the development of 
these counter-terrorism measures.  
 
Having explained Indonesia’s responses to deal with the threat of maritime terrorism, the 
second key point being made in this sub section emphasizes that Indonesia has different 
concerns and priorities regarding maritime terrorism in comparison to the U.S. After 9/11 
the U.S. maintained its concentration on the alleged link between terrorism, WMD and 
maritime transport security.
224
 A significant concern for the U.S. is the possibility for 
terrorist groups to abuse the vulnerabilities of the maritime trade system to transport WMD 
related materials to the U.S or use a container ship bound to the U.S. as a floating bomb. 
Another concern is over smuggling of WMD to non-state actors which will enable them to 
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use these weapons to launch an attack against the U.S. or its overseas installation.
225
 
Consequently, the US, working both with international organizations and unilaterally, has 
made attempts to establish various measures to prevent the smuggling of WMD materials. 
The U.S. global campaign to secure vulnerable links in the international supply chain by 
way of numerous initiatives such as the CSI and the PSI are mainly designed to halt 
proliferation attempts by terrorist groups or to prevent smuggling of WMD.
226
 In contrast 
to the U.S., Indonesia’s perception of maritime terrorism is more locally focused.227 It does 
not focus on a concern over the possibility of terrorist group smuggling WMD materials to 
acquire more sophisticated weapons capability or to smuggle WMD materials to other 
countries. Instead, Indonesia gives more attention to the potential of collision, grounding or 
blocking of its important maritime passages cause by maritime terrorism. This is validated 
in government documents and a statement made by Ansyaad Mbai, the Head of the Anti 
Terrorism Coordinating Desk, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs.
228
 Ansyaad Mbai stated that due to Indonesia’s vast waters, the state is vulnerable 
to maritime terrorism. He explained “if terrorists managed to hijack a tanker and use the 
tanker into a “floating bomb or turn it over,” the sea-lane will be paralyzed.229  
 
The different perceptions between Indonesia and the U.S. as explained above underline 
different priorities between the two parties in dealing with maritime terrorism. Cooperation 
arrangements to address maritime terrorism mainly focus on preventing the smuggling of 
WMD into the U.S. or their acquisition by terrorist groups. These cooperation 
arrangements’ focus, however, does not coincide with Indonesia’s concern over maritime 
terrorism that mainly emphasizes the possibility of terrorist attack at its strategic maritime 
passages.  
 
In conclusion, the maritime terrorism section draws attention to four main points. First, it 
points out that cooperation arrangements to address maritime terrorism do not correspond 
with Indonesia’s concern over this matter. Key initiatives such as the CSI and the PSI were 
launched by the U.S. in late 2002 and 2003 when Indonesia already had a number of 
counter-terrorism mechanisms in place and these measures had already begun to show 
positive results. This has reduced the benefits for cooperation. More importantly, when the 
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international community started to embark upon these initiatives Indonesia has been facing 
other maritime issues that it deemed as more immediate maritime threats. Second, 
Indonesia has invested its resources to address maritime terrorism issues. This goes some 
way to challenge the widespread perception that Indonesia has been hostile in 
acknowledging and addressing maritime terrorism. Third, there are discrepancies between 
Indonesian and U.S. perceptions of maritime terrorism. Indonesia focuses on the possibility 
of terrorist attack upon its key strategic sea-lanes and ports that can disrupt not only its 
national economy but also the flow of international trade. By contrast, international 
arrangements, particularly those that are led by the U.S. such as the PSI and the CSI focus 
on preventing the smuggling of WMD in ships bound to U.S. This point reinforces the first 
finding that maritime security arrangements do not coincide with Indonesia’s concerns 
over maritime terrorism. Fourth, there is a disjuncture between shipping businesses and the 
U.S perception of maritime terrorism. For the shipping businesses, although they treat 
maritime terrorism as a risk for the shipping industry, it is not their top priority issue. For 
the shipping businesses issues related to the safety of navigation such as concerns of 
grounding and collision pose an immediate threat to their business. In comparison, for the 
U.S. since 9/11 maritime terrorism has become the top maritime concern. 
 
 
2.3.2 Armed Robbery against Ships 
This sub section seeks to map trends in sea robbery incidents, changes in the Indonesian 
and international community’s response to this threat over time and the discrepancy 
between both parties’ perception of threat. The International Maritime Organization Code 
of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(Resolution A. 1025(26)) defines armed robbery against ships as any of the following acts:  
“1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of 
depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, 
committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a 
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial 
sea; 
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described above.” 230 
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The IMO’s definition of armed robbery against ships will be used to define the term armed 
robbery against ships that used interchangeably with the term sea robbery in this thesis.  
 
 
2.3.2.1 The Trends of Armed Robbery against Ships 
The early 1990s was a critical period in the trends of armed robbery against ships incidents 
in Indonesian waters. From 1981 to 1988 the number of piratical incidents in Indonesian 
waters was very low. During this period, with 1982-1983 as exception, no more than a 
dozen incidents a year took place in the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore 
through to the southern part of South China.
231
 This trend changed in the early 1990s as 
armed robbery at sea attacks increased from 1990 to 1992.
232
 The most sea robbery prone 
areas at that point in time were the Philip Channel, the Strait of Malacca and around the 
whole Indonesian Riau archipelago with its main islands of Batam and Bintan.
233
  
 
Indonesia carried out unilateral and bilateral attempts to address this armed robbery surge. 
In 1992 Indonesia established a series of bilateral arrangements with Malaysia and 
Singapore to crack down on the armed robbers in the areas where incidents were 
concentrated.
234
 As can be seen from Figure 2.3 below these attempts successfully reduced 
the number of attacks in 1993 by one fifth that of the previous year. Nevertheless, as seen 
in Figure 2.3 as early as 1994 the statistics on armed robbery in Indonesia showed a 
relatively slow and steady increase of armed robbery incidents. Later, as Figure 2.3 and 2.4 
below show, the twin problems of the Asian 1997 economic crisis and rebel military 
operations in Aceh from 1998 have fuelled a surge of armed robbery attacks in Indonesian 
waters. The Aceh separatist group, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) had been reported 
carrying out maritime robberies in the Strait of Malacca to fund their movement.
235
 At the 
same time Indonesia was facing various issues on the domestic front. In the late 1990s to 
early 2000s the Indonesian government was faced with not only the Aceh separatist 
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movement at the western end of the archipelago but also a number of domestic challenges 
including the Papua separatist movement at its eastern end;
236
 the upsurge of religious 
conflict in Maluku and Poso as well as ethnic violence elsewhere which have left 
thousands of people dead, injured and many others as internally displaced persons. The 
economic crisis had forced the Indonesian defence force to tighten its budget putting 
pressure on an already undermanned, ill-equipped and overstretched force.
237
   
 
Figure 2.3 Armed Robbery Attacks and Attempted Attacks in Indonesian Waters 
(Excluding the Straits of Malacca and Singapore) 1991-2010 
 
Source: ICC-IMB (2001; 2006; 2009; 2010) 
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Figure 2.4 Armed Robbery Attacks and Attempted Attacks in the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore 1991-2010 
 
Source: ICC-IMB (2001; 2006; 2009; 2010) 
 
By 1999 Indonesian waters accounted for more than one third of the reported sea robbery 
incidents in the world. As can be seen from Figure 2.3, in 1999, Indonesian waters 
accounted for 38 per cent of worldwide incidents. A close observation of the increase of 
incidents during this period is interesting because it shows that armed robbery issues had 
been on the rise many years prior to the introduction of maritime cooperation to address 
sea robbery. Two important cooperation initiatives to halt sea robbery, the RMSI and the 
ReCAAP, were launched in 2004 and 2006 only after the problems began to decrease. As 
can be seen from Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 the sea robbery incidents in Indonesian waters 
in general and in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore in particular have begun to decline 
since 2001. This trend showed that cooperation arrangements to address sea robbery do not 
coincide with the increase of armed robbery problems in Indonesia.  
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Figure 2.5 Violence to Crew Worldwide (Assaulted, Injured, Killed, Missing), 1991-
2010 
 
Source: ICC-IMB (2001; 2006; 2009; 2010) 
 
The evidence of increased level of violence used in armed robbery actions during 1996 to 
2000 is even more striking. During the end of the 1990s and 2000 the degree of violence 
inflicted upon ship’s crew during the act of robbery had reached an alarming level. As 
shown in Figure 2.5 from 1996 to 1997 there was a 96% increase in number of crews 
murdered by sea robbers and from 1997 to 1998 there was a 52% rise. Although the 
number of crew killed dropped significantly from 78 crews in 1998 to 3 crews in 1999, 
however, this number increased dramatically in 2000 to 72 seamen killed.
238
 Yet, despite 
the increased level of violence, during this period there were no international cooperation 
initiatives launched to halt sea robbery. There was a lag of several years before the 
introduction of RMSI and ReCAAP in 2004 and 2006. This evidence confirmed the earlier 
finding that maritime security cooperation to address sea robbery do not coincide with the 
increase of armed robbery problems in Indonesia. As explained above, cooperation 
initiatives come only after sea robbery incidents have started to decrease. This 
circumstance reduces the benefits of cooperation for Indonesia. In particular, at the same 
time when the international community began to embark upon international counter sea 
robbery cooperation Indonesia has been facing other security problems. Armed robbery at 
sea is a serious maritime concern for Indonesia. Yet, this issue is not the only problem for 
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Indonesia when it comes to maritime security. As previously explained there are four main 
maritime issues that always appear in every government documents and government 
official’s statements. These are illegal fishing; border disputes, illegal seaborne migrants; 
and smuggling.
239
   
 
Government officials are aware of sea robbery incidents in Indonesian waters but do not 
perceive it as a main threat. Currently, the main concern for sea robbery attack is in 
Palembang, Berhala Strait, the South China Sea, particularly, in the triangle between 
Indonesia’s island of Natuna, Anambas, up to off Tioman and Eastern OPL (Outside Port 
Lines) of Singapore.
240
 The Indonesian waterways surrounding Anambas and Natuna are 
gateways for ships to enter and exit the Malacca Straits.
241
 The waterways near Anambas 
and Natuna are situated in one of the most important Sea-Lane of Communication 
connecting the South China Sea via Indonesia’s territory of the Karimata Straits, the Java 
Sea, and the Sunda Straits to the Indian Ocean (see Figure 2.6).
242
 
 
Figure 2.6 Map of the Strait of Malacca 
 
Source: Adapted from http://saripedia.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/malaysia.jpg?w=570. Last 
accessed 15 May 2014 
A indicates the waters near Anambas Island. 
B indicates the waters near Natuna Island.   
C indicates the Strait of Malacca. 
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Although the Indonesian government acknowledges the threat of sea robberies in the 
archipelagic waters the issue is no longer a primary security concern. This is due to the 
decline in the number of sea robbery attacks in the Indonesian waterways, including the 
Strait of Malacca and Singapore. According to an official from the Indonesian Navy the 
issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea has declined significantly. He suggested, “even in 
2009 there was no armed robbery against ships incident, and so far there is no incident 
reported in 2010,”243  although, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre noted 15 incidents had 
taken place in Indonesian waters in 2009 and 16 incidents from January to June 2010 
alone.
244
 In addition, businesses in Indonesia do not deem sea robbery a serious concern. A 
representative of the Indonesian National Shipowners’ Association described the Strait of 
Malacca and Singapore as a “safe waterway” because the number of piratical incidents has 
dropped significantly. To quote him: “Most of the incidents only take the form of petty 
thefts. The armed robbers in these cases do not seize the ship for ransom.”245  
 
The peace process between the Indonesian government and the Aceh separatist movement 
(GAM), in particular after the 26 December 2004 tsunami further contributed to the 
decreasing number of armed robbery attacks in the Strait of Malacca. The 2004 tsunami 
brought a tremendous devastation to Aceh province. It was reported that 166,080 people 
were killed in Aceh and 617,159 Acehnese became internally displaced persons.
246
 Under 
this circumstance the Indonesian government and GAM opted to restart peace negotiations 
in May 2005 to enable Aceh’s reconstruction efforts.247 Successful peace talks between the 
two parties have put an end to the separatist group’ armed robbery activities in the Strait of 
Malacca.
248
 As a representative of the Indonesian shipowners association put it: 
In the past, seizure of freight ships in the Straits are often 
linked with GAM supporters... the successful peace 
settlement between the Indonesian government and GAM 
has significantly reduced the seizures against ships in the 
Straits.
249
  
 
Moreover, there is a widespread perception among government officials that Indonesia has 
performed sufficient cooperation and commitment to combat sea robbery. Government 
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officials perceive that Indonesia’s national measures and cooperation with other littoral 
states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have managed to secure the waterways. As 
the Indonesian Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono put it, “Indonesia believes that it is 
under no pressure to ratify [any agreement to counter sea robbery]. Currently Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore undertake coordinated patrols to secure the Malacca Strait.”250 
The chairman of Indonesian National Shipowners Association (INSA) echoed this stance. 
He claimed that armed robbery against ships is no longer a main threat, the security of 
waterways has improved after the littoral states carried out coordinated patrols.
251
 
 
Nevertheless, over time there has been a disjuncture between Indonesia’s perception of 
threat and the way the international community perceives sea robbery threat. The 9/11 
attacks have driven the maritime sector to re-evaluate its vulnerability against the 
probability of attacks or other forms of sabotage. The 9/11 attacks have raised the profile 
of armed robbery against ships. As can be seen in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, in 2005 armed 
robbery activities in Indonesian waters and the key Straits of Malacca and Singapore were 
already declining. Nevertheless, in 2005, the London-based Lloyd's Market Association's 
Joint War Committee (JWC) declared the Strait of Malacca as a war risk zone, together 
with Iraq, Lebanon and Nigeria despite the incidents of sea robbery in the Strait of Malacca 
showing a declining trend.
252
 This point is confirmed in an interview with a Singapore 
local shipowner that actively involved in protesting and lobbying the JWC to remove the 
Strait of Malacca from the war risk list. He pointed out the JWC decision as a unilateral 
decision. According to the shipowner when the JWC made the announcement the sea 
robbery incidents in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore had already “calmed down,” since 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore had taken action to combat armed robbery at sea.
253
 
Sustain efforts to secure the Straits and protests from the Indonesian, Singaporean and 
Malaysian governments and their shipping associations against Lloyd’s JWC finally 
resulted in the removal of the Strait of Malacca from its list of war and related perils areas 
in 2006.
254
  
 
The removal of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore from the JWC list can be seen as an 
external validation to Indonesia assessment of the problem. Although the Indonesian 
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government officials claim armed robbery against ships is no longer a problem for 
Indonesia and the JWC decision to remove the Strait of Malacca and Singapore validates 
Indonesia’s perception, sea robbery in Indonesian waters has continued to be of 
international concern. Even though the IMB statistics of piratical incidents from 2005 to 
the present time show a dramatic decrease in the number of incidents in Indonesia’s 
waterways, the international community still concern over a sustained spate of armed 
robbery against ships continues to take place in its territorial waters, in particular in the 
Strait of Malacca and Singapore and tri-border areas (bordered by Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippine) in the Sulawesi sea.
255
  Non-governmental organizations that have concern 
over the security and safety of navigation, scholars, international shipping lines 
government officials and media point out to the increased levels of violence and degrees of 
sophistication, taking into account “faster and more military-type craft and weapons,” even 
though as Figure 2.5  showed, the use of violence from 2001 onwards has begun to show a 
significant decline in comparison to the use of violence employed in armed robbery against 
ships in 1998 to 2000.
256
  
 
 
2.3.2.2 The Responses to Armed Robbery against Ships 
There are three key points that will be highlighted in this section. First, Indonesia is willing 
to take action to address armed robbery against ships. Second, Indonesia is not hostile to 
cooperation. In dealing with armed robbery at sea issues Indonesia carries out national 
efforts and shows its willingness to cooperate with neighbouring countries and user states. 
Indonesia’s willingness to cooperate debunks the arguments put forward by scholars which 
claim Indonesia is less interested in cooperation.
257
 Third, there has been a significant 
change of the international community response to sea robbery. Prior to 9/11 Japan was the 
only user state actively seeking for greater involvement to address armed robbery against 
ships in Southeast Asia.  
 
First, in terms of Indonesian commitments to halting sea robbery the reduction of armed 
robbery against ships incidents and the level of violence used in the attacks can be 
attributed to increased national security measures and cooperation between Indonesia and 
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its neighbouring states to patrol key waterways. At national level, responding to the first 
surge of sea robbery in 1990-1992, the Indonesian Navy infiltrated a number of local sea 
robber communities which successfully resulted in arrests throughout 1992. The operation 
resulted in the arrest of 86 to 133 suspects in May, June and July 1992.
258
 During the 
second surge of armed robberies from 1996 to early 2001 propagated by the 1997 financial 
turmoil and military operations in Aceh Indonesian authorities responded in several ways. 
At national level Indonesia intensified its patrols. The Indonesian Navy dedicated 15 
Special Forces boats to help curb sea robbery around Batam, Bintan and Singapore.
259
 The 
Navy also set up an armed robbery monitoring centre in Batam. The initial intention was to 
register all vessels plying through the Strait of Malacca with the centre.
260
 In order to 
support the Batam command centre in 2000, the Navy developed operational bases and 
supporting facilities in Semampir, Surabaya, Belinyu Bangka and Batam; and built two 
ships.
261
 The Navy also carries out routine maintenance and modification of its Garret 
Nbell-412 helicopters and Propeller Nomad N-22 surveillance aircraft to support its 
maritime patrol.
262
 The details of Indonesia’s national initiatives to deal with sea robbery 
can be seen in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1 Indonesia’s National Initiatives to Address Armed Robbery against Ships 
Initiative Frequency Duration Location Government Agency 
Octopus Operation 
(Operasi Gurita) 
 
Five times a year 30-90 days  The Strait of Malacca and Singapore; eastern part of 
Indonesia and waters surrounding Anambas 
Lead by the Indonesian 
Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board 
and involves the Navy, 
the Marine Police, 
Customs,  the Ministry 
of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries (KKP) and 
the Air force 
Bakorkamla Routine 
Patrol 
Four times a year. Once 
in every three months 
30 days  All Indonesian sea-lanes. The Batam work unit covers 
archipelagic sea-lane I; Manado work unit covers 
archipelagic sea-lane II and Ambon work unit covers 
archipelagic sea-lane III.  
Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board 
Operasi Sepanjang 
Tahun 
Every day  365 days, 24 
hours patrol 
Indonesian waters with particular emphasis in the Strait 
of Malacca 
Navy  
Operasi Kamla Every day 365 days, 24 
hours patrol 
Strait of Malacca Navy; Marine Police, 
Customs, KKP 
Operasi Trisila Once a year 90 days Indonesian waters Navy 
Operasi Satuan Tugas 
Muara Perairan (Satgas 
Mupe) 
 
n/a n/a Waters surrounding Aceh (northern end of the Strait of 
Malacca) 
Navy   
Operasi Satgasla 
Koopslihkam 
 
Bi-annual  180 days The northern end of the Strait of Malacca (from 
Sabang to North of Aceh) 
Navy  
Air Patrol Everyday 365 days Strait of Malacca  Air Force (West 
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Squadron) 
Stand by Air Force  Everyday 365 days  Tanjung Pinang, Belawan and Sabang (near Strait of 
Malacca) 
Air Force (West 
Squadron) 
Search and Rescue Units 
Air Patrol 
n/a n/a Tanjung Pinang, Belawan, Dumai and Mentigi Search and Rescue 
Units 
Deployment of Armed 
Forces at Islands 
Bordering Key 
Waterways 
 
 
Everyday 365 days The designated points of deployment along the Strait 
of Malacca are (1) Sabang; (2) Lhokumawe (which 
covers the waterways of Pidie-Lokhsumawe-
Jamboaye-Tanjung Peureula and Tanjung Tamiang); 
(3) Belawan (which covers the waterways of Tanjung 
Tamiang-Belawan-Pulau Berhala and Pulau Pandang); 
(4) Tanjung Balai Asahan (which covers the waterways 
of Pulau Pandang-Tanjung Balai Asahan-Jemur-Bagan 
siapi-api); (5) Dumai; (6) Iyu Kecil (the area of 
coverage is Iyu Kecil waterway); (7) Tanjung Balai 
Karimun (which covers the Philips Strait); (8) Tolop; 
(9) Sambu; (10) Batam;  and (11) Tanjung Pinang.  
Army 
Operation Bakti (Poverty 
reduction programme in 
areas that border key 
sea-lanes) 
n/a n/a Regencies of Rokan, Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak, Palawan, 
Indragiri Ilir and Karimun which border the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore are the key priority areas.
263
 
Second in the welfare programme’s priority list are 
other regencies that border Lombok Strait and Sunda 
Strait.
264
 
Navy 
Sources: Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (2004); J. Ho (2007a:211); Interview IG05; L.P.E. Nuswantoro (2005); Bakorkamla (2010); B.K. Sondakh 
(2004) 
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These counter armed robbery against ships initiatives generate high economic costs. Figure 
2.7, below, shows that even prior to the launched of international initiatives dealing with 
armed robbery against ships in 2004, Indonesia has allocated substantial resources to tackle 
this issue.
265
    
 
Figure 2.7 The Indonesian Ministry of Defence Maritime Security Budget 
(Percentages of Total Ministry of Defence Budget) 
 
Source: Adapted from Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional (2011) 
 
This is also confirmed by Admiral Edhi Nuswantoro and two MoD officials who are in 
charge in planning defence expenditure. They claim that Indonesia has long allocated 
substantial resources from its national budget to halt armed robbery against ships, 
particularly in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore despite most vessels passing through 
the Straits not being bound for Indonesian ports.
266
 As explained earlier, this resource 
allocation has been used to purchase fuel, surveillance and patrol devices; develop and 
maintain information sharing centre and naval operation bases, finance maritime patrols 
and funds welfare improvement programme for areas surrounding important waterways.
267
 
A major counter sea robbery operation such as Octopus, for instance  absorbs enormous 
resources as it takes up to 3 months and involve 90 patrol boats and naval ships, four 
planes, two helicopters, and 2,973 personnel including marine and infantry units, 
amphibious scouts, frogman teams, and intelligence teams.
268
 The government also bears 
the costs to conduct routine patrols that most have been established before 1998 such as 
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“Operasi Kamla,” “Operasi Hiu Macan,” and “Operasi Sepanjang Tahun.”269  Each 
operation involves between 5 to 7 boats and three aircraft.
270
  
 
As a result, when the international community began to pay greater attention to the 
vulnerability of maritime transport plying through Indonesian waters after 9/11 at national 
level Indonesian maritime agencies already have counter sea robbery mechanisms in place. 
As mentioned in Table 2.1 Indonesian maritime agencies have been carrying out various 
unilateral patrols throughout the year and establish “a welfare programme” which aims to 
improve the local economic conditions of regencies which borders Indonesian strategic 
sea-lanes. An Indonesian Navy official claimed that the government dissuasion programme 
through empowering the locals has been very effective in reducing armed robbery at sea 
activities.
271
 Overtime Indonesia’s efforts at national level as explained above are 
important since it has shown how this archipelagic state has taken the issue of sea robbery 
seriously and put resources to address this issue. The IMB 2005 Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships report validated this claim. The IMB complimented Indonesia for 
its effort to police the Strait of Malacca through several ways including unilateral patrols 
on the Indonesian side of the strait and intensive bilateral patrols with Malaysia that has 
caused dramatic reduction in armed robbery.
272
  
 
Second, in halting armed robbery against ships Indonesia is not hostile to cooperation. 
Indonesia signed bilateral arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia in 1992 to set up 
direct communication between their navies. Details of these arrangements will be provided 
in Chapter Five. In the beginning of the 1990s, Indonesia and the Philippines also begun to 
plan increased surveillance in the Sulawesi Sea based on the existing Border Crossing and 
Border Patrol Agreement between the two countries.
273
 In 2000 Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore already began coordinated patrols to guard against sea robbers involving each 
country patrol vessels patrolling its own territorial waters.
274
  
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks there was a growing interest among extra regional 
states, particularly the U.S., in taking a bigger part in securing the strategic sea-lanes. 
Indonesia perceived that it had already begun to reap the benefits from bilateral 
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arrangements already in place as sea robbery incidents started to decline since 2001 (as 
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show). In contrast the international community maintained that armed 
robbery attacks in Indonesian waters remained at a worrying level since it still accounted 
for almost 30 per cent of all incidents globally. Dealing with international concerns over 
armed robbery against ships the Indonesian government maintained its stance that 
responsibility to patrol the Straits lies solely among the littoral states of the Straits and 
conveyed its suggestion to Malaysia and Singapore to conduct round-the-clock coordinated 
patrols.
275
 Thus, as part of the response, the Indonesian Chief of Armed Forces, together 
with his Malaysian and Singaporean counterparts launched coordinated naval patrols in 
2004 in and the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) air patrol in 2005 under the initiative known as the 
MSP agreement. In a bid to improve the Straits security, the three littoral states took a step 
further by inviting Thailand to take part in MSP.
276
 In April 21
st
, 2006, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore signed the Terms of References and Standard Operating Procedure of the 
Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) that links the naval patrol and EiS air patrol. In comparison 
to other form of cooperation agreement signed  in the past, the MSP agreement will allow 
one country patrol vessel  to cross over to other country territorial waters in the event of 
hot pursuit as long as the patrol vessel does not open fire or conduct other military 
actions.
277
  
 
Indonesia’s increased flexibility in addressing sea robbery has been shown in various 
measures including: the EiS initiative that allows patrol aircraft to transgress boundaries up 
to three nautical miles inside the territorial waters; the 2006 Standard Operation Procedures 
of the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) that allows a degree of flexibility to cross borders 
when carrying out hot pursuit against suspected vessels as long as the patrol vessel does 
not open fire or conduct other military action; and Indonesia together with  Malaysia and 
Singapore agreement to extend the invitation to Thailand to join  the MSP in 2006. These 
progresses imply a willingness to strengthen counter sea robbery measures at a practical 
level. This was confirmed in an interview with a government official from the Singapore 
Maritime and Port Authority. He claimed that cooperation between the three littoral states 
became stronger in 2005 and 2006.
278
 Nevertheless, prior to this period there has been 
“coordination between the armed forces and police of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, 
and also informal cooperation between the three countries coast guards, police and 
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military.”279 A senior official from the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs also shared 
this opinion. She suggested that over the years Indonesia has successfully cooperated with 
other littoral states and this cooperation between the littoral states is still ongoing.
280
 A 
director of an international shipping line in an interview claimed that one initiative that 
seemed to be effective in reducing the number of sea robbery is the agreement between the 
littoral states to work together to try to police the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
 281
 He 
pointed out that “the united pooling of resources between Singapore, Indonesia and 
Malaysia to secure the Strait of Malacca and Singapore has been a constructive 
commitment and that appear to be having benefit for all shipowners.”282 Indonesian 
participation in various maritime arrangements to address sea robbery also points to the 
main puzzle of this thesis: Indonesia is willing to cooperate through some arrangements 
but less inclined to take part in others. This will be developed further in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
 
The third key point of this sub section points out to the international community 
engagement to halt armed robbery against ships over time. The act of sea robbery 
constitutes a number of threats to the international community as various ships pass 
through Indonesian waters. It poses a direct threat to the life and safety of citizens of 
various flag states, serves to increase insurance premiums, and has the potential to cause 
environmental pollution if the attacks take place in busy sea-lanes against super-tankers.
283
 
The international community, however, have been showing different pattern of 
involvement throughout the time. In the late 1990s to 2001 among all the user states Japan 
was the only state that has played the most assertive role to address armed robbery against 
ships in Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This sub-section 
briefly explains what Japan has done to address armed robbery against ships to highlight 
the differences in international community approach to this issue prior to the 9/11 attacks 
and after the attacks.  
 
Prior to 9/11 Japan was the only user state that sought for greater engagement to address 
armed robbery against ships in the region.
 
The Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi in 
1999 articulated an idea to set up a regional framework to address armed robbery against 
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ships and piracy. At the 1999 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in Manila, Obuchi 
proposed “a meeting of coast guards of Asian countries to discuss possible counter-
measures” to fight sea robbery.284 In March 2000 Japan hosted a meeting which involved 
coast-guard officials from Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam meeting to discuss 
the possibility for joint anti sea robbery patrols in the region.
285
 At the 2000 APT Summit 
in Singapore, Obuchi’s successor Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed a similar counter 
piracy measure. Mori proposed to start a joint anti sea robbery patrol of the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore. The parties involved would include Japan, China, South Korea, 
and the three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
286
 Indonesia opposed this 
idea of joint patrols. 
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks served as a turning point marking a reinterpreting of the threat 
posed by armed robbery at sea. Heads of state, media and analysts statements that often 
conflated the threat of sea robbery and maritime terrorism had raised public attention and 
enabled more resources to be put into counter sea robbery efforts.
287
 In the years after 9/11 
international attention turned to three specific maritime areas: the vast Indonesian 
archipelago, the busy Strait of Malacca and the poor coast of Bangladesh as homes to 
groups of sea robbers who were responsible for carrying out three-quarters of maritime 
hijackings.
288
 Various elements of the international maritime community comprising of 
shipping business, international shipping insurance companies, and international maritime 
organizations such as the IMB, IMO and user states exercised pressure on the littoral states 
of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore to crack down on armed robbery in their waters. 
Apart from Japan other extra regional states including the U.S., Japan, India and China 
showed their growing interest in this issue and sought a bigger role when engaging in 
counter sea robbery efforts.
289
   
 
Among the extra regional actors a significant change could be seen from the U.S. reaction 
to sea robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore after 9/11. Since pulling out of 
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Vietnam in 1973-75 the U.S. only maintained a low profile engagement in the region.
290
 
Prior to 9/11 the U.S. government did not pay much attention to the issue of sea robbery in 
Indonesian waters. A number of elements within the U.S. administration including the 
Navy, the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the Department of Energy and the Defence 
Mapping Agency (DMA) response to sea robbery in Southeast Asia had been limited to 
developing a number of databases and communication links that were made available to 
ship masters, shipowners and operators who requested them.
291
 In addition, these agencies 
issued advisories periodically to all U.S. flag merchant ships navigating through Southeast 
East Asian waters, including Indonesian territorial waterway.
292
 In the aftermath of 9/11 
the U.S. revised this practice. In 2004 the U.S. proposed the Regional Maritime Initiative 
(RMSI) to play an active role in safeguarding the key Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
However, as showed in Figure 2.4 the number of sea robbery incidents in the Straits has 
started to decline since 2001. At bilateral level maritime security issues became one of the 
main topics during U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s discussions with 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda and 
Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono in 2006.
293
 The U.S. also provided assistance to assist 
Indonesia in setting up radar system across the Strait of Malacca and Singapore and 
Sulawesi Sea. Adding to the puzzle of this thesis, Indonesia rejected the U.S. RMSI with 
sovereignty concerns articulated as its main reason, but cooperates extensively with the 
U.S. through bilateral defence arrangement. 
 
In conclusion, there are three important key points to take away from the armed robbery 
against ships section. First, maritime security cooperation initiatives do not coincide with 
Indonesian concerns over armed robbery against ships. When two main anti-sea robbery 
initiatives, the RMSI and the ReCAAP, were launched in 2004 and 2006, Indonesia 
already has national measures and cooperation to halt sea robbery with neighbouring 
countries in place. Although cooperation was still strictly limited to coordinate naval patrol 
at bilateral and trilateral level but Indonesia began to reap some benefits out of them as 
armed robbery incidents have begun to decrease. Consequently, this circumstance reduces 
the benefit for Indonesia to take part in maritime security cooperation. Moreover at the 
same time that the international community began to launch cooperation initiatives 
Indonesia has been facing other maritime problems at domestic front including illegal 
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seaborne immigrants and illegal fishing. Second, Indonesia has used resources and showed 
willingness to join some cooperation agreements. This poses the main question: why 
Indonesia takes part in some arrangements but not in others. The fact that Indonesia is not 
hostile to cooperation and shows willingness to take action also debunks the alternative 
arguments which claim that Indonesia is hostile to cooperation arrangements. Finally, the 
international community responds shows significant changes over time. In particular, in the 
years following 9/11 there has been a growing interest from user states to be involved in 
the management of key straits such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Two maritime 
security initiatives to address sea robbery, the RMSI and the ReCAAP, were launched in 
2004 and 2006 when armed robbery against ships incidents had already started to decline. 
Here, the international community change of response reinforces the first key point on how 
international maritime security cooperation do not coincide with Indonesia concerns over 
armed robbery against ships.  
 
 
2.4. Maritime Security Issues in Indonesia’s Archipelago 
As explained in the previous section, apart from potential maritime terrorism and armed 
robbery against ships. Indonesia is facing various other maritime security challenges. 
Indonesian documents and government officials identify four main maritime issues in 
Indonesian waters.
294
 These are illegal fishing, illegal migrants travelling through its 
waters, maritime border issues and smuggling. There is no exact priority rank among the 
four maritime issues. To provide a comprehensive discussion this section explores these 
maritime challenges affecting Indonesian waters. Understanding maritime threats facing 
Indonesia and Indonesia’s perception of them is important when seeking to comprehend 
Indonesia’s reaction towards a number of cooperation initiatives in maritime security. This 
sub section begins by explaining first, illegal fishing problem in Indonesia; second, illegal 
seaborne immigration; third, maritime border problem and fourth, smuggling.  
 
First, in terms of illegal fishing a large volume of marine products from the archipelago are 
illegally fished. A substantial portion of these products are fished by foreign vessels 
operating without permit or with a permit that is illegally transferred from an Indonesian 
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permit holder to foreign fishermen.
295
 Each year the state loses US$ 3-4 billion due to 
illegal fishing.
296
 Illegal fishing has also depleted Indonesian fish stocks although 
Indonesia has only used 48 per cent out of its 6.7 million tons total allowable catch.
297
 As a 
consequence of illegal fishing overfishing has become a common phenomenon in almost 
all the archipelagic waters. Details on fisheries products that have been overfished in 
Indonesian waterways can be found in Appendix I. Indonesia takes part in international 
cooperation to address illegal fishing. Indonesia is a signatory to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement and the Food and Agriculture Organization International Plan of Action to 
Deter, Prevent and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.
298
 Indonesia’s 
participation in international arrangements to address illegal fishing suggests that Indonesia 
is willing to join arrangements to solve issues that it considers as prime maritime 
challenges. 
 
Second, in regards to maritime border problems, Indonesian sensitivity over this issue is 
derived from its perception of threat. In 2002 in a territorial dispute with Malaysia 
Indonesia lost Sipadan and Ligitan islands through an International Court of Justice 
decision.
299
 Due to unsettled maritime boundaries there has been a growing concern over 
possible claiming of Indonesia outermost islands by neighbouring states, as shown in the 
Sipadan and Ligitan islands case.
300
 Indonesia shares a maritime border with 10 countries: 
Malaysia, Thailand, India, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Timor Leste and Australia.
301
 Out of 92 Indonesia’s outermost islands there are 22 islands 
in the border between Indonesia and Malaysia; 4 islands are located near the border with 
Singapore; 2 islands sit on the border between Indonesia and Vietnam; 11 islands are 
located near to the Philippines; 7 islands in the border between Indonesia and Palau; 23 
islands are close to Australia; 10 islands near the border of Indonesia and East Timor; 12 
islands are close to the border of Indonesia and India; and one island rests near to the 
border of Papua New Guinea.
302
 Details on the status of maritime border agreements 
between Indonesia and its neighbouring countries can be seen in Appendix II. Indonesia 
categorized 12 of its outermost islands as top priority to be secured as these islands mark 
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Indonesian territories. These twelve outermost islands, their locations and the bordering 
states are outlined in the Appendix III. Even though there has been no open border conflict, 
Indonesia is concerned over unsettle maritime borders with neighbouring states. Although 
Indonesia has acknowledged its loss over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, there remain 
several border disputes to settle between Indonesia and Malaysia. These include the 
dispute over the oil rich Ambalat Block in the Makassar Strait and maritime border in the 
Strait of Malacca.
303
 Due to the bilateral nature of this issue, to manage or seek a solution 
over maritime disputes Indonesia mainly carries out bilateral negotiations.  
 
Third, illegal seaborne immigration has posed a significant challenge to Indonesian 
authority. There are two groups of illegal immigrants that pass through Indonesian waters. 
The first group is illegal migrant workers from Indonesia who are trying to cross to 
Malaysia. The huge volume of illegal crossers from Indonesia to Malaysia has been a 
source of diplomatic tensions between the two governments.
304
 The second group of 
people crossing Indonesian waters is asylum seekers from South Asia and the Middle East. 
Indonesia together with Malaysia, India, Thailand, and Hong Kong (China) is among the 
top 15 United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees Refugee Status Determination 
(UNHCR RSD) operation in the world in terms of applications received and decisions 
given.
305
 In 2009 with 3,230 claims Indonesia has experienced the largest increase in 
asylum applications in the world.
306
 This statistics increased to 3,900 in 2010.
307
According 
to an Indonesian Navy official groups of immigrants that frequently plying through the 
Strait of Malacca are mainly asylum seekers arriving from Sri Lanka.
308
 In addition to 
asylum seekers from Sri Lanka, Indonesia has also become an important staging point for 
people coming from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Middle East and Afghanistan that intended to 
enter Australia and New Zealand.
309
 The Indonesian provinces of East Nusa Tenggara, the 
Riau Islands, West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi particularly Miangas island are common 
corridors for illegal migrants to travel in and out of Indonesia’s territory.310 Indonesia 
cannot easily deport these immigrants because most of them are looking for asylum 
protection and are protected by international convention. This circumstance has burdened 
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the Indonesian government, although the International Organization of Migrants (IOM) 
assists with the provision of the migrants basic needs.
311
 More importantly, there is a 
growing concern that some of the asylum seekers could be members of terrorist 
organizations, as most of the immigrants do not carry a clear identification documents.
312
 
Indonesia participates in international cooperation arrangements to address undocumented 
immigrant issues. Indonesia has ratified the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and two protocols that supplement it, the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. Indonesia attempts 
to address illegal seaborne immigration by taking part in these initiatives imply that this 
archipelagic state is willing to address issue which it considers as high priority in its 
national security agenda through participation in international arrangements.  
 
Fourth, pertaining to smuggling over a porous border, the many outlying uninhabited 
islands throughout the archipelago and an under equipped law enforcement force have 
weakened the state’s capability to control various networks of private authority that operate 
across its border. This situation renders Indonesia vulnerable to the problem of smuggling. 
Most goods are smuggled across the Strait of Malacca to avoid law or tax.
313
 These include 
illicit materials such as small arms and drugs; items that weaken domestic industries (this 
can range from steel to second hand clothing); goods that circumvents national tariffs such 
as liquor and cigarettes; other consumer goods such as subsidized fuel and rice; and 
endangered species.
314
 Consumer goods such as cigarettes and drugs are smuggled from 
Indonesia to Malaysia, but items of concern including small arms and light weapons flow 
from the opposite route.
315
 The arms are smuggled by boat, usually by fishing boat from 
Thailand and Malaysia across the Strait of Malacca to the Indonesian province of Aceh.
316
 
Beside Thailand and Malaysia, arms are also smuggled by sea into the country, particularly 
to North Sulawesi (Miangas Island) from the Philippines and Australia.
317
 Indonesian 
senior intelligence officers claim that smuggled weapons from these four countries have 
been responsible for exacerbating violence conflicts across the country.
318
 Since 1998 
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communal conflicts and terrorist activities have flared up in a number of locations in 
Indonesia.
319
 Smuggling of goods also causes economic loss to Indonesia. The value of off 
book trade can reach US$ 2 billion dollar per year, and every year Indonesia loses US$ 600 
million because of smuggling.
320
 Indonesia has actively taken part in a number of 
international arrangements to address smuggling.
321
 These include the UN Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the UN 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the UN 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects/Plan of Action (PoA). Indonesia’s response to smuggling suggests that the 
archipelagic state is not reluctant to explore possible solutions to one of its top maritime 
security problems through participation in international arrangements.  
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Indonesia is important for international maritime security. The archipelagic key straits of 
Malacca, Lombok and Sunda are designated as part of the world Sea-Lanes of 
Communication. Soon after 9/11 the international community began to view the possibility 
of maritime terrorism and sea robbery in Indonesian waters as an international maritime 
security concern. A number of key international arrangements to address armed robbery 
against ships and prevent maritime terrorism (including the ReCAAP, the ISPS Code, the 
CSI, and the PSI), were launched few years after the 9/11 attacks.  
 
As this chapter demonstrated these arrangements did not coincide with Indonesia concern 
over maritime terrorism and sea robbery. The maritime security arrangements to halt 
armed robbery against ships such as RMSI and ReCAAP were introduced in 2004 when 
Indonesia’s national, bilateral and regional efforts began to show positive results and the 
number of incidents started to decline. In the case of maritime terrorism, when the U.S. 
launched the CSI and the PSI in 2002 and 2003, partly as result of the 2002 Bali Bombing, 
Indonesia had already set up its national mechanism to deal with terrorism. In the 
following years, Indonesia started to show good results in unravelling terrorist networks. 
More importantly, the U.S. led cooperation initiatives to deal with potential maritime 
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terrorism, such as the CSI and PSI, were designed to prevent the delivery of WMD by 
shipping container bound for U.S. territory. These maritime arrangements’ focus does not 
correspond with the way Indonesia perceives the threat posed by maritime terrorism. 
Indonesian concerns over maritime terrorism are more locally focused.
322
 They mainly 
concentrate on the possibility of terrorist attacks upon key waterways, ports or a 
neighbouring port that may block inter-island trade and international navigation. 
 
Indonesia’s perceived benefit of cooperation is further reduced because at the same time as 
the 9/11 attacks raised the profile of maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships 
Indonesia was facing a range of issues in its waterways including illegal fishing, border 
disputes, illegal seaborne migrants, and smuggling. The government perceived these 
threats as more pressing in comparison to maritime terrorism and armed robbery against 
ships since they pose direct threats to the Indonesian economy, territorial integrity and the 
livelihood of Indonesian fisherman. This is a key disjuncture between Indonesia and the 
international maritime community and informs Indonesia’s varying participation across 
various maritime security initiatives. 
 
Despite Indonesia not considering armed robbery against ships and maritime terrorism as 
being at the top of its security agenda, Indonesia has been extensively cooperating with 
neighbouring states and extra-regional states through various international cooperation 
arrangements. Indonesia’s efforts to cooperate through various cooperation channels will 
be explained in more detail in Chapters Three and Five of this thesis. Here, Indonesia’s 
participation adds to the key puzzle of this thesis. Why despite Indonesia active 
cooperation towards some cooperation arrangements, other arrangements seem to be met 
with a high degree of reluctance by Indonesia? This central research theme begins to 
broach the topic which forms the core of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3. Indonesia’s Cooperation to Address Maritime Terrorism 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the reasons underpinning Indonesia’s participation in cooperation 
arrangements to address maritime terrorism. It analyzes Indonesia’s cooperation in 
bilateral arrangements with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, its participation in the two 
BIMP-EAGA MoUs, a trilateral information sharing agreement, the ASEAN Counter-
Terrorism Convention, the ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP.  
 
In order to show why Indonesia’s non-participation in some cooperation arrangements 
dealing with maritime terrorism is counter-intuitive, this chapter explains Indonesia’s 
enthusiasm to cooperate extensively in cooperation cases presented in this chapter. This 
adds to the argument made in Chapter Two that Indonesia has made a range of attempts to 
deal with the threat of maritime terrorism. This chapter explains all cooperation avenues 
that Indonesia has chosen to join to understand Indonesia’s participation in counter 
maritime terrorism cooperation.  
 
The existing scholarly work on cooperation points to relative gains concerns, shared 
identity, bureaucratic politics and the calculation of absolute gains as plausible 
explanations for Indonesia’s participation in cooperation. Government documents, 
interviews with business representatives and officials in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
and New York show that (a) the relative gains calculation cannot account for Indonesia’s 
participation because Indonesia cooperated with near-peer states in the two EAGA MoUs, 
the trilateral exchange of information and the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention; (b) 
shared identity cannot explain Indonesia’s participation across cases as Indonesia joined 
cooperation arrangements that involved non-ASEAN states such as the U.S., Japan and 
Australia; (c) bureaucratic politics also cannot offer a useful explanation for Indonesia’s 
cooperation as the MFA supported Indonesia’s participation in all cases discussed in this 
chapter although none of the benefits delivered by these arrangements were beneficial for 
the ministry; whereas (d) the neoliberal account of the calculation of absolute gains 
provides an explanation for Indonesia’s cooperation across cases. As shown in the case of 
Indonesia’s bilateral cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia, the two EAGA MoUs, 
the trilateral exchange of information agreement, the ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism, the ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP the benefits of 
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cooperation exceeded the costs. From these arrangements Indonesia could gain access to 
maritime security training and exercises, equipment, information sharing and in some 
instances support from other states law enforcement agencies during patrols. 
  
To demonstrate the above arguments, the following sections explain all cooperation 
arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism which Indonesia chose to take part in.  
Sections two to four begin with an explanation of Indonesia’s participation in bilateral 
cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia. Indonesian government officials and 
documents mention the U.S., Japan and Australia as the three main states that cooperate 
intensively with Indonesia in the field of counter maritime terrorism at the bilateral 
level.
323
 Sections five to seven then continue with a discussion of Indonesia’s conduct 
towards sub regional and regional cooperation including the BIMP EAGA MoUs on Sea 
Linkages and Transit and Inter-State Transport of Goods, the trilateral agreement on 
information exchange and the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism. Sections eight 
to nine provide an explanation of Indonesia’s participation in three multilateral 
arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism including the ISPS Code, the SAFE 
Framework and the APEC TRP. Each section explains the requirements of each 
cooperation arrangement to measure the costs of cooperation. It tests all plausible 
explanations for Indonesia’s cooperation including absolute gains, relative gains, shared 
identity and bureaucratic politics. The conclusion of this chapter points to the role of the 
calculation of costs and benefits in absolute terms in informing Indonesia’s cooperation. It 
argues that relative gains concern, shared identity and bureaucratic politics cannot explain 
Indonesia’s participation in these initiatives. 
 
 
3.2 Indonesia and the United States Bilateral Cooperation 
Bilateral negotiation between Indonesia and the U.S. to address maritime terrorism 
commenced in earnest only after 2001. To formalise the bilateral defence cooperation the 
two states signed the U.S.-Indonesia Defence Framework Arrangement in June 2010. The 
defence arrangement requires Indonesia and the U.S. to work together to maintain regular 
dialogue particularly through the Indonesia-US Security Dialog and the United States-
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Indonesia Bilateral Defence Discussion; sustain and develop the existing education and 
training programmes; provide capacity building in maritime security; and ensure 
cooperation in the area of operational support and military supplies including acquisition, 
sale and exchange of goods and services.
324
 
 
Indonesia’s cooperation with the U.S. contradicts expectations of some IR and foreign 
policy theories. The main question which arises here is why Indonesia chose to enter into a 
defence arrangement with the U.S.?   
 
A neorealist might argue that concerns over relative gains would inform Indonesia’s 
decision to cooperate with the U.S. Given Indonesia’s status as a middle power a neorealist 
would expect to see Indonesia cooperates with larger and smaller states because of the vast 
power disparity between them. Could the case meet this expectation? As neorealists would 
expect, Indonesia chose to cooperate with the U.S., a larger state in comparison to 
Indonesia. However, since Indonesia not only cooperates with larger and smaller states but 
also near-peer states (for instance in the two EAGA MoUs and the trilateral exchange of 
information agreement), the relative gains calculation cannot offer a sufficient explanation 
to understand the reasons underpinning Indonesia’s cooperation. 
 
A constructivist would be expected to argue that shared identity plays a central role in 
states’ cooperation. Would it be possible that Indonesia’s participation in defence 
arrangements with the U.S. is derived from shared identity? Indonesia’s decision to join 
the defence arrangement with the U.S. was not in line with the constructivist argument 
regarding the role of shared identity in informing cooperation. Indonesia agreed to 
cooperate with the U.S. despite the fact that the U.S. is not an ASEAN member state. 
 
Bureaucratic politics analysis would point to competing preferences among government 
actors as the source of explanation. Following this lead, could competing government 
actors’ preferences account for Indonesia’s cooperation with the U.S.? With respect to 
bureaucratic politics it is clear that Indonesia’s participation in bilateral cooperation with 
the U.S. was not informed by competing governmental actors’ preferences. The Indonesian 
MoD in close coordination with the MFA did not pursue bilateral cooperation programmes 
with the U.S. to promote the Ministry’s interest or to gain benefit. If we expected 
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Indonesia’s decision to be consistent with the bureaucratic politics expectation regarding 
competing government actors’ preferences then the following scenario may have taken 
place. The MFA would not be in favour of the defence arrangement because the ministry 
would not gain any benefits from cooperation. The MoD on the other hand would be 
expected to support the signing of a defence arrangement. As the arrangement is based on 
existing cooperation networks it would not bring additional costs to the MoD. These 
expectations, however, contrast the actual preferences of the MFA and the MoD. In reality, 
both the MFA and the MoD were in favour of the defence arrangement. Indonesian 
officials also explained that these Ministries’ preferences to cooperate were informed by 
the aggregate benefits of the bilateral cooperation arrangement for Indonesia.
325
 As a MoD 
official confirmed, the Ministry did not push the cooperation forward because of self-
benefits, rather, capacity building assistance from the U.S. both in terms of human 
resources and equipment for Indonesian maritime agencies including the Navy, the Coast 
Guard (MoT), Marine Police and the Maritime Security Coordinating Board had been the 
prime driver of cooperation.
326
 He further explained that the MoD particularly “want the 
Coast Guard and the Maritime Security Coordinating Board to be big institutions and well 
equipped.”327 
 
This statement is also corroborated by the implementation of the cooperation arrangement 
that made maritime exercises, training, seminars and equipment available to various 
agencies that do not fall under either the MFA or the MoD remit. These agencies include 
the Anti-Terrorism Coordinating Desk of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal 
and Security Affairs, Customs, Marine Police, the Maritime Security Coordinating Board 
and the Sea and Coast Guard unit of the MoT.
328
 Although the U.S. Coast Guard and NCIS 
port security training and exercises do not offer economic benefits for both the MFA and 
the MoD, these activities are beneficial for other government agencies including Customs, 
Marine Police and the MoT.
329
 In an interview conducted in 2010 an official from the 
Maritime Security Coordination Board explained that as part of the defence cooperation a 
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large number of aircraft provided by the U.S. will be allocated to his institution to assist 
their patrol operations.
330
 
  
The final plausible explanation to consider is the absolute gains calculation. The 
calculation of absolute gains did inform Indonesia’s decision.331 These findings advance 
the neoliberal argument regarding the role of absolute gains in informing state cooperation. 
Indonesia sought to gain counter-terrorism training, new maritime security equipment and 
additional sources of military logistics for its armed forces through its bilateral cooperation 
with the U.S.
332
 The evidence shows that Indonesia was able to meet these security needs 
through the bilateral defence arrangement with the U.S. The bilateral cooperation offers 
three core incentives to Indonesia. First, it ensures access for Indonesian maritime agencies 
to various U.S. training and exercises programmes. A result of the negotiations was that 
the Indonesian military gained access to U.S. joint programmes.
333
 There are more than 
100 joint programmes under the U.S. Pacific Command’s Theatre Security Cooperation 
ranging from education, training, and exercises, to major foreign military sales and 
financing.
334
 The U.S. also includes Indonesia in its network of exercises such as the 
Cooperation and Readiness Afloat (CARAT), the Southeast Asian Cooperation against 
Terrorism (SEACAT), and the Cobra Gold Exercise.
335
 The U.S. sent its Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS) to train the Indonesian police special unit that was assigned 
to guard international ports including Tanjung Priok Port (Jakarta) and Tanjung Perak 
(Surabaya). In addition, over five days in 2011 the U.S. NCIS personnel trained the 
Indonesian police to use over 100 standard devices to secure a port.
336
  
 
Second, cooperation provides Indonesia with equipment necessary to deal with armed 
robbery against ships. In 2006 the U.S. authorization of the Section 1206 of Public Law 
109-163 on Global Train-and-Equip Authority instructed all organizational entities within 
the Department of Defence to train, equip, and build maritime security capacity in foreign 
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countries to deter terrorists.
337
 Indonesia is one of the countries that benefits from this 
programme, along with the Philippines and Malaysia.
338
 Indonesia received US$ 57 
million through this programme to support the establishment of an Integrated Maritime 
Surveillance Systems (IMSS) located strategically to cover the Strait of Malacca, the Strait 
of Makassar and the Strait of Moluccas.
339
 The U.S. has allocated an additional US$ 4.6 
million to guarantee the sustainability of the system until 2014.
340
 The IMSS is an 
“integrated network of ship and shore based sensors, communications devices, and 
computing resources that collect, transmit, analyse and display a broad array of maritime 
data.”341 The IMSS comprises of 18 Coastal Surveillance Stations (CSS), 11 Ship-based 
Radars, two Regional Command Centres, and two Fleet Command Centres (Jakarta and 
Surabaya).
342
 The IMSS covers more than 1,205 kilometres of coast line in the Straits of 
Malacca and approximately 1,285 kilometres of coast line in the Sulawesi Sea.
343
 An 
Indonesian security expert confirmed that information gathered from the U.S. installed 
IMSS was also shared with the U.S.
344
  
 
Finally, the cooperation arrangements provide a source of weapons and defence technology 
through joint research, co-production, sale and purchase of goods, exchange of goods and 
technology transfers. As part of the bilateral arrangement Indonesia received 19 patrol 
boats to equip its National Police.
345
 These boats are deployed in Batam-Riau, Bangka 
Island Straits, Tarakan, Bitung, Sorong and Ternate-Sofia to help secure the Straits of 
Malacca and the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea.
346
 Indonesia also will receive thirty F-16 jetfighters 
from the U.S. and purchase another six F-16 jet fighters and Hercules aircraft by 2014.
347
 
The U.S. armaments at present account for 80 per cent of the country’s defence system.348 
This weaponry system has suffered due to the U.S. arms embargo. The U.S. imposed arms 
                                                          
337
  U.S. Department of Defense (26 July 2011) 
338
   I. Storey (19 January 2009); Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs (2008: 76) 
339
  U.S. Department of State  (DoS) (18 November 2011) 
340
   U.S. DoS (18 November 2011) 
341
   U.S. DoS (18 November 2011) 
342
  U.S. DoS (18 November 2011) 
343
   Antara (1 July 2010) 
344
  Interview IE23 
345
  U.S. Embassy in Jakarta (3 June 2011) 
346
 U.S. Embassy in Jakarta (3 June 2011) 
347
  Jakarta Post (16 February 2008); Jakarta Post (26 February 2008); Antara (26 August 2011); Antara 
(23 February 2011)  
348
  Jakarta Post (15 January 2007) 
 90 
embargo on Indonesia after military forces opened fire on protesters in Dili, East Timor 
1991.
349
  
 
These are arguably core benefits. Capacity building assistance including training and 
exercises, gifting of equipment and supply of military logistics for Indonesian maritime 
agencies have been categorized as important cooperation outcomes by the government. 
This is because on the supply side the administration does not have adequate resources to 
train and equip its maritime agencies. On the demand side, as explained in Chapter Two, 
Indonesia is facing various maritime challenges. Maritime training, equipment and military 
supplies are the main benefits Indonesia wanted from the bilateral counter-terrorism 
cooperation. 
 
Indonesia pushed forward the defence arrangement because the benefits of cooperation 
exceeded the costs. In addition to incentives brought by the arrangement the defence 
cooperation does not show many changes in Indonesia-U.S. relations. The arrangement 
was carefully worded to indicate the non-binding and voluntary nature of cooperation.
350
 
For this purpose the term “participants” are used instead of “parties,” the term 
“arrangement” instead of “agreement” in the document title, and the word “intend” instead 
of “shall” that implies duties.351 Requirements stated under the Defence Framework 
Arrangement are not compulsory and are articulated as expressions of intention between 
the Indonesian and the U.S. governments. Soon after 9/11 President Megawati and 
President Bush agreed to establish a security dialogue forum between each country’s 
defence establishments in their September 2001 meeting in Washington.
352
 As a follow up 
to their meeting, the two countries have established the Indonesia-U.S. Security Dialog and 
the U.S.-Indonesia Bilateral Defence Discussion before the launch of the defence 
arrangement. These forums are held annually to discuss a wide range of security and 
defence issues and plan maritime security training and exercises. Indonesia and the U.S. 
have also re-opened the International Military Education and Training programme in 2003 
and have begun to discuss cooperation in the area of military weaponry after the U.S. lifted 
its arms embargo in 2005. This occurred in the years before the negotiation of the defence 
arrangement.
353
 At the domestic level, as explained in Chapter Two, Indonesia’s national 
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infrastructure and policies are already in line with these initiatives’ requirements. Indonesia 
has deployed vessels and surveillance aircraft in key waterways and conducted regular 
patrols. 
 
As the arrangement does not introduce many changes it is argued that this initiative poses 
low sovereignty costs. All requirements listed in the cooperation document are already in 
line with policies carried out by Indonesia prior to the establishment of this arrangement. 
This arrangement mainly institutionalises the ongoing cooperation activities that have been 
conducted by the two states for many years.
354
 The implementation costs of the bilateral 
cooperation are also low. The defence arrangement does not require Indonesia to purchase 
new equipment or make substantial changes at national level.  
 
In summary, Indonesia decided to join the bilateral arrangement with the U.S. because 
without having to make much changes Indonesia could gain new radar equipment covering 
its important sea lanes, aircraft, patrol boats and training programmes for its law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
 
3.3 Indonesia and Japan Bilateral Cooperation  
Although Indonesia and Japan have a long history of maritime cooperation, counter 
maritime terrorism is a new area of cooperation for the two countries.
355
 Counter-terrorism 
cooperation between the two countries is formalised by the signing of the Joint 
Announcement on Fighting against International Terrorism on June 24
th
, 2003. The Joint 
Announcement requires Indonesia and Japan to conclude and implement all relevant 
counter-terrorism conventions; exchange information; prevent terrorists from using 
networks, organizations and groups to cover their activities; strengthen immigration 
controls; prevent the financing of terrorists and transfers of WMD to terrorists; implement 
measures to enhance container and maritime security; and develop capacity building.
356
 
 
The question to pose here is why Indonesia joined a cooperation arrangement with Japan?  
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A neorealist would highlight the importance of relative gains concerns in informing 
Indonesia’s participation. As a middle power Indonesia would be expected to cooperate 
with larger states and not with near-power states. With this in mind, would it be possible to 
explain Indonesia’s cooperation through the calculation of relative gains? Indonesia’s 
participation in the bilateral arrangement with Japan could be explained by the calculation 
of relative gains only to the extent that Indonesia agreed to cooperate with Japan, a state 
with larger defence capabilities than Indonesia. However, since Indonesia also chose to 
cooperate with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, all of which are near-peer states, the 
relative gains argument cannot explain Indonesia’s cooperation across cases. 
 
A constructivist might be expected to argue that shared identity would affect Indonesia’s 
participation in a cooperation agreement. Could Indonesia’s cooperation with Japan 
advance the constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity? In contrast to the 
constructivist expectation shared identity did not inform Indonesia’s participation in the 
bilateral initiative. Although Japan is a non-ASEAN state Indonesia joined the cooperation 
arrangement.  
 
The bureaucratic politics approach would be expected to argue that Indonesia’s decision to 
cooperate with Japan was the outcome of competitive bargaining among self-interested 
actors. Could the evidence confirm this bureaucratic politics argument? The evidence 
shows that bureaucratic politics did not have a significant bearing on Indonesia’s 
participation in counter-terrorism cooperation with Japan. If bureaucratic politics mattered 
we would expect to see competing government actor’s preferences to play out in the 
decision making process. The Customs, Marine Police, Maritime Security Coordinating 
Board and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs would be 
expected to support the arrangement because maritime agencies that fall under these 
ministries remit will gain incentives of cooperation both in terms of equipment and 
capacity building programmes. It could be argued that the MFA might have opposed 
entering a maritime arrangement with Japan because the ministry did not gain any 
incentives and Indonesia’s maritime agencies could obtain the incentives of cooperation 
with Japan informally. The evidence, however, shows that the MFA preference 
contradicted this expectation. The MFA was highly in favour of the bilateral maritime 
arrangement with Japan. The decision of the MFA, the lead agency in the negotiation 
process, was not derived from the incentives of cooperation for the Ministry. The evidence 
shows that net benefits for the country as a whole were the main reason for the MFA to 
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drive the cooperation forward.
357
 Officials from the MFA, Customs, Marine Police and 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board and Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs pointed out that the MFA pushed the cooperation forward since maritime 
security projects with Japan are useful to build the capacity of Indonesian maritime 
agencies including the Ministry of Transportation (MoT), Customs, the Marine Police and 
the Maritime Security Coordinating Board and to improve the security of Indonesian sea 
ports.
358
 The actual policy outcomes are also consistent with the argument that the net 
benefits for the country as a whole have been the main reason for the MFA to drive the 
cooperation forward.
359
 Capacity building and equipment projects provided by Japan 
offered tangible benefits in the form of training, exercises and equipment to various 
government maritime agencies but none of them had been allocated to the lead agency, the 
Indonesian MFA.
360
 
 
The findings show that the Indonesian government assessed the bilateral cooperation with 
Japan in absolute terms.
361
 This confirms the neoliberal argument regarding the importance 
of absolute gains in informing state conduct towards cooperation. The bilateral cooperation 
with Japan is seen as “an ideal format” of cooperation as it “provided Indonesia with 
technical assistance, capacity building, burden sharing mechanism and information 
exchange.”362 Cooperation with Japan provides two benefits to Indonesia. First, Indonesia 
receives counter-terrorism capacity building assistance from Japan in six cooperation 
areas: immigration control, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, police 
and law enforcement and measures against terrorist financing.
363
 The capacity building for 
Indonesian maritime agencies are carried out through three main programmes. The first 
cooperation programmes is the Port Security Management Initiative. Under this 
programme Japan dispatched their Long Term Experts to assist Indonesian officials in 
designing Port Facility Security Plans for the state’s major maritime gateways and carry 
out seminars and training on seaport security. The Long Term Experts consist of experts 
and practitioners from the Japan Ministry of Land Infrastructure, Transportation and 
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Tourism, the Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan and the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency.
364
 The programme has been divided into two phases. 
The first phase began in December 2006 and ended in May 2009. The second phase started 
in May 2009 and at present it is still underway. The second capacity building programme is 
the Project on the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board Structural 
Enhancement. In order to enhance the Maritime Security Coordinating Board Japan sent 
their Long Term Experts from May 2008 to May 2011 to conduct seminars and training for 
officials at the Board. The third capacity building programme are on board training 
seminars and combined exercises for maritime law enforcement on the occasion of a port 
visit by Japanese Coast Guard ships. Through this programme the Japanese Coast Guard 
dispatches their patrol vessels to Indonesia to carry out on board training and seminars for 
Indonesian officials. Since 2002 the Japanese Coast Guard has dispatched their vessels to 
Indonesia seven times.
365
 In addition, since 2001, the Japanese Coast Guard has admitted 
Indonesian officials to its Coast Guard Academy in Kure-shi.  
 
Second, the cooperation provides Indonesia with equipment to address maritime terrorism. 
Japan equips Indonesia through three main projects. First the Security Equipment at Major 
Airports and Port Facilities through which Japan provided 747 million Yen (US$ 7.8 
million) in grant aid to improve security facilities at Indonesia’s major airport and 
seaports.
366
 Under this programme equipment including X-Ray inspection systems, metal 
detectors, explosive detectors and CCTV systems were installed at Soekarno Hatta, 
Denpasar and 5 other airports as well as the seaports of Tanjung Priok, Tanjung Perak and 
Batam.
367
 The two countries signed the diplomatic note in July 2004 and the handover to 
Indonesia was completed in September 2005.  
 
The second project is the Improvement of Port Security System. This 545 million Yen 
(US$ 5.7 million) project is aimed at providing security devices such as CCTV cameras 
and X-rays units for the major seaports of Belawan, Dumai, Tanjung Pinang, Palembang, 
Teluk Bayur, Pontianak, Benoa and Makassar.
368
 Indonesia and Japan signed the 
cooperation notes in June 2008. By August 2011 Japan had handed over the project to 
Indonesia.  
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The third project is the launch of the Maritime Telecommunication System Development 
Project Phase IV. The cooperation arrangement between the two states was signed in 
March 2004. Through this arrangement Japan provided a loan of 567 million Yen (US$ 5.9 
million) to Indonesia to improve Indonesian search and rescue systems and piracy and 
maritime terrorism counter-measures.
369
 This project includes the installation of the 
“Global Maritime Distress and Safety System, a communication system for maritime 
safety and security navigation, and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) in coastal 
maritime communications stations. This project is scheduled to be completed in 2012.  
 
All assistance in form of training and equipment mentioned above could be categorized as 
core benefits for Indonesia. Cooperation projects including training, exercises and seminar 
on counter-terrorism, and the granting of new equipment such as patrol vessels, maritime 
telecommunication and port security devices are very important to support resources-
strapped Indonesian law enforcement agencies. Capacity building programmes and 
maritime equipment are two main items sought by Indonesia from bilateral cooperation 
with Japan.
370
  
 
The cooperation arrangement also creates low costs for Indonesia. It can be argued that this 
initiative generates no sovereignty costs because the activities covered by the agreement 
are already in harmony with Indonesia’s counter-terrorism policies. Therefore, Indonesia 
only needs to continue its counter-terrorism policies after the signing of the Joint 
Announcement. For Indonesia the implementation costs are also low because the 
cooperation arrangement is a formalisation of the ongoing cooperation activities between 
the two states. The signing of the Joint Announcement does not bring substantial change to 
existing maritime security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan. The Joint 
Announcement does not provide legal responsibility for both states since obligations are 
framed as confirmation of intention to conduct various counter-terrorism activities. 
Indonesia does not need to make significant policy adjustments at domestic level to meet 
the requirements of the Joint Announcement. As explained in Chapter Two Indonesia has 
carried out various counter maritime terrorism initiatives at national level including 
establishing new institutions, issuing counter-terrorism legislation, conducting patrols and 
purchasing new security devices. Bilaterally, before the counter maritime terrorism 
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cooperation between Indonesia and Japan was announced in 2003, the two governments 
have cooperated extensively in the area of maritime security. Most activities governed by 
this Joint Announcement, including exchange of information and capacity building, have 
been carried out by the two countries since 1969.
371
 
 
To summarize, Indonesia was willing to cooperate because the arrangement did not require 
Indonesia to do much but provided substantial benefits for the country’s counter maritime 
terrorism efforts in the forms of the gifting of equipment and various capacity building 
programmes.  
 
 
3.4 Indonesia and Australia Bilateral Cooperation  
Indonesia and Australia first signed the MoU on Counter-Terrorism in February 2002. The 
October 2002 Bali bombings that claimed the life of 202 people, including 88 Australians 
had a significant impact upon the two states counter-terrorism cooperation.
372
 The two 
countries extended the MoU for a further three years in February 2008 and later in 
February 2011.
373
 Following the establishment of the MoU on Counter-Terrorism, 
Indonesia and Australia further signed the Agreement on Framework for Security 
Cooperation (Lombok Treaty) in 2006, which was ratified in February 2008, and recently 
concluded the Implementation Arrangement of the Lombok Treaty (Defence Cooperation 
Arrangement) in 2012.  
 
The 2002 Counter-Terrorism MoU requires the two governments to enhance counter-
terrorism cooperation among their defence, security and law enforcement officials. As the 
MoU focuses on information sharing, the agreement requires both countries to share 
information and carry out bilateral consultations among relevant security and law 
enforcement agencies.
374
 Under this initiative the two countries law enforcement agencies 
are obliged to continue regular exchanges of views and training.
375
 
 
Indonesia and Australia counter maritime terrorism cooperation also benefited from 
permanent security cooperation governed by the 2006 Lombok Treaty. The Treaty requires 
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Indonesia and Australia to cooperate in counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, defence 
technologies, counter proliferation of the WMD and maritime security.
376
 The Treaty 
obliges both states to strengthen bilateral cooperation through the exchange of information 
on intelligence and law enforcement; promote development and capacity building through 
military education and exercises; develop defence technologies and capabilities through 
joint design, development, production, marketing and transfer of technology; conduct joint 
and coordinated operations; cooperate to prosecute, prevent and combat transnational 
crimes particularly crimes related to smuggling, illegal migration, financing of terrorism, 
and illegal fishing.  
 
In 2012 Indonesia and Australia signed a Defence Cooperation Arrangement. This is 
confidential and therefore not available publicly.
377
 Nevertheless, Indonesian and 
Australian officials have discussed the content of the arrangement on various occasions. 
The arrangement requires Indonesia and Australia to cooperate in the areas of defence 
counter-terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military 
logistics and medical services, peace keeping, intelligence, defence industry, science and 
technology, military education and training, and defence management.
378
 It addresses plans 
to enable rapid clearance for Australian aircraft to operate in Indonesian territorial airspace 
and to land and refuel; sharing of information on defence industrial products owned by 
both states; procedures to involve the Navy and Air Force and coordination between 
Australian Search and Rescue agency and Indonesian agencies (BASARNAS, 
Kohadnudnas) in maritime operations.
379
 
 
Why did Indonesia choose to sign the three cooperation arrangements with Australia? As 
with the cases discussed above, Indonesia’s participation in these arrangements contradicts 
the expectations of some IR theories and the bureaucratic politics approach. 
 
A neorealist might be expected to argue that Indonesia’s cooperation with Australia 
stemmed from Jakarta’s concern over relative gains. As a middle power Indonesia would 
be expected to cooperate with larger and smaller states and less likely to cooperate with 
near-peer states. Could this be the case? Indonesia’s participation in the three bilateral 
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arrangements with Australia confirms the neorealist argument only to the extent that 
Australia is a larger state in comparison to Indonesia. As Indonesia also decided to join 
cooperation arrangements that involve near-peer states such as Malaysia and Singapore 
(for example the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism among others), the relative 
gains argument offers no explanatory power to understand Indonesia’s cooperation across 
cases. 
 
A constructivist would be expected to highlight the role of shared identity in shaping 
Indonesia’s decision to cooperate. Could shared identity account for Indonesia’s decision 
to sign a range of counter-terrorism arrangements with Australia? Indonesia’s participation 
in bilateral cooperation with Australia was not in line with the constructivist argument 
regarding the role of shared identity in informing states cooperation. Indonesia decided to 
join the three security arrangements with Australia although Australia is not a member of 
ASEAN. 
 
Foreign policy scholars might claim that Indonesia’s decision to cooperate with Australia 
could be the result of intense bargaining among government actors. Following this 
expectation, could it be possible that competing government actors’ preferences influence 
Indonesia’s decision to cooperate with Australia? Indonesia’s policy process and outcomes 
towards counter-terrorism cooperation with Australia is not consistent with the 
bureaucratic politics argument. Bilateral cooperation with Australia involved the MFA, the 
MoD, the MoT and the Police. If Allison’s explanation of bureaucratic politics was to have 
some bearing in influencing Indonesia’s conduct then competition between actors might 
have taken the following forms. It could be argued that the MFA would be expected to 
oppose the three defence cooperation with Australia because they would not offer any 
incentives. The MoT and the Police would be expected to be in favour of cooperation 
because the MoT would gain assistance in their search and rescue operations at sea and the 
Police would gain assistance in investigation of terrorist attacks, financial resources to 
develop counter-terrorism training centres and access to various training. Arguably, the 
MoD might have opposed the three defence arrangements because prior to the launch of 
these initiatives the ministry had developed cooperation links with its Australian 
counterpart. Therefore, the MoD could gain the benefits of cooperation in the absence of 
these arrangements.  
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More importantly, as noted by the Australian Ministry of Defence and the Indonesian 
Cabinet Secretariat, the Indonesian Minister of Defence, Purnomo Yusgiantoro has 
emphasized that the search and rescue matter - that is related to people smuggling and 
illegal immigration issues - is one of the focuses of Indonesia-Australia security 
cooperation.
380
 The Indonesian Minister of Defence confirmed that the search and rescue 
issues fall under the MoT remit.
381
 The cooperation in this area did not bring tangible 
benefits to the Indonesian MoD. Rather, such cooperation was expected to provide direct 
benefits in term of operational support and capacity building assistance to Indonesian 
search and rescue services. As the Australian Minister of Transportation, Anthony 
Albanese explained, “...we [the Australia government] were searching for solutions that 
would provide greater assistance for capacity for Indonesian maritime search and rescue 
services [BASARNAS, Kohadnudnas] and so the range of programmes that have been 
agreed today, I...will see that...occur.”382 Although the bureaucratic politics literature 
would expect the the MFA and the MoD to act based on their self-interest and rejected 
these defence initiatives, the actual preference of the the MFA and the MoD shows that the 
ministry was in favour of bilateral cooperation with Australia. The MoD together with the 
MFA, the MoT and Police were highly in favour of bilateral arrangements with Australia.  
 
The final plausible explanation to consider is the absolute gains calculation. Indonesia’s 
cooperation in bilateral arrangements with Australia confirms the neoliberal argument 
regarding the importance of the absolute gains calculation. Looking closely at Indonesia’s 
participation in the negotiation of the defence arrangements, it can be argued that Indonesia 
joined these bilateral arrangements because the overall benefits outweigh the costs of 
cooperation. Counter-terrorism cooperation with Australia could bring the following five 
benefits. First, cooperation with Australia provides assistance to Indonesian police to 
investigate terrorist attacks. It is argued that this could be classed as a core benefit. This is 
because it allows the Indonesian Police to ask for technical assistance from its Australian 
counterpart during investigations of major terrorist attacks. As part of the bilateral 
cooperation Australia has deployed their Australian Federal Police (AFP) team which 
consists of 30 personnel to work with the Indonesian police in investigating a range of 
terrorism incidents including 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing, 5 August 2003 J.W. Marriott 
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hotel bombing in Jakarta, 9 September 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in 
Jakarta, 1 October 2005 Bali bombing and 17 July 2009 J.W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton 
hotels bombing.
383
  
 
Second, through bilateral cooperation Indonesia received Australian assistance in 
establishing the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) and the 
Republic of Indonesia Bomb Data Centre (BDC) in 2004 to provide training and collect, 
analyse and exchange intelligence information.
384
 This form of assistance is highly valued 
by the Indonesian government because Indonesia did not have similar training and 
information centres prior to the establishment of the JCLEC and BDC. In 2004 Australia 
provided AU$ 36.8 million (US$ 37.7 million) to support the JCLEC for five years, supply 
and refurbish the JCELC building, and in 2009 the Australian government continued to 
provide AU$ 26.7 million (US$ 27.3 million) for the next five year period.
385
  
 
Third, Indonesia benefits from Australia’s capacity building programme in the area of 
military training, port security, customs and immigration, criminal intelligence and 
forensic science.
386
 Cooperation in the area of capacity building provided Indonesia with a 
core benefit because the country has limited resources to improve its Navy, Customs, 
Immigration and Police skills and capability in prevention and investigation of terrorist 
attacks. In term of military training, Indonesia and Australia hold a maritime surveillance 
exercise code named Exercise Albatross Ausindo for developing cooperative maritime 
surveillance procedures. The Australia Special Air Service Regiment and the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (TNI) specialist counter-terrorism unit, Kopassus Unit 81, also conducted a 
series of counter-terrorism exercises code-named Dawn Kookaburra.
387
 The Royal 
Australian Air Force and the Indonesian Air Force carried out a similar exercise code 
named Exercise Rajawali Ausindo at the Royal Australian Air Force Base in Richmond.
388
 
In terms of port security, customs and immigration capacity building, a government official 
from the Indonesian Directorate General of Sea Transportation (DGST) explained that 
between 2001 and September 2010 the Australian government have stepped up and 
                                                          
383
  Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2007: 166); Australian 
National Audit Office (2012: 58) 
384
  Australian National Audit Office (2012:62-65); AFP (2012:5) ; Australia Department of Defence 
(2003: 9) 
385
  Australian National Audit Office (2012: 64-65) 
386
  Interview IG11; Interview IG12; Interview IG24; Australian National Audit Office (2012: 63) 
387
  Australian Department of Defence (11 December 2005); AAP News (2 February 2007) 
388
  Australian Embassy in Indonesia (17 July 2007) 
 101 
conducted nine training activities designed to improve the skills of port administrators and 
officials from the DGST in verifying ships and port compliance with the ISPS Code.
389
 
The Australian Customs also held similar training for the Indonesian Customs.
390
 This 
training focused on improving customs monitoring procedures and the prevention of the 
smuggling of WMD. The 2009 White Paper of the Indonesian Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board confirms that Australia assists maritime institutions through training 
and exchanges of personnel.
391
 In addition, in term of criminal intelligence and forensic 
science the establishment of the BDC and the JCLEC also contributed to the training of 
Indonesian police and personnel from relevant government agencies in these two areas.  
 
Fourth, the bilateral cooperation provides new equipment and access to Australia’s defence 
technology through grants, purchase of equipment and joint production of weapons. 
Australian transfer of equipment to Indonesian security agencies includes the gifting of 
patrol vessels to the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board and four C-130 
aircraft to the Indonesian Air Force.
392
 Recently, Indonesia has been planning to acquire 
six more airplanes from Australia.
393
 Indonesia viewed the gifting and purchase of new 
aircraft from Australia as a valuable benefit of cooperation. Although Indonesia had 
allocated resources to deal with maritime terrorism Indonesia’s maritime agencies are 
currently inadequately equipped to cover round-the-clock patrols in its archipelagic waters 
because of their size. Most of Indonesia’s resources have been allocated to secure the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
 
Finally, cooperation with Australia provides burden sharing assistance to deal with illegal 
migration. Indonesian government documents and officials claimed that the administration 
sought to address not only terrorism but also other issues that are crucial for the state’s 
security, particularly illegal migration, through bilateral cooperation with Australia.
394
 To 
quote a MoD official involved in the decision making process of both the 2006 Lombok 
Treaty and the 2012 defence arrangement: 
 For us [the Indonesian government] the most important 
issue to put forward in the bilateral arrangements is illegal 
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migration. ...their [immigrants] main country of destination 
is Australia... through the Lombok Treaty we managed to 
gain Australia’s promise to share the costs for financing 
refugee camps.
395
 
 
At the 2012 Defence Arrangement negotiation the Indonesian Minister of Defence, 
Purnomo Yusgiantoro continued to emphasize that search and rescue matters, which are 
related to the issues of people smuggling and illegal immigration, was one of the focuses of 
Indonesia-Australia security cooperation.
396
 Australia’s assistance to deal with illegal 
migration can be categorised as a core benefit as Indonesian defence authorities deemed 
that the issue of illegal migration is interlinked with terrorism.
397
 To quote an Indonesian 
MoD official:  
...their main country of destination is Australia, we are a 
transit country for immigrants coming from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and [other parts of ] South Asia...their 
identities are unclear. We are worried that some of them are 
terrorists.
398
   
 
The high benefits that Indonesia gained from the three arrangements were also 
accompanied by low cooperation costs. The three cooperation agreements with Australia 
do not introduce significant changes to Indonesia’s domestic counter-terrorism efforts and 
bilateral relation between Jakarta and Canberra. The 2002 Counter-terrorism MoU, the 
2006 Lombok Treaty and the 2012 Defence Arrangement only create weak legal 
obligations. They require Indonesia and Australia to cooperate only after considering the 
primacy of participating states’ sovereignty and authority in all aspects of counter-
terrorism cooperation.
399
 In addition, as discussed in Chapter Two, Indonesia has already 
allocated expenses and carried out unilateral measures addressing terrorism. Prior to the 
establishment of these agreements the two countries have also carried out cooperative 
security and defence activities since 1959. As part of the bilateral relations Indonesia and 
Australia have conducted maritime patrols, exchanges of information; inter agency 
relations and regular training and exercises.
400
 Various issues covered under the three 
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agreements have been discussed and dealt with regularly through the existing defence 
dialogues between the two countries. The Indonesian Ministry of Defence and its 
Australian counterpart regularly communicate through the Indonesia Australia Defence 
Strategic Dialogue.
401
 The MoU on Counter-Terrorism, the Lombok Treaty and the 2012 
Defence Arrangement do not change any organization and coordination practices between 
the two countries.
402
  
 
Although the 2012 Defence Arrangement touches on the issue of providing rapid clearance 
for Australian aircraft to operate and land in Indonesian territory this practice is not new. 
Despite the absence of specific protocols for coordination and rapid clearance procedures 
joint maritime operations had been conducted for five years prior to the signing of the 
defence arrangement through Paket Bantuan Keselamatan Transportasi (Transportation 
Safety Assistance Programme).
403
 The joint maritime operations include allowing 
Australian aircraft to operate in Indonesian airspace and have been carried out by the two 
countries maritime agencies in areas that bordered the eastern part of Indonesia and 
Australia prior to the signing of the Defence Arrangement in 2012.
404
 Indonesia is also able 
to approve and finalize the rapid response of Australian planes into Indonesian airspace for 
joint operations and refuelling without making substantial policy changes because the 
country already has a system in place. The Indonesian Minister of Defence, Purnomo 
Yusgiantoro confirmed this. According to Yusgiantoro, Indonesia already has the required 
system in place because the government “has that... precedent with the U.S. Therefore,” 
Jakarta “can look at that and apply that to Australia. So that’s the easy one.”405  
  
The lack of changes suggests that the sovereignty costs of these agreements are low; 
because the requirements of these agreements are in line with the government’s existing 
counter-terrorism practices at domestic level. After the signing of the three agreements the 
government conducts similar policies to those carried out before. These agreements only 
serve as a set of burden sharing cooperation initiatives between the two neighbouring states 
in order to secure the common maritime border that lies between the eastern part of 
Indonesia and Australia.
406
 The absence of substantial policy changes also implies that the 
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economic costs to implement the three agreements are low. Indonesia does not need to 
introduce policy change at national level and allocate extra expenses to meet cooperation 
requirements. Compliance is automatic because the government does not need to adjust its 
policies. 
 
In summary, Indonesia agreed to cooperate with Australia because the three agreements do 
not pose many obligations to Indonesia but provide Indonesia with aircraft, financial 
resources to counter-terrorism and assistance to deal with illegal migration. 
 
  
3.5 Indonesia’s Participation in the Brunei Darussalam- Indonesia- Malaysia- The 
Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) Sub Regional Cooperation 
Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and the Philippines launched the initiative in 1994 
to address the development gap in the less developed parts of Southeast Asia.
407
 Although 
the BIMP-EAGA was established as an economic cooperation initiative, after 9/11 
attempts to strengthen both transport security and maritime borders became one of the 
focuses of the BIMP-EAGA.
408
 In the case of the EAGA MoUs on Sea Linkages and 
Transport of Goods Indonesia not only participates but also plays an important role as a 
lead country.
409
 The Indonesian MoT chaired both the Sea Linkages Working Group and 
hosted the 2009 BIMP-EAGA 4
th
 Transport Ministers Meeting where the two initiatives 
were drafted and negotiated.
410
 Indonesian officials from the BIMP-EAGA National 
Secretariat and the MoT and government documents confirmed that Indonesia was actively 
involved in exploring potential cooperation activities, formulating agreement drafts, 
proposing new sea routes and project plans, choosing its designated gateway ports and 
conveying its disagreement towards other states’ requests under the EAGA framework.411 
 
In 2007 the member states of the EAGA signed the MoU on Establishing and Promoting 
Efficient and Integrated Sea Linkages. The 2007 Sea Linkages MoU requires parties to: 
designate their gateway ports for facilitation of maritime trade and movement of people, 
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update each other on port facilities development, latest Customs, Immigration, Quarantine 
and Security (CIQS) facilities, procedures and requirements, conduct joint studies  in port 
performance and capacity, establish a database on the EAGA maritime trade, produce 
projection report for maritime flows, and coordinate the establishment and modernization 
of the CIQS facilities in gateway ports. The lists of the designated gateway ports can be 
seen in Appendix IV. 
 
Following the implementation of the MoU on Sea Linkages the four states launched the 
MoU on Transit and Interstate Transport of Goods in 2009. The MoU requires member 
states to ensure that vehicles engaged in cross-border traffic are registered in their home 
country, bear identification marks, carry a valid certificate and comply with safety and 
equipment requirements of transit and host countries. The MoU obliges parties to 
recognize the vehicle registration certificate, technical inspection certificate, establish 
control points, ensure the availability of manpower for speedy clearance of customs, 
immigration, health and foreign exchange controls, coordinate working hours at adjacent 
posts, and to designate points and ports of entry and exit and inter-state routes.  
 
The question which arises is: what are the reasons underpinning Indonesia’s participation 
in the two EAGA MoUs?  
 
A neorealist would expect Indonesia to pay attention to the calculation of relative gains 
when deciding to join the two EAGA MoUs. Could relative gains concerns explain 
Indonesia’s cooperation in the two initiatives?  If policy was guided by considerations of 
relative gains Indonesia would be expected to opt out from the BIMP-EAGA initiatives 
because they involved Malaysia, Indonesia’s near-peer competitor. Indonesia would be 
concerned that the MoU on Sea Linkages and the Transit and Inter-State Transport of 
Goods could significantly favour its partners particularly if they have better policy 
planning. As Elisabeth explains Indonesia’s economic policy related to the EAGA “is more 
like an instant policy, intended primarily to deal with problems of economic inequality 
between the western and eastern regions of Indonesia.”412 State strategies and preparation 
in the cooperation are particularly important as EAGA areas have similarities in economic 
features. These areas offer potential bases for the oil and gas industries, plantations, 
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agriculture, fisheries and forestry.
413
 Consequently, EAGA members tend to compete for 
the same market.
414
 This circumstance could potentially increase Indonesia’s sensitivity 
over relative gains concerns. Yet, Indonesia joined the EAGA initiatives. 
 
A constructivist might argue that shared identity would be attributable to Indonesia’s 
cooperation in MoUs on Sea Linkages and Transport of Goods. Does Indonesia’s 
cooperation in the two cases conform to this argument? There is a correlation between 
Indonesia’s participation in the two EAGA MoUs and the constructivist argument 
regarding shared identity to the degree that the parties to the MoUs on Sea Linkages and 
Inter-state Transport of Goods are all ASEAN member states. However, given Indonesia 
also agreed to cooperate with non-ASEAN states (for instance in defence arrangements 
with the U.S. and Australia), the constructivist argument regarding the role of shared 
identity cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of Indonesia’s cooperation. 
 
Advocates of the bureaucratic politics approach would argue that competing government 
actors’ preferences would play a crucial part in affecting Indonesia’s cooperation in the 
two EAGA MoUs. With this in mind, is it possible to link Indonesia’s cooperation in the 
two MoUs to bargaining processes among self-interested actors?  Indonesia’s cooperation 
to join sub regional cooperation under the BIMP-EAGA shows that the MoT and the MFA, 
as the lead agencies, decided to join the MoU on Establishing and Promoting Efficient and 
Integrated Sea Linkages and the MoU on Transit and Inter-State Transport of Goods 
because of the net incentives of the cooperation for Indonesia in general.
415
 If we expected 
the MFA and the MoT to act in line with the expectations of bureaucratic politics we 
would anticipate competition between government actors to take the following form. The 
MFA would be expected to oppose the two MoUs because the maritime areas covered 
include waters bordering Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. As Indonesia has not 
finalised maritime border arrangements with these two countries it could be argued that 
this would complicate the work of the MFA, particularly, if a dispute related to concern 
over maritime jurisdiction arises. The MoT on the other hand, would be expected to 
support the two EAGA MoUs because these arrangements are in line with its agenda to 
improve maritime connectivity both between Indonesia’s least developed areas in the 
central and eastern part of the country and also between other countries in the sub 
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region.
416
 In contrast to this scenario both the MFA and the MoT were in favour of both 
arrangements.  
 
The evidence shows that the MFA and the MoT preferences to support both EAGA MoUs 
were not derived from their self-benefit calculation. The MFA and the MoT actions to 
promote the MoUs on Sea Linkages and Transport of Goods were carried out as part of the 
national agenda to build a national logistic system.
417
 Such cooperation is expected to 
improve economic growth, address development gaps within these areas and at the same 
time improve the monitoring of goods transported into and out of these sub regions.
418
 The 
Indonesian Coordinating Economic Minister confirmed this, as he claimed “projects under 
the BIMP-EAGA initiative will improve food security and connectivity in the sub-region 
especially in the border areas...we want to improve the quality of life along the border 
areas in various sectors.”419 Indonesia’s EAGA areas include the North Maluku 
(Halmahera, Ternate, and Bacan), Poso and Ambon that have suffered from large scale 
sectarian violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s and Papua which has endured a 
separatist conflict since the 1960s.
420
 In support of the Coordinating Economic Ministry 
agenda to develop the eastern part of Indonesia cooperation under the EAGA also provided 
a framework for Indonesia law enforcement agencies to enhance cooperation with their 
Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines counterparts. As an Indonesian official from the 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board explained the government, in close coordination 
with their BIMP-EAGA counterparts, is attempting to bring a greater law enforcement 
presence in this maritime area to maintain order and security.
421
 In addition, an official 
from the MoT also explained that maritime security training and exercises under the two 
MoUs were very useful for a number of national agencies including Customs, Immigration 
and Quarantine, and the Marine Police.
422
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The last source of explanation to consider is the absolute gains calculation as argued by 
neoliberals. Indonesia joined the EAGA because in absolute terms the aggregate benefits 
of cooperation exceeded the costs. These cooperation initiatives bring four benefits for 
Indonesia. First, the two BIMP maritime initiatives provide training and exercise 
opportunities to Indonesian maritime agencies. These training and exercises are deemed 
highly valuable by the Indonesian government. These activities are necessary to ensure the 
success of actual coordinated border patrols, as well as, customs and immigration 
cooperation between the maritime agencies of participating states.
423
 By January 2010, 
under the CIQS forum, member countries had held 11 maritime exercises to enhance 
coordination, partnership and improve their capacity to deter terrorism and secure their 
ports.
424
 Under the BIMP framework Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also 
regularly hold joint cross-border patrol exercises to strengthen their response against 
terrorism and smuggling.
425
 Second, through this cooperation the Indonesian Navy and 
other maritime agencies received support during patrols along the coast of Sulawesi. This 
included vessels and aircraft accompanying ships on patrol and coastal coordination 
provided by customs, immigration and security agencies of Brunei, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines.
426
 Support from Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines are highly significant for 
the Indonesian government because these countries share a maritime border with 
Indonesia. The border areas between Indonesia and these countries are often used as 
corridors for terrorist suspects, militant groups, and smugglers to escape from or enter 
Indonesia.
427
 Third, cooperation arrangements under both MoUs fitted with pre-existing 
goals that the government had been unable to successfully achieve. The cooperation 
enables Indonesia to achieve these policy goals without having to make significant 
investments. These included halting smuggling and illegal seaborne migration. Assistance 
to deal with smuggling and illegal migration could be seen as an important contribution to 
Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts. As previously explained Indonesia has noted on 
various occasions the potential link between smuggling, illegal seaborne migration and 
terrorism. Smuggling and illegal migration have also been categorized as immediate 
security concerns for the government.
428
 Coordination and designation of points and ports 
of entry and exit and transit routes among the four member states assists Indonesia in 
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monitoring the illegal movement of people and goods. The two MoUs help to identify, 
detect and prevent “movement and possible apprehension of undesirable travellers” and 
goods.
429
 Finally, the EAGA initiatives assist Indonesia to develop the central and eastern 
part of Indonesia.
430
 Assistance to improve supply chain in the central and eastern part of 
Indonesia is arguably can be clustered as ancillary benefit. This benefit does not contribute 
to national counter-terrorism efforts. However, for the Indonesian government the 
improvement of maritime connectivity in these areas is a national development priority.
431
  
 
The EAGA initiatives are not costly. The two agreements do not generate substantial 
changes to Indonesia’s existing counter-terrorism cooperation. Before the launch of the 
two MoUs in 2007 and 2009 Indonesia has regularly held meetings and carried out joint 
cross-border patrol exercises with the other participating states, through bilateral and 
trilateral cooperation with Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines.
432
 The MoUs are built on 
existing bilateral and trilateral cooperation links between member states customs, 
immigration and law enforcement agencies.
433
 Indonesian officials confirmed that the 
government has long standing cooperation with the neighbouring EAGA states to curb 
various illicit activities including the smuggling of goods, arms and people.
434
 As 
explained in Chapter Two, at the domestic level Indonesian maritime agencies have 
conducted regular maritime patrols and maintain their presence in Indonesian territories 
that are parts of the EAGA growth area. Therefore, Indonesia does not need to make 
significant investment to join the EAGA’s Customs, Immigration, Quarantine, Security 
cooperation and participate in the institution’s maritime security initiatives.  
 
Surveying the requirements of both MoUs leads to a conclusion that these agreements pose 
no sovereignty costs to Indonesia as these agreements do not require Indonesia to accept 
external authority over significant decision making areas or change its governance 
structure at national level. The two agreements are already in line with the government’s 
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policies in dealing with maritime terrorism and developing the central and eastern part of 
Indonesia.
435
 As the two MoUs do not bring significant changes to Indonesia’s counter-
terrorism operations the implementation costs associated with these agreements are low. 
Before and after the signing of both MoUs Indonesia carried out similar maritime security 
policies. These two MoUs serve both as legal frameworks that govern cooperative 
activities between Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines and burden sharing 
initiatives to secure waters along their common borders. At national level, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, Indonesia’s unilateral measures to deal with maritime terrorism are already 
in place with resources allocated and patrols carried out to secure maritime areas in the 
central and eastern parts of the archipelago.  
 
In summary, Indonesia agreed to join the two EAGA initiatives because of burden sharing 
assistance provided by its cooperation partners to assist Jakarta in preventing maritime 
terrorism attacks, dealing with smuggling and illegal migration and improving maritime 
trade and growth in the eastern part of the country.  
 
 
3.6 The Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication 
(Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) 
The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia formalised a tripartite cooperation agreement to 
strengthen maritime security cooperation in the tri-border sea areas of the Sulu and 
Sulawesi Sea by signing the Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication 
Procedures agreement on May 7
th
, 2002, to which Thailand and Cambodia later acceded.
436
  
 
The Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication 
Procedures  obliges each party to: designate an organization to act as the communication 
liaison centre for the implementation of the agreement, establish communication networks 
and procedures to be used among the communication centres, relay information in an 
expeditious way, inform the arrest of a national of other parties as expeditiously as 
possible, and establish a Joint Committee to carry out administrative and operational tasks, 
set up communication procedures and implement various cooperation projects under the 
agreement. The agreement requires parties to: share passenger lists, provide access to each 
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other’s fingerprint databank, consult each other on visa waiver lists of third country 
nationals, share blacklists at visa-issuing offices, conduct joint efforts, training and 
exercises to combat terrorism, strengthen border control through designating entry and exit 
points and sea lanes, harmonize legislation to combat terrorism and conduct joint public 
diplomacy to counter terrorists’ propaganda. The agreement also articulates that the MFA 
of each country serves as a point of contact in the implementation of the agreement. 
 
What could explain Indonesia’s cooperation in this agreement? IR and foreign policy 
theories offer a number of plausible explanations including relative gains, shared identity, 
bureaucratic politics and absolute gains. 
 
A neorealist would explain that relative gains concerns would have some bearing in 
shaping Indonesia’s cooperation. Could this possibly be the case? Indonesia’s participation 
in the trilateral agreement did not reflect sensitivity over relative gains. In this agreement 
Indonesia was willing to cooperate with Malaysia, a near-peer state. Indonesia did not 
oppose the trilateral cooperation although Indonesia has unsettled maritime borders with 
Malaysia that have generated military standoffs on a number of occasions. Rather, Jakarta 
was willing to increase cooperation by stepping up joint counter-terrorism efforts and 
sharing sensitive security information with other participating states.  
 
A constructivist might be expected to argue that shared identity would affect the way 
Indonesia approach a cooperation agreement. Is Indonesia’s participation in the trilateral 
exchange consistent with the constructivist argument about the importance of shared 
identity? Indonesia’s participation in the agreement is in line with the constructivist 
argument insofar that parties to this agreement are ASEAN member states. However, 
Indonesia chose to cooperate not only with ASEAN states but also with those that do not 
share ASEAN membership, as shown in bilateral arrangements with the U.S., Japan and 
Australia discussed earlier in this chapter. This shows the limitation of shared identity in 
explaining Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join a cooperation agreement. 
 
Bureaucratic politics analysis would identify bargaining among self-interested actors as an 
important reason which explains Indonesia’s cooperation. Could it be the case that 
competing preferences among self-interested actors influenced Indonesia’s cooperation in 
this case? Indonesia’s participation in the agreement shows that the MFA decided to join 
the agreement because of the net incentives of the cooperation for Indonesia as a whole, 
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not because of its benefits for the Ministry. If bureaucratic politics was to have some 
bearing in explaining Indonesia’s cooperation we would expect to see competing 
preferences between the MFA and the MoD, the Police, and the Coordinating Ministry for 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs. It could be argued that the MFA would not be in 
favour of the information sharing agreement because the agreement does not offer any 
incentives to the ministry. In addition, cooperation activities, including capturing of 
terrorist suspects, might take place in areas with unresolved maritime boundaries. It could 
be argued that should a conflict over jurisdiction occur in unsettled border areas the MFA 
would be put in the difficult position of negotiating with other participating states. The 
other agencies involved in the inter-ministerial negotiations would be expected to be in 
favour of the cooperation agreement because their ministry would gain the benefits of 
cooperation without investing additional resources. This is because the cooperation 
agreement is built upon existing relations between Indonesian law enforcement agencies 
and their Malaysian and Philippines counterparts. However, in contrast to the bureaucratic 
politics expectation, the actual preferences of the MFA and other relevant agencies show 
that competing preferences between them did not exist. The MFA together with the MoD, 
the Police, and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
promoted Indonesia’s participation in the information sharing agreement. 
 
Officials’ statement and cooperation outcomes confirmed that the MFA decision was 
derived from the calculation of costs and benefits. MFA officials explained that sharing of 
information as well as counter-terrorism training and exercises with the neighbouring 
countries did not provide direct benefits for the MFA.
437
 However, as confirmed by 
officials from the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board, the MoD and the 
MFA these activities were crucial to support the success of Indonesia’s law enforcement 
agencies works to address maritime terrorism and their capacity building.
438
 These 
agencies include the Navy, Customs, Immigration and Quarantine, the Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board, the Sea and Coast Guard and the Police. The cooperation outcomes 
also showed that projects governed by the agreement including information exchange, 
maritime exercises and training, sharing of airline passenger lists and access to databases 
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on fingerprints were not dedicated to the Indonesian MFA.
439
 Rather, these projects were 
designed for participating states’ law enforcement agencies. 
 
Indonesia’s cooperation in this trilateral agreement is in line with the neoliberal argument 
regarding the importance of the absolute gains calculation. The evidence shows that in 
terms of the costs and benefits consideration it was absolute gains that mattered for 
Indonesia. The agreement yields two benefits for Indonesia. First, the agreement delivers 
support to Indonesian law enforcement agencies including the Navy, Police, Customs and 
Immigration agencies in carrying out counter-terrorism efforts from their Malaysian and 
the Philippines counterparts.
440
 These supports include information exchange, sharing of 
airline passenger lists and access to databases on fingerprints, visa waiver lists of third 
country nationals and forged or fake documents. Support from the Philippines and 
Malaysian authorities for the Indonesian law enforcement agencies is highly regarded by 
the Indonesian government because it is the most useful cooperation to prevent, detect and 
capture JI members and other Islamic militant groups travelling to the militants training 
camps in the Philippines through Kalimantan Timur to Sabah (Malaysia) then proceed to 
Tawi-Tawi and Sulu/Mindanao (the Philippines).
441
 Second, the agreement assists 
Indonesia in achieving policy goals that it has not managed, particularly smuggling of 
goods, arms and people.
442
 Assistance to deal with other security concerns such as 
smuggling is arguably can be clustered as a core benefit. Illegal migration and smuggling 
of arms are seen by the Indonesian government as linked to terrorism.
443
 By participating 
in the agreement Indonesia can strengthen its border control to prevent these illicit 
activities without having to make substantial investments. Parties to this agreement can 
improve their border control through the establishment of designated entry and exit points 
and sea lanes and coordination among their law enforcement units. Finally, this 
cooperation initiative provides capacity building opportunities for Indonesian maritime 
agencies. These include the establishment of joint training and exercises on combating 
terrorism and other transnational crimes. This benefit is seen as core by the Indonesian 
government. The government views cooperation among littoral states as the most ideal 
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form of cooperation. Joint training and exercises are expected to increase the security 
presence in the region and improve the degree of cooperation during maritime patrols.
444
  
 
In terms of the costs of cooperation the agreement generates low costs because of low 
sovereignty and implementation costs. The agreement does not introduce significant 
changes to the existing counter-terrorism cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. It reserves the right of each party to refuse to exchange “any particular 
information or intelligence for reasons of national security, public order or health.”445  The 
enforcement of rules is also made “without reference to a third party or international 
tribunal.”446 Since the early 1960s the concept of Maphilindo (Malaysia- the Philippines- 
Indonesia) cooperation has been introduced.
447
 Before the establishment of this agreement 
in 2002, the three governments have carried out various cooperation activities in the field 
of maritime security.
448
 The Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of 
Communication Procedures is built upon existing bilateral networks between the three 
states. The agreement aims to set up formal and direct communication channels between 
these states to enable a rapid response and improve coordination among them.
449
 It 
formalizes and improves logistical arrangements for exchanges of information and 
communication between the three countries to uncover terrorist networks.
450
 The 
agreement does not require Indonesia to make substantial changes at national level because 
as elaborated in Chapter Two, Indonesia has installed radars and allocated maritime 
agencies personnel, patrol vessels and surveillance aircraft to monitor its shared maritime 
borders with Malaysia and the Philippines. 
 
Having surveyed the changes brought by the Agreement on Information Exchange and 
Establishment of Communication Procedures to Indonesia’s counter-terrorism measures it 
is argued that the agreement poses no sovereignty costs. The establishment of this 
agreement is already in harmony with the existing government counter-terrorism policies 
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that have been low key and focused on intelligence sharing.
451
 Similarly, the 
implementation costs of this agreement are low because Indonesia is not required to make 
significant policy adjustments to comply with the agreement. 
 
To summarize, Indonesia cooperated because the agreement provides practical solutions to 
deal with terrorism and other transnational crimes along its borders with Malaysia and the 
Philippines. The cooperation outcome brought no additional costs for Indonesia and 
provided the government with support from the Philippines and Malaysia in dealing with 
cross-border terrorist movements and other trans-boundaries crimes. 
 
 
3.7 The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism 
In November 2007, the ASEAN member states including Indonesia signed the ASEAN 
Convention on Counter-Terrorism. This agreement serves as a framework for regional 
cooperation to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism. The Convention requires 
participating states to: take measures to establish jurisdiction over criminal acts of 
terrorism in their land or a vessel flying their flag, guarantee fair treatment to any person 
who is taken into custody, carry out investigations, prosecute or extradite alleged 
offenders, notify the ASEAN Secretary General regarding incidents and detention of 
offenders, establish channels of communication between agencies, share best practices on 
rehabilitative programmes, provide mutual legal assistance to investigate terrorist attacks, 
designate a coordinating agency at national level and preserve confidential information, 
documents and other records.  
 
Why did Indonesia choose to join this Convention?  The existing literature points to 
relative gains, shared identity, bureaucratic politics and absolute gains as sources of 
plausible explanations. 
  
A neorealist would expect relative gains to matter in this case. As a middle power 
Indonesia is expected to cooperate with larger or smaller states and less so with near-peer 
states. Does the evidence correspond with this expectation? Indonesia’s cooperation in the 
case of the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention is not consistent with neorealist 
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concerns over relative gains. Indonesia chose to sign the agreement despite the 
involvement of its near-peer competitors including Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 
 
A constructivist, on the other hand, would put emphasis on the importance of shared 
identity in influencing Indonesia’s decision to sign the ASEAN Convention. Could shared 
identity have any explanatory purchase in accounting for Indonesia’s cooperation?  
Indonesia’s participation in the Convention is in line with the constructivist argument 
regarding the existence of shared identity to the extent that the agreement involved 
ASEAN states. However, shared identity fails to offer an explanatory function since 
Indonesia agreed to cooperate with ASEAN states and also with non-ASEAN states, as can 
be seen in the case of the defence arrangements with the U.S. and Australia to mention a 
few. 
 
A plausible explanation offered by the bureaucratic politics approach would emphasise the 
importance of competing preferences among government actors. Did competing 
government actors’ preferences affect Indonesia’s participation in the Convention? 
Analysis of Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics shows that competing government actors’ 
preferences did not play a significant role in shaping Indonesia’s participation in the 
ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation. Indonesia’s decision to join the ASEAN 
Convention on Counter-Terrorism was shaped through inter ministerial meetings that lead 
by the MFA and involved stakeholders in counter-terrorism including the National Police, 
the MoD and the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Terrorism/BNPT).
452
 If bureaucratic politics played out in the decision 
making process we would expect to see competing preferences among government actors. 
The MFA would be expected to be less supportive of Indonesia’s participation in the 
ASEAN initiative because the agreement did not offer benefits to the ministry and 
Indonesian law enforcement authorities can cooperate with its ASEAN counterparts in the 
absence of this Convention. Arguably, we could expect the National Police, the MoD and 
the BNPT to be in favour of the Convention. The agreement could potentially assist the 
work of these agencies. The reality was quite the opposite of the bureaucratic politics 
expectation. The MFA, the Police, the MoD and the BNPT were all highly in favour of 
Indonesia’s participation in the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism. 
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The evidence also shows that decision for Indonesia to take part in the agreement was not 
based on the calculation of benefits that individual agencies could reap from the 
agreement. Rather, Indonesian governmental agencies assessed the cooperation based on 
benefits of the agreement for Indonesia as a whole.
453
 As an Indonesian official from the 
MoD explained:  
...we were talking about Indonesian interests. The 
cooperation is beneficial because it becomes the basis to 
discuss prevention against terrorist act, protection of 
buildings and other national assets, execution of anti 
terrorism operation, and de-radicalization programme... 
Indonesia is still actively halting terrorism and carrying out 
de-radicalization programmes at a domestic level, 
cooperation with neighbouring ASEAN states is deemed 
important, particularly in the area of information 
exchange.
454
 
 
This is also confirmed by an official from the MFA, as he put it “the MFA assessed 
Indonesia’s participation in the cooperation. There are benefits...not for the MFA but for 
the law enforcement... because the ASEAN cooperation is very active.”455 He further 
explained that in contrast to “a number of sleeping MoU,” where there is not much being 
done at the implementation level...the ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation is a lively 
one.”456 
 
In addition to the statements above, the actual cooperation activities under the ASEAN 
Convention confirmed that the agreement provided no benefits to the MFA as the lead 
agency. Agreed cooperation projects under the agreement cover border control, prevention 
of the use of false identities and travel documents, counter-terrorism exercises, exchange of 
intelligence information and development of regional databases.
457
 These cooperation 
projects fall under the remit of various maritime stakeholders including Customs, 
Immigration agencies, the Ministry of Transportation, the Maritime Security Coordination 
Board, the MoD and the Police.
458
 Cooperation activities governed by the agreement would 
be beneficial for these agencies as they gain support from their Southeast Asian 
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counterparts in investigating incidents, prosecuting perpetrators, preventing attacks and 
securing the country’s maritime trade.459  
 
Indonesia’s decision to join the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism can be 
explained by its concerns over absolute gains. Indonesia joined the Convention because the 
benefits of cooperation outweighed the costs. The cooperation offered three benefits to 
Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts. First, through this agreement the Indonesian law 
enforcement agencies receive support in conducting their counter-terrorism efforts at 
national level. Exchanges of information and assistance to prosecute and extradite terrorist 
perpetrators from the ASEAN member states help Indonesia to deal with terrorism; a pre-
existing policy goal in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing that it has not been fully 
achieved. Assistance from ASEAN member states is deemed highly important by the 
Indonesian government. In 2007 when the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism was 
introduced, in spite of Indonesian law enforcement’s crack down on terrorist networks and 
arresting a number of terrorist suspects, attacks and attempted attacks continue to occur. 
These include simultaneous bomb attacks at the Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Hotels in 
2009; attacks of NGOs workers in Aceh in March to November 2009; attacks on police 
station in Bekasi and Hamparan Perak in 2010; attempts to bomb churches and police 
station in Central Java in 2010; and a series of letter-bombs to public figures in 2010.
460
 In 
several of these cases the perpetrators only came to light when attacks or attempted attacks 
had taken place.
461
 As terrorist groups changed their mode of operation, from large groups 
to small cells consist of 5 to 10 people, their movements have become more difficult to 
trace.
462
 Enhanced cooperation with neighbouring ASEAN states assists Indonesia to track 
terrorist movement across its borders.
463
  
 
Second, the cooperation initiative is beneficial in assisting the Indonesian police and other 
enforcement agencies not only in curbing terrorist activities but also other transnational 
crimes that Indonesia has deemed important including smuggling and illegal seaborne 
migration without having to make additional investment.
464
 Supports from neighbouring 
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Southeast Asian states in addressing smuggling and migration could be categorized as core 
benefits. These benefits were highly valued by the government. Indonesian officials on a 
number of occasions have pointed out that illegal migration and smuggling are among the 
country’s most pressing security concerns and claimed that these issues are interlinked 
with terrorism.
465
 Indonesian officials raised concerns about the influx of refugees from the 
Middle East and South Asia to Indonesia. Their concern was that some of these refugees 
may have links with terrorist organizations.
466
 Indonesia’s concerns over the linkage 
between these two issues were taken into account as the Convention obliges participating 
states to “take appropriate measures...before granting refugee status for the purpose of 
ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the 
commission of terrorist attacks.”467  
 
In term of the net costs, the ASEAN Convention posed low costs because of low 
sovereignty and implementation costs. The agreement does not force Indonesia to act 
against its wishes because it does not dictate how Indonesia must address the terrorist 
problem within its territory.
468
 It obliges parties to carry out their duties under this 
convention in “a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign and territorial 
integrity.”469 It reserves the right of each state to perform counter-terrorism actions in its 
own territory.
470
 The agreement does not generate substantial changes to existing 
Indonesian counter-terrorism cooperation. As discussed in Chapter Two, at national level 
Indonesia already has national counter-terrorism measures in place. It has allocated 
resources to purchase security equipment, carry out regular exercises and maritime patrols 
and build new institutions. Coordination mechanisms to allow the Indonesian government 
to seek assistance from Southeast Asian states to investigate, extradite and prosecute 
terrorist suspects were already in place before the signing of the agreement in 2007.
471
 
 
Before the establishment of this Convention, Indonesia had intensively cooperated in the 
area of counter maritime terrorism with other states in the region through bilateral and sub 
regional channels.
472
 As early as December 2002 Indonesia and the Philippines had 
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discussed possible inclusion of marine police and immigration agencies in border 
monitoring, primarily involving the Navy and the Coast Guards.
473
 As explained 
previously coordination and information sharing between Indonesia and its neighbouring 
states, particularly with Malaysia and the Philippines, have been intensified through the 
signing of the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication 
Procedures in 2002 and the BIMP-EAGA MoU on Sea Linkages in 2007.  
 
Before the establishment of the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention a number of 
counter-terrorism institutions in the region have facilitated cooperation among states. 
These institutions include the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
which was established in Malaysia in 2003; and the JCLEC and the BDC, both set up in 
Indonesia in 2004.  These institutions serve as a regional hub to carry out counter-terrorism 
training, as well as monitor and disseminate intelligence information.
474
 A number of 
successful attempts to capture terrorist ring leaders also confirmed existing cooperation 
among the Southeast Asian states. In February 2003 the Indonesian police arrested Mas 
Selamat Kastari, head of the Singapore branch of JI, after they received information from 
their Singaporean counterpart.
475
 Officials from the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 
also took part in the interrogation of the JI senior operative to identify the suspect and 
assist with the investigation.
476
 Similarly, the arrest of Umar Patek, a JI senior leader in 
Pakistan in 2011 was also derived from information sharing between Indonesian and 
Philippines authorities.
477
  
 
As the Convention does not bring substantial changes it poses no sovereignty costs to 
Indonesia. The Convention does not require Indonesia to accept an external authority to 
settle disputes or regulate how Indonesia should govern its territory. Indonesia only needs 
to continue to carry out its existing security measures to deal with maritime terrorism. The 
implementation costs for Indonesia are also low. This is because the adoption of the 
Convention demands very minimal changes in Indonesia’s counter maritime terrorism 
practices. 
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In summary, Indonesia joined the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism because 
Indonesia was not required to make extra investment but in return received assistance to 
investigate, extradite and prosecute terrorist suspects and deal with illegal migrants.  
 
 
3.8 Explaining Indonesia’s Extensive Cooperation towards the ISPS Code 
The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and its Maritime Security Working Group 
developed the ISPS Code within months after 9/11 attacks.
478
 The Code was implemented 
through the adoption of a new chapter, XI-2, in the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) entitled “Special measures to enhance maritime security” in 
2002.
479
 It came into force in July 2004.  
 
The ISPS Code sets a number of mandatory obligations for government and the private 
sector within its jurisdiction to improve ship and port security. The Code requires each 
state to establish a security level and ensure the provision of security level information to 
ships, carry out port facility security assessments, approve and test ship security plans, 
develop, implement and review port facility security plans, compel all ships flying its flag 
to inform port facilities security officers of the security level of their ship, and to be 
equipped with an automatic security alert system and tracking devices.
480
  
 
Why did Indonesia choose to join the ISPS Code? This section looks at relative gains 
concerns, shared identity, bureaucratic politics and the absolute gains calculation to search 
the answer to this question. 
 
A neorealist would expect that concerns over relative gains would play the main part in the 
formulation of Indonesia’s decision to cooperate in the ISPS Code. Bearing this in mind, 
did Indonesia cooperate because of the assessment of gains in relative terms? Indonesia did 
not assess the prospect for cooperation on the basis of concerns for relative gains. 
Although the cooperation involved near-peer states such as Malaysia and Singapore 
Indonesia agreed to cooperate. The government did not raise any concern that the extensive 
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requirement of the Code would work in favour of developed countries or neighbouring 
countries including Malaysian and Singaporean ports and shipping businesses.
481
 
 
A constructivist might be expected to argue that shared identity would have some bearing 
in influencing Indonesia’s approach towards the ISPS Code. Could shared identity account 
for Indonesia’s cooperation? The constructivist argument regarding the role of shared 
identity cannot explain Indonesia’s cooperation. Despite the majority of participants in this 
case being non-ASEAN states Indonesia was willing to join the cooperation. 
 
The bureaucratic politics approach points to the role of competing government actors’ 
preferences in informing Indonesia’s decision to cooperate. Could competing actors’ 
preferences explain the way Indonesia responded to the Code? Competing government 
actors’ preferences did not define the Indonesian government approach to the Code. If we 
expected the bureaucratic politics to matter in the case of the ISPS Code we would expect 
to see bargaining among self-interested actors. If the MoT acted on the basis of its self-
interest arguably the MoT might oppose the initiative because although the ministry might 
gain assistance to develop the Sea and Coast Guard from other countries, however, this 
assistance would be used to assist the Maritime Security and Coordinating Board as the 
country future Coast Guard despite this institution does not fall under the MoT remit. More 
importantly, as explained later, the initiative generated significant additional economic 
costs for the MoT. As maritime transportation falls under the remit of the MoT this 
Ministry would bear the substantial implementation costs. In contrast to the bureaucratic 
politics expectation the MoT together with the MFA favoured Indonesia’s participation in 
the ISPS Code. Here, their actual preferences contradicted the bureaucratic politics 
expectation. The two Ministries’ preference to join the ISPS Code stemmed from the 
calculation of costs and benefits of cooperation for the country and was not derived from 
their own interests.  
 
Both the MoT and the MFA considered that Indonesia’s participation in the ISPS Code 
was important to ensure the success of the country’s international trade activities.482 The 
MoT was also aware that participation in the Code brought advantages to the nation’s 
transportation businesses including port facilities and maritime carriers since compliance 
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with the Code guaranteed that they would not be excluded from international shipping and 
could potentially lower their insurance premium rate.
483
 Participation in the ISPS Code did 
not provide direct benefits to the MoT or the MFA. Nevertheless, despite the lack of 
benefits the MoT, as the national designated authority for the implementation of the ISPS 
Code, was willing to bear the costs for promoting the initiative at national level and 
reviewing ports and ships ISPS Code compliance. Although there are costs incurred to 
meet the ISPS requirements the MoT deemed the expenditure a necessary economic 
investment.
484
 Governmental actors’ assessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation 
are consistent with the calculation of the costs and benefits.  
 
Indonesia’s participation in the ISPS Code confirms that Indonesia’s decision towards 
cooperation is best explained by the neoliberal argument regarding the calculation of 
absolute gains. Indonesia supported the initiative because, taken as a whole, the benefits of 
cooperation outweighed the costs.
485
 Although the ISPS Code required Indonesia to make 
extra investment the payoff was significant. The ISPS provides three benefits for 
Indonesia. First, compliance with the Code provides assurance for Indonesian ports and 
ships to continue to take part fully in global trade.
486
 By taking part in the ISPS Code 
Indonesian flagged ships which are equipped with the Code certificate will not be banned 
from entering other countries seaports that have complied with the Code requirements. 
Similarly, ships registered in other countries that have complied with the Code can enter 
Indonesian international seaports because these ports have met the IMO international 
security standards. This is the main incentive that the Indonesian government sought from 
its participation in the ISPS Code. This benefit is a core benefit. It is highly valued by the 
government because participation in the Code assists Indonesia to secure ports and vessels 
flying its flags and in addition, acts of non compliance would exclude Indonesian flagged 
ships and ports from international trade. This circumstance will jeopardize the economy 
since, as explained in Chapter Two, Indonesia’s export and import activities rely heavily 
on sea transport. Ships engaging in international trade need to comply with the ISPS Code 
since non ISPS ships will be denied access to a port that has implemented the Code.
487
 An 
official from the Indonesian DGST confirmed this, “a ship that has met the ISPS Code 
requirement will not dare to enter a non ISPS port. This circumstance creates an economic 
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loss for the port.”488 Two representatives of a major terminal operator in Indonesia 
confirmed this in an interview. According to them if a terminal had not complied with the 
ISPS requirement then it would be difficult for that terminal to conduct export and import 
activities. Ships involved in international trade are reluctant to enter a port that has not 
implemented the ISPS Code.
489
  
 
Second, compliance with the ISPS Code brings extra economic incentives for ports and 
vessels because the ISPS certificate is one of the requirements demand by marine 
insurance when assessing a business liability and determining insurance premium rate.
490
 
This benefit is a side payment that Indonesia gained from the counter-terrorism 
cooperation. Despite the maintenance of low insurance premium rates being highly 
regarded by the Indonesian government and businesses,
491
 it does not bring direct benefit 
to Indonesia’s counter-terrorism measures.  
 
Finally, participating in the ISPS Code assists the government in establishing a Sea and 
Coast Guard agency. Indonesian officials and government documents pointed out that the 
adoption of the ISPS Code at global level would assist with the development of Indonesia’s 
independent Sea and Coast Guard agency.
492
 This benefit can be seen as a core benefit for 
Indonesian counter maritime terrorism efforts. The establishment of a Sea and Coast Guard 
agency will improve coordination and increase its law enforcement presence at sea. After 
the political reform in 1998 Indonesia has planned to establish a civilian maritime agency 
to monitor its 17,000 islands.
493
 At present, although Indonesia is the largest archipelagic 
country in the world, it still has no Coast Guard. In the future the Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board is expected to be developed as the core of Indonesia’s Sea and Coast 
Guard agency.
494
 However, the lack of resources both in terms of human capacity and 
equipment continues to be the main hindrances for such a development. By joining the 
ISPS Code Indonesia has received capacity building support from other countries including 
Japan, the U.S. and Australia to build its Coast Guard. This includes experts’ visits, 
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training and seminars, as well as pledges from Japan to provide 137 patrol vessels and the 
U.S. to provide 5 patrol vessels and surveillance aircraft to equip the agency.
495
 
 
The implementation of the ISPS Code brought a number of changes to Indonesian port 
security practices. For the government they have to appoint security officers for 141 
international ports across the archipelago; separate international ports from other business 
activities that were not related to shipping; develop port security plans; monitor port 
security which included the use of lighting, vehicle, waterborne patrols and automatic 
intrusion-detection devices and surveillance equipment; carry out training, drills and 
exercises on port security and establish a national system to monitor compliance. In the run 
up to the ISPS Code deadline the government also allocated its resources to hold 
coordination meetings among ministries, maritime agencies, local government and 
businesses to discuss Indonesia’s preparation to adopt the ISPS Code.496 The government 
also carried out a nationwide survey to test the knowledge and understanding of local 
governments on the Code requirements and its implementation in their province.
497
  
 
Despite these changes, the ISPS Code did not require Indonesia to change the structure of 
its governance. Indonesia did not receive external authority upon important decision 
making on port security. The Code retains Indonesia’s rights to manage its own 
jurisdiction.
498
 The implementation of the ISPS relies on individual governments to adopt 
the requirements into their own national legislation. Although the Code is developed 
through the IMO system the organization does not have the authority to monitor 
compliance and impose any penalties or issue a “black list” of ports or flag states which do 
not comply with the Code’s requirements.499 The Indonesian government sets their own 
pace in meeting the Code’s requirements. Prior to the implementation of the ISPS Code 
Indonesia already had the DGST and the Indonesian Classification Bureau and the Port 
Authority (Otoritas Pelabuhan) to manage the nation’s port security. These institutions 
were appointed to form the ISPS Code enforcement system at national level.
500
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Looking at both changes and continuities brought by the ISPS Code it is argued that the 
agreement poses low sovereignty costs. Although Indonesia needs to make additional 
adjustments to meet the ISPS Code requirements the government holds the full authority to 
decide every step of the country’s compliance. Indonesia also does not need to change its 
governance structure because the government already has the required institutions. Despite 
the absence of sovereignty costs, this initiative brought high implementation costs for the 
Indonesian government. The costs incurred include additional expenses to purchase extra 
fences, install more lights, non intrusive cargo inspection devices and surveillance 
equipment as well as carry out seminars, training and drills in its international ports in 
various part of the archipelago.
501
 The initial costs to comply with the ISPS obligations for 
a port can range between US$ 3,000 and US$ 35,500,000 and the annual costs varies 
between US$ 1,000 and US$ 19,000,000.
502
 As of 2010 there were 246 port facilities and 
881 ships that have complied with the Code.
503
 By December 2011, 279 port facilities and 
1,509 ships have met the ISPS requirements.
504
 Almost 50 per cent of the total number of 
ports facilities adopted the Code early or on time to the deadline.
505
 The government 
continues to review the progress and feasibility for the adoption of the ISPS Code in all 
Indonesian ports.
506
  
 
In summary, Indonesia decided to cooperate because the absolute gains provided by the 
initiative were significant. Although the initiative generated high implementation costs, 
however, it offered significant benefits in form of assurance to Indonesian vessels and 
ports engage in international trade, lower insurance premium and assistance to set up a 
Coast Guard.  
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3.9 Explaining Indonesia’s Participation in the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards 
to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade 
On June 2005 members of the WCO unanimously adopted the WCO SAFE Framework of 
Standards.
507
 Indonesia was among the WCO members who signed the letter of intent to 
implement the WCO SAFE Framework.
508
 The Framework lies on the twin pillars of 
Customs-to-Customs network arrangements and Customs-to-Business partnerships. The 
second pillar of the SAFE Framework provides a global standard for commencing the 
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programme. All economic operators engaged in 
international trade can apply for AEO status, thus, reducing their security risk if certified.  
 
The Framework requires states to secure and facilitate trade through the implementation of 
advance electronic cargo information requirement for shipments; implement a consistent 
risk management approach to address security threats; conduct inspections of high-risk 
containers and cargo using non-intrusive detection equipment and introduce benefits to 
businesses that adopt best practices and meet minimal requirement of the WCO supply 
chain security standards. 
 
The question to ask is: why did Indonesia decide to join the SAFE Framework?  
 
A neorealist would argue that Indonesia’s decision to join the Framework stemmed from 
the calculation of relative gains. In line with the neorealist argument regarding the 
importance of relative gains concerns, Indonesia would be expected to cooperate with 
larger or smaller states and not to cooperate with near-peer states. Could relative gains 
concerns influence Indonesia’s decision to participate in this initiative? Relative gains 
concern did not inform Indonesia’s participation in the SAFE Framework. Despite the 
SAFE Framework included Indonesia’s near-peer competitors such as Malaysia, Thailand 
and Singapore Indonesia chose to join this cooperation arrangement. 
 
A constructivist might be expected to argue that shared identity would play out in affecting 
Indonesia’s approach towards a cooperation agreement. Do the findings confirm this 
expectation? Indonesia’s participation in the SAFE Framework arrangement was not 
consistent with the constructivist argument regarding the importance of share identity. 
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Shared identity did not have any bearing in this case since Indonesia chose to cooperate 
although a large number of the SAFE Framework participants are non-ASEAN states. 
 
Bureaucratic politics approach would put emphasis on the influence of competing 
government actors’ preferences over Indonesia’s decision to participate in the SAFE 
Framework arrangement. Did bargaining between government actors influence Indonesia’s 
participation in the SAFE Framework? An observation of Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics 
also shows that competing preferences between actors did not shape Indonesia’s 
cooperation in this case. Following the bureaucratic politics argument the two lead 
agencies, the MFA and Customs, would be expected to show competing interests towards 
the SAFE Framework. Indonesian Customs would be expected to support the initiative 
because the SAFE Framework was already in harmony with the Customs development 
agenda. As a high government official from the Directorate General of Customs puts it, 
“the WCO SAFE Framework is consistent with our Customs practices.”509 The MFA, 
however, would be expected to raise concerns over the implementation of the SAFE 
Framework. This would be not only because the MFA did not gain any benefits from the 
cooperation but also the MFA avoids creating any legal precedent that puts Indonesia in a 
position where it needs to receive external authority to monitor its maritime security. 
Although the SAFE Framework standards and programmes are voluntary the WCO 
established a review mechanism in the form of the WCO Diagnostic Mission.
510
 From 
February 2
nd
 - 13
th
, 2009 the WCO Diagnostic Mission visited Indonesia to survey 
Indonesia’s compliance with the SAFE Framework. The WCO diagnostic mission 
reviewed seven points concerning Indonesia’s adoption of the Framework. The seven 
points include the Indonesian Customs future strategic plan; financial management; human 
resources management (recruitment system; assessment of official’s performance and 
training); customs enforcement; national legislation; risk management procedure and post 
clearance audit (facilitation service for priority importers).
511
 As part of the review the 
Diagnostic Mission provided feedback and recommendations for Indonesia.
512
 Despite the 
initiative introducing a third party review mechanism the MFA did not block the 
arrangement. 
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In contrast to the bureaucratic politics expectation Indonesian Customs and Excise in close 
coordination with the MFA strongly supported Indonesia’s adoption of the SAFE 
Framework. They pushed the cooperation forward not for their self-benefit. Rather, both 
Ministries agreed to cooperate because of the significant incentives of the initiative for the 
country. They deemed that the initiative is useful to help create an atmosphere conducive 
to facilitate trade between Indonesia and other WCO members.
513
 By joining the 
framework and implementing the AEO programme Indonesia can establish a mutual 
recognition agreement with other WCO members.
514
 Such an agreement can facilitate the 
country’s export, exempt Indonesian cargos from time consuming physical inspections; 
and give priority status for Indonesian businesses.
515
 
 
The SAFE Framework shows that Indonesia’s behaviour towards this initiative was 
consistent with the neoliberal argument regarding the importance of the calculation of 
absolute gains. Cooperation took place because the incentives of cooperation far exceeded 
the costs. Indonesia gained two benefits by taking part in the WCO SAFE Framework. 
First, the SAFE Framework offers capacity building for Indonesia particularly through 
training and seminars on the implementation of the AEO to customs administration and the 
private sectors.
516
 Capacity building assistance to develop Indonesia’s AEO programme is 
deemed as a core benefit for the government counter-terrorism programmes. This is 
because the programme enables Customs “to focus on high risk trade whilst facilitating 
legitimate trade.”517 Recently “Indonesia has been reviewing the WCO’s AEO 
requirements.”518 Thus, taking part in the SAFE Framework provides an opportunity for 
Indonesia “to build its capacity and learning best practices from other WCO members that 
already run their AEO programme.”519 In 2011, as stated in an interview with an official, to 
improve the security of supply chains Indonesia has been focusing on attempts to 
implement the AEO Programme.
520
 According to a Customs official, at present, although 
Indonesia has issued the Ministry of Finance Act No. 219/PMK.04/2010 on customs 
procedures for AEO, Indonesia still requires “a detailed understanding on the 
implementation of the Programme, the authorization process, the recruitment of businesses 
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to be AEO.”521 Second, the SAFE Framework opens up opportunities for Indonesia to 
develop trade and industrial collaboration with businesses from overseas. An official 
claimed that a number of companies in South Korea that already have AEO status have 
asked their customs administration regarding the possibility to identify and open trade 
cooperation with companies in Indonesia that have  similar status.
522
 This type of benefit 
can be clustered as an ancillary benefit. Although mutual recognition programmes between 
companies is beneficial for business entities involved business collaborations between 
Indonesian companies and other overseas entities do not benefit Indonesia’s efforts in 
dealing with terrorism. This is an additional benefit that Indonesia can gain from joining 
the SAFE Framework.  
 
In term of costs, the Framework did not introduce high costs of cooperation. The SAFE 
Framework presents non enforceable obligations. Although the SAFE Framework is 
deemed a minimum threshold to be adopted by member states, it is implemented in 
accordance with each government’s capacity and the required legislative authority without 
a fixed deadline.
523
 It depends entirely on good faith compliance instead of strict 
provisions. All standards and programmes at national level are voluntary.
524
 Indonesia 
easily met the SAFE Framework requirements because the government Customs systems 
were already in line with the Framework, with the AEO programme as the only exception. 
First, to achieve the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information Indonesia 
adopted the WCO Data Model for its customs clearance system.
525
 Indonesia had launched 
its electronic manifest data exchange programme in 1999.
526
 Second, in terms of 
employing a risk management approach Indonesia already had its risk management 
programme before the implementation of the WCO SAFE Framework.
527
 As discussed in 
Chapter Two as part of the risk management programme Indonesia has developed its 
national importer profiling system for a long time. Since 2009 the Indonesian Customs 
began to develop its profiling system for freight forwarders and exporters.
528
 Third, to 
fulfil the non intrusive inspection of containers and cargo requirement Indonesia has been 
using large scale X-Ray, Gamma Ray and High-Co container scanners in its major 
                                                          
521
  Interview IG33  
522
  Interview IG33 
523
  WCO (2007:4) 
524
  WCO (2007: 51) 
525
  APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs (2011:19) 
526
  Interview IG32 
527
  Interview IG32; Interview IG30; Interview IG31; APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs  (2011:21) 
528
  APEC Desk of the Indonesian Customs  (2011:21) 
 131 
international ports.
529
 Finally, to offer incentives to businesses that adopt the requirement 
of the WCO supply chain security standards Indonesia is building its AEO programme. 
The programme itself is still in its developing stage. At national level the government has 
issued the Ministry of Finance Decree No.219/ PMK 04/2010 on December 9
th
, 2010 on 
the Customs treatment to company with AEO status. The Indonesian government offers a 
number of incentives for exporters, importers, customs brokers, carriers and warehouse 
that take part in AEO programme. These include an exemption from physical inspections 
of cargo; rapid transit time; access to information pertaining to AEO activities; special 
service when major disruptions to trade emerge and the threat level is elevated; and priority 
status to obtain customs service and simplification of customs procedures.
530
 Although at 
present Indonesia has not put the AEO programme into practice, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, Indonesia has established the MITA, a facilitation programme for priority importers 
since 2003.
531
 Indonesia is planning to expand the programme for exporters, whilst 
developing its AEO programme.
532
 Thus, the only implementation costs bear by the 
Indonesian government were incurred from financing training, seminars and inter-agency 
meetings on the AEO, and the introduction of this programme to businesses since 2009.
533
  
 
The absence of significant changes brought by the adoption of the framework implies that 
this initiative only generates low sovereignty costs. The Indonesian government only needs 
to continue what it has already been doing in securing supply chains. The implementation 
costs are also low because the government does not need to make additional investment or 
carry out significant changes at domestic level to comply with the framework.  
 
To summarize, Indonesia joined the initiative because it posed low costs and offered 
various capacity building training and exercises for Indonesian maritime agencies and 
opened chances to develop industrial collaboration with overseas companies.  
 
 
3.10 Explaining Indonesia’s Participation in the APEC TRP 
The APEC TRP was introduced in 2007. It defined as a “set of plans, procedures and 
arrangements developed to identify and address specific actions needed following an event 
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that disrupts trade operations.”534 The TRP is not a formal agreement that calls member 
states to sign and ratify an agreement. The APEC TRP only recommends member states to 
build a plan of action which consists of a logical sequence of steps that should be taken 
following an attack, enhance its inter-agency cooperation in the implementation of the 
TRP, identify its national points of contact (Economy Points of Contact), and maintain 
contact details and exchange information.
535
 The question to pose is: what can explain 
Indonesia’s decision to join the TRP? 
 
A neorealist would be expected to point out the crucial role of relative gains calculation in 
informing Indonesia’s cooperation in the TRP. Given Indonesia is a middle power 
Indonesia it would be more likely to cooperate with larger or smaller states and less likely 
to participate in an agreement that involved near-peer states. Does the evidence confirm the 
neorealist expectation? Contrary to the neorealist expectation, the calculation of states 
relative capabilities did not inform Indonesia’s decision in this case because Indonesia 
agreed to join the TRP despite the initiative including its near-peer competitors such as 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  
 
A constructivist would highlight the role of shared identity in affecting Indonesia’s 
decision to join the arrangement. Could shared identity explain Indonesia’s cooperation in 
the TRP? Indonesia’s participation in the TRP cannot be explained by the presence of 
shared identity among its participants. Although the TRP involved non-ASEAN states 
Indonesia chose to join it. 
 
The bureaucratic politics approach might be expected to argue that competing interests 
among different government actors is the prime mover of Indonesia’s cooperation. Could 
this explain the case? Analysis of bureaucratic politics shows that government actors’ 
preferences to participate in the TRP were not shaped by the benefits that these actors 
might gain. The decision making process related to Indonesia’s participation in the APEC 
TRP was led by the MFA and included the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs, the MoT and Customs.
536
  Bureaucratic politics might matter in the case 
of the TRP. On the one hand, the MFA could oppose the TRP. For the MFA the TRP did 
not bring any incentive for the ministry and Indonesia’s non participation would not affect 
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the existing counter-terrorism cooperation that Indonesia already had with other Asia-
Pacific countries. On the other hand, the Coordinating Ministry for Legal, Political and 
Security Affairs, the MoT and Customs could be in favour of the TRP because they could 
gain assistance to improve their counter-terrorism programmes. 
  
However, in contrast to the bureaucratic politics argument all governmental actors wanted 
Indonesia to join the cooperation arrangement. Their decision was consistent with the 
calculation of absolute gains for the country. They supported Indonesia’s participation in 
the TRP because the cooperation requirements were already in line with the national 
counter-terrorism measures that included protection of key off shore installations and port 
facilities.
537
 Therefore, Indonesia did not need to make substantial changes at national 
level. 
 
The TRP was deemed useful to accelerate maritime trade recovery in time of crisis and 
more importantly, develop Indonesia’s AEO programme.538 The MFA as a lead agency at 
national level did not gain benefits from the TRP arrangement. The TRP programmes are 
designed to improve Indonesia’s maritime agencies capacity to deal with the aftermath of 
terrorist attacks or natural disaster. As Indonesia joined the TRP, Indonesian Customs 
could gain training on the AEO. The other maritime agencies such as the MoT, the Navy, 
the Maritime Security Coordinating Board and the Marine Police can take part in the 
APEC training, seminars and capacity building workshops on trade recovery.
539
  
 
The findings suggest that Indonesia’s participation in the TRP is consistent with the 
neoliberal expectation regarding the importance of the absolute gains consideration. The 
government focus lay on what the TRP can contribute to Indonesia’s existing counter-
terrorism measures and its trade facilitation programme rather than consideration over 
relative gains concerns.
540
 The APEC TRP provided some incentives and did not require 
Indonesia to do much. The APEC TRP offers two benefits. First, the APEC TRP can help 
Indonesia to develop its AEO programme, a mutual recognition programme that served as 
a means to facilitate maritime trade.
541
 For Indonesia the trade facilitation programme is 
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the main benefit sought from the TRP. This benefit falls under the category of core benefit 
because the AEO programme allows Indonesia’s law enforcement agencies to focus on 
high risk goods. Officials confirmed that under the TRP Indonesia has focused its attention 
to implement the AEO programme that first introduced under the SAFE Framework.
542
 As 
explained earlier in this chapter although as part of the SAFE Framework Indonesia has 
started to develop the programme Indonesia still need a further understanding on the 
implementation of the AEO and the establishment of this mutual recognition programme 
with other APEC members.
543
 
 
Finally, the APEC TRP also offers trade recovery capacity building for government 
institutions.
544
 Training and workshops on trade recovery for Indonesian law enforcement 
agencies provided a core benefit for Indonesia’s counter-terrorism measures. Most counter-
terrorism arrangements focus on prevention of maritime terrorism. Under the TRP 
initiative APEC organized and financed training and workshops on recovery programmes 
after a terrorist attack or a major disaster.
545
 As part of the cooperation incentives 
Indonesian officials from Customs, Marine Police, and the MoT also received training and 
attended workshops to implement quick response and improve national trade resumption 
capability.
546
 As an Indonesian official from the MFA explained, “The APEC TRP has 
been focusing on the trade resumption programme. This is beneficial for a country like 
Indonesia that had experienced terrorist attacks in the past.”547 
 
The initiative does not introduce substantial changes to Indonesia’s efforts in dealing with 
maritime terrorism. The APEC TRP does not set intrusive obligations and it is not legally 
binding.
548
 Indonesia has decided its national point of contact, adopted national 
programmes to prevent terrorism, and used technology to support its cargo inspection 
before the TRP was introduced. As a point of contact the government already appointed 
the MFA as the point of contact in the APEC before the TRP was launched.
549
 Indonesia 
also has been using non intrusive cargo inspection devices before the establishment of the 
TRP.
550
 Indonesia did not need to carry out extensive efforts at national level to meet the 
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TRP requirements. Two years before the TRP was introduced Indonesia had consented to 
take part in the WCO SAFE Framework. As part of the SAFE Framework Indonesia has 
begun to build its preventive measures to deal with maritime terrorism and to learn about 
the AEO programme that is part of the APEC TRP. Indonesia had also been developing the 
AEO Programme before joining the APEC TRP.
551
 As Figure 3.1 demonstrates even 
without substantial policy reform the country met more than 80 per cent of the APEC TRP 
requirements.  
 
Figure 3.1 Indonesia Self Assessment on State Compliance to the APEC Collective 
Action Plan 
 
Source: The APEC Desk, the Indonesian Customs and Excise (2011: 31-32)  
 
The lack of change introduced by the TRP suggests that the sovereignty costs of this 
initiative are low. Indonesia only needs to continue its existing port and maritime security 
practices. The implementation costs of this initiative are also low since Indonesia has a 
number of measures already in line with the TRP standards prior to acceding to the 
initiative. Therefore, the government is not required to make additional adjustments to 
meet the APEC TRP standards.  
 
In summary, the Indonesian government agreed to join the initiative because it offered 
substantial absolute gains. The TRP did not demand Indonesia to do much and offered 
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assistance for the government to build its own AEO programme and to train its maritime 
agencies to deal with trade recovery following terrorist attack.  
 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
Analysis of Indonesia’s bilateral cooperation with Japan, the U.S. and Australia, and its 
participation in the BIMP-EAGA initiatives, the Agreement on Exchange of Information 
and Communication Procedures, and the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, the 
ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP shows that Indonesia’s 
participation in these arrangements was informed by the calculation of absolute gains. 
Across the cases examined in this chapter the benefits of cooperation outweighed the costs.  
 
In bilateral cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia Indonesia received additional 
equipment without making extra effort. This included aircraft, patrol boats and the 
Integrated Maritime Surveillance System from the U.S. which covers all of its important 
straits; patrol vessels, port security equipment and maritime communication system from 
Japan; and surveillance aircraft from Australia. Similarly, without having to make 
substantial changes, Indonesia gained enormous support from participating in the EAGA 
MoUs, the Agreement on Exchange of Information and the ASEAN Convention in the 
form of access to intelligence information; fingerprint, passenger, visa blacklist and bomb 
databases; coastal and naval support during patrols, and assistance to investigate and 
extradite perpetrators of terrorist acts.  
 
In both the SAFE Framework and the TRP Indonesia gained capacity building assistance 
from other participants and secretariats of the WCO and APEC, while not having to do 
much in addition to its current practice. In the case of the SAFE Framework Indonesia 
gained assistance in establishing its AEO programme. In addition, in the TRP, Indonesia 
received further training in establishing the AEO programme and ways to improve its trade 
resumption capability. In comparison to the SAFE Framework and the TRP, in the ISPS 
Code, Indonesia was expected to allocate more resources to improve the security of its 
ports and vessels, but gained a substantial payoff through the assurance of continued 
participation in global trade, the reduction of insurance premiums and assistance in 
establishing a Sea and Coast Guard agency.  
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Indonesia’s participation in all cooperation arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism 
is not consistent with the neorealist argument regarding the importance of relative gains 
concerns. The evidence shows that Indonesia was willing to cooperate with near-peer state 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand - as shown in the case of the two EAGA MoUs, 
the trilateral agreement on information exchange and the ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism - as well as with larger states - as shown in the case of bilateral arrangements 
with the U.S., Australia and Japan.  
 
The constructivist argument about the role of shared identity also cannot account for 
Indonesia’s participation across cooperation cases. Indonesia joined cooperation 
arrangements that involved non-ASEAN states, for instance three bilateral arrangements 
with the U.S., Japan and Australia, the ISPS Code, the SAFE Framework and the TRP. It 
also joined those that exclusively involved ASEAN states, such as the EAGA MoUs on 
Sea Linkages and Transport of Goods, the agreement on information exchange and the 
ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention.  
 
Bureaucratic politics is another possible alternative explanation for Indonesia’s approach 
towards cooperation. By reviewing Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics it is also shown that 
Indonesia’s decision to cooperate was not derived from competition among self-interested 
actors. The MFA was in favour of all cooperation arrangements discussed in this chapter 
although they did not offer any benefits to the ministry. In contrast to the bureaucratic 
politics literature that points to completely self-interested governmental actors, in the case 
of the ISPS for example the initiative generated high implementation costs for the MoT but 
the ministry was in favour of Indonesia’s participation.  
 
This thesis seeks to examine why Indonesia cooperates in some maritime security 
initiatives but not others. In this chapter it has been shown that Indonesia will cooperate if 
the absolute benefits are high. The next chapter examines whether this will apply to 
cooperation cases that Indonesia refused to join. 
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Chapter 4. Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation to Address Maritime Terrorism 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter explains Indonesia’s non-participation in cooperation arrangements dealing 
with maritime terrorism. Having shown in Chapters Two and Three that Indonesia has 
embarked upon a number of rigorous attempts to prevent maritime terrorism in its 
waterways and port facilities through national efforts and cooperation arrangements at 
bilateral, sub regional, regional and multilateral levels, the question to pose is: why 
Indonesia refused to participate in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
 
As explained in Chapter One the existing literature on cooperation highlighted five 
plausible explanations regarding Indonesia’s participation or non-participation in 
cooperation arrangements. These are absolute gains, relative gains, shared identity, 
hegemonic leadership and bureaucratic politics. Using government documents and 
interviews with officials and business representatives it is argued that (a) relative gains 
cannot explain Indonesia’s choice not to join the three initiatives because Indonesia refused 
to cooperate in the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI despite these initiatives being led 
by the U.S., a much larger state in comparison to Indonesia; (b) shared identity cannot 
account for Indonesia’s non-cooperation because although Indonesia rejected  the SUA 
Convention, the PSI and the CSI which did include a large number of non-ASEAN states, 
as shown in Chapter Three, it has participated in other arrangements which have involved 
non-ASEAN states such as the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP; (c) 
hegemonic leadership does not have explanatory purchase to account for Indonesia’s 
decision in all three cases because despite the U.S. proposing, initiating and enforcing rules 
in the case of the SUA Convention, the PSI and the CSI Indonesia decided not to 
participate; (d) a closer look at Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics also shows that there was 
an absence of competing preferences among government actors, mainly due to the 
prominent role of the MFA in the decision making process; whereas (e) the neoliberal 
argument on the role of the calculation of costs and benefits in absolute terms offers a 
useful explanation to understand Indonesia’s rejection of the SUA Convention, the PSI and 
the CSI. 
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To examine the reasons underpinning Indonesia’s reluctance to participate in the SUA 
Convention, the CSI and the PSI the next part of this chapter is divided into three sections 
based on these three different arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism. The SUA 
Convention was adopted in 1988, the CSI was first introduced in 2002 and the PSI was 
launched in 2003. The next section therefore begins with an explanation of Indonesia’s 
refusal to join the earliest arrangement dealing with maritime terrorism, the SUA 
Convention and the two following sections subsequently explain the reasons underpinning 
Indonesia’s rejection of the CSI and the PSI. Each section begins with an assessment of 
factors that can inform the government’s decision including the absolute gains calculation, 
the calculation of relative gains, shared identity, hegemonic leadership and government 
actors’ preferences. The final part of this chapter summarizes and highlights the 
importance of the absolute gains consideration in informing Indonesia’s decision not to 
join the three cooperation initiatives. It indicates that concerns over relative gains, shared 
identity, hegemonic leadership and bureaucratic politics are unable to explain Indonesia’s 
non-cooperation.   
 
 
4.2. Indonesia’s Non Participation in the SUA Convention and its Protocols 
The SUA Convention was formulated against the backdrop of the terrorist hijacking of the 
Achille Lauro cruise ship in October 1985 that killed a U.S. national. In November 1985, 
the maritime terrorist issue was brought to the IMO’s 14th Assembly. The U.S. proposed 
the introduction of a regulation to prevent unlawful acts at sea. The proposal was supported 
by other states and this led to the adoption of the SUA Convention in 1988.
552
  
 
The Convention requires states to criminalize unlawful acts under national legislation, 
cooperate in investigations, and extradite or prosecute alleged offenders without delay.
553
 
The SUA 1988 Protocol expands the obligations of the Convention to incorporate fixed 
platforms such as those engaged in the exploitation of offshore oil and gas.
554
 The counter 
maritime terrorism elements added within the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention take 
account of the use of any explosive or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against ships 
and the shipment of WMD material or technology.
555
 The 2005 Protocol obliges member 
states to take necessary measures to enable legal entities, including companies or 
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  IMO (6 October 2009) 
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organizations, to be made liable and to face sanctions when a person in charge of that legal 
entity commits an offence.
556
  
 
Having seen Indonesia’s participation in various cooperation arrangements dealing with 
maritime terrorism, as shown in Chapter Three, Indonesia’s rejection of the SUA 
Convention is an anomaly. What can explain Indonesia’s refusal to take part in this 
initiative? 
 
A neorealist might be expected to point out the role of relative gains concerns in shaping 
Indonesia’s decision to reject the SUA Convention. Could the relative gains calculation 
account for Indonesia’s decision in this case? The calculation of relative gains cannot 
explain Indonesia’s decision not to participate in the SUA Convention. A neorealist would 
expect to see Indonesia’s cooperation in the Convention because the military capabilities of 
the U.S. - the leading state in the cooperation - are much larger than those of Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s cooperation or non-cooperation in the SUA Convention would not be able to 
close the vast power gap between the two. In contrast to this expectation Indonesia refused 
to participate in the agreement. 
 
A constructivist might be expected to argue that shared identity is the reason underpinning 
Indonesia’s refusal to cooperate with the U.S. Could this be the case? Indonesia’s decision 
not to join the SUA Convention confirms the constructivist argument regarding the 
importance of shared identity in influencing cooperation only insofar that in this case both 
the leading state (the U.S.) and the majority of participants are non-ASEAN states. 
However, given Indonesia also chose to cooperate in various arrangements that involve a 
large numbers of non-ASEAN states (for example the WCO SAFE Framework), shared 
identity cannot explain Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join an agreement. 
 
A neorealist or neoliberal might be expected to argue that the presence of hegemonic 
leadership would inform Indonesia’s decision. Can Indonesia’s decision be attributable to 
hegemonic leadership? The empirical evidence shows that hegemonic leadership cannot 
provide a useful explanation to understand Indonesia’s rejection of the SUA Convention 
and its protocols. The U.S. played a leading role in drafting and initiating the SUA 
Convention and its 2005 Protocol. The U.S. carried out diplomatic lobbying to promote the 
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Convention, including in UN forums. An official explained that one form of U.S. 
diplomatic persuasion could be seen in the Washington proposal in 2009 to mention the 
SUA Convention in Security Council Resolution no. 1907 concerning Somalia and Eritrea. 
Indonesia rejected the insertion of the SUA Convention.
557
 Despite U.S. leadership 
Indonesia did not ratify the SUA Convention.  
 
The bureaucratic politics approach would highlight the importance of competing 
preferences among government actors as a source of explanation for Indonesia’s non-
cooperation in the SUA Convention. Is Indonesia’s non-participation in the SUA 
Convention consistent with the bureaucratic politics argument? Indonesia’s non-
participation in the SUA Convention did not reflect the influence of bureaucratic politics. 
The decision making process on the SUA Convention involved the MFA, the MoD, the 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal 
and Security Affairs and the Navy. Among governmental actors the MFA played the 
leading role in the formulation of Indonesia’s stance on the SUA Convention.558 For the 
MFA the lack of clear explanation in the SUA Convention and its protocols on state 
jurisdiction are at the heart of its concerns.  The MFA was not in favour of the initiative 
and its protocols for two reasons. First, the Ministry perceived that the Convention and its 
protocols could be used as a legal foundation to refer to unlawful acts at sea that take place 
in Indonesian waters and therefore, provide other states with power to pursuit and arrest 
vessels in Indonesia jurisdiction.
559
 The issue of jurisdiction was perceived as controversial 
since the SUA Convention could be applied to unlawful acts that take place within 
Indonesia’s EEZ and therefore contradict the UNCLOS. The MFA deemed that such legal 
precedent created by the SUA Convention and its Protocols were harmful to Indonesia’s 
autonomy as an archipelagic country. Second, the MFA did not see Indonesia’s non-
participation in the SUA Convention and its protocols as a major political concern. The 
initiative did not provide useful advantages to Indonesian maritime law enforcement 
agencies. Indonesia could gain the benefits of cooperation through other counter-maritime 
terrorism initiatives at bilateral, regional and global level.
560
  
 
However, the SUA Convention would not bring additional implementation costs for other 
governmental agencies. It could be argued that if Indonesia joined the Convention the 
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MoD and the Navy would not need to make additional investment in new maritime 
security measures. If these agencies decided to act based on their self-interest they might 
oppose the MFA’s preference for non-cooperation. Nevertheless, contrary to the 
expectations of the bureaucratic politics literature, these government agencies supported 
Indonesia’s non-participation in the initiative. Other ministries involved in the inter-
ministerial meeting agreed with the MFA assessment of the agreement. This was 
confirmed in an interview with a former government official from the MoD who was 
involved in the decisions making process. He claimed that in the forum other ministries 
and maritime agencies were in agreement with the MFA legal interpretation of the 
Convention and its protocol.
561
 Therefore, Indonesia’s stance on the SUA Convention and 
its Protocols could be formulated in a fast manner. 
 
The neoliberal argument regarding the role of absolute gains in informing states 
cooperation provides the final plausible explanation to consider. Could the absolute gains 
calculation shed lights on the reasons underlying Indonesia’s refusal to join the 
Convention? Indonesia’s rejection of the SUA Convention and its protocols is consistent 
with the expectation set out in the introduction of this thesis regarding the neoliberal 
argument on the role of absolute gains. The initiative brought low incentives for Indonesia. 
The SUA Convention and its protocols provide mechanisms to coordinate actions, policies, 
rules and standards among states to cope with maritime terrorism problems. The initiative 
offered low incentives for Indonesia since it did not provide tangible economic or security 
incentives.
562
 The incentives to join the initiative was further diminished as Indonesia had 
already joined a number of anti maritime terrorism initiatives at bilateral, sub regional, 
regional and multilateral levels including the ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework, and 
the APEC TRP. Indonesia can gain the benefits of cooperation through these cooperation 
channels. 
 
With regards to the costs of cooperation, the SUA Convention and its protocols do not 
require Indonesia to install new security measures or purchase security devices. 
Indonesia’s national law is already compatible with SUA obligations to criminalize 
unlawful acts at sea. Chapter 29 of the Statute of the Criminal Law (Article 438-479) 
criminalizes various forms of unlawful acts at sea.
563
 In addition, Government Regulation 
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No.1/2002, on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism, deals with the problem pertaining 
to the use and transfer of WMD and terrorist acts against ships.
564
 Despite these elements 
of continuity, a careful reading of the Convention shows that it would introduce substantial 
changes to Indonesia’s counter-maritime terrorism policies. First, the Convention regulates 
how a state must deal with unlawful acts within its jurisdiction. Article 4 of the SUA 
Convention suggested that this agreement applies “if the ship is navigating or is scheduled 
to navigate... beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea.”565 Thus, the Convention could 
be applied to crimes/acts of violence/piratical acts that occur within 12 nautical miles (nm) 
from the baseline through to the state’s outer limit jurisdiction (200 nm from the baseline). 
This SUA Convention stipulation contradicts Article 101 of the UNCLOS that provides the 
Indonesian government rights to manage and deal with maritime issues that take place 
beyond the territorial water and within a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or 
between 12 – 200 nm. There was a concern that this Convention and its protocols could be 
used inappropriately to refer to unlawful acts which take place in Indonesia’s EEZ and 
therefore, posed limits on Indonesia’s rights in securing its maritime EEZ area.566 
Indonesia decided not to participate in this initiative and refused any possibility to include 
the SUA Convention in any cooperation documents, particularly, drafts of UN resolutions. 
Second, the Convention obliges parties to receive the presence of external authority over 
significant decision making when disputes over interpretation and implementation of the 
agreement occur. The SUA Convention explicitly delegates authority to settle dispute to an 
international tribunal. 
 
Reviewing the changes imposed by the SUA Convention led to a conclusion that this 
agreement poses high sovereignty costs for Indonesia. The implementation of the 
agreement could lessen state’s autonomy to address unlawful acts that take place within its 
jurisdiction. Despite the high sovereignty costs, the Convention generated low 
implementation costs. This is because at national level Indonesia’s legislation is already in 
line with the Convention. Indonesia is also not required to make additional investment, for 
example to purchase new devices, to join the agreement.  
 
In summary, Indonesia refused to join the SUA Convention because the Convention could 
limit Indonesia’s autonomy. This is because the Convention could potentially change 
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Indonesia’s rights in controlling the security of its EEZ and compel Indonesia to accept the 
authority of an independent third party over dispute settlement.  
 
 
4.3 Indonesia’s Refusal to Join the CSI 
The CSI was introduced by the U.S. in 2002 and came into effect in January 2003. The 
main purpose of the initiative is to increase security for containerized cargo shipped to the 
U.S. from around the world by targeting and pre-screening the containers before they reach 
U.S. ports. The CSI requires government to allow the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) to place teams of U.S. officers from both the CBP and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) to jointly work with host foreign government counterparts in pre-
screening containers bound for U.S. ports, purchase pre-screening equipment and 
radiological and nuclear detection devices, build IT infrastructure to support the 
implementation of the initiative and provide a full descriptions of the cargoes 24 hours in 
advance of its scheduled arrival in U.S. ports, and share critical data, intelligence and risk 
management information with the U.S. CBP.
567
  
 
Given Indonesia’s willingness to join cooperation arrangements to address maritime 
terrorism, as previously explained in Chapter Three, Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the 
CSI at first is difficult to understand. Why did Indonesia choose not to take part in this 
initiative? 
 
A neorealist might be expected to emphasise the role of relative gains calculation in 
shaping Indonesia’s rejection of the CSI. Since Indonesia is a middle power, cooperation 
would be expected with larger or smaller states. This is because the power disparity 
between Indonesia and smaller or larger states would be wide. Could Indonesia’s rejection 
of the CSI confirm this expectation? For a neorealist, the power disparity between 
Indonesia and the U.S. is simply vast. Indonesia’s participation in the CSI would not be 
able to close the power gap between the two. If Indonesia acted according to the neorealist 
expectation Indonesia would agree to join the CSI because the U.S. is by far a larger state 
in comparison to Indonesia. Contrary to this expectation Indonesia refused to participate in 
the initiative.  
 
                                                          
567
  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (8 May 2010); Rosenberg and Chung (2008:53); U.S. 
CBP (2006: 19, 21-23); P. Barnes and R. Oloruntoba (2005:523); U.S. CBP (2 October 2007) 
 145 
A constructivist would argue that shared identity would define Indonesia’s decision to 
reject the CSI. Would it be possible that shared identity played the main part in Indonesia’s 
refusal to join the CSI? Indonesia’s act of non cooperation confirms the constructivist 
argument about the importance of shared identity as a source of cooperation only to the 
extent that the U.S. as a leading state and the majority of the participating states are not 
ASEAN states. However, since Indonesia also agreed to join various arrangements that 
involve non-ASEAN states (for instance the WCO SAFE Framework among others that 
explained in Chapter Three), the constructivist argument regarding the role of shared 
identity shows a lack of explanatory purchase when explaining Indonesia’s non-
cooperation. 
 
Both a neorealist and a neoliberal might be expected to argue that the presence of 
hegemonic leadership would be sufficient to convince Indonesia to cooperate. Did 
hegemonic leadership affect the way Indonesia approached this initiative? Indonesia’s 
decision not to join the CSI was not informed by hegemonic leadership. The U.S. exercised 
its leadership by formulating the initiative, enforcing rules and using its diplomatic 
persuasion. Compliance in the case of the CSI is not based only on parties’ good faith but 
on enforceable rules. The U.S. CBP makes regular assessment on a state compliance to the 
initiative.
568
 Only those that meet all the minimal requirements are eligible to be part of the 
programme.
569
 The U.S. CBP and ICE teams deployed at the foreign ports serve as the 
enforcer of the initiative because they have the authority to pre-screen high risk cargo 
bound for the U.S. In addition to the deployment of the U.S. Customs team to monitor 
compliance the U.S. CBP established an Evaluations and Assessments Branch (EAB). The 
EAB carries out periodic assessment at least every two years to investigate operational CSI 
ports, examine the effectiveness of the CSI programme, and ensure effective coordination 
with foreign host governments.
570
 The EAB examines the development, examination, and 
administrative activities at the ports.
571
 Upon the completion of the port evaluation the 
EAB submits a report, recommendations, and an action plan for implementing 
recommendations.
572
 After the launch of the CSI the U.S. carried out diplomatic persuasion 
and lobbying. The U.S. contacted a number of Indonesian government institutions 
including the MFA, the MoD, the Ministry of Industry, the Customs and Excise and the 
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MoT and explained the benefits of incorporating Indonesian ports in the CSI.
573
 The U.S. 
in particular focused their persuasion on two Indonesian government institutions that are 
responsible for the country’s seaborne containers: the Customs and Excise and the MoT.574 
Nevertheless, despite U.S. leadership Indonesia refused to participate in the CSI. 
 
Proponents of the bureaucratic politics approach would argue that competing government 
actor preferences would have some bearing in informing Indonesia’s decision. Could 
competing preferences among government actors explain Indonesia’s rejection of the CSI? 
Analysis of Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics shows that the refusal to join the CSI was not 
informed by competing government actors’ preferences. It could be argued that 
bureaucratic politics would have some bearing in shaping Indonesia’s decision not to 
cooperate in the CSI. Governmental actors involved in the policy process were the MFA, 
the MoT and the Customs. The MFA opposed the CSI because the legal requirements 
under the CSI were deemed very intrusive.
575
 These requirements include the placement of 
the U.S. Customs team and periodic assessment in Indonesian ports. Following the 
bureaucratic politics argument on the importance of self-interest, the MoT would be 
expected to be indifferent because the CSI would not affect the country’s shipping lines. 
Most Indonesian ships involved in inter-state shipping function as feeder ships from 
Indonesian ports to neighbouring countries ports, or vice-versa and therefore, do not serve 
direct shipping from Indonesia to U.S. ports.
576
 However, Customs would be expected to 
support the CSI. The CSI could provide benefits to Customs’ domestic constituents, 
particularly exporters. Taking part in the CSI suggests that all cargo from the CSI port 
bound to the U.S. can be delivered directly to U.S. ports. In the case when transshipment 
takes place in Singapore or Malaysia CSI ports, containers from an Indonesian CSI 
certified port will not have to go through inspection. Therefore, in this context for Customs 
participation in the CSI could potentially guarantee exporters shorter waiting times at U.S. 
ports or other CSI transshipment port, priority lane in the case of a terrorist attack, and no 
delay due to physical inspection of cargo at the U.S. ports or at transshipment point. This 
treatment translates into lower costs for exporters. Yet, in contrast to the bureaucratic 
politics expectation Indonesian Customs was not in favoured of the CSI.  
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The MFA, the MoT and the Customs opposed Indonesia’s participation in the CSI because 
of the lack of incentives for Indonesia as a whole. These agencies took into account the 
costs and benefits of cooperation for Indonesian businesses and for the government when 
assessing the initiative. The MoT and Customs deemed that there was no urgency to join 
the initiative for the sake of promoting the national shippers and shipowners’ interests. The 
businesses export activities to the U.S. could be made through transshipment via CSI ports 
including Singapore, Port Kelang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. Over 75 per cent of 
containers from Indonesia bound to the U.S. were already transshipped through 
Singapore.
577
 However, this practice is not new for Indonesian businesses. This method of 
shipping has been used to muddle through the nation’s shortage of international shipping 
capacity. Only a very small portion of Indonesian exports to the U.S. are transported 
through direct shipping. As Figure 4.3 shows, on average Indonesia’s direct shipping to the 
U.S. only reaches less than 1 per cent of the country’s total exports.  
 
More importantly, the Indonesian Customs also raised concerns over possible additional 
economic costs that the government would endure if a delay occurs due to the security 
screening process. A government official from the Customs claimed that if Indonesia 
participates in the CSI the government has to anticipate the “additional cost that may incur 
to the shippers and guarantee no delay will occur. Similar to Singapore who can guarantee 
Indonesian export inspected in Singapore will not be subjected to any delay.”578 The 
assessment made by governmental actors shows clearly that their preferences not to 
participate were not shaped by self-interest. Rather, governmental actors’ preferences were 
derived from the consideration of aggregate costs and benefits for Indonesia as a whole.  
 
The empirical findings show that Indonesia’s decision not to participate in the CSI was 
consistent with the consideration of absolute gains as argued by neoliberalism. The total 
benefits offered by the CSI did not exceed the costs of cooperation. Concerning incentives 
of cooperation the CSI generated only low benefits. By participating as a CSI port, states 
will gain economic benefits, allowing containers shipped to “quickly enter into commerce 
in the United States.”579  If a terrorist attack takes place, containers coming from CSI ports 
will be given “special continuity considerations” and “received facilitated handling at ports 
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of entry.”580 Incentives of cooperation offered by the CSI could be economically rewarding 
for a state that relies on containerized trade such as Indonesia. Containerized trade is very 
important for Indonesia’s economy because more than 90 per cent of Indonesia’s export 
cargo is carried out by sea, as showed in Figure 4.1.
581
  
  
Figure 4.1 Indonesia Seaborne Trade: Percentages of National Exports 
 
Source: Adapted from the Indonesian Ministry of Trade (2011) 
 
The country’s exports to the U.S. are also very significant and accounts for 12.3 per cent of 
Indonesia’s total export (see Figure 4.2).582 
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Figure 4.2 The Value of Indonesia-U.S. International Trade: Percentages of National 
Export and Import (in %) 
 
Source: Adapted from the Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Trade (2011) 
 
Despite the economic incentives offered by the CSI the Indonesian government perceived 
that the initiative provided fairly low incentives. This is because without the government 
participation in the CSI containers from Indonesia can have unimpeded access to U.S. 
market. The majority of Indonesian export shipments to the U.S. are via the trans-shipment 
ports of Singapore and/ or the Malaysian ports of Port Klang and Port Tanjung Pelepas, all 
of which comply with the CSI framework. This circumstance reduced the incentives to 
cooperate. The incentives for cooperation were further reduced because Indonesian 
businesses already follow other U.S. security initiatives such as the C-TPAT (Customs-
Trade Partnership against Terrorism) and the 24 Hours Rule.
583
 These initiatives do not 
require the cooperation of the Indonesian government.  
 
In addition, the implementation of the CSI did not impede the small amount of direct 
shipping from Indonesia to the U.S. as shown in Figure 4.3. A number of port facilities that 
have had their security and compliance to the ISPS Code verified by the U.S. Coast Guard 
under the International Port Security (IPS) Programme could carry out direct shipping to 
the U.S.
584
 For detailed information on port facilities that had been visited by the U.S. 
Coast Guard see Appendix V. Indonesia decided not to join the CSI as the low benefits of 
the initiative could not outweigh the costs.  
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Figure 4.3 Indonesian Direct Shipment to the U.S.: Percentage of Total Seaborne 
Export (in %) 
 
Source: Adapted from the Indonesian Directorate General of Sea Transportation (2010b:3, 
10) 
 
The CSI is highly costly because it can introduce significant changes. The practice of 
placing the U.S. CBP officials in Indonesia’s strategic sites such as the country’s major 
international ports as part of the CSI key requirements would be the main change that this 
initiative could bring.
585
 Indonesian high government officials explained that as part of this 
initiative Indonesia would need to accept external authority in the decision making 
process.
586
 As the practice of placing a team of foreign customs in a port to work together 
with the Indonesian officials has never existed before, the government would need to 
formulate new legislation to support its implementation and adjust its port security 
governance to accommodate the presence of U.S. CBP team.
587
 Apart from accepting the 
CBP team, the Indonesian government would also need to purchase automated advance 
devices to share information and target high risk containers that meet the CSI minimal 
requirements. Although Indonesia already has non intrusive pre-screening devices such as 
X-Ray and Gamma-Ray, however, its international ports are not equipped with radiation 
detection devices. In addition, the government would also have to ensure that CSI targeting 
and pre-screening of containers at the port of departure would not cause delays for the 
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shippers and compensate if such incidents occur.
588
 The Indonesian government would 
expect to spend an extra annual cost of at least US$ 1 million to meet the CSI containers 
pre-screening requirements.
589
  
 
The changes brought by the CSI agreement would impose high sovereignty costs. 
Indonesia would need to accept the presence of external authority to monitor its port 
security. This initiative would also generate high implementation costs. If Indonesia joins 
the CSI the economic burden for implementing this initiative rests on the Indonesian 
government. The government would need to make additional investment to purchase new 
equipment, train its human resources to work alongside the CBP team and prepare a 
compensation fund for businesses if the screening process caused them financial loss.
 590
  
 
To summarize, Indonesia’s refusal to join the CSI was influenced by the high costs of 
participation and lack of benefits. The CSI was significantly costly as it required Indonesia 
to purchase new equipment, use certain IT system, accept the presence of U.S. CBP team 
in its port, and to go through periodical reviews. However, it did not offer attractive gains 
for Indonesia. Indonesia could gain the benefits offered by the initiative through carrying 
out transshipment of containers from Malaysian and Singaporean CSI ports. 
 
 
4.4  Indonesia’s Rejection to Join the PSI 
President George W. Bush announced the PSI on May 31
st
, 2003 in Cracow, Poland. The 
PSI does not state fixed requirements for participating states. A state can choose to 
participate in various ways. These options range from taking part in PSI training exercises, 
identifying specific national assets that might contribute to PSI activities, providing 
consent to other states to board and search its flagged vessels to taking part in actual PSI 
operation to intercept vessels flying their flag in internal waters or territorial seas or areas 
beyond the territorial seas of other state that suspected of carrying the WMD-related 
cargoes.
591
 Member states of the PSI form the Operational Expert Group (OEG) in 
managing cooperation activities among them.
592
 This body meets periodically to “develop 
operational concepts, organize the interdiction exercise programme, share information 
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about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industry sectors.”593 The 
OEG consists of experts from the defence, foreign affairs, law enforcement, transport and 
other agencies of PSI countries.
594
 
 
As shown in Chapter Three Indonesia has been willing to join arrangements to address 
maritime terrorism, the question arises as to why Indonesia chose not to join the PSI? 
 
A neorealist would expect relative gains concerns to play an important part in shaping 
Indonesia’s rejection of the PSI. Would it be possible to explain Indonesia’s refusal to join 
the PSI by assessing the calculation of relative gains? Indonesia’s approach towards the 
PSI does not conform to the neorealist expectation regarding the role of relative gains 
concerns. Because Indonesia is a middle power a neorealist would expect to see 
cooperation materialize between Indonesia and larger or smaller states. In this case 
Indonesia’s participation in the PSI is expected as the initiative is led by the U.S., a much 
larger state than Indonesia. Relative gains should not matter in the case of the PSI because 
the power gap between Indonesia and the U.S. is simply too wide. Yet, in contrast to the 
neorealist expectation Indonesia refused to cooperate in the PSI. 
 
A constructivist would argue that shared identity informed Indonesia’s non-cooperation in 
the PSI. Could shared identity account for Indonesia’s refusal to join the PSI? There is a 
correlation between Indonesia’s non-participation in the PSI with the constructivist 
expectation regarding the importance of shared identity only to the extent that the led 
country in the initiative, the U.S. and most participants of the PSI are not ASEAN member 
states. However, as shown in Chapter Three, since Indonesia agreed to cooperate with 
countries that do not share Indonesia’s enthusiasm for the “ASEAN way” identity (for 
instance in the case of the APEC TRP), shared identity cannot explain Indonesia’s 
cooperation or non-cooperation beyond a few cases. 
 
A neorealist and a neoliberal might be expected to highlight the importance of hegemonic 
leadership as a source of cooperation. Could hegemonic leadership explain Indonesia’s 
approach to the PSI? The empirical evidence shows that hegemonic leadership cannot 
explain Indonesia’s rejection of the PSI. The U.S. has proposed the initiative; contributed 
military, customs, law enforcement, and other security experts and assets to interdiction 
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exercises; hosted PSI meetings, workshops, and exercises with other PSI-endorsing states; 
and worked to improve other participants’ counter proliferation capacity.595 More 
importantly, the U.S. has played an important role in enforcing the PSI rules. In its attempt 
to further operationalize the PSI and considerably enhance its reach to interdict ships with 
WMD cargoes the U.S. has concluded bilateral ship boarding agreements with the world’s 
important flag states.
596
 These include Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Panama, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.
597
 Panama, Liberia and Marshall Islands are the top three largest shipping 
registries, with Malta ranked seventh, Bahamas eighth and Cyprus ten.
598
 In some of these 
arrangements, if the participating state fails to answer the U.S. interdiction request, the 
U.S. could still proceed and board the suspected vessel within a couple of hours after the 
flag state received the U.S. request.
599
 The U.S. is the only PSI member that has so far 
made such agreements.
600
 These agreements show U.S. leadership in which the 
government used its advantage in diplomatic and legal resources to enforce the PSI 
rules.
601
 It would be highly unlikely for the participants of the PSI to refuse a U.S. request 
to interdict a vessel, or for any of them to seek the U.S. consensus to board and inspect a 
U.S. vessel.
602
 
 
The U.S. also carried out active diplomatic persuasion to encourage Indonesia to take part 
in the PSI to allow a focus on the interdiction of ships suspected of transporting WMD. In 
March 2006, Condoleezza Rice visited Jakarta. The U.S. Secretary of State conveyed the 
U.S. request for Indonesia to take part in PSI to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hassan 
Wirayuda. The MFA spokeperson Desra Percaya, on March 16
th, 2006 stated Indonesia’s 
rejection of the U.S. request.
603
 The U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant to the U.S. Secretary 
of State for international security and non proliferation Patricia McNerney, during her visit 
to discuss non proliferation and the issue of a nuclear Iran with Indonesian officials, in 
Jakarta in August 2006 sought to assure the Indonesian government that the initiative 
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would not undermine the sovereignty of any country.
604
 Interviews confirm that U.S. 
government officials from both the U.S. Defence and State Department conducted 
diplomatic persuasion to convince Indonesian decision makers.
605
 Nevertheless, despite 
U.S. persuasion Indonesia did not join the PSI.  
 
Bureaucratic politics analysis would be expected to put emphasis on the importance of 
bargaining among self-interested government actors in explaining Indonesia’s decision not 
to join the PSI. Could government actors’ competing preferences account for Indonesia’s 
non-cooperation in this case? An analysis of Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics shows that 
competing interests among governmental actors did not inform the government decision. If 
we took the bureaucratic politics argument into consideration there was a possibility that it 
might influence Indonesia’s decision. Indonesia decision making process pertaining to the 
PSI was shaped by governmental actors, represented by the MFA and the MoD. The PSI 
negotiation fell under the two Ministries’ remit.606 In harmony with the MFA policy 
regarding the SUA Convention this Ministry would be expected to oppose the PSI. Taking 
part in the PSI suggests that Indonesia could be subjected to U.S demands to carry out 
interdiction upon ships plying through the archipelagic’ waterways and ships registered 
under its flag.
607
 Such acts may create legal precedent that challenge Indonesia’s rights to 
secure its sea lanes as granted by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The MoD 
preference could differ from the MFA. Following the bureaucratic politics argument on 
self-regarding actor the MoD might support the PSI because the initiative did not generate 
additional costs for this Ministry. As explained in Chapter Three, through the bilateral 
defence arrangement Indonesia has cooperated extensively with the U.S. in the area of 
counter-terrorism. However, despite the absence of potential costs for the MoD to put the 
cooperation forward the MoD rejected Indonesia’s participation in the PSI. 
 
The evidence shows that both Ministries opposed the PSI not because of their self-interest 
but because of the lack of incentives for the country as a whole. The MFA and the MoD 
assessment of the PSI highlighted the high economic costs of the cooperation, potential 
challenges to current convention on the law of the sea, and lack of incentives to Indonesian 
maritime agencies. First, the two governmental actors’ actions were consistent with the 
calculation of economic risks posed by the PSI. One of the main economic concerns for the 
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two Ministries was compensation for delays to shipments or damage of goods to 
businesses in interdiction case. The Indonesian government was not willing to bear 
additional economic costs of interdiction.
 608
  
 
Second, government officials from both ministries deemed the U.S. led initiative could set 
a legal precedent that challenge the Law of the Sea regime, in particular through the 
application of the PSI “interdiction” principles.609 The Law of the Sea granted Indonesia as 
archipelagic state rights to manage and secure both its territorial water and its EEZ.  A 
senior government official from the MoD involved in the decision making process claimed 
that “the Law of the Sea provides the legal foundation for Indonesia as an archipelagic 
state. Thus, we have to uphold it.”610 Both the MFA and the MoD avoid creating any 
precedent for other country to involve in any form of interdiction of ships in Indonesia’s 
EEZ.
611
 
 
Finally, both ministries considered that without taking part in the PSI Indonesian law 
enforcement agencies could gain the benefit of cooperation with the U.S. through bilateral 
and regional channels.
612
 As explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the Indonesian MoD and 
other law enforcement agencies including the MoT’s Sea and Coast Guard unit, the Navy, 
the Customs and Excise and the Maritime Security Coordination Board can gain the 
benefits of cooperation through bilateral cooperation with the U.S. This reduced the 
incentives to join the PSI.  
 
The MFA and the MoD assessment of the PSI were consistent with the neoliberal account 
of the calculation of costs and benefits. Their opposition to the PSI was derived from the 
lack of incentives for the nation. Due to the similarity of policy preferences it was very 
easy for the MoD and the MFA to object to the PSI.
613
 The decision was formulated in a 
fast manner and was settled at a routine fortnightly MoD forum. Therefore, an inter-
ministerial meeting specially organized to discuss PSI was not required, nor was a special 
meeting organized at the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
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level or the Secretary of State level necessary.
614
 The PSI was discussed among other 
security and defence matters by the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
the Commander of Armed Forces, National Police, the MoT, the Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board and the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.
615
 Other 
governmental actors did not oppose the MoD and the MFA policy preferences.  
 
The neoliberal argument regarding the role of absolute gains presents the final plausible 
explanation to take into account. Did Indonesia choose not to participate in the PSI because 
of the calculation of the absolute gains? The evidence advances the neoliberal argument 
regarding the importance of absolute gains calculation. The initiative demanded Indonesia 
to do more than it already was, but did not offer adequate compensation for doing more. 
With regards to benefits of cooperation, the PSI offered low incentives. The PSI provided a 
number of cooperation incentives including potential capacity building for Indonesian 
maritime agencies and eligibility to participate in PSI exercises and information sharing. 
However, the Indonesian government deemed that these incentives to cooperate were low 
because Indonesia could reap the benefit of cooperation in halting maritime terrorism, 
particularly with the U.S., through other  arrangements at bilateral and regional level, for 
example through the bilateral Defence Arrangement and the ARF. The benefits of 
cooperation were further reduced as Indonesia has already participated in other cooperation 
channels that aim to prevent proliferation of WMD. Indonesia is party to a number of 
multilateral initiatives designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons including the 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure on Aircraft (1970), the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) and the Non 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1970).
616
 An official from the Indonesian Marine Police stated 
“we already have NPT...why do we have to take part in another cooperation 
arrangement.”617 A high government official from the Indonesian Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board for instance pointed out to the repetitive character of PSI. He 
suggested that provisions embedded within the PSI “have been addressed elsewhere in 
other international conventions and protocols. Therefore, Indonesia did not feel compelled 
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to take part in PSI.”618 In addition, the PSI activities are aimed at preventing the 
proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems or related materials. The activities covered 
by the initiative including exercises and interdiction are designed around this purpose.
619
 
As explained in Chapter Two, for Indonesia, the proliferation of WMD is not a priority 
issue and, therefore, cooperation activities designed to deal with this problem would do 
little to assist Jakarta in addressing its maritime security concerns.
620
  
 
The initiative is a costly cooperation. The PSI poses high sovereignty costs because 
although it does not provide mandatory requirements or require a state to accept a third 
party in their decision making process the PSI can limit Indonesia’s rights in controlling 
security over their waters as granted by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. As explained 
earlier in this chapter participants can choose and therefore, limit their mode of 
engagement. However, as explained by Indonesian officials, government document and 
security experts, if Indonesia joined the arrangement and chose not to join any interdiction 
activities the government would still need to answer to its cooperation partners, primarily 
the U.S., demands to cooperate if suspected vessels were registered under the Indonesian 
flag or navigating through Indonesian waters.
621
 Such incidents could create legal 
precedents that challenge Indonesia’s rights as a costal state or a flag state to maintain full 
control over the security of its waters and ships registered under its flag.  
 
In addition to the high sovereignty costs, this initiative can bring high implementation costs 
particularly when a participating state receives a request from another to carry out 
interdiction either in their waters or for vessels flying its flag. Economically, 
implementation of the PSI was deemed as too costly by the Indonesian government, as the 
principal actor that would bear the cost of implementation. Interdiction may cause 
additional economic costs because of delays to shipments or damage of goods; particularly 
in the case of a false alert.
622
 This concern was not unique to Indonesia; for example in 
Singapore, a contracting party to the PSI, concern over this matter was carefully discussed 
between government and businesses.
623
 One issue was potential additional costs and which 
stakeholder was going to pay (government, loading port, shipping lines or shippers) when 
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additional expenses arise.
624
 In Singapore businesses were prepared to perform their best to 
cooperate with any attempt to halt maritime terrorism but shipping industries were not 
willing to pay all the costs. The prevailing problem in the case of interdiction is “how the 
businesses should be compensated.”625 The same issue was a concern for the Indonesian 
government, as explained in Chapter Two hundreds of ships traverse Indonesian waters 
everyday, if one of these ships is interdicted in Indonesian waters the Indonesian 
government could be held responsible for the act.
626
 In addition, as previously explained in 
Chapter Two, thousands of vessels travelling around the world are registered under the 
Indonesian flag. Therefore, as a flag state, if Indonesia provides its consent for an act of 
interdiction to take place on board of ships flying its flag the government can be made 
responsible for economic loss caused by such act.
627
 An Indonesian government official 
closely involved in maritime affairs explained that “most actions conducted under the PSI 
framework are based on intelligence information that is sometimes inaccurate. If an act of 
interdiction takes place on board a ship and the Indonesian government is charged for any 
delay or damage resulting from the interdiction who would compensate the shippers.”628 
 
In summary, the key findings presented in this section highlight that Indonesia did not join 
the PSI because it is a costly initiative. It curbs Indonesia’s rights both as a major flag state 
and as a costal state, and creates additional costs through compensating businesses due to 
shipments being delayed or damaged through interdiction activities without providing an 
adequate payoff. Indonesia could also gain the benefits offered by this arrangement 
through its bilateral defence arrangement with the U.S.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Indonesia’s decision not to join the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI corresponded 
with the absolute gains provided by these arrangements. The SUA Convention, the CSI 
and the PSI required Indonesia to do more than it already was, but did not offer adequate 
compensation. The SUA Convention regulated how Indonesia must act within its 
jurisdiction and expected it to accept authority of international tribunal to settle dispute, but 
did not provide any concrete economic or security incentives. The CSI case presented high 
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costs because the initiative demanded Indonesia to place a U.S. Customs team in major 
international ports, purchase pre-screening, radiation and nuclear detection devices and 
build a specific IT system, but did not offer sufficient benefits. In the PSI Indonesia was 
faced with risks of having its rights as a coastal or flag state changed and providing 
compensation to businesses in case of false alert interdiction, while not gaining much 
benefit from cooperation. In both the PSI and the CSI Indonesia could obtain the benefits 
of cooperation through bilateral cooperation with the U.S. Having reviewed Indonesia’s 
non-cooperation in the case of the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI it could be 
concluded that neoliberalism, which would argue that cooperation can take place when the 
overall benefits exceed the costs, explains Indonesia’s conduct towards these 
arrangements. 
 
Existing works on maritime cooperation pointed to four other possible explanatory 
variables:  relative gains, shared identity, hegemonic leadership and bureaucratic politics. 
Relative gains cannot account for the choices made by Indonesia across the three cases. 
Power disparity between Indonesia and the U.S., a leading state in the three initiatives was 
too vast. Indonesia’s approach towards the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI would 
not make a significant difference and yet, Indonesia decided not to join the three 
arrangements. 
 
Indonesia’s rejection of the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI was consistent with the 
constructivist expectation on the role of shared identity in informing cooperation; but, only 
to the degree that the three initiatives were proposed by the U.S. which is a non-ASEAN 
state and involved a large number of states, most of whom are not members of ASEAN. 
However, since Indonesia also cooperated with the U.S. and other non-ASEAN states in 
various arrangements including the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP to 
mention a couple, shared identity cannot account for Indonesia’s decision to join or not to 
join an arrangement. 
 
According to the neorealism and neoliberalism argument on hegemonic leadership, when 
the benefits of cooperation do not outweigh the costs the presence of hegemonic leadership 
would be sufficient to ensure others to cooperate. The evidence, however, shows that the 
presence of U.S. leadership in the case of the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI could 
not convince Indonesia to join these arrangements. Although the U.S. had proposed the 
draft of arrangement, led the negotiation process, and enforced rules in these cases 
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Indonesia chose not to join these arrangements. This suggests that U.S. leadership cannot 
account for Indonesia’s participation in cooperation arrangements.  
 
The final point to consider is bureaucratic politics. The discussion in this chapter suggests 
that Indonesia’s participation in cooperation arrangements highlights limitations in 
bureaucratic politics as an explanation. In contrast to the bureaucratic politics literature that 
points to completely self-interested governmental actors, Indonesian government actors’ 
preferences in all initiatives discussed in this chapter were not derived from the 
consideration of self-benefit. In the case of the SUA Convention and the PSI if government 
actors were expected to act based on their self-interest it could be argued that the MoD 
might have supported the two initiatives because they would not need to make substantial 
adjustments at the national level to implement the cooperation requirements of both 
initiatives. Similarly, in the case of the CSI, Customs could potentially support this 
initiative because the initiative would enable them to ensure shorter waiting times and 
priority handling at any U.S. ports to national exporters. In contrast to this expectation, the 
MoD in the case of the SUA Convention and the PSI, and Customs in the case of CSI 
agreed with the MFA to oppose these initiatives. Analysis of Indonesia’s bureaucratic 
politics shows that governmental actors assessed each cooperation initiative based on the 
costs and benefits that each arrangement posed to the country as a whole.  
 
This thesis explains why, despite Indonesia’s enthusiasm to join some arrangements 
dealing with maritime terrorism, it shows reluctance to join others. This chapter argues that 
Indonesia refused to participate in initiatives that did not bring significant incentives such 
as the SUA Convention, the CSI and the PSI. The findings in this chapter add to the 
argument made in Chapter Three regarding the centrality of the absolute gains calculation 
in informing Indonesia’s participation or non-participation in counter-terrorism 
cooperation. The next chapter will investigate whether Indonesia’s cooperation in counter 
armed robbery against ships cooperation, a separate policy area in maritime security, will 
support the findings explained in Chapter Three and this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 161 
Chapter 5. Indonesia’s Cooperation to Address Armed Robbery against Ships 
 
  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains Indonesia’s participation in cooperation arrangements dealing with 
armed robbery against ships. Indonesia has joined the coordinated patrol agreements with 
Singapore and Malaysia, closely cooperated with the Philippines, Japan, India and China to 
address armed robbery against ships, and taken part in the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) 
agreement and ASEAN counter sea robbery initiatives.  
 
This chapter explains Indonesia’s cooperation in some counter sea robbery arrangements in 
order to show why Indonesia’s decision not to join other arrangements is puzzling. This 
chapter is interesting since it explains not only Indonesia’s willingness to cooperate to 
address sea robbery but also its engagement to initiate and convene various cooperative 
measures and meetings. It provides an explanation of alternative avenues for cooperation 
that Indonesia has embarked upon to address sea robbery and the substantial resources that 
Indonesia has invested in this cooperation. In doing so, this chapter challenges the 
argument which points to Indonesia’s reluctance in dealing with the issue of armed robbery 
against ships.
629
  
 
The existing literature on cooperation points to the calculation of absolute gains, concerns 
over relative gains, shared identity, and bureaucratic politics as potential explanations for 
Indonesia’s cooperation. Following these plausible explanations, this chapter will argue 
that (a) the calculation of relative gains cannot explain Indonesia’s cooperation across 
cases because in contrast to neorealist expectations Indonesia cooperated not only with 
smaller and larger states but also with near-peer; (b) Indonesia’s decision to cooperate was 
not informed by the notion of shared identity, as expected by constructivism, since 
Indonesia agreed to cooperate with ASEAN states and non-ASEAN states; (c) analysis of 
bureaucratic politics offers little explanatory purchase because the leading role of the MFA 
in all cooperation initiatives presented in this chapter meant competing government actors’ 
preferences did not shape Indonesia’s cooperation; and (d) the neoliberal argument 
regarding the role of absolute gains calculation does explain Indonesia’s cooperation. 
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Indonesia participated in all cases explained in this chapter because the benefits of 
cooperation promised by these arrangements exceeded the costs. Bilateral patrol 
arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore, defence agreements with the Philippines and 
India, bilateral arrangements with Japan and China, the Malacca patrol agreement and 
regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Maritime Forum 
did not require Indonesia to do more than what it already did and provided Indonesia with 
burden sharing assistance, new equipment and capacity building programmes.   
 
To analyse the reasons underpinning Indonesia’s decision to join cooperation arrangements 
dealing with armed robbery against ships, sections two to seven explain cooperation 
initiatives to deal with armed robbery against ships that Indonesia chose to join. At 
bilateral level Indonesia has been closely cooperating with Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Japan, China, and India. These states have been identified in various 
Indonesian government documents and interviews with officials, experts and 
representatives of businesses in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
630
 The Indonesia-
Singapore and the Indonesia-Malaysia coordinated patrol agreements follow a similar 
structure and display the same obligation as well as cooperation procedure for participating 
states. This is also the case for Indonesia’s defence agreements with both the Philippines 
and India. Thus, for the sake of brevity, sections two and three discuss bilateral agreements 
that have similar structures and content together. Sections four to seven then continue with 
an explanation of Indonesia’s cooperation in bilateral arrangements with Japan and China, 
the MSP sub regional agreement and two ASEAN initiatives dealing with sea robbery. The 
discussion of each section begins with an analysis of the variables that might inform 
Indonesia’s decision to cooperate: relative gains, shared identity, government actors’ 
preferences and absolute gains. Finally, the conclusion argues that Indonesia’s 
participation in cooperation arrangements to address sea robbery was informed by the 
calculation of absolute gains.  
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5.2. Coordinated Patrol Agreements: Indonesia-Singapore and Indonesia-Malaysia 
In June 1992, responding to the rise of armed robbery incidents in waters surrounding the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Indonesia signed the Indo-Sin Coordinated Patrol (ISCP) 
agreement with Singapore and the Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol (IMCP) 
agreements in the same year.
631
 These agreements show similar obligations for parties and 
regulate the same procedures. Parties are required to exchange information through direct 
communication channels and carry out coordinated patrols.
632
 Both agreements oblige 
states to mutually inform one another, provide constant monitoring, sharing of information 
and assistance to each other especially when a pursuit is likely to cross territorial 
boundaries.
633
 Under these initiatives the naval and maritime police forces of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore are required to conduct regular patrols within their own territorial 
waters.
634
 These agreements allow patrol vessels of each state to cross boundaries when 
pursuing sea robbers but do not grant them with power of arrest.
635
 
 
Under the ISCP Indonesia and Singapore are required to take part in coordinated patrols 
which are conducted four times per year for 60 days each.
636
  Under the IMCP Indonesia 
and Malaysia are obliged to carry out coordinated patrols along their shared borders in the 
Strait of Malacca.
637
 The IMCP coordinated patrols include two types of patrols: the 
MALINDO and OPTIMA MALINDO. The coordinated patrol MALINDO is carried out 
four times a year for 10 days each.
638
 The OPTIMA MALINDO coordinated patrol is held 
once a year for seven days.
639
 The concerned states need to allocate its military personnel 
and naval resources to join the patrol. Under the ISCP each patrol requires one warship and 
one marine police vessel from both states.
640
 In term of Indonesia-Malaysia agreement, the 
MALINDO patrol requires two warships from each state. It involves an Indonesian Navy 
warship, a Marine Police vessel, a patrol boat of the Directorate General of Sea 
Transportation, a Customs office boat, and a Malaysian Navy warship.
641
 The OPTIMA 
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MALINDO involves an Indonesian Navy warship, a Marine Police vessel, a patrol boat of 
the Directorate of General of Sea Transportation, a Customs office boat, and a Malaysian 
Navy warship. 
642
 
 
Neorealism would argue that the relative gains concerns could shape Indonesia’s decision 
to join or not to join a cooperation agreement. Neorealism would expect Indonesia, as a 
middle power, to be more inclined to cooperate with larger or smaller states and be less 
likely to cooperate with near-peer states. With this in mind, could Indonesia’s participation 
in bilateral arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore support this neorealist expectation? 
Concern over relative gains did not inform Indonesia’s decision to join the two coordinated 
patrol arrangements. As shown in these cases Indonesia was willing to cooperate closely 
with Malaysia and Singapore, two near-peer states.  
 
Constructivism would expect shared identity to matter in informing Indonesia’s 
participation in the two coordinated patrol arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia. The 
question to pose here is, could shared identity explain Indonesia’s cooperation? Indonesia’s 
cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore in the ISCP and the IMCP arrangements 
conform to the constructivist argument regarding the importance of shared identity in 
cooperation to the extent that the two cooperation arrangements involved other ASEAN 
states: Singapore and Malaysia. However, since Indonesia also joined cooperation 
arrangements that involved non-ASEAN states (for instance the WCO SAFE Framework, 
as shown in Chapter Three, and the ASEAN Maritime Forum, as explained later in this 
chapter), the constructivist argument is lacking in explanatory power.  
 
Bureaucratic politics analysis might suggest that competing interests among government 
actors would contribute to Indonesia’s decision to join the two coordinated patrol 
arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia. Taking the bureaucratic politics expectation 
into account, could competition among self-interested actors influence Indonesia’s 
cooperation? The evidence shows that competing government actors’ preferences did not 
inform Indonesia’s decision to cooperate in coordinated patrol arrangements with 
Singapore and Malaysia. The lead Indonesian government actors in the two arrangements 
were the MFA and the MoD. According to the bureaucratic politics argument the MoD 
would be expected to support the two coordinated patrol arrangements because Indonesia’s 
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Armed Forces had been carrying out various patrol activities with its Singapore and 
Malaysian counterparts, including cross-border pursuits, before these arrangements 
materialized in 1992. For the MoD the establishment of these initiatives simply set up 
clearer and formal arrangements. On the other hand, arguably, the MFA would be expected 
to reject these arrangements. As the vanguard of Indonesia’s foreign policy the Ministry 
might deem that the cross border element of these arrangements contradicts the principles 
of non interference and sovereignty. The MFA could have asked the MoD and the 
Indonesian Armed Forces to continue border cooperation and carry out cross border 
pursuits informally because through this mechanism Indonesia can still gain incentives 
without developing any new legal obligations. Yet, this was not the case. In contrast to the 
bureaucratic politics literature these governmental actors were in favour of Indonesia’s 
participation in both arrangements.  
 
The MFA and the MoD based their policy assessment on aggregate costs and benefits of 
cooperation for the whole nation.
643
 The MFA and the MoD agreed that as Singapore and 
Malaysia bordered the Strait of Malacca and Singapore cooperation between their Navies 
and Marine Police is important to support Indonesia’s attempt to halt sea robbery.644 
Government officials from both ministries also highlight the benefit of bilateral 
cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore to deal with other maritime issues such as illegal 
fishing and smuggling.
645
 As an MoD official put it: 
 ...there are many illegal fishing and smuggling incidents [in 
the Straits]. However, so far everything is good. We are 
happy, Malaysia is happy, Singapore is happy...at operational 
level bilateral patrols assist to curb these [illicit activities]. 
We coordinate among us.
646
 
 
This suggests that contrary to the bureaucratic politics literature, the MFA and the MoD 
did not put forward the cooperation because of their own self-interest when engaging in 
coordinated patrol cooperation agreements with Singapore and Malaysia.  
 
The findings are consistent with the neoliberal argument regarding the calculation of costs 
and benefits in absolute terms. In term of the calculation of the absolute gains, the benefits 
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offered by the two coordinated patrol arrangements to Indonesia exceeded the costs. The 
coordinated patrol agreements with Singapore and Malaysia generate four incentives for 
Indonesia. First, Indonesia receives support when carrying out patrol in the Sumatra Coast. 
This includes coastal monitoring and coordination support provided from Singapore’s 
Changi Naval Base and bases along the Malaysian coast. This benefit can be categorized as 
a core benefit because Indonesia and Singapore share a maritime border. The coordinated 
patrol arrangement with Malaysia is particularly important to assist Jakarta in dealing with 
sea robberies because of the long shared maritime borders at four locations: the Strait of 
Malacca, the Strait of Singapore, Sulawesi Sea and South China Sea.
647
 Second, the 
arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia fitted pre-existing goals that Indonesia had 
been unable to successfully achieve. These goals include reducing the number of armed 
robberies at sea and smuggling, particularly arms smuggling.
648
 This is a core benefit for 
Indonesia’s counter sea robbery measures. Before the signing of the coordinated patrol 
agreements, information exchange and cross border pursuit were primarily guided by non-
formal practices through navy to navy communication.
649
 The ISCP and the IMCP provide 
improved procedures to coordinate actions, exchange information and carry out cross 
border pursuit of sea robbers. In 1992, when these agreements were established, 
Indonesian armed forces were embarking on an intensive military campaign to deal with 
the separatist movement in Aceh, an Indonesian province at the northern end of the Strait 
of Malacca. Cooperation with Malaysia in particular was deemed central to ensure the 
success of Indonesia’s national attempt to curtail arms smuggling to the Free Aceh 
Movement. The Indonesian Police Chief, General Da'i Bachtiar, claimed that some of these 
fire arms were being smuggled by fishing boat from Malaysia across the Straits of Malacca 
to the Indonesian province of Aceh.
650
 As explained in Chapter Two, the Indonesian 
government had linked the Aceh separatist group sea robbery activities and the smuggling 
of arms to the province. The Aceh separatist group (GAM) had been reported carrying out 
sea robberies in the Strait of Malacca to support their movement in the 1990s to early 
2000s.
651
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Third, the cooperation initiatives provide the Indonesian armed forces with access to 
Singaporean and Malaysian resources which would be otherwise unavailable. This 
includes access to Singapore’s and Malaysia’s defence equipment, technology for 
servicing of aircraft components, high tech training facilities and tactical engagement 
systems.
652
 Access to technologies and training facilities is highly valued by the Indonesian 
government. This benefit assists Indonesia to develop the capacity of its maritime agencies 
that will be useful during actual maritime counter sea robbery operations.  
 
 Finally, bilateral cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia provides opportunities to 
develop defence logistics through the purchase, sale and gifting of equipment. This 
include: Indonesia’s purchase of arms from Singapore; the sale of six Indonesian-built CN-
235 transport aircraft, Super Puma helicopters and Anoa 6x6 armored personnel to 
Malaysia; and Jakarta’s purchase of 20 Malaysian-built SME MD3-160 aerobatic trainer 
aircraft and military trucks; and the gifting of 5 patrol boats from Singapore’s Coast Guard 
to Indonesia’s Marine Police.653 Singapore’s weapons exports include aircraft, artillery, 
missiles and ships.
654
 This benefit could be seen as core because it not only encouraged 
Indonesia to develop its technologies but also equip its maritime agencies. Ships and 
aircraft purchased or received from its cooperation partners contributed to Indonesia’s 
counter sea robbery surveillance mission. 
 
In addition to substantial benefits the coordinated patrol arrangements posed low 
cooperation costs. These agreements do not introduce much change to the existing counter 
sea robbery cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore and Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The two arrangements are not intrusive because they rely on good faith compliance and do 
not introduce an independent third party to enforce rules.
655
 As explained in Chapter Two, 
prior to these agreements Indonesia had carried out unilateral patrols in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore and allocated resources for these patrols including military 
personnel, patrol ships and surveillance aircraft. As Admiral Nuswantoro and two officials 
from the Ministry of Defence confirmed, Indonesia has invested enormous military 
expenditure and carried out patrols to secure the Straits of Malacca and Singapore before 
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the 1990s.
656
 Before these agreements the Indonesian Navy and the Marine Police have 
already cooperated closely with their Singaporean and Malaysian counterparts. An 
Indonesian official from the Maritime Security Coordinating Board confirmed this: “before 
the signing of the 1992 agreement Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have developed a 
range of formal and non formal cooperation activities.”657 The economic costs of these 
activities have also been shared by the two countries.
658
 The only change brought about by 
these agreements is the formalization of hot pursuit procedures and communication 
channels which enable quick response.  
 
The absence of substantial changes suggests that the sovereignty costs of these agreements 
are low. This is because Indonesia is largely conducting the same activities as before these 
agreements were introduced in 1992. These agreements mainly serve as burden sharing 
cooperation between participating states. The implementation costs of the bilateral 
cooperation are also low. The ISCP and the IMCP are in line with pre-existing Indonesian 
policies in dealing with sea robbery. Therefore, the Indonesian government does not need 
to make significant adjustments at the domestic level to meet the ISCP and the IMCP 
requirements because most cooperation activities are already ongoing.
659
 
 
In summary, Indonesia’s decision to join the coordinated patrol arrangements with 
Malaysia and Singapore was shaped by the absolute gains consideration. As shown above, 
the two arrangements brought significant absolute gains. These benefits range from coastal 
monitoring support to defence industries and logistics development.  
 
 
5.3 Defence Cooperation Agreements: Indonesia-the Philippines and Indonesia-India 
On August 27
th
, 1997 the Indonesian and the Philippines MoD enhanced security 
cooperation between the two countries by signing the Agreement on Cooperative Activities 
in the Field of Defence and Security. The agreement came into force after the Indonesian 
Parliament ratified it in April 2007. Defence cooperation between Indonesia and India is 
formalised by the signing of the Agreement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of 
Defence on January 11
th
, 2001 which was ratified in 2007.  
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Both agreements show identical structures and substance. These agreements require parties 
to take all necessary measures to develop defence and security technical cooperation in the 
area of joint and combined military training and exercises; border patrol operations; 
development of the human resources; exchange of information; defence technology 
including research and development, production, modernization and transfer of 
technology; as well as logistics support system including maintenance and repair. Parties 
are obliged to establish a Joint Defence and Security Cooperation Committee that is 
responsible to identify potential areas of cooperation, common interests, initiate and 
recommend cooperative activities, coordinate, monitor and control the approved activities, 
resolve problem arising out of the implementation of the agreement and submit joint 
reports to both defence ministers. Parties are required to ensure the confidentiality of 
intelligence information and coordinate any form of publications in the media to safeguard 
the interests of both states. These agreements oblige states to label classified information 
and equipment with specific tags indicating their classification. In addition, in the area of 
innovation and development states are required to protect the industrial intellectual 
property rights of both states from unauthorized usage. 
 
Neorealism would expect that the calculation of relative gains to play a central role in 
shaping Indonesia’s decision to cooperate with the Philippines and India. Could the 
relative gains calculation explain Indonesia’s cooperation in the two agreements? 
Indonesia’s decision to join the two defence agreements with the Philippines and India 
meets this expectation insofar that as a middle power Indonesia cooperated with India, a 
larger state, and the Philippines, a smaller state in comparison to Indonesia. However, the 
relative gains calculation cannot offer a sufficient explanation because Indonesia does not 
cooperate with only larger or smaller states but also with its near peer-competitors (for 
instance in the two coordinated patrol agreements with Singapore and Malaysia). 
 
Constructivism would argue that shared identity would have some bearing in influencing 
Indonesia’s participation in defence agreements with the Philippines and India. Following 
this argument, could it be possible that shared identity informed Indonesia’s decision in 
both cases? The constructivist argument about the role of shared identity cannot account 
for Indonesia’s participation in both cooperation agreements because Indonesia was willing 
to cooperate with a state that shares a similar identity, Philippines, and one that does not, 
India. The former being an ASEAN state and the latter being a non-ASEAN state.  
 170 
 
In line with the bureaucratic politics approach, Indonesia’s participation in defence 
agreements with the Philippines and India would be expected to result from bargaining 
among self-interested actors. Bearing this in mind, could competing actors’ preferences 
explain Indonesia’s participation in both agreements? The evidence shows that 
bureaucratic politics cannot provide a satisfactory explanation pertaining to Indonesia’s 
decision to join bilateral cooperation with the Philippines and India. It is possible to 
imagine a scenario in which the conventional understanding of bureaucratic politics plays 
out. The MoD is highly in favour of cooperation with the Philippines and India since the 
two countries shared common maritime borders with Indonesia. Cooperation between 
Indonesia and both states to address sea robbery and other transnational crimes is seen as 
an ideal solution to deal with these matters.
660
 In line with the bureaucratic politics 
argument it could be argued that the MFA would be expected to oppose the MoD decision 
to negotiate the two defence agreements that include patrol arrangements or joint exercises. 
In the case of the defence cooperation with the Philippines the main issue is Indonesia and 
the Philippines have not settled their maritime boundaries. As archipelagic states both 
countries claim EEZ up to 200 nm wide in the Sulawesi Sea, despite, no part of the Sea 
reaches more than 200 nm from the nearest coast.
661
 The Philippines claims all waters 
within its treaty limits as its territorial waters.
662
 Indonesia would not enter into negotiation 
as long as the Philippines asserted this claim because Indonesia’s Pulau Miangas (Palmas 
Island) is located within those treaty limits.
663
 Under this circumstance Indonesia and the 
Philippines maritime agencies would be expected to cooperate to secure undefined 
maritime borders. The absence of clear territorial limits might cause misunderstanding or 
open conflict between the two countries’ law enforcement agencies. In the case of the 
defence agreement with India the MFA arguably, could oppose the initiative because of 
India’s previous attempts to get directly involved in securing the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore. As previously explained, India’s decision to deploy its naval warships in 2002 
to escort merchant ships navigating through the Straits of Malacca was met with hostility 
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by the Indonesian government. India’s conduct was seen as a threat because it could 
encourage other user states to take a similar action and undermine Indonesia’s authority.664 
 
Despite the bureaucratic politics expectation the evidence, however, shows that the 
Indonesian MoD in close coordination with the MFA agreed to conclude the two defence 
agreements. Their decision was derived from the calculation of net incentives of 
cooperation for the entire nation.
665
 As explained before in this Chapter cooperation with 
India and the Philippines is seen as an acceptable solution to deal with sea robbery and 
other transnational crimes such as smuggling of arms and illegal migration. The MoD 
carefully designed the type and timing of maritime patrol and exercises to complement the 
nation’s Navy, Sea and Coast Guard (MoT) and Marine Police maritime patrols in the 
waters bordering Indonesia and these two states.
666
  
 
The final plausible explanation to consider is the absolute gains calculation. Indonesia’s 
cooperation in defence agreements with the Philippines and India is consistent with the 
neoliberal expectation regarding the calculation of absolute gains. The bilateral 
cooperation with both countries provides three benefits. First, the Indonesian Navy, Marine 
Police, Sea and Coast Guard (MoT) receive support during patrols along both the coast of 
Sulawesi located near to the Philippines border, and at the northern end of the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore that located near the Indian border. This benefit is a core benefit. 
Indonesia highly valued the two countries’ assistance in supporting its counter sea robbery 
patrols. These include surveillance aircraft accompanying ships on patrol and coastal 
coordination support provided from the Philippines shore and from India Naval and Coast 
Guard bases in the Andaman, Nicobar Islands and Port Blair.
667
 In addition, the Philippines 
Coast Guard stations in Palawan, South Western and Southern Mindanao districts, and 
Indian Maritime Operation Centres and Maritime Regional Coordination Centres that are 
located at Mumbai, Kochi, Vishakhapatnam and Port Blair maintain communication with 
the Indonesian maritime centre in Batam.
668
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Second, these cooperation initiatives allow Indonesia to achieve specific policy goals in 
maritime security which Indonesia had been unable to successfully achieve without having 
to make additional investments. These goals include dealing with arms smuggling, illegal 
fishing and illegal migration.
669
 Cooperation with the Philippines authority was seen as 
central strategy to assure the success of Indonesia’s national attempts to curb smuggling of 
weapons to its provinces that have experienced ethnic and sectarian conflicts. When the 
agreement was introduced in 1997 communal and sectarian conflicts had flared up in a 
number of locations in Indonesia.
670
 As explained in Chapter Two, the smuggling of arms 
from the Philippines to the North Sulawesi (Miangas Island) has played a role in 
exacerbating violence in the conflicts across the country.
671
 A former Navy official 
explained that “for the MoD and the MFA cooperation with the Philippines and India is 
important to increase law enforcement presence in our common maritime borders... to deal 
with illegal fishing and smuggling.”672 In terms of cooperation with India, the two navies 
carry out the INDO CORPAT coordinated patrol in the Andaman Sea twice a year.
673
 Each 
patrol involves two Navy ships from each states and an aircraft.
674
 The Andaman Sea is 
located at the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
675
 For Indonesia, 
due to the proximity of the Andaman Sea with the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the 
coordinated patrol is useful not only in supplementing Indonesia’s counter sea robbery 
efforts in the Straits. As confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Warsono, “the coordinated 
patrol of the Indonesian and Indian navies is expected to free the Malacca Strait from 
security threats such as, smuggling, illegal logging....”676 Closer monitoring and exchange 
of information between the two navies are also crucial to ensure the success of Indonesia’s 
attempts to prevent the influx of illegal seaborne migrants from South Asia, particularly Sri 
Lanka, and the Middle East.
677
 This benefit can be categorized as an ancillary benefit. As 
explained in Chapter Two, officials from the Navy and the MoD identified smuggling and 
illegal seaborne migrants as the main security challenges facing the country.
678
 However, 
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reduction in smuggling and illegal migration does not contribute to Indonesia’s counter sea 
robbery efforts.  
 
Third, these agreements provide Indonesia with an opportunity to develop its defence 
industry through joint research, sale, and exchange of goods or transfers of technology 
with the Philippines and India that otherwise would be unavailable. This includes the sale 
of three landing platform docks (LPD), CN-235 aircraft and ammunition and assault rifles 
from Indonesia to the Philippines.
679
 Currently, Indonesia is exploring the possibility of 
purchasing and jointly manufacturing missiles, submarines and aircraft carriers with 
India.
680
 This benefit can be seen an ancillary benefit. The manufacture of missiles and 
submarines is useful to develop Indonesia’s military capacity but will contribute little to 
the country’s counter sea robbery efforts, as that task requires more high-speed patrol 
boats, helicopters and surveillance aircraft to secure its sea.  
 
These agreements do not introduce significant changes to the already ongoing cooperation. 
The two agreements maintain “full respect of sovereignty,” create weak legal responsibility 
because they require parties mainly “to endeavour”, “encourage” and “promote” bilateral 
relations, and settle disputes through mutual consultation.
681
 Bilateral cooperation between 
Indonesia and the Philippines has also been institutionalized in the form of the Indonesian 
and the Philippines Joint Border Committee (JBC) forum since 1975. The JBC cooperation 
forum covers a broad range of issues including armed robbery against ships, smuggling, 
illegal fishing and illegal immigration.
682
 The two countries carry out various activities 
under this forum including the Marine Policing Exercise that involves the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transport (MoT) and the Philippines Coast Guard, the two navies coordinated 
patrol called the Corpat Philindo, joint search and rescue exercises, information exchange 
and border crossing controls.
683
 The coordinated maritime patrol involving patrol vessels 
and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to secure the waterway between Southern Mindanao 
and northern Sulawesi for instance has been established since 1989, many years before sea 
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robbery receives worldwide attention after the 9/11 attacks.
684
 Similarly, prior to the 
signing of the defence agreement in 2001 the Indonesian and Indian defence ministries and 
armed forces have conducted cooperative activities including seminars on sea robbery, 
search and rescue exercises, military exercises, navy to navy talks, “Milan (Hindi for 
meeting)” biannual gathering of warships, Indindo coordinated patrols in waters between 
Sabang and Andaman, regular meeting, and exchanges of personnel at cabinet level 
between the Ministry of Defence, the Home/Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs and regular visits between Parliaments.
685
 Under both agreements 
Indonesia is also not required to purchase new equipment or deploy more personnel 
because, as explained in Chapter Two, at domestic level through dissuasion programmes 
along the Sulawesi coast area and the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as 
well as various unilateral patrols Indonesian maritime agencies have maintained their 
presence in these waters. 
  
As the two cooperation agreements do not introduce significant changes it is argued that 
the sovereignty costs associated with these agreements are low. These agreements only 
formalize the ongoing cooperation between Indonesia and the Philippines, and Indonesia 
and India, since they do not introduce more restrictive obligations or new dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Most activities governed by these agreements are not new to 
Indonesia. The country’s maritime agencies have carried out these activities prior to the 
signing of both agreements.
686
 For Indonesia these defence agreements mainly serve as 
tools to share the burden of improving security in its maritime borders and deal with illicit 
activities in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines 
cooperation, and at the northern end of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in regards to 
Indonesia and India cooperation.
687
 The implementation costs of both agreements for 
Indonesia are also low. These agreements do not require Indonesia to make substantial 
policy adjustment and economic investment at domestic level to comply with the two 
agreements. 
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In summary, the calculation of absolute gains influenced Indonesia’s participation in the 
defence agreements with the Philippines and India. The two defence agreements brought 
significant gains because without having to make substantial changes Indonesia would gain 
support when carrying counter sea robbery patrols and assistance from India and the 
Philippines to deal with other pressing maritime concerns including smuggling of weapons 
and illegal migration.  
 
 
5.4 Indonesia-Japan Bilateral Cooperation 
Counter sea robbery cooperation between Indonesia and Japan has been governed by non-
legally binding arrangements mainly through joint statement.
688
 In 2005, the two countries 
signed the Joint Announcement on Maritime Affairs. Indonesia’s keenness to conclude the 
maritime arrangement with Japan showed that Indonesia is not reluctant to cooperate in 
countering sea robbery. The Joint Announcement requires Indonesia and Japan to 
strengthen cooperation in the areas of safety of navigation, marine environment and 
maritime security. Maritime security cooperation covers security against armed robbery 
against ships and smuggling (arms, goods, persons and drugs). The arrangement obliges 
the two governments to actively cooperate to enhance the capacity of the maritime 
enforcement authorities of the littoral states, and to establish an effective information 
exchange mechanism among their relevant authorities. The Joint Announcement also 
requires Indonesia to “seriously consider concluding the Regional Cooperation Agreement 
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).”689 
 
Neorealism would argue that concerns over relative gains would affect Indonesia’s 
participation in the cooperation arrangement with Japan. From this point of view 
Indonesia, as a middle power, would be expected to cooperate with larger or smaller states. 
Does this case confirm the neorealist expectation? Indonesia’s choice to join the bilateral 
arrangement with Japan seems to meet this expectation because in terms of relative 
military capabilities Japan is a larger state than Indonesia. However, since Indonesia 
cooperates not only with larger and smaller states but also with near-peer states (as shown 
in two patrol arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore that discussed earlier in this 
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chapter), concerns over relative gains cannot account for Indonesia’s cooperation across 
cases. 
 
Constructivism would argue that shared identity is an important factor underpinning 
Indonesia’s decision to cooperate. Indonesia would be likely to cooperate with ASEAN 
states, as they share the same identity, and less likely to cooperate with non-ASEAN states. 
Is this the case in the Indonesia-Japan Joint Announcement on Maritime Affairs?  The 
constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity in informing states 
participation cannot explain Indonesia’s participation in this case. Indonesia joined the 
bilateral arrangement although Japan is not an ASEAN member state. 
 
The bureaucratic politics approach argues that states’ participation in a cooperation 
agreement is the result of competing preferences among government actors. Could 
bureaucratic politics explain Indonesia’s cooperation in this maritime arrangement with 
Japan?  The evidence suggests that competing government actors’ preferences did not play 
a crucial role in shaping Indonesia’s participation in bilateral cooperation with Japan. If we 
expected bureaucratic politics to influence Indonesia’s decision to cooperate we would 
anticipate seeing competition between self-interested governmental actors. Indonesia’s 
decision to cooperate with Japan was formed through an inter-ministerial meeting that led 
by the MFA and involved the MoD, the MoT, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, 
Legal and Security Affairs, the Navy, Police and the Maritime Security Coordinating 
Board.
690
 In line with the bureaucratic politics literature apart from the MFA, other 
agencies would be expected to be in favour of the Joint Announcement with Japan because 
the cooperation brought incentives to their agencies or other maritime agencies that fell 
under their remit. The MFA on the other hand might oppose the cooperation because Japan 
is a user state that has showed a great interest in participating directly in halting sea 
robbery in the Straits. On various occasions the MFA has opposed the Japanese idea of 
joint patrols. The Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, articulated an idea to set up a 
regional framework to address armed robbery against ships and piracy. At the 1999 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in Manila, Obuchi proposed “a meeting of coast guards 
of Asian countries to discuss possible counter-measures to fight piracy”.691 At the 2000 
APT Summit in Singapore, Obuchi’s successor Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed a 
similar counter piracy measure. Mori proposed starting a joint anti piracy patrol at the 
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Strait of Malacca. The parties involved would include Japan, China, South Korea, and the 
three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
692
 Bilateral maritime cooperation 
with Japan might create, for Tokyo, the opportunity for greater participation in the 
management of the Straits. The MFA could have refused to support the arrangement 
because of this potential risk and the lack of benefits of cooperation for the Ministry. 
Indonesia’s participation in the Joint Announcement would not provide the MFA with any 
incentive. 
 
Contrary to the bureaucratic politics argument on competition among self-interested actors, 
the MFA was highly in favour of the bilateral arrangement. The MFA based their policy 
assessment on the benefits of cooperation for the capacity building of the country’s 
maritime agencies.
693
 In 2003 and 2004 for instance Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda 
requested that Japan provide patrol vessels to strengthen Indonesia’s maritime agencies’ 
capacity in dealing with armed robbery against ships.
694
 Various cooperation activities with 
Japan are also designed to fill the gap in Indonesia’s efforts to fight sea robbery, both in 
terms of equipment and human resources for various maritime agencies including the 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board, the Marine Police and the DGST.
695
  
 
Indonesia’s participation in the bilateral arrangement with Japan advances the neoliberal 
argument regarding the role of the absolute gains calculation in shaping states’ decision to 
cooperate. The Indonesian government supported the country’s participation in the 
bilateral arrangement because the overall benefits of cooperation exceeded the costs. The 
Joint Announcement provided Indonesia with two benefits. First, the cooperation is 
beneficial for Indonesian maritime agencies including the Navy, the MoT, the Marine 
Police and Customs because they receive capacity building and new equipment (patrol 
vessels and development of vessel traffic system) from Japan.
696
 The Joint Announcement 
explicitly mentions “provision of patrol boats” and other “assistance from the Japan Coast 
Guard and Japan International Cooperation Agency for enhancing the capacity of the 
maritime law enforcement authorities of Indonesia.”697 Capacity building assistance in 
form of training, exercise and new equipment is highly valued by the Indonesian 
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government. This form of assistance can contribute directly to Indonesia’s maritime 
agencies efforts in addressing sea robbery. Japan provided two grants aid to Indonesia. 
These are the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessel for the Prevention of Piracy, 
Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons (1,921 million Yen/ US$ 18.6 million) 
in June 2006 and the Project for Development of Vessel Traffic Service in Malacca and 
Singapore Straits (1,573 million Yen/ US$ 15.2 million) in November 2008 and in June 
2010 (1,432 million Yen/ US$ 13.9 million).
698
 Second, technical assistance from Japan 
assists Indonesia in establishing its national coast guard. The Japanese Coast Guard has 
been heavily involved in providing experts and technical assistance to the Indonesian MoT 
and the Maritime Security Coordinating Board to identify gaps and challenges and 
accelerate the process of establishing an Indonesian Coast Guard.
699
 This assistance can be 
grouped as a core benefit. The establishment of a Coast Guard agency in Indonesia will be 
expected to increase the presence of law enforcement authorities in Indonesia’s vast 
maritime areas and improve the coordination of counter sea robbery operations across 
maritime agencies. 
 
The Joint Announcement on Maritime Affairs is not a costly cooperation. The cooperation 
requirements for participating states are expressed only as “desire” or “intention” of both 
parties.
700
 The Announcement requires both parties to conduct various activities to 
maintain the safety and the security of the Straits of Malacca, but only after recognizing the 
sovereignty and sovereign rights of Indonesia over its territorial sea and EEZ within the 
Straits.
701
 It does not introduce any change in Indonesia and Japan bilateral cooperation. 
Japan and Indonesia counter sea robbery cooperation has existed prior to the signing of 
these statements. In late 1990s a series of armed robbery attacks on Japanese vessels 
including Tenyu and Alondra Rainbow that were plying through the Strait of Malacca and 
Strait of Singapore prompted Japan to call stronger cooperation to counter sea robbery.
702
 
Before sea robbery incidents in the Straits receive worldwide attention particularly after 
9/11 attacks, Indonesia and Japan has been conducting bilateral counter sea robbery 
exercises and other capacity building programmes.
703
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This absence of changes leads to the conclusion that this initiative does not create any 
sovereignty costs. The Joint Announcement does not require Indonesia to act contrary to its 
own wishes. It sets up non-intrusive requirements and does not require Indonesia to accept 
external authority to interpret rules or settle dispute. Counter sea robbery arrangements 
between Indonesia and Japan also pose low implementation costs to Indonesia. This is 
because prior to this agreement Indonesia has carried out all activities prescribed by this 
initiative. Indonesia is not required to make substantial changes at domestic level or to 
purchase any new maritime equipment to comply with cooperation requirements.
704
 
Indonesia’s national policies are already in harmony with the cooperation requirements. 
The Joint Announcement only governs the already ongoing activities between the two 
states.  
 
In summary, Indonesia’s willingness to join this arrangement with Japan can be explained 
by the significant absolute gains. The agreement did not required Indonesia to make 
substantial adjustment at domestic level but offer various grants, technical and expert 
assistance to deal with sea robbery.  
 
 
5.5 Indonesia-China Bilateral Cooperation 
On April 25
th
, 2005 Indonesia and China signed the Republic of Indonesia-People 
Republic of China Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership which included maritime 
cooperation between the two countries.
705
 Following the signing of the Joint Statement, in 
the same day the two governments signed the MoU on Maritime Cooperation.
706
 As an 
attempt to provide a legal umbrella to govern their defence cooperation in November 2007 
the Indonesian Ministry of Defence and China Ministry of Defence signed an Agreement 
on Cooperation Activities in the Field of Defence.
707
 The Agreement is now awaiting 
ratification by the Indonesian Parliament.
708
 Ratification can take a long time due to poor 
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legislation achievement and a low attendance record of the parliament.
709
 The Parliament 
met only 27 per cent of their legislative approval targets in 2011 and 47 per cent in 2012.
710
  
Currently, this concern has been raised by the chairman of the Parliament’s legislative 
body Ignatius Mulyono, and by the Indonesian Parliament Watch, a non-governmental 
organization whose mission is to monitor and empower the parliament and national 
media.
711
 The poor performance of the Parliament contributes in slowing down the 
implementation process of bilateral defence agreements. In spite of this maritime security 
cooperation between the two states continues to progress under the MoU on Maritime 
Cooperation.  
 
The MoU requires both governments to cooperate in maritime security, safety of 
navigation, marine environment, search and rescue operations, research, shipping 
manufacture and training projects. It stipulates duties for the Chinese and the Indonesian 
governments to exchange information, provide equipment and related facilities to assist 
cooperation, exchange naval personnel, conduct naval visits and exercises, and strengthen 
navy to navy dialogue.
712
 China and Indonesia are obliged to establish a committee to 
discuss and decide practical aspects of cooperation including projects, channels, 
procedures, plans and recommendations. This committee will report any related condition 
to the two MFA that are appointed as the lead agency in this bilateral arrangement. 
 
Neorealism would argue that the calculation of relative gains is the source of explanation 
for Indonesia’s cooperation with China. Given Indonesia’s status as a middle power 
Indonesia would be expected to cooperate with larger or smaller states. Could the relative 
gains calculation explain Indonesia’s cooperation? There is a certain correlation between 
this argument and the finding insofar that Indonesia’s cooperation partner in this case, 
China, is a larger state. However, since Indonesia also joined agreements that involve near-
peer states (for example the two patrol arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore), this 
argument is not sufficient. 
 
Constructivism highlights the role of shared identity in informing Indonesia’s cooperation. 
However, Indonesia’s participation in the MoU on Maritime Cooperation with China is not 
                                                          
709
  Jakarta Post (15 December 2012); Jakarta Post (2 January 2013); Jakarta Post (26 December 2012); 
S. Mishra (19 November 2002); S. Sherlock (2003: 18-19) 
710
  Jakarta Post (2 January 2013) 
711
  Jakarta Post (15 December 2012); Jakarta Post (2 January 2013); Jakarta Post (26 December 2012); 
S. Mishra (19 November 2002) 
712
  Article 2 of the Indonesia-China  MoU on Maritime Cooperation 2005 
 181 
in line with the constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity. Indonesia 
agreed to cooperate with China even though China is a non-ASEAN state. 
 
Bureaucratic politics might be expected to put emphasis on the presence of competing 
preferences among government actors as the reason informing Indonesia’s decision. Could 
it be the case that competing government actors preferences influence Indonesia’s 
maritime cooperation with China? Analysis of Indonesia’s bureaucratic politics shows that 
the competing interests of government actors’ and their corresponding policy preferences 
cannot explain Indonesia’s participation in bilateral cooperation with China. If bureaucratic 
politics, as understood by competing interests within government, then the following 
preferences would have come into play. The negotiation of the MoU on Maritime 
Cooperation was led by the MFA and involved representatives of the Coordinating 
Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of 
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Navy Headquarters and Marine 
Police.
713
 It could be argued that with the MFA as an exception other agencies would 
support the MoU because the bilateral maritime cooperation with China would provide 
benefits to these agencies. Nevertheless, the MFA would be expected to oppose the 
arrangement because the arrangement does not only fails to provide any incentives for the 
MFA; but also could potentially increase China’s political leverage when negotiating its 
EEZ with the Indonesian MFA. In 1993 China extended its claims in the South China 
Sea.
714
 The EEZ China has claimed since 1993 overlaps with waters above the Indonesian 
Natuna gas and oil fields.
715
 Arguably, the establishment of enterprises and joint ventures 
based on maritime technology and defence weaponry between Jakarta and Beijing could 
make any future bargaining process regarding EEZ limits more complicated for the 
Indonesian MFA. However, in contrast to this potential conflict the MFA supported 
Indonesia’s participation in the MoU. The MFA preference to support bilateral maritime 
cooperation with China was not consistent with the incentives offered to this individual 
ministry but by the calculation of net benefits for the country as a whole. The MFA 
considered the benefits of cooperation for various agencies in Indonesia and held national 
meetings with domestic agencies to establish concrete steps to implement the cooperation 
programme.
716
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The calculation of the aggregate costs and benefits of cooperation in absolute terms 
provides a useful explanation of Indonesia’s cooperation. The neoliberal argument on the 
importance of the calculation of absolute gains is consistent with Indonesia’s participation 
in the MoU. The bilateral cooperation provides four benefits to Indonesia. First, the 
Indonesian Navy receives support during patrols along the coast of the Natuna Islands that 
border the South China Sea.
717
 This includes naval coordination support provided by the 
Chinese Navy. Support during patrol is a core benefit. It is highly valued by the Indonesian 
government because, as explained in Chapter Two, in recent years there have been an 
increasing number of armed robbery attacks in this area. Second, the cooperation is 
beneficial for Indonesia because the cooperation assists Indonesia in achieving pre-existing 
security goals without the need for additional investment. These goals include dealing with 
illegal fishing in Indonesian waters that border the South China Sea where illegal fishing is 
often carried out by Chinese fishermen.
718
 Although coordination with the Chinese Navy is 
beneficial to address this issue, however, such a benefit does not contribute to Indonesia’s 
counter sea robbery measures. Third, the bilateral cooperation provides an opportunity for 
Indonesia to improve defence technology through joint research, co-production, sale and 
purchase of goods, exchange of goods or transfer of technology. These include joint 
production of ships, shipping equipment, and short, medium and long range rockets, as 
well as, C-705 anti-ship missiles that can equip Indonesia’s warship.719 This benefit is an 
ancillary benefit for Indonesia. Although technology cooperation is useful for Indonesia 
because it encourages the growth of Indonesian shipping manufactures and its defence 
industry it does not necessarily contribute to the government efforts to address sea robbery. 
This is because the technology cooperation does not specifically target the development of 
fast patrol boats or surveillance aircraft that would be most useful to deal with sea robbery. 
Finally, cooperation with China provides financial assistance and maritime equipment. 
These are core benefits for Indonesia. As the Indonesian government has been struggling to 
modernize its patrol and surveillance equipment, financial support and new equipment 
from China were highly valued. China pledged to provide 1 billion Yuan (US$ 154 
million) to start a fund for the maritime cooperation programme and a remote sensing 
satellite to monitor activities at sea for the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating 
                                                          
717
  Jakarta Post (23 May 2011) 
718
  Interview IG05; Jakarta Post (23 May 2011); Antara (17 May 2005); Indonesian Coordinating 
Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2007:35-36; 2008:81); A.Kustia (2003: 55) 
719
  Article 2(1) and 2(6) of the Indonesia-China  MoU on Maritime Cooperation 2005; Antara (17 May 
2005); Straits Times (24 August 2012); Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs (2007: 32) 
 183 
Board.
720
 The Indonesian Head of the Maritime Security Coordinating Board claimed that 
“although the satellite will be owned by the Bakorkamla” the monitoring results “could be 
used by other agencies in the country.”721  
 
In term of costs the MoU does not introduce significant changes to Indonesia-China 
cooperation. Although one of the key areas of cooperation under the MoU includes the 
establishment of maritime enterprises and joint ventures the MoU is not accompanied by 
an obligation to make reparations or restitution when one party’s breach of the agreement 
leads to the other’s loss or injury. The agreement does not assign functions to interpret, 
implement, amend and add rules to the MoU to an independent third party or an 
international tribunal. Only the Indonesian and Chinese governments can carry out these 
functions.
722
 The MoU is built on existing links between the two governments. Most of the 
activities that are covered by the agreement such as ocean research, naval dialogue, 
exchange of personnel, naval visits and military exercises began after the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries in December 1989.
723
 This was many years 
before the establishment of the MoU on Maritime Cooperation in 2005. The agreement 
only formalizes the cooperation mechanism and activities between the two countries.  
 
The lack of changes explained in the above paragraph leads to a conclusion that the 
agreement has low sovereignty costs. Indonesia carries out activities that it has been 
conducting prior to the establishment of the MoU. The agreement introduces neither 
requirement to compensate others if one’s failure to meet its commitments creates loss to 
another nor external authority to monitor compliance and resolve disputes. The absence of 
meaningful changes also implies that the economic costs to implement the bilateral 
maritime cooperation are low as the agreement does not oblige Indonesia to go through 
substantial changes at national level.  
 
In summary, Indonesia joined the MoU on Maritime Cooperation with China because the 
absolute gains offered by the initiative were significantly high. The MoU brought high 
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incentives because it did not require Indonesia to do much but provided Indonesia with 
support to deal with sea robbery and illegal fishing and a new source of weaponry.  
 
 
5.6 Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) Agreement 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed the Malacca Straits Patrol cooperation 
agreement on April 21
st
, 2006.
724
 The cooperation agreement governs the two already 
ongoing cooperation activities including the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP) and the 
"Eyes-in-the-Sky" (EiS) air patrols.
725
 The MSP requires each state to be involved in 
coordinated maritime and air patrols. As explained in Chapter Two, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore started trilateral coordinated sea patrols in the Strait of Malacca as early as 
1992 during the first surge of sea robbery in early 1990s. In early 1990s this patrol was 
limited to only four patrols a year.
726
 On July 20
th
, 2004, the Chief of Armed Forces from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore established a new arrangement for coordinated sea 
patrol.
727
 The new coordinated patrol entails year-round sea patrols. The agreement allows 
patrol ships from a participating country to enter into another country’s territorial waters 
up to 5 nautical miles when pursuing a ship involved in maritime crime, provided the 
patrol ship does not open fire or conduct any form of military action.
728
 This agreement 
allows air patrols to fly up to three nautical miles inside the three countries’ territorial 
waters.
729
 It obliges participating countries to deploy seventeen warships, comprising seven 
warships from Indonesia and five warships each from Malaysia and Singapore, as well as 
two aircraft from each state to patrol the Strait.
730
  
 
As part of the MSP agreement Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are also required to 
undertake a combined air patrol code named the EiS. The EiS was first proposed by the 
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak at a meeting in Singapore in June 2005, 
when he suggested using patrols aircraft to track sea robbers’ movements.731 Only three 
months after it was first proposed the first air patrol operation was carried out in September 
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2005.
732
 Under this programme each state is obliged to take turns in providing two 
maritime patrol aircraft each week to patrol the Straits seven days a week.
733
 Personnel 
from all member states must take part in each EiS patrol. Military officers that take part in 
the EiS surveillance mission form a combined team known as the Combined Maritime 
Patrol Team (CMPT). The CMPT tasks include establishing a surface picture over the 
patrol area and reporting any suspicious contacts on designated radio frequencies to 
agencies on the ground in each participating country.
734
 To follow up the CMPT report the 
respective agency within a country in which incident takes place will need to activate their 
maritime assets to carry out necessary action. The MSP agreement requires the three states 
to establish coordination focal points within each country. Indonesia located its centre in 
Batam and Belawan, Malaysia positioned its national coordination centre in Lumut, while 
Singapore situated its coordination headquarter in Changi Naval Base.
735
   
 
Neorealism would argue that relative gains concerns would influence Indonesia’s decision 
to join a cooperation agreement. Indonesia would be expected to avoid cooperation with its 
near-peer competitors and pursue cooperation with larger or smaller states. Does 
Indonesia’s cooperation in the MSP agreement reflect the relative gains calculation? The 
evidence shows that relative gains calculations did not influence Indonesia’s decision to 
join the MSP agreement. Although the agreement involved Malaysia and Singapore, two 
near-peer states, Indonesia chose to join this initiative. Indonesia not only participated in 
the initiative but also proposed the idea to Malaysia and Singapore and, later in 2007, 
designed the Standard Operation Procedure to enable Thailand, another near-peer state, to 
get involved in the MSP.
736
 
 
Constructivism would point out the role of shared identity in shaping Indonesia’s 
cooperation in the MSP agreement. Constructivism argues that states with shared identity 
are more likely to cooperate with each other. Could this argument explain Indonesia’s 
participation in the MSP agreement? Indonesia’s decision to join the MSP agreement 
seems to meet the constructivist expectation regarding the role of shared identity to the 
degree that all participants of the MSP cooperation are ASEAN member states. However, 
since Indonesia also chose to join cooperation initiatives that involve non-ASEAN states 
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(for instance the defence agreement with India and the MoU on Maritime Cooperation with 
China) the constructivist argument on shared identity cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation for Indonesia’s cooperation. 
 
Bureaucratic politics, because of intense bargaining between government actors over 
decisions, might affect Indonesia’s decision to cooperate. Can Indonesia’s participation in 
this case be explained by competing government actors’ preferences? The evidence shows 
that competing government actors’ preferences did not inform Indonesia’s participation in 
the MSP arrangement. Bureaucratic politics might have had some bearing in Indonesia’s 
behaviour if there were competing preferences among self-interested actors. On the one 
hand the MoD and the Navy would be expected to support the initiative because it is in line 
with their interest to gain support during maritime patrol from Malaysia and Singapore. In 
addition, the initiative is not costly because prior to the signing of the MSP agreement the 
Navy has cooperated intensively with its Malaysian and Singaporean counterparts. 
Therefore, the Navy was not required to do more than what it already was. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that the MFA might oppose it because the arrangement includes 
joint air patrol and maritime patrol that can transgress Indonesian boundaries. The MSP is 
a precise arrangement that regulates clear procedures for coordinated sea patrols and 
combined air patrols including cross border pursuits.
737
 This arrangement could be 
problematic because Indonesia still has maritime boundary disagreements to settle with 
Malaysia.
738
 Since the signing of the MSP agreement a number of incidents have taken 
place in an overlapping area of the EEZ claimed both by Indonesia and Malaysia in the 
Strait of Malacca. In 2010 officials from the Indonesian Ministry for Marine and Fisheries 
were detained by the Malaysian law enforcement agency for alleged trespassing.
739
 In 
April 2011, an Indonesian patrolling team from the Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries detained two Malaysian flagged vessels.
740
 This incident almost escalated to 
involve the military. As the Indonesian enforcement agency seized the vessels, three 
Malaysian Enforcement Agency and Navy helicopters flying over the waters demanded the 
release of the Malaysian flagged vessels.
741
 These incidents generated more tasks for the 
MFA to negotiate and manage Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia. In contrast to the 
bureaucratic politics argument, the Indonesian MFA, the MoD and the Navy supported 
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Indonesia’s involvement in the MSP. Their preferences stemmed from the estimation of 
incentives of cooperation for the entire nation. They took into account the importance to 
secure the sea surrounding new port development areas and also the need to meet other 
security concerns including smuggling and illegal migration.
742
  
 
It is argued in this section that Indonesia’s cooperation in this case is in line with the 
neoliberal argument pertaining to the importance of absolute gains concerns. Indonesia 
joined the MSP agreement as the benefits offered by this initiative exceeded the costs. This 
initiative brought high incentives for Indonesia for three reasons. First, the cooperation 
assists Indonesia in achieving pre-existing policy goals in maritime security without having 
to make additional investments. These goals included halting smuggling of subsidized 
fuels, drugs and liquor, and illegal migration.
 743
 As the Indonesian Chief of Western Navy 
Fleet, Colonel Amarullah Octavian confirmed: “the Indonesian Navy had shared 
information with the Singaporean and Malaysian maritime agencies and taken part in the 
MSP sea patrol to limit smugglers movement.”744 This incentive is an ancillary benefit. 
Although smuggling and illegal migration are among the top security concerns of the 
Indonesian government curbing these activities does not necessarily have positive 
implications for the country’s counter sea robbery efforts. Second, through the MSP the 
Indonesian Navy, particularly its Western Fleet and Marine Police, receive support during 
patrols along the coast of Sumatra. This includes aircraft accompanying ships on patrol and 
coastal coordination support provided from Singapore and Malaysia. These supports are 
most useful to monitor the Straits and track down sea robbers, in particular, when hot 
pursuit takes place. Therefore, this benefit can be seen as a core benefit.  Finally, the 
cooperation to secure the straits is in line with Indonesia’s national policy to develop ports 
and trading areas in islands at the northern end of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
These areas include Nipah Island, Sabang (Weh Island, Klah Island, Rubiah Island, 
Seulako Island, Rondo Island), Breuh Island, Nasi Island and Teunom Island.
745
 A secure 
sea lane is important to facilitate economic activities in these areas. For the government the 
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success of this development project is crucial because the investment in Sabang and the 
surrounding area is aimed at accelerating economic growth in Aceh and also it is serving as 
a pilot project that might be implemented in other parts of Indonesia.
746
 This is a core 
benefit for Indonesia’s efforts to halt sea robbery. The Indonesian government highly 
valued this benefit because, as explained in Chapter Two, economic development in areas 
close to Indonesia’s key sea lanes is believed to discourage locals from resorting to sea 
robbery activities as a means to earn a living.
747
 
 
For Indonesia the MSP arrangement is not costly cooperation. The MSP does not introduce 
many changes to existing counter sea robbery cooperation among the littoral states of the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The initiative does not introduce intrusive obligations. It 
does not entail duties to make reparation or restitution if a party fails to deliver on its 
commitments or causes loss to the other.
748
 The MSP is mainly built on the network of 
bilateral patrols between the three states. Prior to the establishment of the MSP agreement, 
Indonesia has signed bilateral coordinated patrol arrangements with both Singapore and 
Malaysia in 1992. At sub regional level, prior to the launch of the MSP agreement in 2006, 
Indonesia together with other littoral states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore had 
embarked on a year round coordinated sea patrol since 2004 and a combined air patrol 
since 2005. The two activities that form the crucial parts of the MSP: the MSSP sea patrol 
and the EiS air patrol had begun before the signing of the MSP. The agreement was aimed 
at formalising ongoing cooperation on the ground and improving information sharing 
between participating maritime agencies.
749
 Indonesia has already allocated resources to 
carry out coordinated patrols when the MSP agreement was introduced in 2006.
750
 At the 
domestic level Indonesian national policies are already compatible with MSP 
obligations.
751
 As explained in Chapter Two and earlier in this chapter at national level 
Indonesian maritime agencies have carried out various patrols along the Straits. Indonesia 
has purchased radars and deployed its military personnel, patrol vessels and surveillance 
aircraft to monitor and secure the straits. 
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As the MSP does not generate many changes it is argued that this initiative only poses low 
sovereignty costs. The agreement does not compel Indonesia to act against its interest. As 
explained above the MSP agreement does not pose intrusive obligations. The agreement 
only includes the littoral states of the Straits and excludes a third party to monitor 
cooperation, interpret rules or settle disputes.
752
 The MSP agreement serves as an avenue 
for Indonesia and the littoral states of the Straits to share the burden of improving the 
security of the straits. The absence of changes also suggests that the implementation costs 
of the MSP agreement are low. The agreement does not require Indonesia to make 
additional investment or substantial adjustment at the domestic level to comply with MSP 
requirements. 
 
To summarize, Indonesia’s cooperation resulted from the significant absolute gains that the 
government could achieve. The calculation of costs and benefits shows that the incentives 
of the MSP outweighed the costs. This was because without making additional investment 
Indonesia could gain Malaysia and Singapore support not only in addressing sea robbery 
but also other concerns that it deemed important including smuggling and illegal 
migration.  
 
 
5.7 The ASEAN Regional Cooperation to Combat Sea Robbery: ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 
Regional cooperation against armed robbery against ships is primarily conducted under 
two ASEAN forums: the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the ASEAN Maritime 
Forum (AMF).
753
 Indonesia has been actively involved in initiating and convening 
meetings, as well as proposing drafts of the cooperation agreement under the two ASEAN 
frameworks. Indonesia participated in the formulation of the ARF Statement on 
Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security and proposed the 
establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) during the ASEAN Standing 
Committee meeting in Vientiane in 2005.
754
  
 
The ARF is a dialogue and consultation forum on political and security issues that draws 
together the ASEAN member states and its dialogue partners including Australia, 
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Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, the 
Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian 
Federation, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, and the United States. The discussion of sea robbery in 
the ARF has been carried out through ad-hoc activities and subsumed under general 
discussion on transnational crimes for some years.
755
 A leap forward took place in 2003 
when participating states endorsed the ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and 
Other Threats to Maritime Security during the 10
th
 ARF meeting in Phnom Penh. Since 
then the ARF has conducted various meetings to discuss maritime security and carry out 
maritime exercises.
756
  
 
The ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security 
requires participating states to cooperate at bilateral and multilateral level to combat armed 
robbery against ships; consider IMB proposal on prescribed traffic lanes for large super 
tankers with naval escort; provide technical and capacity building assistance to countries 
that need help; share information; develop regional anti armed robbery against ships 
training; encourage member states’ shipping communities to report incidents to the 
relevant coastal states; review progress on efforts to combat sea robbery; establish a legal 
framework for regional cooperation to combat piracy and armed-robberies against ships 
and welcome the IMO discussion pertaining to the delivery of criminals who have 
committed crimes on a ship on the high sea or in the EEZ.
757
  
 
Outside of the ARF, Indonesia also demonstrated its leadership at the ASEAN level by 
driving forward the proposal for the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 
in 2005.
758
 The AMF is designed to improve the region’s confidence building measures 
and capacity building and, in the long run, the AMF is expected to be a maritime dispute 
settlement forum in the region.
759
 It requires states to exchange information; carry out 
capacity building programmes such as educational and training programme; cooperate in 
maritime surveillance programmes; exchange naval personnel; cooperate to halt 
transnational crimes including sea robbery, smuggling and illegal fishing; and improve 
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cooperation among law enforcement and conduct other collaborative activities not only in 
the area of maritime security but also marine environment and safety of navigation.
760
  
 
Neorealism would point to the role of relative gains calculation in informing Indonesia’s 
cooperation in the ARF or the AMF. In line with the calculation of relative gains, 
Indonesia would not be expected to cooperate with its near-peer competitors. Given the 
narrow power disparity between Indonesia and its near-peers, if a cooperation agreement 
brings greater benefits to its competitors Indonesia’s survival could be at stake. Following 
this lead, could Indonesia’s cooperation be explained by the relative gains consideration? 
Indonesia did not show any sensitivity over relative gains when proposing initiatives and 
taking part in the ASEAN cooperation frameworks to halt sea robbery. In contrast to the 
neorealist expectation regarding the calculation of relative gains Indonesia was willing to 
cooperate not only with larger or smaller states but also near-peer states such as Malaysia, 
Thailand and Singapore who also joined the ARF and the AMF. 
 
Constructivism might be expected to argue that shared identity would influence 
Indonesia’s participation and non-participation in a cooperation agreement. According to 
constructivism cooperation is likely to take place among states that shared the same 
identity. Is it the case that shared identity shape Indonesia’s cooperation in the ARF and 
the AMF? Indonesia’s participation in the two ASEAN initiatives does not reflect the 
constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity. Although the ARF and the 
AMF involved non-ASEAN states Indonesia chose to join the two arrangements.  
 
Bureaucratic politics is an alternative explanation to consider. This line of reasoning 
emphasises the role of competing preferences among self-interested government actors in 
informing states’ cooperation. Does Indonesia’s participation in ASEAN counter sea 
robbery initiatives advance such an argument? With respect to bureaucratic politics the 
evidence shows that Indonesian governmental actors’ preferences were not informed by 
competing self-interest. Arguably, if bureaucratic politics matter we would expect for 
competing preferences to play out in the decision making process. At domestic level the 
dialogue forums to discuss ASEAN maritime initiatives were led by the MFA and involved 
representatives of the Navy, the MoD, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and 
the MoT. It could be argued that the MFA could have turned down the ARF and the AMF 
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counter sea robbery cooperation because the two initiatives would not deliver any benefits 
to the ministry. In addition, involving more parties, in particular, non-littoral states in these 
initiatives could complicate the MFA’s diplomatic efforts to manage the cooperation to 
deal with sea robbery.
761
 The Navy and the MoD on the other hand would support the 
initiative. They do not need to make additional investment in both initiatives because - as 
shown earlier in this chapter – Indonesia had already joined various bilateral and sub 
regional arrangements with both littoral and user states and these ministries could receive 
additional benefits from both the ARF and the AMF.  
 
The evidence, however, shows that there were no competing preferences between the 
MoD, the Navy and the MFA. Their active engagement to drive forward the AMF and 
participate in ARF activities was not derived from the benefits that this cooperation could 
provide their ministries.
762
 The aggregate incentives of cooperation for the entire country 
were the prime driver for the cooperation. Government officials from the Indonesian MFA, 
the MoD, Navy, the Marine Police and the MoT confirmed this in interviews.
763
 As an 
MFA official put it, “our main consideration is how [ASEAN] cooperation initiatives add 
value to our maritime security efforts, and provide benefits to Indonesian maritime 
agencies.”764 Through this cooperation framework Indonesian maritime agencies can draw 
on assistance from extra regional states to deal with sea robbery and other security 
threats.
765
  
 
Indonesia’s participation in these arrangements is best explained by the neoliberal 
argument regarding the absolute gains consideration. In terms of the calculation of absolute 
gains the benefits offer by ASEAN counter sea robbery initiatives exceed the costs of 
cooperation. The regional initiatives arguably generate two benefits for Indonesia. First, 
cooperation provides Indonesian maritime agencies with access to capacity building 
programmes including maritime exercises and training carried out as part of ARF and 
AMF activities. This is a core benefit for Indonesia’s counter sea robbery measures. The 
ARF includes not only the ASEAN member states but also developed states including the 
U.S., China, Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea that provide “technical assistance 
and capacity-building infrastructure,” extending training and offer equipment to 
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Indonesia.
766
 Second, regional cooperation allows Indonesia to achieve specific policy 
goals in domestic maritime security without having to make additional investment. The 
AMF and the ARF forums assist Indonesia in dealing with not only with the issue of armed 
robbery against ships but also with a number of security concerns that lie at the heart of the 
government’s priority list including illegal logging, illegal fishing and smuggling.767 
Indonesia’s efforts to shape ASEAN initiatives to suit its security concerns are particularly 
apparent in the attempt to deal with smuggling of arms. The smuggling of arms into the 
country has exacerbated internal conflict in the archipelago. These illicit weapons are 
smuggled from Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Cambodia to Indonesia.
768
 
Through regional cooperation Indonesia receives coastal coordination, exchange of 
information and monitoring support from the participating states to halt the trafficking of 
firearms to its territory.
769
 Indonesia regarded ASEAN member states assistance in dealing 
with smuggling highly. However, this benefit can only be considered as an ancillary 
benefit. It is an additional benefit that Indonesia gained from the cooperation, beyond 
assistance in dealing with armed robbery against ships. 
 
The ARF Statement and the AMF do not generate high cooperation costs for Indonesia. 
These arrangements do not change Indonesia’s counter sea robbery efforts. The two 
arrangements do not introduce cross border pursuit or joint patrols. The ARF Statement 
only seeks “to encourage” parties where and when possible to take action prescribed in the 
statement.
770
  It only requires parties to take various actions to address piracy and armed 
attacks against ships after taking into account their sovereignty and sovereign rights. 
Similarly, the AMF only provides guidelines and recommendations on member states 
pertaining to the existing and future maritime cooperation activities that states may or may 
not follow.
771
 Member states use the forum only to discuss and exchange views on 
maritime cooperation.
772
 Activities mentioned in the ARF Statement and the AMF 
arrangement have been conducted by Indonesia unilaterally, bilaterally and trilaterally with 
other littoral states and extra regional states prior to the launching of these cooperation 
arrangements. Therefore, it is concluded that the initiative causes a low degree of 
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sovereignty costs. After the establishment of both initiatives Indonesia largely conducts 
similar counter sea robbery practices that had been carried out prior to their introduction.
773
 
The implementation of both the ARF Statement and the AMF also posed low economic 
costs to Indonesia. This is because at the domestic level Indonesia is not required to make 
substantial changes to meet the ARF and the AMF cooperation requirements.
774
 
Indonesia’s resources and policies are already in line with the ARF and the AMF 
requirements. 
 
In summary, Indonesia decided to participate in the ARF and the AMF because the two 
ASEAN initiatives do not oblige Indonesia to make any changes at domestic level and 
provide substantial benefits by providing access to capacity building programme, coastal 
coordination and monitoring support from the participating states to address smuggling of 
weapons to Indonesian territory. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The key findings in this chapter show that Indonesia’s participation in cooperation 
arrangements dealing with armed robbery against ships is primarily informed by the 
calculation of costs and benefits in absolute terms as argued by neoliberals. The two 
coordinated patrol agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, bilateral cooperation with 
India and the Philippines and the sub regional MSP agreement provided Indonesia with 
high incentives as they offered burden sharing opportunities to secure waters between 
Indonesia and these states without making extra investments. Indonesia gained assistance 
in term of training and new maritime equipment through its cooperation with Japan and 
China whilst not having to take an additional costs, tasks or responsibilities. In the case of 
the ARF and the AMF Indonesia received capacity building assistance from ASEAN 
dialogue partners and coastal coordination support from other Southeast Asian member 
states but did not need to make substantial changes at the domestic level to secure this 
support.  
 
The evidence shows that sensitivity over relative gains concerns did not matter. Indonesia 
joined cooperation arrangements that exclusively involve larger and smaller states, for 
instance bilateral cooperation with Japan, India, China and the Philippines, and those that 
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involved near-peer states such as the Indo-Singapore and Indo-Malaysia coordinated patrol 
agreements, the Malacca Straits patrol agreement, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 
the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF).  
 
The constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity in influencing states 
decision to cooperate cannot explain Indonesia’s cooperation across cases. Indonesia did 
join cooperation arrangements which exclusively involved ASEAN states - for instance the 
two patrol agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, the defence arrangement with the 
Philippines and the sub regional MSP agreement. However, Indonesia also joined 
agreements that engaged non-ASEAN states - such as the three bilateral arrangements with 
India, Japan, and China, the ARF and the AMF. 
 
Analysis in this chapter also shows that competing individual actor preferences did not 
inform the way Indonesia responded to counter sea robbery initiatives. In contrast to the 
bureaucratic politics expectation, this chapter shows that Indonesian government actors did 
not oppose or support counter sea robbery cooperation initiatives because of self-interest. 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the preferences of Indonesia’s leading 
ministries to support both the Indo-Singapore and Indo-Malaysia coordinated patrol 
agreements, the bilateral agreements with India, the Philippines and China, the MSP, and 
the ARF and AMF regional arrangements were informed by the calculation of the net 
benefits of cooperation for the entire nation. In the case of the coordinated patrol 
agreements with Malaysia and Singapore and the MSP there was no intense bargaining 
between the MFA and the MoD and the Navy. Despite these initiatives included cross 
border patrols the MFA did not oppose the MoD and the Navy preferences to join this 
initiative. In the case of the bilateral defence agreement with the Philippines although there 
are unresolved maritime boundaries between the two countries the MFA did not challenge 
the MoD preference to participate in the agreement. Rather, the evidence shows that both 
the MFA and the MoD were highly in favour of this cooperation. Similarly, in the case of 
the defence agreement with India, despite the MFA strong disagreement over India’s 
action in escorting merchant vessels navigating through the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore the MFA did not disputed the MoD preference to cooperate with India. The 
MFA and the MoD supported the initiative. The MFA, which is an omnipresent feature in 
all cooperation initiatives, in particular led and proposed Indonesia’s MoU on Maritime 
Cooperation with China, bilateral arrangement with Japan and ASEAN counter sea robbery 
efforts through ARF and AMF. The Ministry calculated that the benefits of the cooperation 
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for Indonesian maritime agencies, businesses including shipowners and shipping 
manufacture outweighed their own concerns and therefore provided them with means to 
participate in arrangements they might otherwise have seen little incentive in or have 
rejected.  
 
Taken as a whole, this chapter has provided an explanation of Indonesia’s participation in 
various alternative avenues for cooperation to address sea robbery. The findings in this 
chapter point to the crucial role of the calculation of absolute gains in informing 
Indonesia’s decision when joining cooperation arrangements dealing with sea robbery. 
Indonesia cooperated in initiatives that brought significant incentives. These findings echo 
the argument presented in Chapters Three and Four regarding the importance of the 
absolute gains calculation in shaping Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join a 
cooperation arrangement. The following chapter discusses whether these findings will be 
consistent with Indonesia’s rejection of some initiatives dealing with sea robbery. 
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Chapter 6. Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation to Address Armed Robbery against Ships 
 
  
6.1 Introduction  
Having seen in Chapters Three, Four and Five, that Indonesia played a central role in a 
number of cooperation arrangements to halt armed robbery against ships, one question 
remains. Why did Indonesia choose not to participate in three other similar arrangements: 
the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Defence 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Singapore? The RMSI is an initiative which was 
proposed and promoted by the United States (U.S.). In comparison, the ReCAAP was led 
by Japan. Both initiatives involved various states, 20 Asia-Pacific countries in the case of 
the RMSI, and 19 European and Asian countries in the ReCAAP. In comparison to the two 
initiatives the DCA exclusively involved Indonesia and Singapore. 
 
The existing literature on these matters focuses upon sovereignty concerns as the main 
explanation for Indonesia’s non-participation in these agreements.775 However, these 
scholarly works overlook Indonesia’s apparent willingness to join various other counter 
sea robbery arrangements that enable cross-border sea and air patrols (see Chapter 5). If 
sovereignty costs were the decisive issue, we would expect Indonesia to eschew these 
arrangements also. As this is not the case, we must look elsewhere for alternative 
explanations. The burgeoning literature on cooperation provides five plausible 
explanations on Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join cooperation arrangements 
including the calculation of absolute gains, concerns over relative gains, shared identity, 
hegemonic leadership and bureaucratic politics. Drawing on this literature, this chapter will 
contend that (a) hegemonic leadership offers little explanatory purchase as Indonesia did 
not cooperate despite the presence of hegemonic leadership in the RMSI; (b) the relative 
gains calculation cannot account for Indonesia’s non-cooperation since contrary to 
neorealist expectations Indonesia refused to cooperate with larger states in the RMSI and 
the ReCAAP; (c) shared identity is unable to explain Indonesia’s non-participation across 
cases since Indonesia chose not to join the DCA, a cooperation arrangement which 
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involved only ASEAN states; (d) bureaucratic politics likewise cannot provide a useful 
explanation since there was no competing preferences between the Indonesian MFA and 
the MoD in all cases presented in this chapter;  finally, (e) absolute gains offers a rationale 
for understanding Indonesia’s decision not to join the three arrangements. This is because 
the benefits offered by the three initiatives were not much better than the status quo. 
Indonesia could gain the benefits offered by the RMSI, the ReCAAP and the DCA from 
existing cooperation. 
 
This chapter will proceed as follows.  Sections Two to Four will introduce the cooperation 
arrangements in question—the RMSI, ReCAAP, and DCA—and elaborate the 
requirements of each arrangement with a view to ascertaining their potential costs and 
benefits. The RMSI was launched in 2004, the ReCAAP agreement entered into force in 
2006 and the DCA was introduced in 2007. Therefore, the first empirical section in this 
chapter explains the factors behind Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI. This is followed by 
a discussion of the way Indonesia responded to the ReCAAP and the DCA with Singapore 
in Sections Three and Four. Each of these sections also assesses the influence of 
hegemonic leadership, the relative gains consideration, shared identity, government actors’ 
preferences and the calculation of absolute gains had on Indonesia’s decision not to join 
the three cooperation arrangements. The concluding section argues that Indonesia’s non-
participation in the DCA, the RMSI and the ReCAAP is influenced primarily by the 
calculation of absolute gains. Hegemonic leadership, the relative gains calculation, shared 
identity or government actors’ preferences cannot explain Indonesia’s decision not to join 
the three agreements.  
 
 
6.2 Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation in the RMSI 
In 2003, the U.S. Pacific Command, working with the Department of State, started 
conceptual discussion with countries in the Asia-Pacific on the development of the 
RMSI.
776
 The initiative requires states to share information on maritime threats, 
standardize procedures for decision making processes, enhance interception capacity and 
synchronize international cooperation among agencies and ministries in the Asia-Pacific to 
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address armed robbery against ships, piracy and other transnational threats.
777
 As part of 
the information sharing activities member states needed to forward maritime data to the 
U.S. Pacific Command to obtain a real time maritime picture.
778
 After the RMSI 
negotiations Indonesia declined to join the initiative.  
 
Indonesia did not decline to join the RMSI because of concerns that the U.S. would send 
its naval vessels to patrol the Straits as cited in national and foreign media. In a 
Congressional hearing on March 31
st
, 2004, Admiral Fargo explained that as part of the 
RMSI, the U.S. was “looking at things like... putting Special Operations Forces on high-
speed vessels, potentially putting Marines on high-speed vessels...to conduct effective 
interdiction.”779 His statement was quoted in various international and national media. 
Despite Fargo’s comments and the media reports they produced, the U.S. never intended to 
send patrols as part of the RMSI and the Indonesian government understood this.
780
 A 
former MoD official that took part in the formulation of Indonesia’s policy on the RMSI 
explained that the administration understood that direct patrols by the U.S. Marines were 
not part of the cooperation activities that Washington offered to Indonesia.
781
 In order to 
clarify media reports, U.S. officials including the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph L. 
Boyce, the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of the United States of America in Malaysia, 
John Medeiros and the U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld explained to the media 
that the U.S. had no plan to deploy troops in the Straits of Malacca as part of the RMSI.
 782
 
According to Ambassador Boyce, Fargo’s statement was purely hypothetical.783 The U.S. 
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, during his visit to Indonesia in June 2004, felt it 
necessary to emphasize the U.S. stand over RMSI. Rumsfeld suggested that there were no 
plans for the U.S. to send standing forces or set up a military base in the Straits.
784
 The 
main question to pose here is: why Indonesia did not join the RMSI?  
 
The RMSI represents a case that shows Indonesia’s puzzling decision regarding 
cooperation. Indonesia’s conduct was in contrast to the expectations of many IR theories 
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on cooperation. A neorealist or neoliberal would argue that the presence of hegemonic 
leadership would be sufficient to encourage Indonesia to cooperate. Keeping this argument 
in mind, could Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the RMSI be attributable to the absence or 
presence of U.S. leadership?  The evidence shows that U.S. leadership in the case of the 
RMSI could not inform Indonesia’s decision. The U.S. created and proposed the RMSI. 
The U.S. initiated this cooperation programme partly due to perceived “slowness in the 
implementation of concrete measures to address transnational maritime threats.”785 The 
U.S. used its diplomatic leverage to begin discussion of the RMSI with the littoral states of 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. During a meeting with Indonesian officials in 2003, 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Fargo stated his concern over the 
security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, pointing out that the U.S. government 
viewed the security of the Straits as a serious issue and would expect Indonesia to join the 
U.S. led initiative.
786
 The U.S. leadership was most apparent in its willingness to bear the 
costs to establish the RMSI. The U.S. Department of State had proposed to allocate US$ 2 
billion to finance the implementation of the RMSI.
787
 As explained earlier the U.S. was 
willing to assist participating states in building a complete maritime picture, training their 
law enforcement to deal with organized crimes, and aiding the development of their 
national coast guard.
788
 The presence of U.S. leadership, however, was not sufficient to 
ensure Indonesia’s cooperation. On April 16th, 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesperson, Marty Natalegawa announced Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI.789  
 
Neorealists might be expected to argue that the calculation of relative gains would play a 
major part in any decision taken by Indonesia in respect of cooperative arrangements. As a 
middle-power Indonesia would be expected to cooperate with larger or smaller states. With 
this in mind, could Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the RMSI be explained by the relative 
gains calculation? Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI did not reflect concerns over relative 
gains. Neorealism would expect Indonesia to join the RMSI because the U.S. is a larger 
state in comparison to Indonesia. As the U.S. is a much larger state the arrangement would 
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not materially influence the great power discrepancy between the U.S. and Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI does not support this expectation.  
 
Constructivists might emphasize the role that shared identity plays in explaining instances 
of cooperation and non-cooperation. In line with this expectation, is Indonesia’s non-
participation in RMSI potentially derived from the lack of shared identity with the other 
actors involved? There is a certain correlation here insofar as the RMSI was proposed by 
the US, a non-ASEAN state and would include other states from the Asia-Pacific that are 
not ASEAN members. However, given that Indonesia refused to participate in a 
cooperation arrangement with an ASEAN state (the DCA with Singapore) and join 
cooperation arrangements with non-ASEAN states (for instance the ARF), this is an 
insufficient explanation. 
 
An alternative explanation to consider is bureaucratic politics. Following the argument of 
bureaucratic approach, competing government actors’ preferences might be expected to 
inform Indonesia’s decision making process regarding the RMSI. Does the case meet this 
expectation? The answer to this question is competing government ministries’ preferences 
did not influence Indonesia’s non-participation in the RMSI. The MFA and the MoD were 
the government actors who shaped the Indonesian decision on the RMSI.
790
 If we expected 
bureaucratic politics to matter we would have witnessed competing interests between 
government actors playing out in the policy process. For example, as the MFA would not 
gain any incentives from the RMSI arguably, the MFA would be expected to oppose the 
RMSI.   
  
The MoD, however, could have supported the initiative because at bilateral level the 
Ministry has extensively cooperated with its U.S. counterpart. As explained in Chapter 
Three, Indonesia has exchanged intelligence and maritime information with the U.S., and 
took part in various U.S. military exercises. If Indonesia participated in the RMSI, the 
MoD would not have to do much more than what it already did.  
 
In contrast to this expectation, both the MFA and the MoD agreed to reject Indonesia’s 
participation in the initiative. Their actual preferences to refuse the initiative were not 
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derived from the calculation of costs and benefits for their own ministries. Rather, the 
evidence shows that the two ministries assessed the RMSI based on the aggregate costs and 
benefits of the cooperation initiative for the entire nation. Two reasons underscored the 
ministries’ preferences. First, the MFA and the MoD suggested that the initiative was 
perceived as overtly militaristic. Both ministries preferred not to take part in the initiative 
to avoid any possibility of the country being seen as aligning too closely with the U.S. by 
the public.
791
   
 
The Indonesian Parliament did not state its official position regarding the RMSI.
792
 
However, members of the Parliament, in particular those who are members of opposition 
parties, were not convinced by the U.S. government’s attempt to clarify Admiral Fargo’s 
statement.
793
 Amris Hassan, Chairman of Commission I (Foreign Affairs Commission), 
House of Representative and also a member of the opposition party, the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), categorized the initiative as an act of intervention 
and violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty.794  Senior politicians in Indonesia’s main Islamic 
party, the United Development Party (PPP), also shared this view. Aisyah Aminy, a senior 
politician from the PPP, warned the U.S. not to intervene in Indonesia’s sovereign territory 
and declared a readiness to support an increase in the military budget to improve naval 
capacity.
795
  
 
Although the public and members of the opposition parties were not directly involved in 
formulating Indonesia’s stance on the RMSI, their reactions to the initiative have 
influenced government decisions. In the case of the RMSI the societal actors, particularly 
members of opposition parties in the Parliament, made a difference in the way the 
government assessed the costs and benefits of cooperation.  A former government official 
from the MoD explained how the two ministries’ preferences were also derived from 
careful calculations of the possible political implications that the RMSI might bring. 
According to him the RMSI was overtly militaristic and strong public opposition against 
the initiative suggested that taking part in the initiative could compromise the “political 
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manoeuvrability of Indonesian political leaders.”796 Although the strong rejection by 
opposition parties, particularly those with nationalist platform, were symbolic, it was 
important to maintain a careful balance between halting sea robbery and cooperating with 
foreign countries without going against the will of the public.
797
 As the official put it, this 
was because “states with high regional pride such as...Indonesia...on the one hand need 
U.S. assistance but on the other hand they do not want to be assisted in such a large scale 
because we want to maintain the symbolic sense of pride.”798  
 
More importantly, the MoD and the MFA, in line with Indonesian law enforcement 
agencies and in particular the Navy and Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board, 
strongly opposed the initiative because of the potential security challenges posed by 
militant groups to the security of the Straits.
799
 As explained earlier, although U.S. patrols 
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were not part of the cooperation activities covered 
by the RMSI, media reports on Fargo’s comments created negative publicity in Indonesia. 
Despite U.S. officials efforts to clarify Fargo’s statements the Indonesian public believed 
that the U.S. planned to send their Marine forces to patrol the Straits as part of the 
RMSI.
800
 Radical factions such as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia stated their intention to 
expel American troops from the Straits of Malacca.
801
 The Navy and Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board were concerned that taking part in the RMSI could provoke a backlash 
from radical elements in Indonesia and make the Straits of Malacca a more desirable target 
for both Al Qaeda and JI.
802
 A Maritime Security Coordinating Board document explained 
that the RMSI “will create new problem, such as the rejection from groups that opposed” 
U.S. involvement in securing the Straits of Malacca.”803 
 
Second, the MFA and the MoD preferred bilateral cooperation with the U.S compared to 
the RMSI because through bilateral negotiation Indonesia has a better chance to influence 
the terms of agreement, which would in turn presumably contribute to generating 
preferable outcomes for Indonesia. As the MFA Director General of Legal Affairs and 
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International Treaties, Eddy Pratomo, confirmed in terms of security issues Indonesia 
prefers technical assistance to be given through bilateral channels.
804
 Joining the RMSI 
was not an immediate concern for Indonesia. The Indonesian and the U.S. security relation 
had significantly improved after 9/11, three years before the RMSI was introduced. The 
U.S. has provided training and equipment as part of the bilateral cooperation. Therefore, 
the country could gain the benefits of cooperation through existing bilateral cooperation 
 
The reasons underlying governmental actors’ preferences show that their decision was not 
based on incentives that the RMSI offered to their ministries. Instead, the MFA and the 
MoD rejection of the RMSI stemmed from the consideration of incentives for the country.  
 
The neoliberal argument on the importance of the calculation of absolute gains and the 
government anticipation of problems generated by societal actors in this case offer 
explanations on Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI. The Indonesian government found that 
the RMSI only provided low absolute benefits because the initiative offered unsubstantial 
benefits and the implementation of this initiative would bring high costs. The RMSI 
provided three core benefits if Indonesia participated. First, under this programme 
Indonesia could receive assistance in the form of new equipment from the U.S. The U.S. 
equipped participating countries with devices in order to build capacity in generating “a 
complete operating picture of the Malacca Strait.”805 Second, the RMSI provides training, 
education and military exercises to assist participating countries in improving its decision 
making structures, create fast domestic and international command and control processes 
to provide a rapid response to maritime threats, and improve maritime interdiction 
capabilities.
806
 Finally, the RMSI was potentially beneficial in assisting Indonesia to 
develop its coast guard. The RMSI was designed to assist participating states, including 
Indonesia, in empowering their human resources and building their own coast guard.
807
 In 
2004 when the initiative was introduced Indonesia was in the process of developing the 
country’s sea and coast guard.  
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Despite this, the Indonesian government found that the RMSI only provided low benefits 
for two reasons. First, when the U.S. introduced the RMSI in 2004 Indonesia was 
consistently highlighted in various media as a dangerous area of rampant sea robberies, 
hijackings and maritime kidnapping.
808
 However, the actual number of attacks had 
significantly reduced by the time that Indonesia declined to join RMSI. As discussed in 
Chapter Two a careful reading of the statistics of armed robbery attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore between 1991 and 2010 points out that sea robbery incidents in the 
Straits were already in decline from 2001.
809
 Indonesia’s actions to address armed robbery 
against ships which had been carried out prior to 2004 had already begun to show positive 
results. This temporal disjuncture between the problem of sea robbery in the Straits and the 
launching of the RMSI reduced the benefits for Indonesia to join the initiative. Second, the 
incentives were further reduced because Indonesia could gain the benefits of cooperation in 
the form of bilateral exchanges of training and equipment with the U.S. As explained in 
Chapter Three Indonesia and the U.S. have intensified their bilateral security and defence 
cooperation since 2001. Thus, without participating in the RMSI, Indonesia can benefit 
from cooperating with the U.S. via bilateral channels.  
 
The initiative did not introduce significant changes to Indonesia’s policies to deal with sea 
robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The RMSI relies solely on good faith 
compliance and not on enforceable requirements. The initiative clearly points out that the 
conduct of activities under the RMSI, including “information sharing with other states or 
acting against a threat remains voluntary and sovereign for each participating nation.”810 
Therefore, the ultimate decision for member state to join any maritime security activity 
including information sharing and intercepting threats is entirely voluntary.
811
 It did not 
specify any requirements for Indonesia to purchase new equipment nor did it oblige 
Indonesia to undergo significant policy changes at national level.
812
 Indonesia already has 
the necessary infrastructure to participate in counter sea robbery cooperation with other 
states, including the U.S. As explained in Chapters Two and Three Indonesian aircraft and 
vessels have been patrolling the waterways, maintaining a 24 hours presence in the straits, 
and have been coordinating closely with other littoral states to conduct cross-border 
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pursuits if required. At bilateral, sub regional and regional level Indonesia has been 
cooperating closely with both littoral states and major powers, including the U.S. 
Indonesia’s decision not to take part in the RMSI was certainly not based on its reluctance 
to share maritime information with the U.S. As has been noted in Chapter Three, Indonesia 
exchanges information with the U.S. defence agencies as part of their bilateral defence 
arrangement.  
 
Reviewing the RMSI requirements it is argued that there is a significant continuity in 
Indonesia’s existing counter sea robbery practices. This leads to the conclusion that the 
initiative posed only low sovereignty costs. If Indonesia participated in the RMSI the 
government would carry out similar activities to those it has conducted as part of the 
country’s policies to deal with sea robbery. Indonesia did not need to change its counter 
sea robbery governance structures or accept the presence of an external authority in 
national decision making processes. Cooperative activities under the RMSI including 
capacity building programmes and exchanges of information with the U.S. had been 
carried out by Indonesia before the initiative was introduced in 2004.
813
 The absence of 
substantial changes also implies that in economic term the costs to implement this initiative 
were low. The RMSI did not require Indonesia to make substantial adjustments or 
investments at domestic level to comply with the arrangement. However, despite the low 
economic costs, participation in the RMSI would bring high political and security costs. 
According to a former official who was involved in decision making on the RMSI both 
ministries were aware that direct U.S. involvement in the Straits, as reported by the media, 
was not part of the RMSI, yet, the misreporting of the initiative by the media had some 
bearing in informing the government assessment of the costs and benefits brought by the 
RMSI.
814
 Due to the media storm generated from Admiral Fargo’s comments, members of 
opposition parties in Parliament and radical groups in Indonesia understood that direct U.S. 
patrols in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were part of the cooperation deal offered to 
Indonesia.
815
 Participation in the RMSI would lessen government credibility with the 
electorate, reduce the space for political manoeuvre at the domestic level and could invite 
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radical groups and terrorist groups to make vessels and port facilities in the Straits a 
target.
816
  
 
In summary, Indonesia’s non-participation in the RMSI is best explained by the calculation 
of the costs and benefits in absolute term. Indonesia decided not to join the RMSI because 
the costs of cooperation outweighed the benefits. The high costs of cooperation resulted 
from the opposition of legal societal actors and government anticipation of trouble from 
non-legal societal actors. The benefits offered by the RMSI were insignificant. Before the 
RMSI was introduced Jakarta has gained the incentives of cooperation through bilateral 
cooperation with the U.S.  
 
 
6.3 Indonesia’s Non-Participation in the ReCAAP 
The ReCAAP was established through a negotiated process which involved 10 ASEAN 
member states including Indonesia, three East Asian states (Japan, China and South Korea) 
and three South Asian states (India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka).
817
 The agreement was 
finalized in Tokyo on November 11
th
, 2004 and came into effect on September 4
th
, 2006.
818
 
When the ReCAAP agreement came into force it became open to accession by others 
states.
819
 The agreement requires states to communicate with the ReCAAP ISC, respect the 
confidentiality of information transmitted from the centre, ensure smooth communication 
between its national focal point and other relevant government and non-governmental 
organizations, oblige its shipping businesses to notify national focal points and the ISC of 
armed robbery incidents, disseminate alerts to ships when receiving a warning from the 
ISC, cooperate in detecting the perpetrators of armed robberies against ships, and 
participate in the rescuing of victims of armed robberies.
820
 After the agreement was 
concluded Indonesia refused to sign it. The question arises in this case is: what could 
explain Indonesia’s refusal to sign the ReCAAP agreement?  
 
Indonesia’s rejection of the ReCAAP agreement is puzzling as it does not conform to the 
expectations of some IR theories on cooperation. Given Indonesia’s status as a middle 
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power, a neorealist would expect Indonesia to join the ReCAAP. This is because the 
agreement was led by Japan, a larger state in comparison to Indonesia. Following this lead, 
does Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the ReCAAP meet this expectation?  The evidence 
shows that relative gains concerns did not shape Indonesia’s rejection of the ReCAAP. In 
contrast to this expectation Indonesia decided not to join the ReCAAP. Government 
officials and documents did not suggest that Indonesia limited its commitments to the 
ReCAAP because of concerns over relative gains.
821
 Rather, they cited the lack of gains in 
absolute terms as the main reason underlying Indonesia’s decision not to sign the 
agreement.
822
  
 
Constructivism argues that shared identity would have some bearing in informing 
Indonesia’s refusal to join the ReCAAP. Does the case conform to the constructivist 
expectation? Indonesia’s decision not to join the ReCAAP was in line with the 
constructivist argument on shared identity to the extent that Japan who proposed the 
initiative is a non-ASEAN state and a large number of ReCAAP members are non-ASEAN 
states. However, since Indonesia was willing to cooperate with non-ASEAN states in 
dealing with sea robbery (for instance in the ASEAN Maritime Forum), the constructivist 
argument regarding the role of shared identity cannot offer a satisfactory explanation of 
Indonesia’s participation or non-participation in cooperation agreement. 
 
The bureaucratic politics approach expects that competing preferences of government 
actors could influence Indonesia’s rejection of the ReCAAP. Could it be the case that 
competing government actors’ preferences were the source of Indonesia’s non-
participation in the ReCAAP? The evidence shows that competing government actors’ 
preferences did not influence Indonesia’s rejection of the ReCAAP. Rather, what mattered 
in the case of the ReCAAP, was whose preference prevailed in informing Indonesia’s 
decision. In this instance the MFA preference is important in shaping Indonesia’s decision 
not to join the ReCAAP. Both in negotiations with foreign counterparts and in formulating 
Indonesia’s decision towards the ReCAAP the MFA was the leading agency among 
governmental actors.
823
 The MFA organized an inter ministerial meeting and invited other 
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relevant governmental actors including the MoD, the MoT, the Coordinating Ministry for 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs to discuss Indonesia’s position regarding the ReCAAP 
agreement.
824
  
 
If ministries behaved as expected by conventional bureaucratic politics explanations it 
could be argued that the MFA would oppose the agreement because it offered no 
incentives to the ministry. However, although the MFA opposed the ReCAAP initiative, 
the MoT, the MoD, and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
could have supported it. This is because the cooperation initiative would not impose 
additional costs as their associated agencies all cooperated informally with the ReCAAP 
ISC. Despite these expectations, the MoD and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, 
Legal and Security Affairs supported the MFA preference to reject Indonesia’s 
participation in the ReCAAP. As an official from the Indonesian Ministry of Defence 
maintained:  
That [decision about ReCAAP] is not within our [referring to 
an agency that he lead] scope of authority. We always follow 
the foreign policy formulated by the MFA. When the MFA 
said ‘this,’ we have to do the same… 825 
   
An official from the MoT confirmed this account of the internal deliberations, claiming: 
ReCAAP…it is more a policy of the MFA…we need to 
follow the guidance from the MFA. The MFA prohibited the 
involvement of us in ReCAAP.
826
  
 
The MFA also instructed officials from other ministries who attended ReCAAP meetings. 
As a government official from the Department of Sea Transportation, MoT suggested: 
 It was the MFA that gave note. Usually, whenever there 
were ReCAAP forums, they [the MFA] would provide us 
with a note, on what we should do.
827
  
 
The MFA was initially enthusiastic about ReCAAP, but ultimately chose not to join the 
agreement. The Ministry’s early enthusiasm was due to seeing it as a possible burden 
sharing agreement between the user states and the littoral states of the Straits.
828
 It thus 
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expected to gain material and capacity building support from user states. The final 
agreement, however, did not include burden-sharing arrangements, and the MFA’s 
enthusiasm began to diminish.
829
 The MFA was further put off the ReCAAP by its 
inability to get the ISC located in Indonesia. It had hoped that locating the ISC in Indonesia 
would both facilitate capacity building in Indonesia’s maritime agencies and address 
Indonesia’s dissatisfaction about what it considered exaggerated reporting of sea robbery 
and piracy incidents in regional waters by the IMB.
830
 Its  concern that unfair reporting of 
sea robbery incidents would continue if the ISC were placed in another country was 
sufficient that the Indonesian MFA consistently maintained their standpoint that if the ISC 
was not placed in Indonesia, Indonesia would refuse to participate.
831
 This was ultimately 
the critical sticking point. A vice president of a nongovernmental organization that 
specializes in maritime security in Asia confirmed Indonesia’s disagreement regarding the 
location of the ISC. He indicated in an interview that:  
Indonesia’s objection to ratify ReCAAP agreement derived 
from their dissatisfaction over the decision on ReCAAP ISC 
location...
832
  
 
In order to understand Indonesia’s refusal to join the ReCAAP it is argued in this section 
that the calculation of absolute gains is a useful insight. Indonesia did not join the 
ReCAAP because although participation in the initiative generated low costs for Indonesia 
the initiative offered insufficient benefits in absolute terms. The ReCAAP offers a number 
of benefits for each contracting party. The ReCAAP ISC provides information on the 
statistics of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the region, facilitates information 
exchange among participating governments, offers capacity building programmes and joint 
exercises. It also enables each participating state to send their representatives to manage 
and oversee the work of ReCAAP.
833
 Indonesia, however, found these incentives 
insufficient for three reasons: First, the benefits that the ReCAAP offered were not much 
better than the status quo.
834
 The agreement did not deliver benefits in absolute terms. The 
ReCAAP would add little benefits because critically, the Indonesian government already 
secured the benefits offered by the ReCAAP through bilateral cooperation with littoral and 
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extra-regional states since the early 1990s, many years before the ReCAAP was launched 
(see Chapter 5).
835
 In addition, Indonesia already had two anti-sea-robbery centres - the 
Rescue Coordinating Centre of the Maritime Security Coordinating Board and the Navy 
Command Centres (Puskodal) in Batam and Belawan - that served the same purpose as the 
ISC.
836
 Almost two years before the ReCAAP agreement came into force, Indonesia 
together with Malaysia, Singapore and with IMO assistance established the Co-Operative 
Mechanism initiative.
837
 The Co-Operative Mechanism become a key cooperation 
institution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for the strait states, user states and 
businesses to discuss, exchange information and contribute to improving navigational 
safety and marine pollution control.
838
 Although the Co-Operative Mechanism does not 
cover cooperation to deal with armed robbery against ships or other maritime security 
concerns this initiative brings a positive impact for Indonesia’s maritime security. Prior to 
the establishment of the Co-Operative Mechanism the burden for maintaining the safety of 
navigation and pollution prevention was left primarily to the strait states (Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore); for example the strait states are required to allocate resources to 
prevent and deal with the aftermath of accidents caused by the high volume of traffic in the 
Straits. The substantial burden sharing provided by user sates through the Co-operative 
Mechanism means that the government can have greater flexibility to use its budget and 
invest more resources to improve the capacity of Indonesian maritime agencies.
839
  
 
The second reason the benefits of ReCAAP were not appealing to Indonesia was that the 
problem it was intended to address was not perceived as pressing. Sea robberies in 
Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were already in decline by 
2004, the year in which ReCAAP was signed (see Chapter 2). As a result, joining the 
initiative was seen by the government as a low priority as it would not add much to what 
was already being done.
840
 Indeed, Indonesia could still cooperate through ReCAAP 
without formally taking part. As a government official put it, “We can gain the same 
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advantages from the cooperation [in ReCAAP] with or without being a member.”841 
ReCAAP established links with the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board 
(Bakorkamla) and the Ministry of Transportation, Sea and Coast Guard unit.
842
 The 
ReCAAP ISC disseminates information to Indonesian maritime agencies including the 
Navy, Marine Police and Maritime Security Coordinating Board. In return, based on 
Indonesia’s free choice even in the absence of formal membership, Indonesian maritime 
agencies such as the Maritime Security Coordinating Board, the Navy, and the Sea and 
Coast Guard cooperate with ReCAAP. As the Indonesian Director of Sea and Coast Guard 
points “We exchange information through ReCAAP, even though we are not a member 
state… ReCAAP also shares information with us.”843 Shipping businesses can also attend a 
number of events held under the ReCAAP framework. The ReCAAP establishes 
cooperation with national shipping associations and regularly organizes piracy and sea 
robbery conferences and nautical forums to engage the shipping community in the fight 
against sea robbery, enable exchanges of views and provide an opportunity for feedback 
and recommendations.
844
 The Indonesian National Shipowners’ Association (INSA) 
participates in the ReCAAP public-private collaboration programmes. Ever since the 
ReCAAP invited external participants to attend its Governing Council Annual Meeting in 
2008, industry organizations such as the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations 
(FASA) and the Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF) have sent their delegates to these 
events.
845
   
 
In terms of costs the changes brought by the ReCAAP are insignificant. The ReCAAP 
reserves the rights of states to exercise jurisdiction on their own territory.
846
 An official 
from an international maritime institution confirmed that the ISC does not impinge on 
national authorities within their jurisdiction.
847
 The agreement also obliges states to 
endeavour to extradite pirates or sea robbery and render mutual legal assistance in criminal 
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matters to others, but only after considering their national laws.
848
 The ReCAPP would 
have imposed low sovereignty costs on Indonesia had it joined. The absence of significant 
changes also implies that if Indonesia joined the ReCAAP Indonesia would not have 
incurred high implementation costs as compliance would be automatic.  
 
In short, Indonesia did not sign the ReCAAP because it did not provide for burden sharing 
and did not locate the ISC in Indonesia, which would have addressed its long-standing 
concern about the misreporting of information.   
 
 
6.4 Indonesia’s Non-Participation in the Defence Cooperation Agreement with 
Singapore 
Although the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol arrangement has been a success, the 
Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that was signed by the two states’ Ministers of 
Defence on April 2007 was not. The DCA required Indonesia to provide Singaporean 
Armed Forces sites for individual and joint air, land, and naval military exercises.
849
 
Indonesia was required to provide air space, code named Alpha areas, to be used for air 
combat manoeuvring, weapons firing, and overland flight training space. These areas 
included air space above Pekan Baru in Riau, which is located in the Strait of Malacca, 
adjacent to Malaysia and Singapore.
850
 The DCA also obliged Indonesia to provide areas, 
code named Bravo, for naval exercises that would involve the use of naval gunfire support 
systems, firing of arms and missiles.
851
 The agreement also obliged Indonesia to provide 
training grounds for army exercises. The agreed location for the army training site was the 
Batu Raja Training Area, South Sumatra.
852
 In addition to the provision of war exercises 
sites, the agreement required Indonesia and Singapore to restore and maintain areas and 
facilities used for exercises including the Air Combat Manoeuvring Range and Baturaja 
Training Area; operate and develop an Air Weapon Range facility; provide naval technical 
assistance to the Indonesian Navy; and  provide the Indonesian Armed Forces with 
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sustainable access to Singapore Armed Forces military training facilities, simulator 
training, academic courses and technology.
853
  
 
As explained in Chapter Five Indonesia has cooperated extensively with various states, 
including Singapore, in dealing with armed robbery against states. The question to pose 
here is: what could explain Indonesia’s rejection of the DCA with Singapore? 
 
Neorealism would expect that the calculation of relative gains would influence Indonesia’s 
decision not to join the DCA. Neorealism suggests that because of Indonesia’s status as a 
middle power it would be less likely to cooperate with a near-peer competitor such as 
Singapore. Bearing this in mind, does the evidence confirms the neorealist expectation? 
The DCA indicates that the calculation of relative gains was consistent with Indonesia’s 
decision not to join the agreement. However, the relative gains calculation cannot offer a 
sufficient explanation because, as explained in Chapter Five, Indonesia did cooperate with 
near-peer competitors (as shown in the case of the two coordinated patrol agreements with 
Singapore and Malaysia and the Malacca Straits Patrol agreement). 
 
A constructivist might argue that shared identity would have some influence on 
Indonesia’s decision to participate or not to participate in a cooperation agreement. 
Following this argument, the question is could Indonesia’s decision not to cooperate in the 
DCA advance the constructivist expectation on the role of shared identity? This case shows 
that Indonesia’s decision not to cooperate in the DCA was not in line with the 
constructivist argument on the role of shared identity. According to the constructivist 
notion of shared identity since Singapore and Indonesia are ASEAN member states 
cooperation between the two would be expected to take place. In contrast to this 
expectation Indonesia cancelled the agreement. 
 
Proponents of a bureaucratic politics approach would argue that competing preferences 
among government actors would shape Indonesia’s rejection of the DCA. Indonesia’s 
decision not to join the DCA was not consistent with the bureaucratic politics analysis. If 
the conventional interpretation of bureaucratic politics was to have some bearing in 
explaining Indonesia’s non-cooperation then competition between actors might have taken 
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the following forms. The two key ministries in the negotiation of the DCA were the MoD 
and the MFA. Among the two Ministries the MoD, particularly, would be expected to 
oppose the negotiation of the DCA in the first place. Although the agreement provides 
assurances on Singapore’s sustainable training assistance, the absence of the DCA would 
not have serious implications for the Indonesian Armed Forces. The existing links between 
the two armed forces would allow the Singapore armed forces to provide training 
assistance to their Indonesian counterpart and contribute significantly to the development 
and maintenance of training facilities.
854
 In contrast to the bureaucratic politics literature 
expectation the Indonesian MoD preferred to cooperate because by joining the DCA 
Indonesia could obtain Singapore’s commitment to take part in the Extradition Treaty.855  
 
The MoD and the MFA did not obtain substantial benefits from the DCA. The lack of 
benefits for promoting the DCA for the MFA and the MoD was even more apparent at 
domestic level. On the domestic front the two ministries’ preferences were met with strong 
opposition from the Parliament. Members of Parliament asserted that the terms of the 
agreement were highly in favour of Singapore.
856
 Parliament members from opposition 
parties including the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party 
(PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), the Golkar Party and the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) urged the government to cancel the DCA.
857
  
 
As the issue become more politicized the Riau Islands local government officials and 
legislators felt it necessary to raise their objections over military exercises in their vicinity 
to the President, the Minister of Defence and Parliament.
858
 They raised their concern that 
military exercises which involved the use of war equipment could harm the local 
population and cause environmental damage.
859
 This is despite their support of Indonesian 
armed forces large scale national joint military exercises and Indonesia-Singapore bilateral 
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routine maritime exercises that involved the use of fast patrol boats and heavy armaments 
in their area.
860
  
 
Responding to the growing opposition at domestic level both ministries presented the DCA 
as both a beneficial arrangement and a necessary trade off to gain the Extradition Treaty.
861
 
Despite the mounting opposition both ministries did not immediately cancel the DCA, 
instead they proceeded with negotiation on implementing arrangements of the defence 
treaty.
862
 In 2007, however, Singapore’s rejection of the retroactive application of the 
Extradition Treaty for 15 years set back the negotiation of the DCA.
863
 For Indonesia, 
Singapore’s action removed the side payment of Indonesia cooperating. The Indonesian 
Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono stated that Singapore’s rejection of the retroactive 
application of the Extradition Treaty suggested that the city state had dropped the DCA.
864
 
He explained that both agreements were signed as one package, thus, if one failed the other 
would be discontinued.
865
 Indonesia decided to freeze both agreements indefinitely in late 
2007.
866
  
 
It could be argued that the neoliberal account of the absolute gains consideration provides a 
useful explanation to understand Indonesia’s rejection of the DCA. Although the DCA is 
not a costly cooperation the initiative also did not offer sufficient incentives. The DCA 
brought low incentives for Indonesia’s counter sea robbery efforts because without taking 
part in the DCA the Indonesian armed forces already had access to Singapore’s military 
training facilities, academic and technical courses and technology.
867
 Even though the 
DCA provides a better deal for Indonesia in term of cost sharing, because Singapore 
agreed to finance 90 per cent of the costs for the development and maintenance of army 
training ground in Baturaja (South Sumatra) and air combat training facility in Seabu 
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(Pekanbaru),
868
 before the signing of the agreement Singapore already bore most of the 
expenditures to develop and maintain these facilities.
869
 The Minister of Defence 
confirmed this in an interview, according to him if the agreement failed: “it would have no 
implication because the two countries had already been” conducting joint exercises and 
cooperating for a long time before the DCA.
870
   
 
Indonesia decided to join because of the side payment of this agreement. In exchange for 
the DCA, the Singaporean government agreed to sign an Extradition Treaty that has long 
been desired by Indonesia.
871
 All previous administrations have failed to secure the 
Extradition Treaty.
872
 Indonesia tied the negotiation of the DCA together with the 
Extradition Treaty. During the negotiation Indonesia and Singapore discussed the DCA 
and the Extradition Treaty as one package.
873
 Indonesia has long sought an Extradition 
Treaty with Singapore to prosecute around 80 businessmen that fled the country with 
government bailout funds worth US$ 87 billion during the 1997/1998 financial crisis.
874
 
Following the signing of the DCA and the Extradition Treaty Indonesia proposed for the 
implementing arrangement for the naval exercise areas (Bravo Areas) to be discussed 
together, the same way the two countries have discussed the implementing arrangements 
for Alpha I and Alpha II training areas.
875
 During the negotiation Singapore requested the 
naval training to be conducted once a month for 15 days each, in contrast, the Indonesian 
Minister of Defence demanded that the frequency of training be limited to 4-6 times in a 
year in recognition of the impact on the environment and local fishermen.
876
 Singapore was 
persistent that negotiation of such an arrangement was unnecessary because Indonesia did 
not raise this matter prior to the signing of the DCA and the Extradition Treaty.
877
 
Singapore's position was that the two agreements “were already settled, and the terms 
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cannot be changed casually or piecemeal, without risking the whole package of the 
Extradition Treaty and DCA unravelling.”878 Singapore then proposed a standard operating 
procedure for the naval exercise area without involving the Indonesian MoD in the 
negotiation.
879
 Indonesia’s dissatisfaction continued when Singapore rejected making the 
Extradition Treaty retrospective for 15 years and this then led to Indonesia’s decision to 
cancel the DCA.
880
 As Singapore did not approve the retroactive application of the DCA 
the city state took away the only side payment wanted by Indonesia. This led to 
Indonesia’s subsequent rejection of the DCA.  
 
In term of the costs of cooperation the DCA did not introduce significant changes to 
Indonesia’s counter sea robbery activities. The agreement did not delegate authority to 
review, interpret rules and resolve conflict to a tribunal or an independent third party.
881
 In 
addition, as explained in Chapter Two at unilateral level Indonesia has conducted maritime 
patrols, military exercises, dissuasion programmes and allocated resources including 
manpower, vessels and aircraft to deal with sea robbery. At bilateral level the DCA only 
provided a continuation of a number of activities that Indonesia and Singapore have 
conducted prior to the establishment of the DCA. Military exercises between the two 
countries have existed since 1974 when the two navies started their bi-annual military 
exercise code named the Eagle Exercise. Indonesia and Singapore military exercises also 
include an air force joint exercise called the Elang-Indopura (since 1980), armed forces 
annual exercises called SAFKAR-INDOPURA (since 1989) and the Fighter Weapon 
Instructor Course to train combat pilots (since 1999).
882
 Indonesia has also provided 
training areas for the Singapore armed forces before the signing of the DCA in 2007.
883
 
These areas include Baturaja as the location for army training, Kayu Ara, West Kalimantan 
and Natuna, Riau Islands as the location for naval exercises and Siabu, Riau for air force 
joint exercises.
884
 These military exercises, held under Indonesian jurisdiction, have used 
combat equipment, weapons, bombs and jet fighters.
885
 Most training facilities have been 
built by the two countries. Indonesia and Singapore developed the Air Weapons Range 
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facility (1989), Air Combat Manoeuvring Range facility (1991), Military Training Area 
(MTA) and Overland Flying Training Area (OFTA) that are located in Pekanbaru Air 
Base.
886
 Indonesia and Singapore are provided a 40 per cent allocation to use these 
facilities and the remaining 20 per cent is reserved for maintenance.
887
 Initially the costs of 
development and maintenance of equipment were borne equally by the two states. This 
arrangement changed in 1995 with Singapore responsible for 75 per cent of the costs.
888
  
 
Having surveyed the changes posed by this agreement it is argued that the agreement 
generated low sovereignty costs. It does not limit Indonesia’s authority to govern its 
territory or introduce an independent third party to implement rules or resolve disputes. As 
previously discussed, Indonesia was not required to do much more than what it already did 
under the arrangement. Most activities covered by this agreement have been conducted by 
the two countries since 1970s. The lack of changes also suggests that the DCA generates 
low implementation costs. The government is not required to make additional investment 
to comply with the DCA because Indonesia’s policies are already in line with the 
agreement’s requirements. 
 
To summarize, since its formulation the DCA did not offer any core benefits to support 
Indonesia’s counter sea robbery efforts. The only ancillary benefit sought by Indonesia 
from the DCA was Singapore’s approval of the Extradition Treaty. Therefore, when 
Singapore refuse the retroactive application of the Extradition Treaty the city-state 
eliminated the only side payment wanted by Indonesia from the DCA.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter shows that Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the case of the RMSI, the ReCAAP 
and the DCA was informed by insignificant absolute gains offered by these initiatives. This 
is because in the case of the RMSI, the ReCAAP and the DCA the overall incentives to 
cooperate were low. Although in the RMSI, the ReCAAP and the DCA cases Indonesia 
was not expected to do more than it already was, it did not receive substantial benefits. The 
benefits of cooperation offered by the RMSI and the ReCAAP were low because when 
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both initiatives were introduced Indonesia had taken part in similar initiatives at bilateral, 
sub regional and regional level to deal with sea robbery. Similarly, the DCA added little to 
the benefits of cooperation that Indonesia could gain from other existing bilateral 
arrangements with Singapore. Singapore’s decision to make the DCA non-retroactive had 
removed the only side payment sought from the cooperation. There was thus scant 
incentive for Indonesia to participate in the three initiatives. 
 
The neorealist emphasis on the importance of relative gains cannot explain Indonesia’s 
non-cooperation across all three cases. Indonesia was not willing to cooperate with either 
larger states or near-peer states. Indonesia did not join either the RMSI or the ReCAAP in 
spite of the fact these initiatives were proposed and led by larger states; the U.S. in the case 
of the RMSI and Japan in the case of the ReCAAP. Indonesia also refused to join the DCA 
that involved Singapore, a near-peer state. 
 
The constructivist argument about the role of shared identity in informing state’s 
cooperation also could not account for Indonesia’s decision not to participate in all cases 
presented in this chapter. Indonesia refused to cooperate with an ASEAN state, as shown in 
the case of the DCA, and non-ASEAN states in the case of the RMSI and the ReCAAP. 
 
In the case of RMSI, hegemonic leadership was insufficient to overcome Indonesia’s 
reluctance and even contributed to popular opposition to the agreement.   
 
In neither case did bureaucratic politics provide a push for agreement, with the MFA very 
much in the ascendency, particularly in the case of the ReCAAP. The MFA and - in the 
case of the RMSI and the DCA - the MFA and the MoD preferences not to cooperate were 
not based on the calculation of benefits for their own ministries. For the MFA incentives 
delivered by the RMSI, the ReCAAP and the DCA were not useful for the ministry, yet in 
some cases such as the ReCAAP and the DCA, the MFA was willing to promote these 
agreements during the early stage of negotiations because they saw potential benefits for 
the country. These included burden sharing assistance in the case of the ReCAAP and the 
success of the Extradition Treaty negotiation in the case of the DCA.  Similarly, the MoD 
saw little benefits from the DCA, yet they pushed for the signing of the agreement. The 
MoD together with the MFA only rejected to promote the DCA further after Singapore 
refused the retroactive application of the Extradition Treaty. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: The Sources of Cooperation  
 
  
7.1. Introduction  
Indonesia occupies a vitally important position in respect of global maritime security.  
Situated between two shipping routes connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans and with 
maritime areas covering the three Sea Lanes of Communications of Malacca and 
Singapore, Lombok and Sunda Straits, it exercises responsibility for a large percentage of 
the world’s shipping trade. In one year it is estimated that over 3 million ships pass through 
Indonesia’s waters.889 This makes Indonesia’s role in securing shipping against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea of great significance. Given the economic and security significance of 
the issue and the cross-border nature of the problem, there have been numerous 
international efforts to secure the sea lanes.  Strikingly, Indonesia has joined some of these 
maritime security arrangements, such as the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) Agreement and 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework, but not others, like the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Both the MSP Agreement 
and the ReCAAP are aimed at increasing coordination and information sharing among 
states to deal with armed robbery attacks at sea. Whereas, the WCO SAFE Framework and 
the CSI are designed to improve port and container security and deter terrorist attacks. This 
prompts the motivating question of this thesis: why did Indonesia participate in some 
maritime security arrangements, but not join functionally similar initiatives?   
 
The existing literature on Indonesia’s maritime security cooperation fails to suggest a 
convincing argument. In particular, the existing literature, which is overwhelmingly 
informed by individual cases, advances explanations that suggest that Indonesia should 
either join all such cooperation arrangements or none. A careful reading of the Indonesia-
specific literature reveals five possible explanations to Indonesia’s behaviour:  
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  This figure is an estimate generated from data of vessels navigating through Indonesian waters on 
12 December 2013, 08:30 GMT. As shown by the live marine traffic map (available at 
http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/) there were 1,735 vessels plying through Indonesian waters at this time. 
This number only includes ships that are fitted with Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders. 
According to IMO regulations (Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V) the AIS is only required to be fitted 
abroad all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages. Therefore, this figure 
does not include vessels below 300 gross tonnage involved in international shipping. 
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 whether Indonesia shares an identity with other participating states, which is a 
constructivist argument;   
 whether a great-power is leading the cooperative venture, which is consistent with 
both neo-liberal and neo-realist accounts of cooperation; and  
 whether key government actors anticipate gaining or losing from the agreement, 
which would be suggested by foreign policy analysis. 
International Relations theories suggest two further possible explanations: 
 whether Indonesia expects to gain more or less than other key actors from 
cooperation. Such relative gains calculations are suggested by neo-realist accounts 
of cooperation, which are thought to capture security cooperation particularly well; 
and 
 whether Indonesia expects the gains from cooperation to outweigh the costs; an 
absolute gains calculation, as suggested by neo-liberalism.  
 
This thesis has tested propositions derived from these explanations across the entire 
population of maritime security cooperation agreements affecting Indonesia from 1988 to 
2013. In doing so, it has demonstrated that most of the explanations in the existing 
literature over- or under- or mis-predict Indonesia’s cooperation. The explanation that best 
fits the evidence is one that has been neglected in the literature to date: the importance of 
absolute gains, as stressed by neo-liberal accounts of cooperation. This finding is 
particularly surprising since it suggests that, contrary to what one might otherwise assume, 
the consideration of absolute gains trumps concern for relative gains concerns even in the 
sphere of maritime security cooperation. 
 
This chapter proceeds by summarizing the evidence from across all of the cases in order to 
demonstrate that the absolute-gains explanation is the most persuasive. This chapter, and 
indeed this thesis, will then conclude with a brief discussion of the further lines of enquiry 
that can be derived from this research and which might be profitably developed in future 
work. 
 
 
7.2. Findings 
This section draws together findings of this thesis. For this purpose this section is divided 
into six sub-sections. The first five sub-sections are structured based on five plausible 
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explanations offered by the existing IR literature on cooperation and bureaucratic politics.  
Sub-section one begins with the neorealist argument regarding the role of relative gains 
concerns since neorealism claims to explain security particularly well.
890
 Sub-sections two 
to five continue with other alternative explanations provided by the IR literature on 
cooperation and bureaucratic politics including shared identity, hegemonic leadership, 
bureaucratic politics and absolute gains. Sub-section six summarizes the findings of this 
thesis. 
  
The summary of evidence across cooperation cases presented in this thesis can be found in 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 below. 
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Table 7.1 
Cooperation to Address Maritime Terrorism: Variables and Negotiated Outcomes 
Initiative Relative Gains Shared 
Identity 
Hegemonic 
Leadership 
Absolute Gains Bureaucratic 
Politics 
Outcome 
Benefits Sovereignty 
Costs 
Implementation 
Costs 
U.S.-Indonesia Defence Arrangement Advantage 
position 
Not present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Indonesia-Japan Joint Announcement on 
Counter-Terrorism 
Advantage 
position 
Not present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Three security arrangements with Australia Advantage 
position 
Not present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Two BIMP-EAGA MoUs Disadvantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The Agreement on Information Exchange 
and Establishment of Communication 
Disadvantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism 
Disadvantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code 
Disadvantage 
position 
Not present N/A High Low High In favour Cooperation 
The World Customs Organization (WCO) 
SAFE Framework 
Disadvantage 
position 
Not present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Trade Recovery Programme (APEC TRP) 
Disadvantage 
position 
Not present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation 
Advantage 
position 
Not present High Low High Low Not in favour Non-
cooperation 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Advantage 
position 
Not present High Low High High Not in favour Non-
cooperation 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) Advantage 
position 
Not present High Low High High Not in favour Non-
cooperation 
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Table 7.2 
Cooperation to Address Sea Robbery: Variables and Negotiated Outcomes 
Initiative Relative Gains Shared 
Identity 
Hegemonic 
Leadership 
Absolute Gains Bureaucratic 
Politics 
Outcome 
Benefits Sovereignty 
Costs 
Implementation 
Costs 
Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol 
Arrangement 
Disadvantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol 
Arrangement 
Disadvantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Indonesia-the Philippines Defence Agreement Advantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Indonesia-India Defence Agreement Advantage 
position 
Not-present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
Indonesia-China MoU on Maritime 
Cooperation 
Advantage 
position 
Not-present N/A High Low Low  In favour Cooperation 
The Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) 
Agreement 
Disadvantage 
position 
Present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 
Disadvantage 
position 
Not-present N/A High Low Low In favour Cooperation 
The Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
(RMSI) 
Advantage 
position 
Not-present High Low Low High Not in favour Non-
cooperation 
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 
Advantage 
position 
Not-present N/A Low Low Low Not in favour Non-
cooperation 
The Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) 
with Singapore 
Disadvantage 
position 
Present 
 
N/A Low Low Low Not in favour Non-
cooperation 
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7.2.1 Relative Gains Concerns: Lack of Explanatory Purchase  
Both neorealism and neoliberalism argue that the state is a rational actor and therefore, is 
likely to join a cooperation arrangement when the benefits are higher than the costs to 
cooperate. The two lines of reasoning, however, differ in their understanding of how costs 
and benefits are calculated. For neorealists, as explained in Chapter One, states are not 
only preoccupied with the total gains that they can achieve from a cooperation arrangement 
since they also take into account their concerns over relative gains. The existing literature 
does not advance the calculation of relative gains as an explanation for Indonesia’s 
participation or non-participation in security cooperation dealing with maritime terrorism 
and armed robbery against ships. Despite the existing literature not making much reference 
to the relative gains calculation, this argument is worth considering in this thesis given that 
neorealism purports to offer its most precise explanations when investigating security 
cooperation.
891
 
 
A neorealist would argue that given Indonesia is a middle power it is likely to cooperate 
with larger and smaller states. Cooperation with larger and smaller states would put 
Indonesia in an advantageous position. This is because the power disparity between them is 
vast and, therefore, a cooperation arrangement would not change the power gap between 
them and put Indonesia in a risky situation. In contrast, neorealists would expect that a 
middle power like Indonesia would be less likely to cooperate with near-peer states 
because a single cooperation arrangement between Indonesia with near-peer states can 
easily close the narrow power disparity between them and risk disadvantaging Indonesia. 
 
Contrary to these expectations, Indonesia chose to cooperate with near peer-states, as well 
as with larger and smaller states (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2).  For instance, Indonesia was 
willing to join cooperation arrangements that involved near-peer states including two 
coordinated patrol arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore, the MSP agreement, the 
AMF and ARF, the BIMP EAGA MoUs on Sea Linkages and Transport of Goods, the 
Agreement on the Information Exchange, the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention, the 
ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP.  Moreover, Indonesia refused 
to join cooperation arrangements that were led by larger states such as the U.S. and Japan, 
for instance the SUA Convention, the PSI, the CSI, the RMSI and the ReCAAP, where 
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relative gains considerations would not be expected to matter.  The only instance in which 
Indonesia refused to cooperate with a near-peer was the DCA with Singapore. Taken as a 
whole, the neorealist argument regarding the role of relative gains calculation cannot 
explain Indonesia’s cooperation or non-cooperation. In contrast to the neorealist 
expectation Indonesia agreed to cooperate with near-peer states as well as smaller and 
larger states. 
 
 
7.2.2 Shared Identity: Not A Cause of Cooperation 
Constructivism argues that states that share a similar identity are more likely to cooperate 
than those who cannot identify positively with each other. Scholars including Ball, 
Johnston, Acharya and Tan echo the constructivist argument regarding the importance of 
shared identity in informing states’ cooperation. They point out that ASEAN states have a 
sense of shared identity often called the “ASEAN way” norm that put emphasis on the role 
of consensus and accommodation to settle dispute and advance security-cooperation 
among them.
892
 Given the “ASEAN way” identity is believed to be embraced by ASEAN 
states ASEAN membership is an appropriate proxy for shared identity. In this context, 
Indonesia is expected to cooperate with other ASEAN states, and less likely to do so with 
non-ASEAN states. 
 
The constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity cannot account for 
Indonesia’s varying participation across cases. As seen in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 
Indonesia  joined agreements that included non-ASEAN states, as shown in the case of 
bilateral arrangements with the U.S., Japan, Australia and India, the ISPS Code, the WCO 
SAFE Framework, the APEC TRP, the ARF and the AMF; and those that exclusively 
involved ASEAN states, including the BIMP EAGA MoUs on Sea Linkages and Transport 
of Goods, the trilateral information sharing agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines, the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention, two coordinated patrol 
arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore, a bilateral defence agreement with the 
Philippines, and the MSP agreement. Shared identity also did not play a major part in cases 
that showed Indonesia’s non-cooperation. Indonesia cancelled the DCA with Singapore 
that only involved Indonesia and Singapore, both ASEAN member states. Indonesia also 
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refused to participate in cooperation arrangements that were led and involved a large 
number of non-ASEAN states, as shown in the case of the SUA Convention, the PSI and 
the CSI, and the RMSI. A closer observation of Indonesia’s participation in maritime 
security arrangements shows that Indonesia is most likely to cooperate with states with 
which it shares common maritime boundaries. Most of these states happen to be members 
of ASEAN. Therefore, it is concluded that shared identity cannot account for the full range 
of cases involving both Indonesia’s participation and non-participation in cooperation 
arrangements.    
 
 
7.2.3 Hegemonic Leadership: Insufficient Cause of Cooperation  
King, Byers, Stryken, Rosenberg and Chung’s studies on maritime cooperation touch upon 
the neorealist and neoliberal hegemonic leadership argument. They draw attention to U.S. 
leadership in promoting new maritime arrangements, such as the PSI and the RMSI among 
others, but do not assess how the U.S. leadership informs Indonesia or other states 
participation in these arrangements.
893
 Using these scholarly works as a point of departure 
this thesis treats hegemonic leadership as a plausible explanation to understand Indonesia’s 
cooperation and non-cooperation. 
 
As discussed in Chapter One both neorealism and neoliberalism explain that when the 
benefits of cooperation are insignificant the presence of hegemonic leadership can 
convince states to cooperate. Contrary to this expectation this thesis show that hegemonic 
leadership cannot explain Indonesia’s participation or non-participation in cooperation 
because in a number of arrangements that involved the U.S. including the SUA 
Convention, the PSI, the CSI and the RMSI the presence of U.S. leadership was not 
sufficient to ensure Indonesia’s cooperation (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). The U.S. 
drafted, initiated, and actively promoted the SUA Convention, the CSI, the PSI and the 
RMSI both through its bilateral relations with Indonesia and its engagement in multilateral 
forums. In the case of the PSI the U.S. for instance actively enforced rules through 
developing various agreements with major flag-states to facilitate interdiction of vessels 
suspected of carrying WMD materials and conducting actual interdiction activities. In the 
case of the CSI the U.S. could place U.S. Customs in foreign ports and bar all containers 
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coming from non-CSI ports from entering U.S. ports. Yet, despite the presence of strong 
U.S. leadership Indonesia decided not to join these cooperation arrangements. Thus, it 
would seem that the neorealist and neoliberal argument on hegemonic leadership is not 
sufficient to explain Indonesia’s decision to cooperate or not cooperate in a maritime 
security arrangement.   
 
 
7.2.4 Bureaucratic Politics: Absence of Competitive Preferences among Self-
Interested Actors 
A group of works have used bureaucratic politics to understand Indonesia’s foreign policy 
making. Liddle, Jackson, Suryadinata, Emmerson and Nabbs-Keller point to the centrality 
of government actors in the decision making process.
894
 Given the importance of 
bureaucratic actors and processes in Indonesia’s policy making this thesis uses 
bureaucratic politics as a plausible explanation to account for Indonesia’s varying 
participation across cooperation cases. 
 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics focuses on the process of formulation and reformulation of 
policy decisions through the interaction of various actors’ competing preferences.895 This 
thesis shows the limitation of bureaucratic politics approach in understanding Indonesia’s 
participation and non-participation in maritime security arrangements. It demonstrates that 
Indonesia has a distinct bureaucratic politics, different from Allison’s focus on competing 
preferences of various government institutions involved in the policy process. Chapters 
Three, Four, Five and Six show that the MFA has been a leading agency in Indonesia’s 
decision making process. The main function of the MFA is to make assessments of 
cooperation and to lead both the negotiation at international level and formulation of policy 
at national level. This is solely delegated to the MFA or shared between the MFA and 
other agencies because the area of cooperation falls under these agencies’ remit. Given the 
MFA’s dominant role in Indonesia’s foreign policy competitive bargaining among self-
interested actors as expected by the bureaucratic politics literature does not take place.  
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The discussion in this thesis also shows that Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join 
cooperation was not informed by individual ministries’ self-interest. Leading ministries did 
not assess each cooperation arrangement on the basis of the benefits that they might attain. 
Rather, government ministries assessed each cooperation initiative according to the 
calculation of costs and benefits for other government agencies, Indonesian businesses and 
the country as a whole. The MFA as one of the leading agencies supported Indonesia’s 
participation in various maritime security arrangements including the bilateral counter-
terrorism cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia, a trilateral information sharing 
arrangement, the BIMP EAGA MoUs on Transport of Goods and Sea Linkages, the 
ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, the ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework 
and the APEC TRP, bilateral coordinated patrol arrangements with Singapore and 
Malaysia, defence arrangements with the Philippines and India, the MoU on maritime 
cooperation with China, the MSP agreement, the AMF and the ARF counter sea robbery 
initiatives despite the ministry not receiving any benefits from Indonesia’s cooperation. 
Cooperation activities under these initiatives including training, military exercises, gifting 
of equipment and patrols were tailored to assist the work of Indonesia’s law enforcement 
agencies such as  the Navy, the MoT Coast Guard unit, Customs, the Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board and the Marine Police. All arrangements discussed in this thesis did 
not allocate incentives or resources to the MFA. The consistent feature of the MFA in all 
cooperation cases was also shown even in a cooperation case that involved a large number 
of Indonesian government actors such as the ReCAAP. In addition to the MFA, the 
ReCAAP also involved the MoD, the MoT, and the Maritime Security Coordinating 
Board. However, as explained in Chapter Six, officials from other government agencies 
confirmed that the MFA played the key role in deciding Indonesia’s non-participation and 
informing how their agencies should engage with the ReCAAP ISC.  
 
 
7.2.5 The Calculation of Costs and Benefits: Absolute Gains Matter 
As explained above concerns over relative gains, shared identity, hegemonic leadership 
and bureaucratic politics cannot explain Indonesia’s participation and non-participation 
across cooperation cases. Therefore, we need to locate the reason of Indonesia’s varying 
cooperation elsewhere. Bradford and Sato cited the calculation of costs and benefits as the 
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reason underpinning Indonesia’s reluctance to sign the ReCAAP.896 The calculation of 
costs and benefits in absolute terms is the final plausible explanation to consider. 
 
The findings in this thesis confirm the neoliberal argument regarding the role of absolute 
gains calculation. Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six show that the calculation of absolute 
gains corresponded with negotiated outcomes. Indonesia only joined cooperation initiatives 
where the overall benefits exceeded the costs.  
 
Indonesia participated in bilateral cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia, the 
BIMP EAGA MoUs on Sea Linkages and Transport of Goods, a sub regional information 
sharing cooperation, the ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Convention, the ISPS Code, the WCO 
SAFE Framework, the APEC TRP, two coordinated patrol arrangements with Malaysia 
and Singapore, bilateral agreements with the Philippines, India, and China, the MSP sub 
regional patrols, and the AMF and the ARF because the incentives offered by these 
initiatives exceeded the costs. Without having to do much Indonesia gained new 
equipment, funds to establish counter-terrorism centres and capacity building assistance in 
the form of training and exercises for its maritime agencies from bilateral cooperation with 
the U.S., Japan, Australia and China. Indonesia did not need to make significant 
adjustment for its maritime agencies to gain naval and aircraft surveillance support during 
patrols from Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and India. 
 
The BIMP EAGA initiatives, the Exchange of Information Agreement, the ASEAN 
Counter-Terrorism Convention and the MSP agreement did not require Indonesia to make 
substantial changes at national level. Yet, these sub regional and regional initiatives enable 
Indonesia to receive enormous support from countries in the region in investigating 
terrorist attacks, and providing access to their finger print databases, lists of airline 
passengers, visa blacklists, and intelligence information and sharing burdens among them 
in dealing with armed robbery against ships and deterring maritime terrorism. The ISPS 
Code posed high implementation costs because Jakarta needed to allocate additional 
resources to install new security devices in its international ports, carry out ISPS Code 
training and exercises and review ports and ships compliance to the Code. Nevertheless, 
the payoff that Indonesia gained from making these additional investments was high. This 
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was because Indonesian ports and ships were not excluded from international trade, and the 
government received assistance to establish a Sea and Coast Guard. As the ISPS Code was 
one of the requirements demanded by marine insurance companies, compliance with the 
Code also provided the additional economic benefit of avoiding an increase in insurance 
premiums. Cooperation in the WCO SAFE Framework and the APEC TRP was even more 
straightforward for Indonesia because these initiatives provided high incentives and 
generated low costs. From both initiatives Indonesia gained capacity building programmes 
from other member states and secretariats of the WCO and the APEC to develop its own 
trade facilitation and recovery programme, while not having to do much more than what it 
already did. 
 
Indonesia’s reluctance to join some maritime security cooperation arrangements also 
confirms the neoliberal argument regarding the importance of the calculation of absolute 
gains. Indonesia did not join three arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism: the SUA 
Convention, the PSI and the CSI; and three arrangements to address sea robbery: the 
RMSI, the ReCAAP and the DCA because these initiatives did not offer sufficient absolute 
gains. The Indonesian government deemed that participation in these initiatives was 
redundant because Indonesia could gain the benefits offered by the initiative including 
exchange of intelligence information, new equipment and capacity building assistance 
through its participation in other maritime arrangements. Some of these arrangements 
including the SUA Convention, the RMSI, the PSI and the CSI also brought high costs.  
The SUA Convention regulates how Indonesia must deal with unlawful acts that occur in 
parts of Indonesia’s maritime jurisdiction and requires Jakarta to accept external authority 
over disputes settlement without offering tangible economic and security benefits. The 
RMSI was costly for Indonesia because of problems caused by the rejection of the 
agreement from some Parliament members and security risks posed by radical groups. The 
PSI and the CSI posed even higher costs in comparison to the SUA Convention and the 
RMSI. The PSI would compromise Indonesia’s rights as a coastal or flag state since under 
this initiative Jakarta would be subjected to other participants’ demands for access when an 
act of interdiction took place in Indonesian waters or was carried out against vessels 
registered under the Indonesian flag. In addition, when a false interdiction takes place the 
Indonesian government faces the risk of compensating businesses for any loss and delay 
suffered by them. Indonesia felt that bearing such costs were unnecessary because Jakarta 
can gain the incentives of cooperation offered by the PSI, particularly in term of new 
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equipment and capacity building training and exercises, through bilateral cooperation with 
the U.S. The CSI required Indonesia to change its legislation to accommodate the presence 
of external authority in its ports, accept external authority over significant decision making 
in relation to port and container security and invest more resources to purchase new 
security devices that meet the cooperation standard. At the same time, the high costs of the 
cooperation were not met with sufficient benefits. The main advantage of the CSI is to 
ensure unimpeded access to U.S. ports. Indonesia can gain this benefit of cooperation by 
transshipping its containers bound to the U.S. through Singapore and Malaysia CSI ports, a 
practice that has been conducted for many years by Indonesian businesses.  
 
Across the cooperation cases presented in Chapters Three to Six the calculation of absolute 
gains was not influenced by societal actors, with the RMSI the only exception. In the case 
of the RMSI, because of popular sentiment against the initiative, societal actors which 
included parliament members and radical groups rejected the agreement and this 
influenced the government’s assessment of the costs and benefits posed by the initiative. 
Having surveyed the calculation of absolute gains in all cooperation cases discussed in this 
thesis it is concluded that Indonesia’s decision to participate in some cooperation 
arrangements and not to participate in others is consistent with the absolute gains 
calculation.  
 
 
7.2.6 Conclusion  
The main findings of this thesis confirm the neoliberal account of the role of the 
calculation of absolute gains in international cooperation. This thesis, therefore, offers four 
major contributions. First, given the importance of absolute gains across cooperation cases 
this thesis shows that even in maritime security cooperation relative gains concerns did not 
matter. Although the neorealist claim that the calculation of relative gain would have better 
explanatory purchase in explaining security issues, the findings presented in this thesis 
contradict this expectation. Only the calculation of absolute gains can explain Indonesia’s 
cooperation and non-cooperation in maritime arrangements.  
 
Second, by analysing the absolute gains calculation of each cooperation cases this thesis 
provides a conceptual definition and a method to assess the benefits of cooperation. 
Although the IR cooperation literature has provided a wealth of discussion to define and 
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assess the costs of cooperation, the concept of benefits has been overlooked. Most 
scholarly work only mentions the term benefits in passing. This thesis provides a 
conceptual definition of different types of benefits. It introduces the concepts of core 
benefit and ancillary benefit to different sorts of benefits brought by certain cooperation 
arrangements. This thesis also shows a consistent way to assess the benefits of cooperation 
across multiple cases.   
      
Third, by focusing solely on explaining Indonesia’s decision to join or not to join a 
cooperation arrangement this thesis has met its main purpose to seek the causes underlying 
Indonesia’s participation in maritime security arrangements. As a result this thesis also 
offers a conceptual discussion on the reasons underlying middle power participation or 
non-participation in cooperation agreements. The IR cooperation literature tends to focus 
on cooperation between major powers.
897
 Little attention has been given to the study of 
middle power participation in cooperation arrangements, some of which they have little 
influence on. This thesis has provided as starting point for a new research agenda to search 
for the reasons underpinning middle power participation in cooperation arrangements. 
Most literature on middle power focuses on explaining traditional middle power leadership 
at international organization such as the United Nations.
898
 These works primarily centre 
on Canadian and Australian foreign policy. Very little attention has been given to 
discussing the behaviour of emerging middle power such as Indonesia. The existing studies 
on emerging middle powers show a lack of theoretical discussion on factors that inform 
state decision in approaching different cooperation settings.
899
 By systematically testing IR 
arguments on why a state cooperates this thesis has filled the gap left both by the current 
IR literature on cooperation and the middle power literature.  
 
Finally, the evidence in the empirical chapters supports the role of absolute gains in 
informing Indonesia’s cooperation also dismisses scholarly arguments which state that 
Indonesia was reluctant to participate in maritime cooperation during the early years 
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following 9/11, particularly between 2001 and 2004. This study demonstrates that 
Indonesia cooperated when the benefits of cooperation exceeded the costs. Indonesia does 
take part in maritime cooperation and has been a willing participant and aspiring leader in 
establishing various arrangements. Indonesia has been less willing to commit itself to some 
arrangements because the incentives offered by these arrangements do not outweigh the 
costs. Indonesia can gain the benefits offered by a number of arrangements including the 
SUA Convention, the PSI, the CSI, the RMSI and the ReCAAP through other cooperation 
channels.  
 
 
7.3 Future Work 
This chapter has dealt with the main question of this thesis, why Indonesia joined some 
maritime security arrangements but refused to participate in others? In addressing this 
question, this thesis has revealed several further questions that warrant attention, and 
would thus provide fruitful lines for further inquiry.  
 
First, why does Indonesia choose different forms of agreement across cases? The form of 
agreement refers to design of cooperation that can range from non-legally binding joint 
announcement to formal treaty that call for parliament ratification. This thesis does not aim 
to explain why some forms of cooperation are chosen by Indonesia over others. The 
reasons underpinning Indonesia’s decision to join some cooperation arrangements and its 
lack of keenness to participate in other arrangements are the focus of this thesis. The 
question of why Indonesia chooses certain forms of cooperation that entail particular 
cooperative activities and levels of political commitment rather than others at a given time 
is a question that will be addressed in my future research. 
 
Second, why did Malaysia and Singapore join the CSI when Indonesia did not? Why did 
Singapore choose to participate in the SUA Convention, the PSI and the ReCAAP and 
supported the RMSI when Indonesia and Malaysia did not? This thesis does not seek to 
compare Indonesia’s varying participation in international cooperation with other littoral 
states policies in responding to maritime security arrangements. This study focuses solely 
on investigating Indonesia’s participation in maritime security arrangements. Nevertheless, 
this study opens the avenue to embark upon a systematic comparison of the littoral states 
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of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore participation in maritime security arrangements in 
the future using the plausible explanations that I have developed in this thesis.  
 
It would be useful to test whether these explanations hold across countries or if they are 
unique to Indonesia. Some of the alternative explanations offered in this thesis including 
relative gains, hegemonic leadership and shared identity apply in the same way to these 
countries as Indonesia. In term of relative gains, Malaysia and Singapore have relatively 
similar defence capabilities as Indonesia. Therefore, they would be expected to cooperate 
with larger or smaller states but avoid cooperation with their near-peer competitors. Given 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have cooperated among them to address maritime 
terrorism and sea robbery this argument offers no explanatory power. With regards to 
hegemonic leadership, the U.S. leadership was also present in the case of the SUA 
Convention, the PSI, the CSI and the RMSI. Despite a constant presence of U.S. 
leadership, the negotiated outcome varied across cases and countries. Singapore supported 
all of these U.S. led initiatives and Malaysia opposed most of them with the CSI as the 
only exception. This implies that hegemonic leadership argument cannot hold across cases. 
Finally, in terms of shared identity the three states are all ASEAN states. Since Malaysia 
and Singapore cooperated with non-ASEAN states as well as ASEAN states shared 
identity cannot account for their cooperation or non-cooperation. Taken as a whole, since 
relative gains, shared identity and hegemonic leadership arguments apply to Malaysia and 
Singapore exactly as they do to Indonesia these three arguments can be rejected. Therefore, 
future inquiry can focus on assessing the role of the absolute gains calculation and 
bureaucratic politics in informing Singapore and Malaysian cooperation or non-
cooperation. 
 
Third, to what extent does Indonesia comply with the requirements of cooperation 
initiatives that it has chosen to join? This thesis does not seek to test the degree of 
compliance, implementation and enforcement displayed by Indonesia towards cooperation 
arrangements dealing with maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships. The 
Indonesian government and businesses level of compliance to a number of cooperation 
arrangements including the ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework, and the APEC TRP 
at domestic level is beyond the scope of this thesis but this line of enquiry can be 
developed further in the future.  
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This thesis also raises questions about the behaviour of the U.S. Indonesia’s participation 
was important to the U.S. objectives of halting the proliferation and transportation of 
WMD and securing important sea-lanes from terrorist and sea robbery attacks; yet, the 
U.S. only provided incentives and stated its agreement to bear the enforcement costs. The 
question arises from this circumstance is why the U.S. did not use overt coercion to compel 
Indonesia to join initiatives such as the SUA Convention, the PSI, the CSI and the RMSI? 
It would be useful in the future to study whether or not the Indonesian cooperation with 
U.S. unilateral initiatives, such as the 24 Hours Rule, the International Port Security 
Programme and the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism was sufficient to 
induce changes at the domestic level and, therefore, U.S. coercion in the case of the SUA 
Convention, the PSI, the CSI and the RMSI was not required.   
 
In this thesis the question of why Indonesia chose to cooperate with some initiatives but 
not others was addressed. As part of the process of answering this question a number of 
concepts were defined in a way which means that they can be applied in future case and 
comparative studies. In particular the concept of benefits in international cooperation has 
been defined and operationalised. It has been shown that Indonesia has been willing to 
make compromises in allowing cross-border maritime and air patrols and enabling its 
cooperation partners’ aircraft to enter its airspace, land and refuel in its territory to enable 
the success of cooperation. This is in contrast to most academic works that cited concerns 
over sovereignty infringement as the main impediment for Indonesia’s participation in 
maritime security arrangements. Indonesia chose to cooperate when the benefits of an 
initiative outweighed the costs. This is important not just to the academic exercise of trying 
to understand middle power cooperation in International Relations but it is also of 
significance to those involved in the design, negotiation and decisions on international 
cooperation agreements that involve middle powers. It is vital that negotiators and policy 
makers understand that in order to achieve success the absolute gains should be sufficient 
to entice a state to cooperate.  
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APPENDIX   
Appendix I 
Table A. Overfished Fishery Stocks in Indonesia 
 Type of Fishery 
Product 
Overfished Areas 
1. Shrimp All Indonesian waters except from Seram Sea to Tomini 
Bay, Sulawesi Sea, Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean 
2. Karang Tille Fish Java Sea, Makasar Strait, Flores Sea, Sulawesi Sea, 
Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean 
3 Demersal Fish The Strait of Malacca, Strait of Makasar and Flores Sea, 
Sulawesi Sea, Pacific Ocean and Arafura Sea 
4. Little Pelagic Fish The Strait of Malacca and Java Sea 
5. Big Pelagic Fish Sulawesi Sea and Pacific Ocean 
6. Lobster The Strait of Makasar and Flores Sea 
7.  
Squid 
The Strait of Malacca, Java Sea, the Strait of Makasar, 
Flores Sea and Arafura Sea 
Sources: Dewan Maritim Indonesia (2007a: 5-6 – 5-7) 
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Appendix II 
 
Table B.  Status of Indonesia Maritime Boundaries Agreements with Neighbouring 
States 
 
Neighboring State Status of Maritime Boundaries Agreement 
Territorial 
Sea 
Contiguous 
Zone 
Exclusive 
Economic 
Zone 
Continental 
Shelf 
1 India × × - √ 
2 Thailand × × - √ 
3 Malaysia √ - - √ 
4 Singapore √ × × × 
5 Vietnam × × - √ 
6 The Philippines × - - - 
7. Palau × × - - 
8 Papua New 
Guinea 
√ × √ √ 
9 Australia × × √ √ 
10 East Timor - - - - 
Source: Dewan Maritim Indonesia (2007a:8-3-8-4) 
√ indicates that maritime border agreements between the two countries had been signed or 
ratified 
× indicates that maritime border agreements between the two countries are not required 
- indicates that maritime border agreements have not been discussed 
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Appendix III 
Table C. List of Indonesia’s Outermost Islands 
No Name of the Island Location Bordering State 
1 Rondo Indian Ocean (Nangroe Aceh Darussalam) India 
2 Berhala Strait of Malacca  (North Sumatera) Malaysia 
3 Nipa the Straits of Singapore (Riau Islands) Singapore 
4 Sekatung the South China Sea (Riau Island) Vietnam 
5 Marore the Sulawesi Sea (North Sulawesi) The Philipines 
6 Marampit the Sulawesi Sea (North Sulawesi) The Philipines 
7 Miangas the Sulawesi Sea (North Sulawesi) The Philipines 
8 Fani the Pacific (West Papua) Palau 
9 Fanildo the Pacific (Papua) Palau 
10 Bras the Pacific (Papua) Palau 
11 Batek the Sawu Sea (East Nusa Tenggara) Timor Leste 
12 Sebatik Island East Kalimantan Malaysia 
Source: Indonesian Ministry of Defence (2008:48-49) 
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Appendix IV 
Table D. Designated BIMP-EAGA Gateway Ports 
Participating States Gateway Ports 
Brunei Darussalam Kuala Belait and Muara 
Indonesia Balikpapan, Banjarmasin, Bitung, Jayapura, Makassar, Nunukan, 
Pantoloan, Pare-Pare, Pontianak, Sorong, Tarakan and Ternate 
Malaysia Bintulu, Kuching, Kudat, Labuan, Lahad Datu, Menumbok, Miri, 
Sandakan, Sepanngar/Kota Kinabalu, Sibu, Tanjung Manis and 
Tawau 
Philippines Bongao, Brooke’s Point, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General 
Santos, Glan, Pagadian, Puluan and Zamboanga 
Source: Schedule A of the 2007 MoU Between the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines on Establishing and Promoting Efficient and 
Integrated Sea Linkages  
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Appendix V 
Table E. List of Port Facilities that Have Been Visited by the United States Coast 
Guard 
 
No. Port Facility 
Port 
Administrator 
Date of Visit 
1 Jamrud Pelindo III Tanjung Perak Tg. Perak 
2 September 
2005 
2 
Senipah Terminal Total E & P 
Indonesia Balikpapan 
Balikpapan 
3 September 
2005 
3 PT. Caltex (Chevron) Dumai Dumai 
4 September 
2005 
4 
PT. Pelindo III Cabang 
Banjarmasin 
Banjarmasin 
5 September 
2005 
5 
Jakarta International Container 
Terminal 
Tg. Priok 20 June 2006 
6 Terminal Peti Kemas Koja Tg. Priok 20 June 2006 
7 
Pelindo II Convention Terminal 
Jakarta 
Tg. Priok 20 June 2006 
8 
Semarang International Container 
Terminal 
Semarang 20 June 2006 
9 PT. Pupuk Kaltim Bontang Lhoktuan 23 June 2006 
10 
Indominco Mandiri Bontang 
(Bontang Coal Terminal) 
Lhoktuan 23 June 2006 
11 
PT. Badak Bontang Natural Gas 
Liquefaction 
Tg. Laut 23 June 2006 
12 PT. Pelindo I Cabang Dumai Dumai 26 June 2006 
13 PT. Multimas Nabati Asahan Belawan 24 June 2007 
14 
Belawan International Container 
Terminal (BICT) 
Belawan 27 June 2007 
15 
Pertamina Unit Pengolahan II 
Dumai 
Dumai 29 January 2007 
16 Belawan Multi Purpose Terminal Belawan 27 January 2007 
17 PT. Pelindo II Cabang Padang Tl. Bayur 30 January 2007 
18 DUKS PT. Semen Padang Tl. Bayur 30 January 2007 
19 
Pertamina Unit Pengolahan V 
Balikpapan 
Balikpapan 30 January 2007 
20 
PT. Pertamina Unit Pemasaran III 
Jakarta 
Tg.Priok 1 February 2007 
21 
PT. Terminal Peti Kemas 
Surabaya 
Tg. Perak 2 February 2007 
22 British Petroleum Arco Ardjuna Kep. Seribu 3 March 2008 
23 Chevron Santan Marine Terminal Tg. Santan 5 March 2008 
24 Newmont Nusa Tenggara Benete 8 March 2008 
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25 
PT. Pelindo IV Cabang 
Balikpapan 
Balikpapan 22 June 2009 
26 Pertamina Balikpapan Balikpapan 24 June 2009 
27 Petrosea Tanjung Batu Balikpapan Balikpapan 26 June 2009 
28 PT. Mahakam Sumber Jaya Samarinda 29 June 2009 
29 PT. Pelindo IV Cabang Tarakan Tarakan 30 June 2009 
30 North Pulau Laut Coal Terminal Kotabaru 2 July 2009 
31 PT. Pelindo IV Cab Makasar Adpel Makasar 20 January 2010 
32 PT. Pertamina Makasar Adpel Makasar 20 January 2010 
33 
PT. Berdikari Sari Utama Flour 
Mills, Makassar 
Adpel Makasar 
20 January 2010 
34 
Belawan Internatioal Conteiner 
Terminal (BICT) 
Belawan 
20 January 2010 
35 
Belawan Multi Purpouse, PT. 
Pelindo I Cabang Belawan 
Belawan 
20 January 2010 
36 PT. Chevron (Caltex) Dumai Dumai 22 January 2010 
37 PT. Pelindo I Cabang Dumai Dumai 22 January 2010 
38 
PT Salim Ivomas Pratama 
(BIMOLI) 
Bitung 
22 January 2010 
39 Pelabuhan Petikemas Bitung Bitung 22 January 2010 
40 PT Pelindo III Cab.Semarang 
Adpel Tg 
Emas 
22 January 2010 
41 
Jakarta International Container 
Terminal (JICT), Jakarta 
Adpel Tg. 
Priok 
22 January 2010 
42 Multi Terminal Indonesia, Jakarta 
Adpel Tg. 
Priok 
22 January 2010 
Source: Indonesian DGST (2010e: 4-5) 
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Appendix VI Interview Methodology 
 
This appendix will explain methods and triangulation techniques used in data collection 
and analysis for the thesis. My research benefited greatly from the use of interview and 
document collection in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. I gathered interview and 
document data mainly during two periods of field work. The first period of field work was 
conducted in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia from June to September 2010.  During 
my field work in Jakarta I was hosted by the Department of International Relations, 
Universitas Indonesia. In Singapore I was hosted by the International Centre for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. My first 
research trip to Southeast Asia also included a two week visit to Kuala Lumpur. The 
second period of field work was carried out in Indonesia’s two largest cities: Jakarta and 
Surabaya from August to December 2011. During my second field trip I was hosted by the 
Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. 
 
I interviewed Indonesian active-duty and retired officials dealing with maritime security. 
Interview subjects were selected after I identified them from government and non-
government websites, their writings, newspaper articles, discussions with other 
interviewees, and consultation with lecturers at the Department of International Relations, 
Universitas Indonesia. All interviews that I carried out in Indonesia were arranged through 
the Universitas Indonesia. The host institution has established good contacts with some 
retired and active officials, and security experts assisted me in gaining access. As part of 
my interview data collection the host institution also sent letters of request to key 
Indonesian bureaucratic actors in the field of maritime security. These institutions were 
identified primarily from Indonesian government websites, particularly the Indonesian 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board website, and documents that were available to me 
during my past research on Indonesian port security such as defence white papers and 
drafts of Indonesian maritime legislation. The host institution also wrote letters of request 
to Indonesian shipping and transport associations in Jakarta and Surabaya to facilitate my 
field work. I did not use a strict sampling frame to select interviewees. In practice to trace 
suitable interview subjects a snowball sampling procedure was useful to help me to select 
further interviewees.
900
 As I started the interview process some of my interviewees put me 
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in contact with other individuals including officials, business representatives, security 
experts and representatives of non-governmental organizations involved in security 
cooperation.  
 
I used a similar sampling procedure for my research visit in Singapore and Malaysia. I 
identified research subjects through government websites, journal articles, newspapers and 
non-governmental organization and international shipping association websites such as the 
ReCAAP ISC, the Singapore Shipping Association, Asian Shipowners’ Forum, and the 
International Maritime Bureau-Piracy Reporting Centre websites. In Singapore and 
Malaysia a letter of introduction from the host institution was not required to gain access to 
interview subjects. I was able to contact all interviewees directly, primarily via email. 
However, in conducting research in Singapore being associated with a research institute 
was helpful both to gain trust from interview subjects and to facilitate security clearance 
processes when it was required by government institutions. In a few situations I had to wait 
for security clearance to be issued before I could interview high profile government 
officials. As the interview began in Singapore a number of interviewees introduced me to 
other additional respondents that they had contacts with. In comparison to my field trip in 
Indonesia and Singapore, I did not interview government officials in Malaysia since I did 
not have a research permit from the Malaysian Economic Planning Unit (EPU). Although I 
applied for the permit in 2010 the EPU only contacted me few months before I submitted 
my thesis. In total I was able to carry out 63 interviews in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore by using the snowball sampling procedure. 
 
I did not always get to interview desired subjects. I tried to interview representatives from 
the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, Jakarta and the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for 
Counter-Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur but could not gain access. The former could not allocate 
time during my visit and the latter raised concerns over security and confidentiality. 
 
In the beginning of each interview I provided a brief description about my research to the 
interviewee and a consent form.  Interview proceedings were recorded with digital recorder 
if the interviewees deemed that this was acceptable. Interview transcripts and notes are 
currently available. However, in order to comply with the University of Glasgow ethic 
guidelines and major requirements from the College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee 
for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects my interview data will not be kept 
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indefinitely. I agreed to erase the audio recording of all interview proceedings and 
transcripts of interviews after the completion of my study. 
 
I am aware that there are three issues that could arise from the use of interview data in this 
thesis. First, not all interviewees can be assumed as equally important.
901
 Only a few 
interviewees were involved in the decision making process or had access to closed 
meetings and therefore, could explain how the government decision was actually 
formulated.
902
  Most interviewees that provided insightful answers were either the current 
or former leaders of government agencies, or relevant leaders of business associations and 
companies. One way to give weight to interviewee statements is to “place each item of 
material in light of the character structure and social position of the informant.”903  
Providing detailed discussion of each interviewee’s professional position and role in 
relation to each cooperation agreements, however, would breach ethical guidelines for 
reporting the data with anonymity and in certain cases could endanger the career and safety 
of my interviewees.
904
 Second, in numerous interviews I also asked interviewees to 
recollect specific events, decisions or arrangements which happened in the past or “have 
developed over a long period of time.”905 This was because a number of bilateral, regional 
and multilateral arrangements dealing with maritime security covered in this thesis were 
introduced in mid 1990s and early 2000s. Under this circumstance distortion to the 
interview report could take place if the interviewee could not recollect the details of what 
happened and rather, stated what is supposed to happen.
906
 The data reported may also give 
a distorted account of what actually happened if interviewees unconsciously explained the 
situation to suit their own perspective, or consciously modified the facts.
907
 Third, I am 
aware that data from an interview was what the interviewee was willing to share with me at 
that particular moment.
908
 Under other circumstances, what the interviewee stated to me 
could be different.
909
 
 
                                                          
901
   L.A. Dexter (1970: 6) 
902
   See  Dexter (1970: 6-7, 130) 
903
   Dexter (1970: 148) 
904
   Dexter (1970: 148) 
905
   Dexter (1970:11) 
906
   Dexter (1970:126) 
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I used triangulation techniques in data collection to address concerns about validity and 
bias.
910
 Interviews with officials, business and NGO representatives were cross-checked 
against each other.
911
 I compared statements made by an interviewee with the account 
provided by other interviewees.
912
 I talked to individuals from public and private sectors, 
and officials from different ranks. Talking to officials from different government agencies 
at different stages of their career has proved useful.
913
 High government officials or former 
officials were able to explain Indonesia’s participation or non-participation in certain 
cooperation agreements because they were consulted or involved in the decision making 
process. Their statements could be corroborated with mid-career officials involved in 
arranging and assisting meetings, drafting internal policy assessment and conducting 
maritime operations as part of the country’s compliance with maritime agreements. I asked 
for further clarification through re-interviewing informants in person when possible or 
through phone and email correspondence when there were discrepancies found in the 
cross-examination of interviewees’ accounts.914  
 
In order to validate interview data I also combined interviews with document analysis to 
learn about Indonesia’s participation in maritime cooperation.915 Documents that I gathered 
during field work were helpful as sources of information and for cross-examining 
interview data.
916
 Under situations where statements and statistical data found in 
documents conformed with interview data I cited the two types of data to support my 
argument. However, a number of government officials granted me access to confidential 
and internal documents that were crucial for my research and asked me to cite these 
documents as part of the interview data. Although these documents were invaluable 
sources that confirmed interview data I did not cite them explicitly as document sources to 
honour my interviewees’ requests. Giving complete sources of these documents means 
breaching their trust and could possibly endanger my interview subjects.  
 
                                                          
910
   For discussion about triangulation techniques see Arksey and Knight (1999: 22-23) 
911
   Dexter (1970: 15); H. Arksey and P. Knight (1999: 27) 
912
   Dexter (1970: 127) 
913
    See Arksey and Knight (1999: 27) 
914
   See Dexter (1970: 128) 
915
  For discussion about combining other research methods see Dexter (1970:16-17); Arksey and 
Knight (1999: 20, 23, 28) 
916
   Arksey and Knight (1999: 17) 
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Interviewees’ statements were compared with statements and statistical data I collected 
from various documents. These documents included companies and NGOs’ reports, 
official speeches, ministries’ reports, defence white papers, yearbooks, draft legislation, 
meetings reports, inter-ministerial correspondence, national and sub regional development 
and transportation blueprints, transcripts of meetings, notes and guidelines published by 
government ministries. I used various document sources to develop statistical data to build 
a clear picture of Indonesia’s participation or non-participation in maritime security 
agreements. These statistical data comprise statistics on Indonesia and its cooperation 
partners’ defence expenditure, Indonesia’s maritime agencies’ expenditure, Indonesia’s 
export and import values, Indonesia’s shipment overseas, Indonesia’s ISPS Code certified 
ports, armed robbery against ships attacks in Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore and frequency of terrorism incidents as well as the number of perpetrators 
that have been captured in Indonesia. Sources of some of this data included the IMB-PRC 
annual reports, the Indonesian Ministry of Transportation yearbook, the Ministry of 
Defence’ white paper and the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs annual reports. Statistics on Indonesia’s maritime agencies expenditure, shipment, 
foreign trade, and ports that were not available online and could not be found in documents 
collected were made available to the author during the interview process or through formal 
written request by the host institution to the head of relevant government agencies. 
 
There were two concerns related to the statistical data that I managed to collect. First, I did 
not manage to obtain data of actual maritime defence expenditure from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Defence. Data that I obtained from the Indonesian National Development 
Planning Agency (Bappenas) was the planned defence budget for the Ministry of Defence 
established at the beginning of each government financial year. Therefore, this data does 
not capture any difference between planned and actual expenditure. Second, there were 
inconsistencies in the categories measured each year. Prior to 2002 categories measured in 
the Ministry of Defence expenditure were very broad and vague. For instance, categories 
used in the budget included state’s defence awareness programmes and sub regional 
defence programmes among others. There was no clear indication of the allocation of 
resources for the Navy or maritime security. From 2002 onwards categories measured 
adopted in the defence budget showed a clearer numerical picture of budget allocation for 
the Navy, the Air Force and the Army. For this reason I only presented data of defence 
allocation for maritime security from 2002 onwards. Third, among statistical data of 
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Indonesian government agencies’ expenditure only the data of the Ministry of Defence and 
the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs’ allocation for the 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board provides a relatively good numerical picture of 
these agencies’ resources allocation for maritime security. Statistical data of the Indonesian 
National Police and the MFA expenditure does not provide clear indicators of budget 
allocations for maritime security cooperation. For instance, the expenditure of Indonesian 
National Police did not mention budget allocations for its Marine Police. Categories 
measured in the budget of these government agencies’ expenditure were very broad and 
therefore, less useful. Given this limitation, in an attempt to show Indonesia’s allocation of 
resources for maritime security, I only presented statistical data of Indonesia’s defence 
expenditure, and the Maritime Security Coordinating Board expenditure. Expenditure of 
other civilian government agencies such as the MoT, Customs, and the MFA in dealing 
with maritime cooperation were either unavailable or too imprecise and vague to be useful. 
 
Table F.1 List of Interviews Conducted in Indonesia 
No Code Information on Interview 
1. IB01 Interview with a representative of Indonesian Shipowners’ 
Association (Jakarta, 29 June 2010) 
2. IG02 Interview with a high government official  at the Indonesian 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Jakarta, 2 July 2010) 
3. IG03 Interview with a former government official at the Indonesian 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Jakarta, 3 July 2010) 
4. IG04 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Defence (Jakarta, 7 July 2010) 
5. IG05 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian Navy 
(Jakarta, 14 July 2010) 
6. IG06 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
(Jakarta, 30 July 2010) 
7. IG07 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Jakarta, 23 August 2011) 
8. IG08 Interview with government officials at the Indonesian Ministry of 
Trade (Jakarta, 1 September 2010) 
9. IG09 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian Marine 
Police (Jakarta, 2 September 2010) 
10. IG10 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transportation (Jakarta, 3 September 2010) 
11. IG11 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian  
Ministry of Transportation (Jakarta, 3 September 2010) 
12. IG12 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transportation (Jakarta, 3 September 2010) 
13. IG13 Interview with a high government official at the Ministry of 
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Transportation (Jakarta, 3 September 2010) 
14. IG14 Interview with two high government officials at the Ministry of 
Transportation (Jakarta, 7 September 2010) 
15. IG15 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta, 8 September 2011) 
16. IB16 Interview with a representative of Indonesian Forwarders 
Association (Jakarta, 9 September 2011) 
17. IB17 Interview with a corporate communication official of a port 
operator (Surabaya, 20 September 2011)  
18. IB18 Interview with a security and safety official of a port operator 
(Surabaya, 20 September 2011) 
19. IG19 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
National Development Planning Agency (Jakarta, 28 September 
2011) 
20. IG20 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transportation (Jakarta, 29 September 2011) 
21. IG21 Interview with a former high government official at the Ministry of 
Defence (Depok, 8 October 2011) 
22. IE22 Interview with an Indonesian security policy expert at the 
University of Indonesia (Depok, 11 October 2011) 
23. IE23 Interview with an Indonesian foreign and security policy expert at 
the University of Indonesia (Depok, 11 October 2011) 
24. IG24 Interview with an official at the Indonesian Customs and Excise, 
Ministry of Finance (Jakarta, 11 October 2011) 
25. IG25 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta, 26 October 2011) 
26. IN26 Interview with an NGO representative (Jakarta, 27 October 2011) 
27.  IB27 Interview with a representative of an Indonesian local shipping 
company (Jakarta, 29 October 2011) 
28. IG28 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
(Jakarta, 2 November 2011) 
29. IG29 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Industry (Jakarta, 2 November 2011) 
30. IG30 Interview with high government officials at the Indonesian 
Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance (Jakarta, 3 November 
2011) 
31. IG31 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance (Jakarta, 3 November 
2011) 
32. IG32 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance (Jakarta, 4 November 
2011) 
33. IG33 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance (Jakarta, 9 November 
2011) 
34. IG34 Interview with high government officials at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Defence (Jakarta, 24 November 2011) 
35. IG35 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Industry, (Jakarta, 6 December 2011) 
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36. IG36 Interview with a Japanese high government official at the Embassy 
of Japan in Indonesia (Jakarta, 13 December 2011) 
37. IG37 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta, 16 December 2011) 
38. IB38 Interview with representatives of Indonesian Shipowners’ 
Association (Surabaya, 22 September 2011) 
39.  IG39 Interview with a high government official at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transportation (Jakarta, 3 November 2011) 
40 IG40 Interview with an Indonesian government official (Jakarta, 4 
November 2011) 
41 IG41 Interview with an Indonesian Customs Official, Tanjung Priok Port 
(Jakarta, 11 October 2011) 
42 IE42  Interview with an Indonesian foreign policy expert at the 
University of Indonesia (Depok, 12 September 2011) 
 
Table F.2 List of Interviews Conducted in Malaysia 
 Code Information on Interview 
1. ME01 Interview with a security expert at a Malaysian think tank 
institution (Kuala Lumpur, 23 July 2010) 
2. MI02 Interview with a representative of the International Maritime 
Bureau-Piracy Reporting Centre (Kuala Lumpur, 20 July 2010) 
 
Table F.3 List of Interviews Conducted in Singapore  
 Code Information on Interview 
1. SG01 Interview with a Singaporean high government official (Singapore, 
11 August 2010) 
2. SB02 Interview with a Singaporean local ship owner (Singapore, 6 
August 2010) 
3. SB03 Interview with a representative of multinational shipping line 
(Singapore, 11 August 2010) 
4. SG04 Interview with a representative of the United States Coast Guards 
(Singapore, 20 August 2010) 
5. SG05 Interview with a high government official from the Singapore 
Maritime Port Authority (Singapore, 6 August 2010) 
6. SB06 Interview with a representative of an international shipping 
association (Singapore, 18 August 2010) 
7. SB07 Interview with representatives of Asian Shipowners’ Forum 
(Singapore, 5 August 2010) 
8. SB08 Interview with a representative of the Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO) (Singapore, 12 August 2010) 
9. SG09 Interview with a high government official from the Singapore 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Singapore, 16 August 2010) 
10. SB10 Interview with a representative of an international insurance 
company (Singapore, 17 August 2010)  
11. SB11 Interview with an international tanker operator (Singapore, 19 
August 2010) 
12. SE12 Interview with a Singaporean maritime expert (Singapore, 4 August 
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2010) 
13. SB13 Interview with a representative of an international re-insurance 
company (Singapore, 17 August 2010) 
14. SG14 Interview with a high government official at the Singapore Navy 
(Singapore, 19 August 2010) 
15. SB15 Interview with a representative of a chamber of commerce in 
Singapore (Singapore, 18 August 2010) 
16. SB16 Interview with a representative of an international insurance 
company (Singapore, 18 August 2010) 
17. SN17 Interview with a representative of a non-governmental organization 
in the area of maritime security (Singapore, 6 August 2010) 
 
Table F.4 List of Interviews Conducted in New York 
 Code Information on Interview 
1 IG43 Interview with an Indonesian official from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (New York, 20 February 2013) 
2 PG01 Discussion with a Philippines official  20 February 2013 
Notes: 
 
Interviewee profession is coded with letter G, B, N, E and I. 
G: Government representative 
B: Business representative 
N: NGO representative 
E: Expert 
I: International organization 
 
The last two digits indicate the number assigned for each different interview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
Bibliography   
 
AAP News, “Aust-Indon special forces plan counter-terror exercise,” 2 February  
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Abbot, Kenneth W. (1999). “International Relations Theory, International Law, and  
the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts.”  The American Journal of 
International Law 93:2, pp. 361-379. 
  
Abbot, Kenneth W and Snidal, Duncan. (2000). “Hard and Soft Law in International  
Governance.” International Organization 54:3, pp. 421-456. 
 
Abbot, Kenneth W; Keohane, Robert O; Moravcsik, Andrew; Slaugter, Anne-Marie,  
and Snidal, Duncan. (2000). “The Concept of Legalization.” International 
Organization 54:3, pp. 401-419. 
 
ABC News, “Indonesia, Philippines Expand Security Ties,” 13 July 2007, available at  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-07-13/indonesia-philippines-expand-security-
ties/2502392. Last accessed 12 December 2013. 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (1990). “A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN  
States: Bilateralism or Alliance?” Centre for International and Strategic Studies 
Occasional Paper No. 14 available at http://yciss.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/06/OP14-
Acharya.pdf. Last accessed 16 January 2013. 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (1992). “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third  
World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations).” Journal of Peace Research February 
29, pp. 7-21. 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (1995). “A regional security community in Southeast Asia?.”  
Journal of Strategic Studies 18:3, pp. 175-200.  
 
Acharya, Amitav. (1997). “Ideas, identity and institution building: From the ‘ASEAN  
way’ to the ‘Asia – Pacific way’?.” The Pacific Review 10:3, pp. 319-346. 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (1998). “Culture, security, multilateralism: The ‘ASEAN way’ and  
regional order.” Contemporary Security Policy 19:1, pp. 55-84. 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (2000). “Collective identity and conflict management in Southeast  
Asia,” in Security Communities, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.). 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (2001). Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:  
ASEAN and the problem of regional order. New York: Routledge. 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (2004). “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm  
Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism.” International 
Organization 58:2, pp. 239-275. 
 
254 
 
Acharya, Amitav and Tan, See Seng. (2006). “Betwixt balance and community:  
America, ASEAN and the security of Southeast Asia.” International Relations of 
the Asia Pacific 6:1, pp. 37-59.  
  
Acharya, Arabinda. (2007). “Maritime Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” in  
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.). 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Adler, Emanuel. (1992). “The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities  
and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control.” International 
Organization 46:1, pp.101-145. 
 
 
Adler, Emmanuel. (1997). “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World  
Politics.” European Journal of International Relations 3:3, pp. 319-363. 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael. (2000). “Security communities in theoretical  
perspective,” in Security Communities, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.). 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael. (2000). “A framework for the study of security  
communities,” in Security Communities, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 
(eds.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael. (2000). “Studying security communities in theory,  
comparison and history,” in Security Communities, Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett (eds.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Agence France-Presse, “Joint air patrols over Malacca Strait to start next week:  
Indonesia,” 8 September 2005; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Agoes, Etty R. (2005). “Pengelolaan Keamanan di Selat Malaka Secara Terpadu,” in  
Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Kebijakan Terpadu Pengelolaan Keamanan Selat 
Malaka. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Kementerian 
Luar Negeri Indonesia.  
 
Agoes, Etty R. (2009). “Upaya Diplomatik Indonesia dalam Penetapan Alur-Alur  
Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI).” Indonesian Journal of International Law 6:3, 
pp. 353-374. 
 
Agung, Ide Anak Agung Gde. (1973). Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945- 
1965. The Hague: Mouton.  
  
Ali, Mushahid and Pardesi, Manjeet S. ASEAN-India Strategic Engagement:  
Singapore-India Synergy, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 
Commentaries, 6 October 2003, available at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS372003.pdf. Last accessed 21 
May 2013. 
 
255 
 
Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the  
Cuban Missile Crisis, 2
nd
 edition. New York: Wesley Longman.  
 
Anggoro, Kusnanto. (2009). “Strategi Pertahanan Kepulauan, Diplomasi Kelautan dan  
Kekuatan Matra Laut Indonesia.” Jurnal Diplomasi 1:2, pp. 59-83. 
 
Antara, “Indonesia, Singapore agree to resume talks on defense agreement,” 10 July  
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database 
 
Antara, “Indonesia, China to sign memorandum on cooperation for making rockets,”  
17 May 2005; accessed from the Newsbank database 
 
Antara, “Indonesia Formulating Rules for Thai Role in the Malacca Straits Patrol,” 3  
September 2005; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
  
Antara, “Indonesia, Singapore agree on location for joint military exercises,” 19  
January 2006;  accessed from the Newsbank database. 
    
Antara, “RI Declines to Join Proliferation Security Initiative,” 17 March 2006; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “Indonesia determined to postpone ratification of Malacca Strait pact,” 25  
September 2006; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “Indonesia Perlu Tegas atas Penolakan Revisi DCA,” 8 July 2007 available at  
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/69259/indonesia-perlu-tegas-atas-penolakan-
revisi-dca. Last accessed 8 May 2014.  
 
Antara, “Menhan: Pelaksanaan DCA Mungkin Tidak di Natuna,” 2 August 2007  
available at http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1186044439/menhan-pelaksanaan-
dca-mungkin-tidak-di-natuna. Last accessed 30 January 2013.  
  
Antara, “Anggota DPR: Singapura Secara Faktual Telah Membatalkan DCA,” 19  
September 2007, available at 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1190136535/anggota-dpr-singapura-secara-
faktual-telah-membatalkan-dca. Last accessed 28 January 2013. 
 
Antara, “Indonesia: Minister says still chance to review defence ties with Singapore,”  
22 September 2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “Thailand Ikut Amankan Selat Malaka,” 20 November 2008, available at  
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/124601/thailand-ikut-amankan-selat-malaka. 
Last accessed 20 May 2014.  
 
Antara, “China to Grant Remote Sensing Satellite to Indonesia,” 22 January 2009;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “U.S. envoy dedicates maritime radar equipment for Indonesia,” 1 July 2010;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “Indonesia, Malaysia agree on procedure for border patrols,” 23 November  
256 
 
2010 available at http://www.antara.co.id/en/print/?i=1227432707. Last accessed 
14 November 2010. 
  
Antara, “RI expecting F-16 jets from US,” 23 February 2011; accessed from the Newsbank  
database. 
 
Antara, “Minister says US Congress has agreed to donate fighter jets to Indonesia,”  
26 August 2011; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “RI Boosting International Defense Cooperation,” 22 September 2011; accessed 
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “RI-India hold joint patrol in Malacca Strait,” 27 September 2011, available  
at http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/76025/ri-india-hold-joint-patrol-in-
malacca-strait. Last accessed 26 May 2013. 
 
Antara, “RI, Australia Discuss Cooperation in Defense Industry,” 5 September 2012;  
accessed from the Newsbank database 
 
Antara, “LAM Natuna: PPRC Pembuktian Kekuatan Militer Indonesia,” 8 September  
2012 available at http://kepri.antaranews.com/berita/22148/lam-natuna-pprc-
pembuktian-kekuatan-militer-indonesia. Last acccessed 13 March 2013.  
 
Antara, “Indonesia to send 15 observers to monitor south Philippines cease-fire,” 27  
June 2012; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Antara, “TNI Unjuk Kekuatan di Gerbang Utara Indonesia,” 10 September 2012,  
available at http://kepri.antaranews.com/berita/22167/tni-unjuk-kekuatan-di-
gerbang-utara-indonesia. Last accessed 13 March 2013.   
 
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. (2006). “Resource Issues and Ocean Governance in Asia  
Pacific: An Indonesian Perspective.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28:3, pp. 466-
489. 
 
Antoniades, Andreas. (2003). “Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of  
(World) Politics.” Global Society 17:1, pp.21-38. 
 
APEC. (2008a). “Summary of Annual Fora Report to SCE and  
SOM2008/SOM3/SCE/013a,” available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-
Steering...on.../~/.../08_cttf_TRP.ashx. Last accessed 11 August 2011. 
 
APEC. (2008b). APEC Trade Recovery Programme. Singapore: APEC Counter  
Terrorism Task Force. Available  at 
http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2009/03362.pdf. Last accessed 7 June 2013. 
 
APEC. (2008c). “Singapore’s Report on the APEC Capacity Building Workshop on  
Trade Recovery Programme 23-24 July 2008,” Singapore: APEC Counter 
Terrorism Task Force, available at http://publications.apec.org/publication-
detai.php?pub_id=156. Last accessed 18 May 2012. 
 
APEC. (2009). “Report on the APEC Trade Recovery Programme Pilot Exercise,” 6  
257 
 
July 2009, available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-
Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-
Groups/~/media/Files/Groups/CTTF/09_som2_018_.ashx.Last accessed 11 August 
2011. 
 
APEC. (2010). “APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan,” available at  
http:www.apec.org/Groups/...on.../CTAP2010_INDONESIA.ashx. Last accessed 28 
November 2011.  
 
APEC Desk of the Republic of Indonesia Customs. (2011). Collective Action Plan.  
Jakarta: The APEC Desk of the Republic of Indonesia Customs, available at 
http://www.sjdih.depkeu.go.id/fullText/2010/219~PMK.04~2010Per.HTM.Last 
accessed 28 November 2011.  
 
APEC, “Transportation Working Group,” available at  
http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM- 
Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-
Groups/Transportation.aspx. Last accessed 18 May 2012. 
 
Arksey, Hillary and Knight, Peter. (1999). Interviewing for Social Scientists. London: Sage  
Publications. 
 
Arsana, I Made Andi, “Mapping a Good Fence With Singapore,” Jakarta Post, 9  
February 2009; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Arsana, I Made Andi. (2011). “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours: Challenges and  
Opportunities in Finalising Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Malacca Strait 
between Indonesia and Malaysia,” Proceeding of the 2nd CILS Conference 2011: 
International Conference on ASEAN’s Role in Sustainable Development, 21-22 
November, Yogyakarta. 
 
ASEAN, “ASEAN-U.S. Security: U.S. Proposes Cooperation on Maritime Security  
for Asia-Pacific,” 5 December 2004, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/afp/42.htm. Last accessed 5 October 2009.  
 
ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement, 3rd ASEAN Maritime Forum,” 9 October 2012,  
available at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-
communiques/item/chairman-s-statement-3rd-asean-maritime-forum. Last accessed 
15 October 2012. 
 
ASEAN, “ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to  
Security,” 17 June 2003, available at http://www.aseansec.org/14837.htm. Last 
accessed 16 May 2010. 
   
ASEAN. (2009). ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 
 
Asian Development Bank, “Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-The Philippines  
East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA),” available at 
http://beta.adb.org/countries/subregional-programs/bimp-eaga. Last accessed 1 
February 2012.  
258 
 
  
Australian Department of Defence. (2003). Department of Defence Submission No.92  
to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Inquiry into 
Australia’s Relations with Indonesia, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representa
tives_Committees?url=jfadt/reports.htm. Last accessed 21 October 2012.  
 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Agreement Between the  
Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation,” 
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/ind-aus-sec06.html. Last 
accessed 30 January 2012 
 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Indonesia Country Brief,”  
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html. Last 
accessed 22 October 2012.  
 
Australian Embassy in Indonesia, “Media Release: Australian Ambassador Welcomes  
Joint Air Force Exercises,” 17 July 2007 available at 
http://www.indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jakt/MR07_045.html. Last accessed 30 
January 2012. 
 
Australian Federal Police. (2012). Countering Terrorism available at  
http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/~/media/afp/pdf/c/countering-terrorism.ashx. Last 
accessed 21 October 2012.  
 
Australian Department of Defence, “Media Release for the Senator the Hon Robert  
Hill, Minister for Defence, Leader of the Government in the Senate: Australian and 
Indonesian Special Forces Begin Exercises,” 11 December 2005, available at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/2005/198.doc - 38k - [ doc ] - Cached - 11 Dec 
2005. Last accessed 30 January 2012.  
 
Australian Department of Defence, “Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence  
Materiel – Joint Press Conference – Indonesia,” 5 September 2012 available at 
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/05/minister-for-defence-and-minister-
for-defence-materiel-joint-press-conference-indonesia/. Last accessed 19 October 
2012. 
 
Australian Department of Defence, “Joint Press Conference in Indonesia,” 4  
September 2012 available at 
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/minister-for-defence-stephen-
smith-transcript-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-for-defence-
yusgiantoro-purnomo/. Last accessed 20 October 2012.  
 
Australian National Audit Office. (2012). Audit Report No. 30 2011-12 Performance  
Audit: Fighting Terrorism at its Source Australian Federal Police available at 
http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Uploads/Audit%20Reports/2011%2012/201112%
20Audit%20Report%20No%2030.pdf. Last accessed 19 October 2012.  
 
Axelrod, Robert. (1981).“The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists.” American  
Political Science Review 75: 2, pp. 306-318. 
 
259 
 
Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O. (1985). “Achieving Cooperation under  
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.” World Politics 38:1, pp. 226-254. 
 
Ba, Alice. (2005). “On norms, rule breaking, and security communities: a constructivist  
response.” 5:2, pp. 255-266. 
 
Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (Bakorkamla). (2004). “Workshop Selat Malaka:  
Pola Pengamanan Selat Malaka dan Permasalahannya”. Bakorkamla: Jakarta. 
 
Bakorkamla. (2010). Buku Putih Bakorkamla 2009. Jakarta: Pustaka Cakra. 
  
Barnes, Paul and Oloruntoba, Richard.  (2005). “Assurance of security in maritime  
supply chains: Conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management,” Journal 
of International Management 11, pp. 519-540. 
 
Barnett, Michael N. (1997). Bringing In the New World Order: Liberalism,  
Legitimacy and the United Nations. World Politics 49:4, pp. 526-551. 
 
BBC, “U.S. eases Indonesia arms ban,” 26 May 2005, available at  
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4581733.stma. Last accessed 6 June 2013.  
 
BBC, “Indonesia determined to postpone ratification of Malacca Strait pact,” 27  
September 2006; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
  
BBC, “SE Asia acts on maritime security,” 29 June 2004, available at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3849217.stm. Last accessed 11 May 
2013.  
 
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). (2011). Sandingan Alokasi  
Pagu Definitif APBN Tahun 2005-2010 Berdasarkan Program Per 
Kementerian/Lembaga (Juta Rupiah): Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Politik 
dan Keamanan. Jakarta: Direktorat Pertahanan dan Keamanan. 
 
Bakti, Ikrar Nusa. (2010). “Bilateral Relations between Indonesia and the Philippines:  
Stable and Cooperative,” in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between 
Bilateralism and Multilateralism, N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (eds). Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2010. 
 
Baldor, Lolita.C, “Coast Guard Issuing More Fines As Port Security Deadline Nears”,  
25 March 2004, available at https://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi-
bin/st/portal/uscg_docs/MyCG/Editorial/20061206/CGfines.pdf?id=866396f80278f
d7b62ae4aa2622c9ac5bff8d406&user_id=2a47d4dbfd24ce2da39438e736cab2d6. 
Last accessed 17 October 2012. 
 
Ball, Desmond. 1993. “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region.” Security Studies  
3:1, pp. 44-74.  
 
Balzacq, Thierry. (2005). “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience,  
and Context.” European Journal of International Relations 11:2, pp. 171-201. 
 
Bandoro, Bantarto. (2005). “The Hassan Initiative dan Desain Baru Politik Luar  
260 
 
Negeri Indonesia,” in Mencari Desain Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia. Jakarta: 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 
 
Banloi, Rommel C. (2006). “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,” in the  
Best of Times, the Worst of Times:Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific, Joshua Ho 
and Catherine Zara Raymond (Eds.). Singapore: World Scientific and Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies.  
 
Basiron, Mohd Nizam and Dastan, Amir. (2006). Building A Comprehensive Security  
Environment. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Bateman, Sam. (2005). “Maritime Regime Building,” in The Best of Times, The Worst  
of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific. Joshua Ho & Catherine Zara 
Raymond (eds.). Singapore: World Scientific & Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies.  
 
Bateman, Sam. (2007). “Building good order at sea in Southeast Asia: The promise of  
international regimes,” in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, Edited by Kwa 
Chong Guan and John K. Skogan. New York: Routledge, pp. 97-116. 
 
Bateman, Sam. (2009).“Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Indonesian  
Waters,” in Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge. Singapore: ISEAS. 
 
Buzan, Barry, Weaver, Ole and De Wilde, Jaap. (1998). Security: A New Framework for  
Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner.  
 
Beckman, Robert C., Grundy-War, Carl and Forbes, Vivian L.(1994). “Acts of Piracy  
in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.” International Boundaries Research Unit 
Maritime Briefing 1:4, pp.1-43. 
  
Beckman, Robert C. (2002). “Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in  
Southeast Asia: The Way Forward.” Ocean Development & International Law 33, 
pp. 317-342 . 
 
Beckman, Robert. (2006). “Legal Implications of the Proliferation Security  
Initiative,” in the Best of Times, the Worst of Times:Maritime Security in the Asia 
Pacific, Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (Eds.). Singapore: World 
Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.  
 
Behringer, Ronald M. (2005). “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security  
Agenda.” Cooperation and Conflict 40:3, pp. 305-342. 
 
BIMCO, 12 March 2010, “ReCAAP Council Approves MoU with ReCAAP,”  
available at https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2010/03/12_ReCAAP.aspx. Last 
accessed 12 May 2013.  
 
BIMP EAGA. (2012). Implementation Blueprint 2012-2016, available  
at http://bimp-eaga.org/Documents/ef4b1b8e-7291-40a5-9a0a-2d0250543801.pdf. 
Last accessed 6 June 2013. 
 
BIMP EAGA North Sulawesi, “4th BIMP-EAGA Transport Ministers Meeting  
261 
 
(TMM) Manado, North Sulawesi-Indonesia,” 25 June 2009, available at 
http://www.bimpeaganorthsulawesi.org/show_news.php?Berita_Id=129. Last 
accessed 1 July 2013.  
 
BIMP EAGA Transport Infrastructure, Information Communication Technology,  
Development Cluster Group, “Transport Infrastructure, Information 
Communication Technology, Development Cluster Group 20
th
 Senior Officials 
Meeting, Cagayan de Oro, Philippines ” 19 October 2011 http: www. bimp-eaga-
ocean-indonesia.com/wp-content/plugins/.../download.php?...pdf. Last accessed 1 
July 2013. 
 
Bingley, Barrett. (2004). “Security Interests of the Influencing States: The  
Complexity of Malacca Straits.” The Indonesian Quarterly 32:4, pp. 353-383. 
 
Boestami, John Tjahjanto. (2009). “Maritime Security Initiatives and Its Implications  
on Indonesia,” Jurnal Diplomasi 1:2, pp. 136-150. 
 
Boey, David, “S'pore, KL, Jakarta sign anti-piracy pact - Defence chiefs again ask  
Bangkok to join patrols in Malacca Strait,” Straits Times, 22 April 2006; accessed 
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Boutilier, James. (2005). “The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: The Global  
Maritime Outlook 2004,” in  The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime 
Security in the Asia Pacific. Joshua Ho & Catherine Zara Raymond (eds). 2005: 
Singapore. 
 
Bradford, John F. (2004). “Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy  
Formulation and the Coastal States Responses.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 
26:3, pp. 480-505. 
 
Bradford, John F. (2005). “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation  
in Southeast Asia.” Naval War College Review 56:3, pp. 63-86. 
 
Bradford, John F. (2008). “Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian  
Waters.” Asian Survey 48:3, pp. 473-491. 
 
Brenner, Michael J. (1976). “Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy.”Armed Forces  
& Society 2, pp. 326-332. 
 
Brodie, Ian; Theodoulou, Michael and Cobain, Ian, “Suicide bombers gave salute as  
they died,” Times, 13 October 2000; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Brunei Times, “BIMP-EAGA vital for development of borders, says Indonesian  
official,” 26 April 2013, available at http://www.bt.com.bn/business-
national/2013/04/26/bimp-eaga-vital-development-borders-says-indonesian-
official. Last accessed 22 May 2013. 
 
Bryman, Alan. (2004). Social Research Methods 2
nd
 Edition. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press. 
 
Burton, John, “ASIA-PACIFIC: Malacca Strait loses its war risk rating as piracy  
262 
 
eases,” Financial Times, 9 August 2006; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
  
Business Times, “Accord on hot pursuit of pirates in Straits imminent - Patrol vessels  
can chase pirates up to 5 miles into neighbours' waters,” 13 September 2005; 
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Business World, “BIMP-EAGA tries to go the next level by seeking to eliminate  
trade,” 3 August 2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Business World, “Mindanao traders frustrated with EAGA, call for timetable,” 10  
March 2006; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Business World. “EAGA members agree to conduct joint exercises versus terrorism,”  
3 February 2004; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Butcher, John G. (2009). “Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda Declaration  
of 1957 and the ‘Struggle’ to Gain International Recognition of the Archipleagic 
Principle.” Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge. Robert Cribb& Michelle Ford 
(eds.). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
  
Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin. (1968). “Preface,” Diplomatic Investigations:  
Essays in Theory of International Politics. Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1968. 
 
Bull, Hedley. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New  
York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Buzan, Barry. (2001). “The English School: An Underexploited Resources in IR,” Review  
of International Studies 27:3, pp. 471-488. 
 
Byers, Michael. (2003). “Preemptive Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality and  
Strategies of Legal Change.” Journal of Political Philosophy 11:2, pp. 171-190. 
 
Byers, Michael. (2004). “Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security  
Initiative.” The American Journal of International Law 98:3, pp. 526-545. 
 
Carana. (2004). Impact of Transport and Logistics on Indonesia’s Trade  
Competitiveness, available at 
http://www.carana.com/images/PDF_car/Indonesia%20Transport%20and%20Logis
tics%20Report.pdf. Last accessed 20 January 2011. 
 
Carlsnaes, Walter. (2006). “Foreign Policy,” in Handbook of International Relations.  
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.). London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
 
Chalk, Peter.  (1998a). “Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia.” Studies in  
Conflict & Terrorism 21:1, pp. 87-112. 
 
Chalk, Peter. (1998b). “Political Terrorism in South-East Asia.” Terrorism and  
Political Violence 10:2, pp. 118-134. 
 
263 
 
Chapnick, Adam. (1999). “The Middle Power.” Canadian Foreign Policy 7:2, pp. 73- 
82. 
 
Chapnick, Adam. (2000). “The Canadian Middle Power Myth.” International Journal  
55:2, pp. 188-206. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998). “Review: The Constructivist Turn in International  
Relations Theory.” World Politics 50:2, pp. 324-348. 
 
Chen, Jeffrey. (2007). “The Emerging Nexus between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism  
in Southeast Asia Waters: A Case Study on the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM),” in 
Violence at Sea Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr (ed.). New York: 
Routledge. 
 
China Daily, “Indonesia Wins Loans and Deals,” 30 April 2011, available at    
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/30/content_12425113.htm Last 
accessed 26 July 2011. 
 
Choong, William, “US: It's not for us to police Malacca Straits - American forces will  
not step in to pre-empt threats, say top officials,” The Sunday Times, 6 June 2004. 
 
Chow, Jonathan T. (2005).  “ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11.”  
Asian Survey 45:2, pp. 302-321. 
  
Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen. (2000). “Recent development and Social  
Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis: An Overview,” in Indonesia in Transition: Social 
Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis. Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen (Eds.). 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Christensen, Thomas J. (2001).“Posing Problems without Catching up: China’s Rise  
and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy.” International Security 25:4, pp. 5-40. 
 
Christiansen, Thomas, Jorgensen, Knud Erik and Wiener, Antje. (1999). “The Social  
Construction of Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, pp. 528-544. 
 
Christophersen, Jan Georg .(2007). “Satellite-based tracking of ships as global crime  
control ISPS Code, AIS, SSAS and LRIT,” in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. 
Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.), New York: Routledge. 
 
Claude, Inis L. Jr. (1966). “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the  
United Nations.” International Organization 20: 3, pp. 367-379.  
 
Clough, Patricia.“Gaps left in liner passengers' account of hijack ordeal - Achille  
Lauro affair.” Times, 18 October 1985; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Collins, Alan. (2007). “Forming a security community: lessons from ASEAN.”  
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7:2, pp. 203-225. 
 
Cooperative Mechanism, “Contributions,” available at  
264 
 
http://www.cooperativemechanism.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=42:contributions&catid=26:cooperative-mechanism&Itemid=39. Last 
accessed 7 September 2012. 
 
Consulate General of India in Medan, “20th INDOCORPAT Indian Navy- TNI AL,”  
available at 
http://www.congendiamedan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=120&Itemid=169. Last accessed 6 October 2012. 
 
Coutrier, P.L. (1988). “Living on an Oil Highway.” Ambio 17:3, pp. 186-188. 
 
Cribb, Robert and Ford, Michele. (2009). “Indonesia as An Archipelago: Managing  
Islands, Managing the Seas,” in Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Dam, Syamsumar. (2006). “Pelaksanaan Diplomasi Kelautan Dalam Mendukung  
Pemberdayaan Potensi Kelautan Nasional,” in Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli 
Membahas Aspek Strategis Diplomasi Kelautan Dalam Mendukung Pembangunan 
Nasional. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Kementerian 
Luar Negeri. 
  
David, Adrian & Mahavera, Sheridan, “Eye in sky’ for straits,” New Straits Times, 3  
August 2005; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Dent, Christopher M. and Richter, Peter. (2011). “Sub-Regional Cooperation and  
Developmental Regionalism: The Case of BIMP-EAGA.” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 33:1.   
 
Desker, Barry. (2007). “Re-thinking the safety of navigation in the Malacca Strait,” in  
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.), 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme (DKPT). (2008). Catatan DKPT. Jakarta:  
Kementrian Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan Republik 
Indonesia. 
 
Detik News, “RI Tolak Pengamanan Selat Malaka oleh Pihak Asing,” 16 April  
2004, as cited in the Indonesian Ministry of Defence website, available at 
http://www.kemhan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5532. Last 
accessed  24 December 2010. 
 
Detik News, “Isi Naskah Perjanjian Pertahanan RI dan Singapura”, 28 May 2007  
available at http://news.detik.com/read/2007/05/28/122524/785983/10/isi-naskah-
perjanjian-pertahanan-ri-dan-singapura. Last accessed 27 January 2013.  
 
Deutsche Press-Agentur, “Report: Indonesia-Singapore defence, extradition pacts  
shelved,” 20 March 2009; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Deutsche Press-Agentur, “Indonesia, Singapore to sign long-awaited extradition  
treaty,” 27 April 2007; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
265 
 
Dexter, Lewis Anthony. (1970). Elite and Specialized Interviewing. Evanston:  
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Dewan Maritim Indonesia. (2007a). Laporan: Perumusan Kebijakan Grand Strategi  
Pembangunan Kelautan. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan 
Perikanan. 
 
Dewan Maritim Indonesia. (2007b). Perumusan Kebijakan Strategi Pengamanan  
Wilayah Nasional. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan 
Perikanan. 
 
Dewan Maritim Indonesia. (2007c). Analisis Potensi Ekonomi Maritim Dalam  
Rangka Perumusan Kebijakan Ekonomi Maritim Indonesia. Jakarta: Sekretariat  
Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan. 
 
Dinas Perhubungan Kalimantan Timur, “Indonesia Ikuti BIMP EAGA Cluster  
Meeting,” 28 June 2011. Available at 
http://dishub.kaltimprov.go.id/dinamic.php?act=I&id=146&kategori=&cari=. Last 
accessed 1 July 2013.  
 
Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Laut. (2010c). Kronologis Kunjungan United States  
Coast Guard di Indonesia. Jakarta: Direktorat Kesatuan Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai. 
 
Dittmer, Lowell. (2007). “Assessing American Asia Policy.” Asian Survey. 47:4, pp.  
521-535. 
  
Djalal, Hasjim. (1995). Indonesia and the Law of the Sea. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic  
and International Studies. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim. (2003). “Pembentukan Kerja Sama Maritim ASEAN.” Jurnal Luar  
Negeri 50, pp. 57-67. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim. (2004). “Piracy In South East Asia: Indonesia & Regional  
Responses.” Indonesian Journal of International Law 1:3, 419-440. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim. (2006). “Diplomasi Kelautan dan Kepentingan Indonesia: Mengelola  
Potensi Laut Indonesia,” in Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Membahas Aspek Strategis 
Diplomasi Kelautan Dalam Mendukung Pembangunan Nasional. Jakarta: Badan 
Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim. (2007). “The Strategic Values of the Indian Ocean to Indonesian  
Diplomacy, Law and Politics”. The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the 
Indian Ocean Region. Dennis Rumley, Sanjay Chaturvedi and Mat Taib Yasin 
(eds.). Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim, “The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and  
Singapore,” The Nippon Foundation, 24 November 2008 available at 
http://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/eng/current/malacca_sympo/6.doc. Last 
accessed 28 June 2011.  
 
Djalal, Hasjim. (2009a). “The Regime of Managing Safety and Security in the Straits  
 
266 
 
of Malacca and Singapore.” Jurnal Diplomasi 1:2, pp. 8-26. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim.(2009b). “Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes,” in Indonesia beyond  
the Water’s Edge. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Djalal, Hasjim. (2009c). “Regulation of International Straits.” Indonesian Journal of  
International Law 6:3, pp. 315-332. 
  
Djumala, Darmansjah. (2004). “Kepentingan Indonesia dalam KTT Johannesburg:  
Antara Martabat dan Manfaat,” in Hubungan Internasional: Percikan Pemikiran 
Diplomat Indonesia. Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama. 
 
Dosch, Jorn. (2006). “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign  
Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.” Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs 25:5, pp. 42-70. 
 
Doughton, Thomas F. (2006). “Straits of Malacca and the Challenges Ahead: The  
U.S. Perspective,” in Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits 
of Malacca. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Eaton, Sarah and Stubbs, Richard. (2006). “Is ASEAN powerful? Neo-realist versus  
constructivist approaches to power in Southeast Asia.” The Pacific Review 19:2, pp. 
135-155. 
 
Efstathopoulos, Charalampos. (2011). “Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle  
Power Prism.” Asian Journal of Political Science 19:1, pp. 74-95. 
 
Elman, Colin. (1996). “Horses for courses: Why nor neorealist theories of foreign  
policy?” Security Studies 6:1, pp. 7-53. 
 
Elisabeth, Adriana. (2008). The Role of the Philippines in the BIMP-EAGA Growth  
Triangle and the Dynamics of ASEAN Political Economy, PhD Thesis, Department 
of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2008, available at 
http://ru.uow.edu.au/theses/52. Last accessed 20 November 2012.  
 
Elson, Robert Edward. (2008). The Idea of Indonesia: A History. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Embassy of Japan in Indonesia, “Record of Recent Major Japan-Indonesia  
Cooperation Projects in Maritime Security, Counter Piracy, Counter Terrorism and 
Improving Port Security,” provided to author by a high government official  of the 
Embassy of Japan during interview in Jakarta, 13 December 2011. 
 
Embassy of Japan in Indonesia, “Japan’s 545 Million Yen Grant Aid to RI to Provide  
Security Equipments for Main Ports”, 25 June 2008 available at 
http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news08_25e.html. Last accessed 20 December 
2011. 
 
Embassy of Japan in Indonesia, “Penandatanganan dan Pertukaran Nota Diplomatik  
Bantuan Hibah Jepang untuk Indonesia: Proyek Pengadaan Peralatan Keamanan di 
Bandara dan Proyek Peningkatan Kemampuan Vessel Traffic System di Selat 
267 
 
Malaka dan Selat Singapura Tahap ke-2,” 25 June 2010 available at 
http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news10_24.html. Last accessed 20 December 2011. 
 
Embassy of the Republic of China in Indonesia, “China and Indonesia,” 21 April  
2004, available at http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyyn/sbgxgk/. Last accessed 26 
July 2011. 
 
Embassy of the United States in Nassau, “CSI Scanner Unveiling Ceremony:  
Remarks by U.S. Ambassador John D. Rood at the Freeport Container Port, 
Freeport, Grand Bahama, 11 January 2007,” available at 
http://nassau.usembassy.gov/sp_12012007.html. Last accessed 8 May 2010. 
  
Emmers, Ralf. (2003). “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in  
Southeast Asia.” The Pacific Review 16:3, pp. 419-438. 
 
Emmers, Ralf. (2007). “Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and  
Diplomatic Status Quo,” in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Emmers, Ralf. (2007). “Securitization”, Contemporary Security Studies. Edited by Alan  
Collins, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Emmerson, Donald K. (1983). “Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic  
Pluralism in Indonesia.” Asian Survey 23: 11, pp. 1220-1241. 
 
Febrica, Senia. (2010). “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the  
Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia.” Asian Survey 50:3, pp. 569-590. 
 
Finnemore Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn. (1998). “International Norm Dynamics and  
Political Change.” International Organization 52:4, pp. 887-917. 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn. (2001). “Taking Stock: the Constructivist  
Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 4, pp. 391-416. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. (2001). “Exporting the English School?” Review of International  
Studies 27:3, pp. 509-513.  
 
Forbes, Vivian Louis. (2006). “The Malacca Straits in the Context of the ISPS Code,”  
in Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca. 
Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Fox, Annette Baker. (1980). “The range of choice for middle powers: Australian and  
Canada compared.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 26:2, pp. 193-203. 
 
Gabel, Josiane. (2004). “The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons after September 11.”  
The Washington Quarterly 28:1, pp.181-195. 
 
Gilpin, Robert. (1975). U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political  
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. New York: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
 
268 
 
Gilpin, Robert. (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Glazebrook, G.det. (1947). “The Middle Powers in the United Nations System,”  
International Organizations 1:2, pp. 307-315. 
 
Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. (1996). “Squaring the circle: the domestic sources of  
international cooperation.” International Organization 50:2, pp. 349-373. 
 
Gowa, Joanne. (1986). “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of  
Cooperation and International Relations.” International Organization 40:1, pp. 
167-186. 
 
Granatstein, J.L. (1973). Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or  
Satellite? 3
rd
 Edition. Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company.  
 
Granatstein, J.L.(2011). “Can Canada Have a Grand Strategy?” presented at a Grand  
Strategy Symposium, 6-7 April 2011, at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 
available at 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Can%20Canada%20Have%20a%20Grand%20Strategy.
pdfLast accessed 26 April 2013. 
 
Gray, Colin. (1974). “How Does the Nuclear Arms Race Work?,” Cooperation and  
Conflict 9:1, pp. 285-295. 
 
Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist  
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42:3, 
pp. 485-507. 
 
Grieco, Joseph M. (1995). “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the  
Neo-Realist Research Programme.” Review of International Studies 21:1, pp. 21-
40. 
 
Guenther, LCDR Darren B. Time for a New Theater Security Cooperation Plan for  
Indonesia. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463963. 
Last accessed 6 June 2013.  
  
Guilfoyle, Douglas. (2009). Shiping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Haas, Peter. (2004). “When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the  
policy process.” Journal of European Public Policy 11:4, pp. 569-592. 
 
Hadiwinata, Bob S. (2009). “International Relations in Indonesia: Historical Legacy,  
Political Intrusion and Commercialization.” International Relations of the Asia 
Pacific 9:1, pp. 55-81. 
 
Halloran, Richard. “Indonesia a worrying blip on American radar screens,” Straits  
Times, 2 August 2003; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Handberg, Roger. (2013). “Crowded and Dangerous Space: Space Navigation System  
269 
 
Proliferation’s Impact on Future Security Operations.” Comparative Strategy 32:3, 
pp. 207-223. 
 
Hapsoro, Bagas. (2004). “Tantangan Diplomasi Multilateral Indonesia.” Hubungan  
Internasional: Percikan Pemikiran Diplomat Indonesia. Jakarta: PT Gramedia 
Pustaka Utama. 
 
Hassan, Ahmad Ghazali Bin Abu. (2007). “The Rhine Navigation Regime: A Model  
for the Straits of Malacca?” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the 
Malacca Straits. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Hasenclever, Andreas, Mayer, Peter and Rittberger,Volker. (2000). “Integrating  
Theories of International Regimes.” Review of International Studies 26, pp. 3-33. 
 
Higgott, Richard A. and Cooper, Andrew Fenton. (1990). “Middle Power Leadership  
and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations.” International Organization 44:4, pp. 589-632. 
 
Hill, Larry B. (1991). “Who Governs the American Administrative State? A  
Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance.” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 1:3, pp. 261-294.  
 
Hindu, “India, Indonesia agree on anti-terror measures,” 3 September 2003; accessed from  
the Newsbank database.. 
 
Hindu, “India signs maritime accord with Thailand,” 21 May 2005; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.  
 
Ho, Joshua. (2006). “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia.” Asian Survey  
46:4, pp. 558-574. 
 
Ho, Joshua. (2007a). “Securing the Seas as a Medium of Transportation in Southeast  
Asia,” in The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region. 
Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Ho, Joshua. (2007b). “The Importance and Security of Regional Sea Lanes,” in  
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. Routledge: New York. 
  
Ho, Joshua. (2009a). “Short Communication: Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery  
in Asia: The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC).” Marine Policy 33:2, pp. 
432-434. 
  
Ho, Joshua. (2009b). “Recovering after a maritime terrorist attack: The APEC Trade  
Recovery Programme.” Marine Policy 33:4, pp. 733-735. 
  
Holmes, John W. (1976). Canada: A Middle-Aged Power. Ottawa: McClelland and  
Stewart Ltd. & The Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University.  
 
Howorth, Jolyon. (2004). “Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European  
Security and Defence Policy.” West European Politics 27:2, pp. 211-234. 
 
270 
 
Huang, Victor. (2008). “Building maritime security in Southeast Asia: outsiders not  
welcome?” Naval War College Review 61:1, pp. 87-105.  
 
Human Rights Law Centre, “Military Cooperation with Indonesia Must Be Subject to  
Stringent Safeguards,” available at http://www.hrlc.org.au/content/publications-
resources/hrlrc-e-bulletin/vol-78-october-2012/. Last accessed 22 October 2012.  
 
Hurrell, Andrew. (2001). “Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within  
the English School.” Review of International Studies 27:3, pp. 489-494. 
 
Hurrell, Andrew. (2002). “International Society and the Study of Regimes A  
Reflective Approach,” in Regime Theory And International Relations. Volker 
Rittberger & Peter Mayer (eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Hussin, Abdul Rahim. (2007). “The Management of the Straits of Malacca: Burden  
Sharing as the Basis for Cooperation,” in Establishing the Facts, Eliminating the 
Fears: Proceedings of Lima International Maritime Conference Malaysia 4-5 
December 2005. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Huxley, Tim. (2002). Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security.  
New York: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
 
Huysmans, Jef. (2000). “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.”  
Journal of Common Market Studies 38:5, pp. 751-777. 
 
Indian Embassy in Jakarta, “Joint Statement: Vision for the India-Indonesia New  
Strategic Partnership over the coming decade,” 25 January 2011, available at 
http://indianembassyjakarta.com/Joint%20Statement.pdf. Last accessed 3 October 
2012. 
 
Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “India - Indonesia Relations August 2012,”  
available at  http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044478. Last accessed 3 
October 2012.  
 
Indonesian Armed Forces, “DANLANTAMAL I Tutup Patkor MALINDO 114/11,” 3  
August 2011, available at 
http://www.tnial.mil.id/News/Seremonial/tabid/79/articleType/ArticleView/articleI
d/5449/DANLANTAMAL-I-TUTUP-PATKOR-MALINDO-11411.aspx. Last 
accessed 17 September 2012. 
 
Indonesian Armed Forces, “GBC Malindo Ke-33 Banyak Kemajuan,” 10 December  
2004, available at http://web.tni.mil.id/view-637-gbc-malindo-ke-33-banyak-
kemajuan.html. Last accessed 17 September 2012. 
 
Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. (2006a).  
Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Tahun 2005. Jakarta: Kementerian Koordinator 
Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan. 
 
Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. (2006b).  
Penetapan Rencana Kinerja Tahun 2006. Jakarta: Kemenkopolhukam. 
 
271 
 
Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. (2007).  
Kumpulan Pidato Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik Hukum dan Keamanan 
Republik Indonesia. Jakarta: Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Politik Hukum dan 
Keamanan Indonesia. 
 
Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. (2008).  
Evaluasi Pengelolaan Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan Tahun 2007. Jakarta: 
Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs. 
 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, “Kebijakan Pemerintah Yang Dikritisi,  
Implikasi Bagi Nasib Rakyat, Sikap Politik Fraksi PDI Perjuangan,” 26 January 
2013 available at http://www.pdiperjuangan-jatim.org/v03/?mod=release&id=9. 
Last accessed 27 January 2013. 
 
Indonesian Directorate General of Sea Transportation (DGST). (2010a). “Data  
Pelabuhan Comply ISPS Code (Data of Ports that Have Complied with the ISPS 
Code).”Jakarta: Indonesian Ministry of Transportation. Data is provided to author 
during interview with an official from the DGST. 
 
Indonesian DGST. (2010b). Data Distribusi Angkutan Ekspor dan Impor Tahun 2009.  
Jakarta: Directorate General of Sea Transportation. 
 
Indonesian DGST. (2010c). “Bahan Wawancara Direktur Jenderal Perhubungan Laut  
dengan Staf Pengajar FISIP UI”, made available to author during interview with a 
high government official from the Indonesian Directorate General of Sea 
Transportation (Jakarta, 3 September 2010). 
 
Indonesian DGST. (2010d). Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai (Indonesian Sea and Coast  
Guard). Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Perhungan Laut. 
 
Indonesian DGST. (2010e). Kronologis Kunjungan U.S. Coast Guard di Indonesia.  
Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Laut. 
 
Indonesian DGST, “Internal Report: Seminar Port Facility Security di Jepang,” made  
available to author during interview with a high government official from the 
Indonesian DGST (Jakarta, 3 September 2010). 
 
Indonesian Embasssy in Canberra, “Indonesia Calls,” 8 May 2003 available at  
http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/brief/2003/may/08may03.htm. Last accessed 21 
January 2013.  
 
Indonesian Embassy in Serbia. (2011). “RI and Philippine Agree to  Extend Patrolling  
Areas.” Equator 14:1,  available at 
http://www.kemlu.go.id/belgrade/Magazines/EQUATOR%20JANUARY%202011.
pdf. Last accessed 10 July 2011. 
 
Indonesian Embassy in Washington D.C, “Joint Statement of Indonesia and the U.S.  
Security Dialogue V,” 19 April 2007 available at 
http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/ina-usa/statement/jointstatementSDV.htm. 
Last accessed 21 March 2012.  
 
272 
 
Indonesian Government, “Internal Document: Pengesahan Resolusi Dewan  
Keamanan PBB mengenai Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships di Somalia,” 
Jakarta, 9 June 2008. This document was made available to author during an 
interview in Jakarta in 2010. 
 
Indonesian Immigration Agency. “Tri-Lateral Inter-Agency Maritime Law  
Enforcement Workshop (TIAMLEW) III”, 5 April 2011, available at 
http://www.imigrasi.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=517&It
emid=34. Last accessed 13 July 2011. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Defence (MoD). (2003). Buku Putih Pertahanan [Defence  
White Paper]. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence. 
 
Indonesian MoD. (2008). Defence White Paper. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence.  
 
Indonesian MoD, “RI-China Adakan Dialog Bahas Peningkatan Kerjasama  
Pertahanan,” 19 May 2011, available at 
http://www.dmc.kemhan.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4
14:ri-china-adakan-dialog-bilateral-bahas-peningkatan-kerjasama-
pertahanan&catid=37:diplomasi-pertahanan&Itemid=64. Last accessed 10 July 
2013. 
 
Indonesian MoD, “DPR Menentang Pengerahan Armada AS ke Selat Malaka,” 26  
April 2004, available at 
http://www.kemhan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5567DPR. 
Last accesed 10 October 2009.  
 
Indonesian MoD, “Laporan Aset dan Pembangunan Pos di Pulau Nipah,” 24 June  
2010. Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan. 
 
Indonesian MoD, “Sekjen Kemhan Pimpin the 3rd Indonesia-India Joint Defence  
Cooperation Committee Meeting,” 16 October 2012, available at 
http://www.kemhan.go.id/kemhan/?pg=63&id=649. Last accessed 10 January 
2013.  
 
Indonesian MoD, “Menhan RI - India Adakan Pertemuan Bilateral Bidang  
Pertahanan,”  18 October 2012 available at 
http://www.kemhan.go.id/kemhan/?pg=63&id=653. Last accessed 10 January 
2013. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). (1986). Perjuangan Indonesia di  
Bidang Hukum Laut. Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan. 
 
Indonesian MFA. (2004). Forum Dialog ke XI Kerjasama Maritim ASEAN. Jakarta:  
Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan. 
 
Indonesian MFA. (2005a). Diskusi Panel tentang Studi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia  
Dalam Rangka Mendukung Pembangunan dan Integritas Nasional, Surabaya 7-8 
April 2005. Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan. 
  
Indonesian MFA. (2005b). Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli: Kebijakan Terpadu  
273 
 
Pengelolaan Keamanan Selat Malaka, Medan 19-20 Juli 2005. Jakarta: Badan 
Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “Pernyataan Press Tahunan Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik  
Indonesia,” Jakarta, 19 January 2005, available at 
http://www.kbrisingapura.com/docs/Press_release/19_jan_2005_2.pdf. Last 
accessed 26 November 2010.  
 
Indonesian MFA, “Pidato Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, Dr. N. Hassan  
Wirajuda pada Pembukaan Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Diplomasi Energi dalam 
Konstelasi Politik Kawasan,” 11 June 2005, available at 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&
Name2=Menteri&IDP=301. Last accessed 24 December 2010. 
 
Indonesian MFA. (2006). Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Membahas Aspek Strategis  
Diplomasi Kelautan Dalam Mendukung Pembangunan Nasional. Jakarta: 
Indonesian MFA. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “Pidato Menteri Luar Negeri: Paparan Lisan Menteri Luar Negeri  
Republik Indonesia Dr. Hassan Wirajuda Refleksi 2005 dan Proyeksi 2006,” 6 
January 2006 available at 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&
Name2=Menteri&IDP=310. Last accessed 1 April 2011.  
 
Indonesian MFA, “Background Singkat Pembentukan ASEAN Maritime Forum,”  
made available to author through an email correspondence with the Head of 
Security Division, Directorate of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation, Heru 
H. Subolo (Jakarta, 26 August 2009). 
  
Indonesian MFA, “Masyarakat Internasional Mengakui Keberhasilan Negara Pantai  
Dalam Mengamankan Selat Malaka,” 21 September 2006, available at 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/News.aspx?IDP=318. Last accessed 1 April 2012. 
 
Indonesian MFA. (2007). Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli: Optimalisasi Kerjasama  
Kelautan Intra ASEAN Melalui Pembentukan ASEAN Maritim Forum (Bandung, 
21-22 Maret 2007). Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan 
 
Indonesian MFA, “The 1st Technical Meeting Committee on Indonesia-China  
Maritime Cooperation,” 1 March 2007, available at 
http://www.kemlu.go.id/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=433&l=en. Last accessed 
10 July 2013. 
 
Indonesian MFA. (2009). ASEAN Regional Forum: The First Inter-Sessional Meeting  
on Maritime Security, Surabaya, Indonesia, 5-6 March 2009. Jakarta: Directorate 
General of Asia Pacific and African Affairs.  
 
Indonesian MFA, “The Duty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 1 August 2009,  
available at http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/Polugri.aspx?IDP=3&l=en. Last 
accessed 3 January 2011. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 6 September 2009,”  
274 
 
available at http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/Polugri.aspx?IDP=13&l=en. Last 
accessed 3 January 2011. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “International Issues: Small Arms and Light Weapons”, 7 July 2010  
available at http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IIssueDisplay.aspx?IDP=17&l=en. Last 
accessed 4 May 2011. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “Indonesia's Foreign Minister Meets Philippines' to prepare  
President Aquino III Visit,” 7 March 2011, available at 
http://www.kemlu.go.id/islamabad/Pages/News.aspx?IDP=4496&l=en. Last 
accessed 13 July 2011. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “RI-Filipina Perkuat Kerjasama Perbatasan,” 16 February 2011,  
available at http://www.kemlu.go.id/perth/Pages/News.aspx?IDP=4432&l=id. Last 
accessed 21 March 2012. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “China People’s Republic (China Republik Rakyat),” available at  
http://www.kemlu.go.id/Daftar%20Perjanjian%20Internasional/china.htm. Last 
accessed 17 October 2012. 
 
Indonesian MFA, “Brunei–Indonesia-Malaysia-Philipina East Asia Growth Area  
(BIMP-EAGA),” available at 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=RegionalCooperation&IDP
=8&P=Regional&l=en. Last accessed 22 May 2013. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Health, “Jumlah Pengungsi akibat Korban Tsunami Mencapai  
617.159 jiwa,” available at http://www.depkes.go.id/index.php/berita/info-umum-
kesehatan/668-jumlah-pengungsi-akibat-korban-tsunami-mencapai-617159-
jiwa.html. Last accessed 20 May 2013.  
 
Indonesian Ministry of Justice. (2002). Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang- 
Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Terorisme dan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 2 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberlakukan Peraturan Pemerintah 
Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 tahun 2002 tentang 
Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme, Pada Peristiwa Peledakan Bom di Bali 
tanggal 12 Oktober 2002. Jakarta: Departemen Kehakiman Republik Indonesia 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, “Siaran Press: Kembali Kapal  
Ikan Illegal Ditangkap,” available at  
http://www.kkp.go.id/index.php/mobile/arsip/c/4336/KEMBALI-KAPAL-
ILLEGAL-FISHING-DITANGKAP. Last accessed 21 December 2012. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of State Secretariat. (2001). Lampiran Pidato Presiden Republik  
Indonesia Pada Sidang Tahunan Majelis Permusywaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia. Jakarta: Perum Percetakan Negara.  
 
Indonesian Ministry of State Secretariat. (2004). Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden  
Republik Indonesia serta Keterangan Pemerintah Atas Rancangan Undang-
Undang tentang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara tahun Anggaran 2005 
275 
 
beserta Nota Keuangannya di Depan Rapat Paripurna Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia 16 Agustus 2004. Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of State Secretariat. (2008). Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden  
Republik Indonesia Serta Keterangan Pemerintah Atas Rancangan Undang-
Undang Tentang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara Tahun Anggaran 
2009 Beserta Nota Keuangannya Di Depan Rapat Paripurna Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat 15 Agustus 2008. Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara.  
 
Indonesian Ministry of Trade, “Indonesian Export-Import Data 1996-2010,” made  
available to author by the Ministry of Trade 8 October 2011. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Trade. (2010). Draft of Indonesian President Regulation on  
National Logistic System Appendix Section, 9 March 2010. This document was 
made available to author during an interview in Jakarta. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Transportation, “Pernyataan Kerjasama SAR Maritim  
Indonesia-Australia,” 4 September 2012 available at 
http://www.dephub.go.id/read/berita/berita-umum/14553. Last accessed 22 October 
2012. 
 
Indonesian Ministry of Technology, “Indonesia- Australia Tingkatkan Kerjasama  
Hankam,” 6 September 2012, available at 
http://www.ristek.go.id/index.php/module/News+News/id/11877/print. Last 
accessed 22 October 2012.  
 
Indonesian Parliament. (2000-2013). “Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja dan Rapat Dengar  
Pendapat Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Komisi I 2000-2013,” available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/Komisi/Komisi-I/laporan-singkat. Last accessed 24 April 
2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Report of the Working Meeting of Commission I of the  
Indonesian House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs”, 21 September 2006,” available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/Komisi/Komisi-I/laporan-singkat. Last accessed 15 
January 2013.  
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan  
Menteri Pertahanan dan Panglima TNI,” 5 March 2007, available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/131/Rapat-Kerja-Komisi-I-DPR-RI-
dengan-Menteri-Pertahanan-dan-Panglima-TNI. Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Report of the Working Meeting of Commission I of the  
Indonesian House of Representatives with the Minister of Defense and Armed 
Forces Commander”,17 September 2007, available 
athttp://www.dpr.go.id/id/Komisi/Komisi-I/laporan-singkat. Last accessed 15 
January 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Pertahanan  
276 
 
dan Panglima TNI,” 25 September 2006, available 
athttp://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/95/Rapat-Kerja-Komisi-I-DPR-
RI-dengan-Menteri-Pertahanan-dan-Panglima-TNI. Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri,”  
25 June 2007, available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/149/Rapat-Kerja-Komisi-I-DPR-RI-
Dengan-Menteri-Luar-Negeri. Last accessed 24 April 2013.  
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri,”  
25 January 2007, available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/89/Rapat-Kerja-Komisi-I-DPR-RI-
dengan-Menteri-Luar-Negeri. Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menkopolhukam,” 26  
February 2007, available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/88/Rapat-Kerja-Komisi-I-DPR-RI-
dengan-Menkopolhukam. Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Dengar Pendapat Komisi I DPR-RI dengan Gubenur  
Lemhanas dan Sekjen Wantannas,” 9 July 2007, available at  
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/150/Rapat-Dengar-Pendapat-
Komisi-I-DPR-RI Dengan-Gubernur-Lemhannas-dan-Sekjen-Wantannas. Last 
accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri,”  
29 October 2008, available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/365/Raker-Komisi-I-dengan-Menlu. 
Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Pertahanan  
dan Panglima TNI,” 28 May 2007, available at 
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/143/Rapat-Kerja-Komisi-I-DPR-RI-
Dengan-Menteri-Pertahanan-dan-Panglima-TNI. Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
Indonesian Parliament, “Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menkopolhukam,” 12  
June 2006, available at http://www.dpr.go.id/id/komisi/komisi1/report/2/Raker-
dengan-Polhukam. Last accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships  
Annual Report January 1
st
- December 31
st
, 1992. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2001. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2002. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2003. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
277 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2004. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2005. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2006. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2007. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2008. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2009. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
IMB. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report January 1
st
- December  
31
st
, 2010. Kuala Lumpur: IMB. 
 
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Indonesia Briefing: Impact of the Bali Bombing,”  
24 October 2002, available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1766&l=1. Last accessed 20 
August 2008. 
 
ICG, “Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status,” 3 May 2007 available at  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-
releases/2007/asia/indonesia-jemaah-islamiyahs-current-status.aspx/ Last accessed 
12 May 2011. 
 
ICG, “Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans,” Asia Report No 204, 19 April  
2011 available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-
asia/indonesia/204-indonesian-jihadism-small-groups-big-plans.aspx. Last accessed 
10 May 2011. 
 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2003). ISPS Code. London: IMO. 
 
IMO, “FAQ on ISPS Code and Maritime Security,” available at  
http://www.imo.org/newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897. Last accessed 5 
October 2009. 
 
IMO, “SUA Circular Titles,” available at https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/circular- 
titles/sua.html. Last accessed 6 October 2009. 
 
IMO, “2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention,” available at  
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Instruments/Pages/SUA.aspx. Last accessed 
16 February 2012. 
 
IMO, “MSC/Circ.984 - International Maritime Organization,” 20 December 2000  
278 
 
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=877/984.pdf. Last 
accessed 4 July 2011. 
 
IMO. (2007). Information Sheet No. 32: Information Resources on the International  
Maritime Security and ISPS Code. Available at 
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/InformationResourcesOnCurrentTopics/Info
rmationResourcesOnCurrentTopicsArchives/Documents/MARITIME%20SECURI
TY%20AND%20ISPS%20CODE%20%28December%202007%29.pdf. Last 
accessed 20 June 2013. 
 
IMO, “Membership,” available at  
http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx. Last accessed 15 July 
2013. 
 
IMO, “International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information Resources on Trade,  
Safety, Security, Environment,” 6 March 2012, available at 
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRol
eandImportanceofInternationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20
-%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf. Last accessed 17 April 2013. 
 
Intertanko, “Shipowners challenge Malacca Strait war risk zone,” 16 August 2005  
available at http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=36077. Last 
accessed 15 November 2010. 
 
Ireland, Robert. (2009). The WCO SAFE Framework of Standards: Avoiding Excess  
in Global Supply Chain Security Policy. Available at 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/research/activities-and-
programmes/~/media/44CC67F66E7C48FC9834F3504F9D7C19.ashx. Last 
accessed 20 June 2013. 
 
Jackson, Karl D. (1978). “The Prospects for Bureaucratic Polity in Indonesia,” in  
Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. 
Pye (Eds.). University of California Press: California, pp.395-398.  
 
Jackson, Karl D. (1980). “Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the  
Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia,” in Political Powers and 
Communication in Indonesia, Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (Eds.). 
University of California Press: Berkeley, pp. 3-22. 
 
Jailani, Abdulkadir [Staf Direktorat Perjanjian Politik Keamanan Kewilayahan  
Kementerian Luar Negeri].  (2005). “Pokok-Pokok Masalah Kebijakan Luar Negeri 
Tentang Issue Keamanan Laut dan Kewilayahan Selat Malaka,” in Pertemuan 
Kelompok Ahli: Kebijakan Terpadu Pengelolaan Keamanan Selat Malaka. Jakarta: 
Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Departemen Luar Negeri 
Republik Indonesia.  
 
Jakarta Globe, “Hercules Deal Boosts Cooperation,” 6 September 2012, available at  
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/hercules-deal-boosts-cooperation/542598. 
Last accessed 10 November 2012. 
   
Jakarta Globe, “Singapore Presents 5 Coastal Patrol Craft to the Indonesian Marine  
279 
 
Police,” 9 February 2012, available at 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/singapore-presents-5-coastal-patrol-craft-
to-indonesian-marine-police/. Last accessed 13 December 2013.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Illegal guns enter Indonesia through four countries,” 10 July 2002; accessed  
from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Government Seek Public Support in the War on Terror,” 30 September  
2002; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Customs service wants to negotiate over new U.S. import policy,” 15  
March 2003; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Paddy's Pub is back more secure than ever,” 7 August 2003; accessed from  
the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, "No plan to deploy troops to Malacca Strait: U.S.,” 20 April 2004; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Navy launches operation to secure Malacca Strait,” 13 July 2005; accessed  
from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “The Eyes in the Sky’ patrol over Malacca to start soon,” 9 September  
2005; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Territory no longer an issue in Malacca Strait Security,” 12 December 2005;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “RI to Join U.S.-led Security Arrangement,” 9 June 2006; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Indonesia key to end piracy in Malacca Straits,” 6 August 2006; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Poles turn to Indonesia for partners,” 15 January 2007; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Indonesia-India security pact comes into effect,” 3 April 2007; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
  
Jakarta Post, “Indonesian, U.S. officials discuss Iran resolution,” 16 August 2007; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “President urged to revoke defense pact with Singapore”, 14 December  
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Domestic and foreign links go much deeper in 2007,” 28 December  
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Indonesia may buy U.S. jet fighters,” 16 February 2008; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.  
280 
 
 
Jakarta Post, “U.S. offers help with defense,” 26 February 2008; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Expedition team sent to observe outermost islands,”17 November 2009;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Terror cell alliance forges new structure and attack methods,” 12 March  
2010; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
  
Jakarta Post, “Police find it hard to fight illegal gun trade,” 26 August 2010; accessed from  
the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “TNI chief candidate vows to boost security in RI waters,” 24 September  
2010; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Osama's death will not stop local radicals: Experts,” 3 May 2011; accessed  
from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Malaysia, Indonesia pace ASEAN Military Industry,” 19 May 2011;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Indonesia, China plan coordinated sea patrols,” 23 May 2011; accessed from  
the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “SBY wants better military ties between Jakarta and KL,” 6 July 2011;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jakarta Post, “Australia, RI hold inaugural defense talks,” 4 September 2012; accessed  
from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “House faces same old problem,” 15 December 2012; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “National scene: Poor planning slows down House,” 26 December 2012;  
accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Jakarta Post, “Another year, another poor showing,” 2 January 2013; accessed from the  
Newsbank database.   
 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), “Record of Discussion between the  
Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning 
the Japan-Indonesia Partnership Programme, Tokyo,” 10 December 2003a, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/partner0312.pdf. 
Last accessed 5 October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “Signing of the Framework Documents concerning the Japan-Indonesia  
Partnership Programme,” 10 December 2003b, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2003/12/1210.html. Last accessed 5 
October 2012. 
 
281 
 
Japan MFA. “Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press  
Conference, 6 November 2001, Following the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting,” 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/asean/conference/asean3/state0111.html. Last accessed 9 January 2011. 
 
Japan MFA, “Grant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol  
Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of 
Weapons, 16 June 2006,” available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html. Last accessed 5 
October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “Courtesy Call on Mr. Yoshihiko Noda, Prime Minister by Mr. Djoko  
Suyanto, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia,  29 August 2012,” available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/meeting1208_pm.html. Last 
accessed 5 October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “Dinner between Mr. Koichiro Gemba, Minister for Foreign Affairs and  
Mr. Djoko Suyanto, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
of the Republic of Indonesia (Overview), 28 August 2012,”  available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/8/0828_01.html. Last accessed 5 
October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “The Third Japan-Indonesia Ministerial Level Strategic Dialogue, 14  
October 2011,” available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/indonesia/s_dialogue1110b.html. Last accessed 5 October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “The Third Japan-Indonesia Ministerial Level Strategic Dialogue,  
(Dinner) (Overview) 13 October 2011,” available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/s_dialogue1110.html. Last 
accessed 5 October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and  
Prosperous Future, 28 November 2006,” available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/joint0611.html. Last accessed 5 
October 2012. 
 
Japan MFA, “Mr. Akio Shirota, Ambassador in Charge of International Counter- 
Terrorism Cooperation Visits Indonesia, 14 April 2005,” available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2005/4/0414-2.html. Last accessed 5 
October 2012. 
 
Jervis, Robert. (1978). “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics  
30:2, pp. 167-214. 
 
Jervis, Robert. (1988). “Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,” World Politics  
40:3, pp. 317-349.  
 
Johnston, Alistair Ian. (1999). “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the  
Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” in Imperfect Unions: Security 
Institutions over Time and Space. New York: Oxford University Press. 
282 
 
 
Jones, Sidney, “Three strategies for Jihad - and more prevention needed,” Tempo, 6  
April 2011, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-
asia/indonesia/op-eds/jones-three-strategies-for-jihad-and-more-prevention-
needed.aspx. Last accessed 8 May 2014. 
 
Jones, Sidney, “Implications of Bin Laden's Death for Indonesia,” Jakarta Post, 4  
May 2011; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Jordaan, Eduard.(2003). “The Concept of A Middle Power in International Relations:  
Distinguishing Between Emerging And Traditional Middle Powers.” Politikon 
30:2, pp.165-181. 
 
Joshi, Vijay. “Plain Sailing' for an Anti- Piracy Drill - Japan, Malaysia and Thailand  
Join Forces for Exercise in Strait of Malacca,” The Washington Post, 11 March 
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Juwana, Hikmahanto. (2008). “Catatan atas Masalah Aktual dalam Perjanjian  
International.” Indonesian Journal of International Law 5:3, pp. 443-451. 
 
Kahler, Miles. (2000). “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization.”  
International Organization 54: 3, pp. 661-683. 
 
Karyotis, Georgios. (2012). “Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives and  
Implications.” International Political Sociology 6:4, pp. 390-408. 
 
Ke, Xu. (2009). “Myth and Reality: The Rise and Fall of Contemporary Maritime  
Piracy in the South China Sea,” in Maritime Security in the South China Sea: 
Regional Implications and International Cooperation. Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou 
(Eds.). Surrey: Ashgate. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1969). “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International  
Politics.” International Organizations 23:2, pp.291-310. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1974). “Transgovernmental Relations and  
International Organizations. “ World Politics 27: 1, pp. 39-62.  
 
Keohane, Robert O. and  Martin, Lisa L. (1995). “The Promise of Institutionalist  
Theory.” International Security 20:1, pp. 39-51. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1982). “The Demand for International Regimes.” International  
Organization 36:2, pp. 325-355. 
 
Keohane, Robert O.  (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World  
Political Economy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1988). “International Institutions: Two Approaches.”  
International Studies Quarterly 32:4, pp. 379-396. 
 
Keohane, Robert O., Haftendorn, Helga, Wallender, Celeste A. (eds). (1999).   
283 
 
Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1973). “Power and interdependence,” Survival  
15:4, pp. 158-165. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1987). “Power and Interdependence revisited.”  
International Organization 41:4, pp. 725-753. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1989). Power and Interdependence. 2
nd
 Edition.  
New York: Longman.  
  
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (2000). Power and Interdependence, 3
rd
  
Edition. New York: Longman. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Moravcsik, Andrew. (2000). “Legalized Dispute Resolution:  
Interstate and Transnational.” International Organization 54:3, pp. 457-488.  
 
Kepabeanan Internasional. (2008). “Seratus Persen Scanning Atas Ekspor Barang ke  
Amerika Serikat,” in Warta Bea Cukai 402 available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/7707773/Warta-Bea-Cukai-Edisi-402. Last accessed 15 
March 2012. 
 
Kerr, Pauline. (1994). “The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific.” The Pacific  
Review 7:4, pp. 397-409. 
 
King, John. (2005). “The Security of Merchant Shipping.” Marine Policy 29, pp. 235- 
245.  
 
King, Michael. (2005). “Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas: Central Bank  
Reform in the United Kingdom.” West European Politics 28:1, pp. 94-123. 
 
Kollman, Kelly. (2008). “The Regulatory Power of Business Norms: A Call for a  
New Research Agenda”. International Studies Review 10:3, pp. 397-419. 
 
Kurniawan, Rama Anom [Directorate of Treaties for Political, Security and  
Territorial Affairs at the Foreign Ministry], “Piracy an extension of Somalia's 
lawless land,” Jakarta Post, 17 December 2008. 
 
Kurth, James. (2007). “The New Maritime Strategy: Confronting Peer Competitors,  
Rogue States and Transnational Insurgents.” Orbis 51:4, pp. 585-600. 
 
Kustia, Aa [Indonesian Ambassador for China]. (2003). “Tujuan Historis,  
Perkembangan dan Permasalahanya.” Jurnal Luar Negeri 50, pp. 47-55. 
 
Kompas, “Alutsista Indonesia Diminati Asing,” 22 March 2011; available at  
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/03/22/16002370/Alutsista.Indonesia.Dimina
ti.Asing. Last accessed 8 May 2014. 
  
Kompas, “Singapura Tetap Berkomitmen pada Paket DCA dan ET”, 8 February 2008,  
284 
 
as cited in 
http://entertainment.kompas.com/read/2008/02/08/1812358/singapura.tetap.berkom
itmen.pada.paket.dca.dan.et. Last accessed 14 January 2013. 
 
Kompas, “WCO: Sistem Kepabeanan Indonesia Sudah Modern,” 14 April 2009  
available at 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/04/14/10201899/WCO.Sistem.Kepabeanan.I
ndonesia.Sudah.Modern. Last accessed 7 December 2011. 
 
Kompas, “RI-China Targetkan 80 Miliar Dollar AS”, 1 May 2011, available at  
http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2011/05/01/15112041/RIChina.Targetkan.80.
Miliar.Dollar.AS. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1976). “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.”  
World Politics 28:3, pp. 317-347.  
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as  
Autonomous Variables.” International Organization 36:2, pp. 497-510. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1991). “Global Communications and National power: Life on  
the Pareto Frontier.” World Politics 43:3, pp. 336-366. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1992). “Realism, Imperialism and Democracy: A Response to  
Gilbert.” Political Theory 20:1, pp. 38-52. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (2002). “Chapter 7: Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights,”  
in Regime Theory and International Relations, Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer 
(eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Kristiadi, J. “Nasib kerjasama pertahanan RI-Singapura,” 17 July 2007 available at  
http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=633. Last accessed 17 
January 2013. 
 
Laksmana, Evan A. (2011). “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does  
Size Really Matter.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33:2, pp. 157-182. 
 
Laksmana, Evan A., “Indonesia 's pivotal role in the US's grand strategy”, Jakarta  
Post,  6 October 2009; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Lee, Seng Kong (Senior Director Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore),  
“Singapore-flagged ships not the most hit by pirates”, Straits Times, 3 August 
2005; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Lee, Junhan. (2002). “Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling  
Conventional Myths.” Asian Survey 42:6, pp. 821-837. 
 
Leifer, Michael and Nelson, Dolliver. (1973). “Conflict of Interest in the Straits of  
Malacca.” International Affairs 49:2, pp. 190-203. 
 
Leifer, Michael. (1983). Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. London: Allen and Unwin.  
 
285 
 
Liddle, R. William. (1985). “Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political  
Institutions.” Pacific Affairs 58: 1, pp. 68-90. 
 
Liddle, R. William. (1999). “Regime: The New Order.” Indonesia Beyond Suharto:  
Polity, Economy, Society Transition. Donald K. Emmerson (ed.). New York: M.E. 
Sharpe.  
 
Lipson, Charles. (1984). “International Cooperation in Economic and Security  
Affairs.” World Politics 37:1, pp. 1-23. 
 
Lloyds, “Market removes Malacca Straits from the List,” 11 August 2006 available at  
http://www.lloyds.com/News-and-Insight/News-and 
Features/Archive/2006/08/Market_removes_Malacca_Straits_from_the_List. Last 
accessed 20 October 2009.  
 
Lunnon, Rebecca & Taufiqurrohman, Muh, “Indonesia’s Newest Jihadist Are Down,  
but Not For Long,” Jakarta Globe, 29 April 2011, available at 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/indonesias-newest-jihadists-are-down-but-
not-for-long/437958 Last accessed 1 May 2011. 
 
Mak, J.N. (2006). “Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in  
the Malacca Straits,” in Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits. 
Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (ed.). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. 
 
Mak, J.N. (2007). “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: The Politics of “Sustainable”  
Piracy in the Strait of Malacca,” in Violence at Sea Piracy in the Age of Global 
Terrorism, Peter Lehr (ed.). New York: Routledge.  
 
March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1998). “The Institutional Dynamics of  
International Political Orders.” International Organization 52:4, pp. 943-969. 
 
Marsetio, Laksamana Madtya TNI, “Komando Armada RI Kawasan Timur,”  
available at 
http://koarmatim.tnial.mil.id/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1530:mar
itime-domain. Last accessed 16 June 2013. 
 
Mason, Jenifer. (2006). Qualitative Researching, 2
nd
 Edition. London: Sage  
Publications.  
 
Martin, Lisa L. and Simmons, Beth A. (1998). “Theories and Empirical Studies of  
International Institutions.” International Organization 52:4, pp. 729-757. 
 
Martosetomo, Supraprto [Kepala Pusat Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan,  
Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia]. (2004).“Paparan Umum,” in Forum Dialog 
ke XI Kerjasama Maritim ASEAN. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan 
Kebijakan Departemen Luar Negeri, pp. 27-31.  
 
Matthews, Ron and Maharani, Curie, “Singapore’s Arms Sale to UK:  A Defence  
Export Breakthrough,” 2 January 2009, available at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0012009.pdf. Last accessed 
10 June 2013. 
286 
 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). “The False Promise of International Institutions.”  
International Security 19:3, pp. 5-49. 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W.  
Norton & Company. 
 
Medeiros, John. “No plans to unilaterally deploy US forces to secure Malacca  
Straits,” Straits Times, 7 April 2004.  
 
Meredith, “Indonesia lacks defence funding,” Straits Times, 24 May 2000; accessed from  
the Newsbank database.  
 
Meyer, O. Christoph. (2005). “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A  
Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms.” European Journal of 
International Relations 11:4, pp. 523-549. 
 
Military Balance, “Country Comparison: Force Levels and Economics.” 113:1, pp. 543- 
556.  
 
Milner, Helen. (1992). “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations:  
Strengths and Weaknesses.” World Politics 44:3, pp. 466-496. 
 
Milner, Helen V. (1997). Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics  
and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Mindanao Development Authority, “BIMP-EAGA simplifies port security rules, sees freer  
flows of goods and people,” 18 October 2013, available at 
http://minda.gov.ph/site/BIMP---EAGA/news-and-events/view/BIMP-EAGA-
simplifies-port-security-rules,-sees-freer-flow-of-goods-and-people. Last accessed 
14 December 2013. 
 
Mishra, Satish. “Indonesia's journey: Is the glass half empty?” Jakarta Post, 19  
November 2002; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Mo, John. (2002). “Options to Combat Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia.” Ocean  
Development and International Law 33, pp. 343-358. 
 
Moersid, Ali. et.al. (2005). Sejarah Diplomasi Republik Indonesia Dari Masa Ke  
Masa. Jakarta: Departemen Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia.   
 
Monje, Theresa Guia. “Maritime Enforcement in the Philippines: Issues and  
Challenges,” Presentation for the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of 
the Sea, the UN-Nippon Fellowship Programme, New York, 25 January 2013. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993a). “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic  
Theories of International Bargaining,” in International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics: Double-Edged Diplomacy. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert 
D. Putnam (eds).California: University of California Press. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993b). “Armaments among Allies European Weapons  
287 
 
Collaboration, 1975-1985,” in International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: 
Double Edged Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of Californian Press. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. (2000). “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic  
Delegation in Postwar Europe.” International Organization 54:2, pp. 217-252. 
 
Muhibat, Shafiah Fifi. (2007). “Competing to Secure the Straits of Malacca and  
Singapore.” The Indonesian Quarterly. 35:3, pp. 242-253. 
 
Murphy, Ann Marie. (2009). “Indonesia Returns to the International Stage: Good  
News for the United States.” Orbis 53:1, pp. 65-79. 
  
Murphy, Martin. (2007). “Piracy and UNCLOSL Does International Law Help  
Regional States Combat Piracy?” in Violence at Sea Piracy in the Age of Global 
Terrorism, Peter Lehr (ed.). New York: Routledge.  
 
Nabbs-Keller, Greta. “Reforming Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization  
and Leadership.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 35:1, pp. 56-82. 
 
Narine, Shaun. (1998). “Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia: The Case of  
ASEAN.” World Affairs 161:1, pp. 33-47. 
 
Nasrun, Rezal Akbar. (2009). “The Importance of Promoting the Image of Indonesian  
Maritime Continent for Strengthening Territorial Integrity.” Jurnal Diplomasi 1:2, 
pp. 115-135.  
 
National Institute for Defense Studies. (2004). “Southeast Asia-From Regional  
Cooperation to Regional Integration.” East Asia Strategic Review. Tokyo: National 
Institute for Defense Studies.  
 
Neufeld, Mark. (1995). “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada  
as Middle Power.” Studies in Political Economy 48, pp. 7-29. 
 
Nik, Ramli Hj and Permal, Sumathy.(2008). “Security Threats in the Straits of  
Malacca,” in Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective. H.M. 
Ibrahim & Hairil Anuar Husin (Eds.). Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of 
Malaysia, pp. 189-199.  
 
Nikitin, Mary Beth. (2010). Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for  
Congress:Proliferation Security Initiative, available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34327_20100108.pdf. Last accessed 15 February 
2012. 
 
Nuswantoro, Laksamana Pertama Edhi [Kepala Staf Komando Armada RI Kawasan  
Barat] (2005). “Pengelolaan Keamanan Selat Malaka Secara Terpadu,” in 
Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Tentang Kebijakan Terpadu Pengelolaan Keamanan 
Selat Malaka, Medan 19-20 Juli 2005. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan 
Pengembangan Kebijakan Departemen Luar Negeri.  
 
Nye, Joseph S. and Keohane, Robert O. (1971). “Transnational Relations and World  
Politics: An Introduction.”  International Organization 25: 3, pp. 329-349.  
288 
 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2003). Migration  
and the Labour Market in Asia 2002: Recent Trends and Policies. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
   
Oegroseno, Arif Havas. (2005). “Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia Tentang Selat  
Malaka.” Forum Hukum 2:3, pp. 54-62.  
 
Oegroseno, Arif Havas. (2006). “The Straits of Malacca and Challenges Ahead:  
Japan’s Perspective.” Building Comprehensive Security Environment. Kuala 
Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, pp. 28-39. 
 
Oegroseno, Arif Havas. (2009). “Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries,” in Indonesia   
Beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, Robert Cribb and 
Michelle Ford (Eds.). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 49-58. 
 
O’Neill, Kate, Balsiger, Jorg and VanDeveer, Stacy. (2004). “Actors, Norms and  
Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-
Structure Debate.” Annual Review of Political Science 7, pp. 149-175. 
 
Ong, Graham Gerard. (2004). “Ships Can Be Dangerous Too: Coupling Piracy and  
Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Framework,” ISEAS 
WorkingPaper: International Politics and Security Issues Series No. 1, available at 
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ipsi12004.pdf. Last accessed 1 
May 2013.  
 
Ong-Webb, Graham Gerard. (2007). “Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends,” in  
Violence at Sea Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr (ed.). New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Otte, Max and Greve, Jurgen. (2000). A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign  
Policy in Transportation, 1989-1999. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Stevenson, Angus (Ed.). (2010). Oxford Dictionary of English. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press. 
 
Oye, Kenneth A. (1985). “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy.” World Politics  
38:1, pp. 1-24.  
 
Parthiana, I Wayan. (2008). “Kajian Akademis (Teoritis dan Praktis) atas Undang- 
Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2000 Tentang Perjanjian Internasional Berdasarkan 
Hukum Perjanjian Internasional.” Indonesian Journal of International Law 5:3, pp. 
460-487. 
 
Pauker, Guy J. (1958). “The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia.” Far  
Eastern Survey 27:9, pp. 129-142. 
 
Noer, John H. and Gregory, David. (1996). Chokepoints: Maritime Economic  
Concerns in Southeast Asia. National Defense University Press: Washington D.C. 
  
Pfister, Roger. (2005). Apartheid South Africa and African States: from Pariah to  
289 
 
Middle Power, 1961-1994. London: Tauris Academic Studies. 
 
Philippine Coast Guard, “Ten Coast Guard Districts,” available at  
http://www.coastguard.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
08&Itemid=54. Last accessed 21 May 2013.  
 
Philippine Department of National Defense, “Defense and Security Cooperation with  
Indonesia,” available at http://www.dndph.org/press-releases/defense-and-security-
cooperation-with-indonesia. Last accessed 21 May 2013.   
 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, “Borderless economy in EAGA,” 21 March 2005; accessed from  
the Newsbank database. 
 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, “Mindanaos Best of 2009,” 9 January 2010; accessed from the  
Newsbank database. 
  
Philippine Navy. (2011). “Navy Launches Website for Inter-agency Coordinatioon.”  
Navy Today 003-11:2, available at 
http://www.navy.mil.ph/downloads/1303842887-
%20newsletter_February%202011.pdf. Last accessed 21 May 2013.  
 
Ping, Jonathan H. (2005). Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia  
Pacific. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 
Poerwoko, F. Djoko, “Is it possible for sovereignty to be given up?” Straits Times, 2  
July 2007; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Polner, Mariya. (2010). WCO Research Paper No.8: Compendium of Authorized  
Economic Operator (AEO) Programmes, available at 
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/research/a
eo_compendium.pdf. Last accessed 11 August 2011.  
 
Polres Tanjung Perak, “Antisipasi Terror di Pelabuhan,” 21 June 2011 available at  
http://polrestanjungperak.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&li
mitstart=1021Last accessed 1 August 2011. 
 
Powell, Sian, “Megawati Offers Swansong Apology,” The Australian, 24 September  
2004; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Power, Jason. (2008).“Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for National and  
International Security.” Barry Law Review 10, pp. 111-133. 
 
Prabhakar, W.Lawrence S. (2006). “Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific:  
Issues and Challenges,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-
Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, Lawrence W. 
Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Eds.).  Singapore: World Scientific 
Printers. 
 
Prescott, Victor and Schofield, Clive. (2001). “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of  
the Asian Rim in the pacific Ocean,” Maritime Briefing 3:1, pp. 1-68. 
290 
 
 
Pullen, Captain Lynn D. and Truver, Scott C. (2006). “Security in the Pacific Rim:  
Evolving U.S. Strategies, Doctrines, and Forces for Maritime Cooperation and 
Regional Collective Action,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the 
Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, Lawrence W. 
Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Eds.).  Singapore: World Scientific 
Printers. 
 
Purdjianto, Tedjo Edhy. (2009). “Peran TNI Angkatan Laut dalam Penegakan  
Kedaulatan Negara dan Keamanan di Laut.” Jurnal Diplomasi 1:2, pp. 27-48. 
 
Purnomo, Y. Didik Heru. (2004). “Pengamanan Wilayah Laut RI Bagian Barat.”  
Indonesian Journal of International Law, pp. 27-40.  
 
Putnam, Robert D. (1988). “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two levels  
games.” International Organization 42:3, pp. 427-460. 
 
Quentin, Sophia, “Shipping Activities: Targets of Maritime Terrorism.” MIRMAL- 
Maritime Law Bulletin Vol. 2, 20 January 2003, available at 
http://www.derechomaritimo.info/pagina/mater.htm.  Last accessed 11 July 2011.    
 
Ragin, Charles C. (1989). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and  
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Rahman, Chris. (2007). “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast  
Asia,” in Violence at Sea Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr (ed.). 
New York: Routledge.  
 
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Pirates Flourish on Asian Seas - Seizure of Indonesian  
Freighter Illustrates Growing Anarchy,” Washington Post, 18 June 2001. Last 
accessed 28 April 2011. 
 
Raustiala, Kal and Slaughter, Anne-Marie. (2002). “International Law, International  
Relations and Compliance.” Handbook of International Relations. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.). London: Sage Publications. 
 
Ravenhill, John. (1998). “Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in  
Australian and Canadian foreign policies.” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 52:3, pp. 309-327. 
 
Raymond, Catherine Zara. (2006). “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk  
Asessment.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18:2, pp.239-257. 
 
Raymond, Catherine Zara. (2007). “Piracy in the waters of Southeast Asia,” in  
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.). 
New York: Routledge, pp. 62-77. 
 
ReCAAP, “Press Release: The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre establishes itself  
as an authority on piracy and armed robbery against ships, and develops as the 
focus of anti-piracy co-operation in Asia,” 28 February 2008 available at 
291 
 
http://www.recaap.org/news/pdf/press/2nd%20GC%20Press%20release%20-
%20revised%20%2828-2-08%29.pdf. Last accessed 10 December 2010. 
 
ReCAAP, “About ReCAAP,” available at  
http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx. Last accessed 9 January 2011. 
 
ReCAAP, “Press Release: The Sixth Governing Council Meeting of the ReCAAP  
ISC,” 8 March 2012 available at 
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/News%20and%20Press%20Releases/Press%
20Release%20%282012-03-08%29.pdf. Last accessed 11 June 2013. 
 
Rencwick, Neil & Abbott, Jason. (1999). “Piratical Violence and Maritime Security in  
Southeast Asia.”  Security Dialogue 30:2, pp. 183-196. 
 
Reus-Smit,Christian. (2005). “Constructivism,” in Theories of International  
Relations, 3rd ed. Scot Burchill and others. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Reuters, “Security Raised in Malacca Strait after Terror Warning,” 4 March 2010  
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/04/us-malacca-threat-
idUSTRE62335120100304. Last accessed 15 March 2011. 
 
Richardson, Michael, “Aiming A Shot Across the Bow,” Straits Times, 25 May 2005;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Richardson, Michael. “Securing choke points at sea against terrorists,” Straits Times,  
19 January 2004; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. (1991). “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign  
Policy in Liberal Democracies.” World Politics 43:4, pp.479-512. 
  
Risse, Thomas. (2002). “Constructivism and International Institutions: Towards  
Conversations Across Paradigms” in Political Science: The State of Discipline, Ira 
Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (Eds.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
 
Roach, J. Ashley. (2004). “Initiatives to enhance maritime security at sea.” Marine  
Policy 28:1, pp. 41-66. 
 
Rosenberg, David and Chung, Christopher. (2008). “Maritime Security in the South  
China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities.” Ocean Development 
and International Law 39:1, pp. 51-68. 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard. (1992).“Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution.”  
International Organization  46:3, pp. 561-598.  
 
Ruland, Jurgen. (2009). “Deepening ASEAN Cooperation through Democratization?  
The Indonesian Legislature and Foreign Policymaking.” International Relations of 
the Asia-Pacific 9:3, pp. 373-402. 
 
Ruland, Jurgen. (2000). “ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and  
292 
 
practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism.” The Pacific Review 13:3, 
pp. 421-451. 
 
Sakhuja, Vijay, “Who’s to pay for smooth sailing?,” Asia Times, 16 May 2007  
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE16Ae01.html. Last 
accessed 30 April 2013.   
  
Sakhuja, Vijay. (2007). “Sea Piracy in South Asia,” in Violence at Sea Piracy in the  
Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr (ed.). New York: Routledge.  
 
Saroinsong, Willyam. (2008). “Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and  
Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation 2006.” Indonesian Journal of 
International Law 5:3, pp. 618-621. 
 
Sato, Yoichiro. (2007). “Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime  
Security Cooperation,” The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu (A 
research center under the U.S. Department of Defense), available at 
http:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD ADA472466 . Last accessed 7 
December 2013. 
 
Sekretaris Kabinet Indonesia, “RI-Australia Tingkatkan Kerjasama Keamanan Laut,”  
5 September  2012,  available at http://setkab.go.id/berita-5570-ri-australia-
tingkatkan-kerja-sama-keamanan-laut.html. Last accessed 22 October 2012.  
 
Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan. (2006). Laporan Kegiatan:  
Sosialisasi Nilai-Nilai Kemaritiman. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen 
Kelautan dan Perikanan.  
 
Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan. (2007). Laporan  
Perumusan Kebijakan Kelembagaan Tata Pemerintahan di Laut. Jakarta: 
Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan.   
 
Semedi, Bambang. (2012). “Pengawasan Bea dan Cukai di Wilayah Perairan  
Indonesia,” available at 
http://www.bppk.depkeu.go.id/webbc/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_
download&gid=435&Itemid=130. Last accessed 21 June 2013. 
 
Simon, Sheldon W. “Realism and neoliberalism: International relations theory and  
Southeast Asian security.” The Pacific Review 8:1, pp. 5-24. 
  
Rekhi, Shefali. “Malacca Strait security: External powers still wary - Japan, India,  
Australia and US could seek bigger part to play in protecting narrow sea lanes,” 
Straits Times, 3 June 2006.  
 
Sharpe, Samuel. (2003). “An ASEAN way to security cooperation in Southeast Asia?.”  
The Pacific Review 16:2, pp. 231-250. 
 
Shie, Tamara Renee. (2006). “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and   
Progress of Intra-ASEAN Cooperation,” in Maritime Terrorism and Securing the 
Malacca Straits. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (eds.). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. 
 
293 
 
Sherlock, Stephen. (2003). Struggling to Change: The Indonesian Parliament in an  
Era of Reformasi. Canberra: Centre for Democratic Institutions, available at 
https://cdi.anu.edu.au/CDIwebsite_19982004/indonesia/indonesia_downloads/DPR
ResearchReport_S.Sherlock.pdf. Last accessed 24 April 2013.  
 
Siboro, Tiarma, “ASEAN defense dialogue amid 'crystalized' border disputes,”  
Jakarta Post, 28 April 2011; accessed from the Newsbank database.   
 
Simon, Sheldon. (2008). “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to  
Community.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30:2, pp. 264-292. 
  
Singapore Maritime and Port Authority (MPA), “Singapore Meeting on the Straits of  
Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection 
4- 6 September 2007,” available at 
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/spore_statement.pdf. Last accesed 7 September 
2012. 
 
Singapore MPA, “Annex A: Co-operative Mechanism on Safety of Navigation and  
Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” available at   
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/.../annex_a_factsheet_on_co-
operative_mechanism.pdf. Last accessed 24 December 2012.  
 
Singapore Ministry of Defence (MoD), “Singapore hosts Proliferation Security  
Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, 25 July 2006,” 
available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2006/jul/25jul06_nr.html. 
Last accessed 16 February 2012. 
 
Singapore MoD, “Reply by Minister Teo Chee Hean on the Defence Cooperation  
Agreement at Parliament,” 16 July 2007 available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2007/jul/16jul0
7_nr.print.noimg.html. Last accesed 1 July 2013.  
 
Singapore MoD, “Closing Ceremony of the 13/2001 SAFKAR INDOPURA Bilateral  
Exercise,”  30 October 2001, available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2001/oct/30oct01_nr2/30o
ct01_speech.html. Last accessed 30 October 2010. 
 
Singapore MoD, “1980 - Exercise Elang Indopura I,” 7 June 2001, available at  
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v05n06_history.h
tml. Last accessed 18 May 2011. 
 
Singapore MoD, “Closer bonds with Project SURPIC,” 27 May 2005, available at  
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2005/may/27m
ay05_news2.html. Last accessed 14 November 2010. 
  
Singapore MoD. “Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols –MALSINDO Malacca  
Straits Coordinated Patrol,” 20 July 2004, available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jul/20jul04_nr.html. 
Last accessed 20 September 2010. 
 
294 
 
Singapore MoD, “Factsheet: Milestones of Malacca Strait Patrols,” 28 March 2008  
available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/mar/28mar08_nr/28
mar08_fs.html. Last accessed 26 June 2011. 
  
Singapore MoD, “Exercise Elang Indopura marks 30 years of cooperation,” 8  
December 2010 available at  
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/new
s/2010/december/08dec10_news.html#.UP76EmFpb8o. Last accessed 22 January 
2012.  
 
Singapore MoD, “Singapore and Indonesia Air Forces Conclude Bilateral Exercises”,  
30 November 2012, available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2012/nov/30no
v12_nr.html#.UP71BGFpb8o. Last accessed 22 January 2012.  
 
Singapore MoD, “Factsheet: Exercise Eagle,” 17 January 2008, available at  
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/jan/17jan08_nr/17jan
08 fs.html. Last accessed 26 June 2011.  
  
Singapore MoD. (2009). “SAFKAR INDOPURA Professionalism and Ties  
Strengthen,” in Army News No.171. 
 
Singapore MoD, “Fact Sheet: Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol (ISCP),” 27  
May 2012, available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2012/may/11ma
y12_nr/11may12_fs.html#.UjBduX8neCk. Last accessed 11 September 2013. 
 
Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), “The Batam Joint Statement of the 4th  
Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore,” 2 August 2005 available at 
http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press.asp?post_id=140602/08/2005. Last 
accessed 20 September 2010. 
 
Singapore MFA, “MFA Spokesman’s Comments-Remarks by Indonesian Minister of  
Defence Prof Juwono Sudarsono – Defence Cooperation Agreement,” available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/jakarta/press_statements_spee
ches_archives/2007/200706/press_200706.html, 13 June 2007. Last accessed 1 July 
2013. 
 
Singer, David J. (1958). “Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma.”  
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2:1, pp. 90-105. 
 
Singh, Bilveer. (2004). “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia.”  
Australian Journal of International Affairs 58:1, pp. 47-68. 
 
Siregar, Hasnil Basri, Nasution, Sanwani, Rahman, Abdul, Sutiarno, Hasibuan Rosmi,  
Munthe, Makdin, Purba, Deni and Eliana. (2004). Pengamanan dan Perlindungan 
Pulau-Pulau Terluar Pada Batas Wilayah RI Di Kawasan Selat Malaka. Sumatera 
Utara: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Sumatera Utara.  
 
295 
 
Sittnick, Tammy M. (2005). “State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the  
Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to 
Secure the Strait.” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 14, pp. 743-769. 
 
Sjaastad, Anders C. (2007). “Southeast Asian SLOCs and security options.” Maritime  
Security in Southeast Asia. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.). New 
York: Routledge, pp. 3-13. 
 
Sodik, Dikdik Mohamad. (2009a). “IUU Fishing and Indonesia’s Legal Framework  
for Vessel Registration and Fishing Vessel Licensing.” Ocean Development & 
International Law 40:3, pp. 249-267. 
 
Sodik, Dikdik Mohamad. (2009b). “Analysis of IUU Fishing in Indonesia and the  
Indonesian Legal Framework Reform for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of 
Fishing Vessels.” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24, pp. 67-100. 
 
Sondakh, Admiral Bernard Kent. (2006). “ National Sovereignty and Security in the  
Straits of Malacca,” in Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the 
Straits of Malacca. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, pp. 79-110. 
 
Sondakh, Bernard Kent. (2004). “Pengamanan Wilayah Laut Indonesia.” Indonesian  
Journal of International Law, pp. 1-26. 
 
Song, Yann-huei. (2007). “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional  
Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the US Proposal,” in International Law 
Studies Vol. 83: Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic 
Communications, and Natural Disasters, Michael D. Carsten (Ed.).  Newport: 
Naval War College Press. Available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---
Gaming/International-Law/New-International-Law-Studies-%28Blue-Book%29-
Series/International-Law-Blue-Book-Articles.aspx?Volume=83. Last accessed 20 
May 2014. 
  
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism, “About the Southeast Asia  
Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism,” 12 February 2013 available at 
http://www.searcct.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=760&I
temid=648. Last accessed 12 February 2013. 
  
Smith, Anthony L. (2001). “Indonesia Transforming the Leviathan,” in Government  
and Politics in Southeast Asia. John Funston ed. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, pp. 74-119. 
 
Smith, Steve. (1980). “Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the  
Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Millenium 9:1, 
pp. 21-40. 
 
Snidal, Duncan. (1985a). “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for  
International Cooperation and Regimes.” American Political Science Review 79:4, 
pp. 923-942. 
 
Snidal, Duncan. (1991). “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International  
Cooperation.” American Political Science Review 85:3, pp. 701-726. 
296 
 
 
Staf Umum Operasi Markas Besar Angkatan Laut. (2004). “Kerjasama Regional  
Maritim ASEAN Dari Perspektif Pertahanan Matra Laut,” in Forum Dialog ke XI 
Kerjasama Maritim ASEAN. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan 
Kebijakan Kementerian Luar Negeri, pp. 32-39. 
 
Storey, Ian. “The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia's Ungoverned Space,”  
24 October 2007, Terrorism Monitor 5:19. The Jamestown Foundation. Available 
at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4465. Last 
accessed 13 July 2011.  
 
Storey, Ian, “What's behind dramatic drop in S-E Asian piracy”, Straits Times, 19  
January 2009; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
  
Straits Times, “Japan keen on joint patrols to fight piracy,” 18 February 2000; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Straits Times, “Jakarta's joint-patrol proposal 'welcome' - Singapore endorses  
Indonesian plan, the latest in a series of steps by littoral states to protect Malacca 
Straits,”  21 June 2004; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
  
Straits Times, “Indonesia hikes defence budget to record $10b - Move comes as it  
seeks to leverage rising economy to overhaul hardware,” 24 August 2012; accessed 
from the Newsbank database.  
   
Straits Times, “Indonesia, Malaysia to beef up sea patrols,” 24 May 2000; accessed from  
the Newsbank database. 
  
Straits Times, “Pirates hit Straits of Malacca,” 3 August 2000; accessed from the  
Newsbank database. 
 
Straits Times, “Rights to area come with islands,” 8 March 2005; accessed from the  
Newsbank database. 
 
Straits Times, “Piracy in Asia on the rise - Report shows incidents up 60% on last  
year, while pirates are becoming more violent,” 20 October 2010; accessed from 
the Newsbank database. 
 
Straits Times, “Senior MPs insist Indonesia won't ratify defence pact.” 26 July 2007;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Straits Times, “Singapore Officers Quiz Leader of JI Branch,” 6 February 2003; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Straits Times, “JI’s Singapore Branch Chief A Step Closer to Being Deported,” 12  
February 2003; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Stryken, Christian-Marius. (2007). “The U.S. Regional Maritime Security Initiative  
and US Grand Strategy in Southeast Asia,” in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. 
New York: Routledge, pp. 134-145. 
 
297 
 
Suara Karya, “Kegiatan Militer TNI AL-AL Singapura Tingkatkan Kerja Sama,” 13  
April 2010.   
 
Suchharitkul, Sompong. (2006). “Liability and Responsibility of the State of  
Registration or the Flag State in Respect of Sea Going Vessels, Aircraft and 
Spacecraft Registered by National Registration Authorities.” American Journal of 
Comparative Law 54, pp. 409-442. 
 
Sudarman, Suzie (2010). Report of Riset Unggulan Universitas Indonesia 2009: Anti  
Terrorism Norms and Supply Chain Security in Indonesia. Depok: Centre for 
International Relations Studies. 
 
Sudrajat [Direktur Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan Kementerian Pertahanan Indonesia].  
(2005). “Kebijakan Kelautan Nasional dari Perspektif Pertahanan dan Keamanan,” 
in Laporan Kegiatan Diskusi Panel: Mencari Format Kebijakan Kelautan 
Indonesia Dalam Rangka Mendukung Pembangunan dan Integrasi Nasional (Studi 
Kasus Kanada dan Norwegia), Surabaya, 7-8 April 2005. Jakarta: Kementerian 
Luar Negeri Indonesia. 
 
Suhartono. (2001). “Hubungan Indonesia-Timur Tengah Era Pemerintahan  
Abdurrahman Wahid,” in Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri Pemerintahan 
Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2000). Jakarta: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia. 
 
Sukma, Rizal. (1995). “The Evolution of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: An Indonesian  
View.” Asian Survey 35:3, pp. 304-315. 
  
Sumaryono, Laksmana Muda TNI Djoko. (2004). “Kerjasama Regional Maritim  
ASEAN dari Perspektif Keamanan Matra Laut,” in Forum Dialog ke XI Kerjasama 
Maritim ASEAN. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan 
Departemen Luar Negeri. 
 
Sumaryono, Djoko. (2009). “The Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board,”  
in Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
 
Sumut Pos, “Selat Philips Rawan Penyelundupan Narkoba,” 27 January 2013  
available at http://www.hariansumutpos.com/2013/01/50850/selat-philips-rawan-
penyelundupan-narkoba#axzz2WswmXQc0. Last accessed 21 June 2013.  
 
Sunday Times, “Big trouble' if terrorists turn tankers into floating bombs”, 20  
November 2005; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Sunday Times, “SM says terrorist penetration of S'pore 'inevitable,” 10 February  
2002; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Sunday Times, “War games with a soft touch,” 17 September 2000; accessed from the  
Newsbank database. 
   
Supriyadi. (2010). “DJBC Ikut Serta dalam Latihan Bersama TNI-Polri untuk  
298 
 
Penanggulangan Teroris.” Warta Bea Cukai. Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Bea dan 
Cukai. 
 
Suryadinata, Leo. (1998). Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Soeharto. Jakarta:  
LP3ES. 
 
Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV) Liputan 6, “Menhan: Penolakan Ratifikasi Salah  
Kaprah,” 26 June 2007 available at http://news.liputan6.com/read/143646/menhan-
penolakan-ratifikasi-salah-kaprah. Last accessed 13 June 2013.  
 
SCTV Liputan 6, “Indonesia Jadi Mediator Konflik Thailand Selatan”, 20 September  
2008, available at http://news.liputan6.com/read/165464/indonesia-jadi-mediator-
konflik-thailand-selatan. Last accessed 3 July 2013. 
 
Stritzel, Holger. (2012). “Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the  
translations of organized crime.” Security Dialogue 43:6, pp. 549-567.  
 
Suryokusumo, Sumaryo. (2004). Praktik Diplomasi. Jakarta: STIH IBLAM.  
 
Suristiyono, Komisaris Besar Polisi [Wakil Direktur Polair Babinkam Polri]. (2005).  
“Penyelenggaraan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Di Kawasan Perairan Selat Malaka,” 
in Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Tentang Kebijakan Terpadu Pengelolaan Keamanan 
Selat Malaka. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan 
Kementerian Luar Negeri. 
 
Susumu, Takai. (2002). “Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of the Navy,” in  
The National Institute for Defense Studies Security Reports 4, available at 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2002_2.pdf. Last 
accessed 4 October 2012.  
 
Suzanne Greaves and George Hill, “The Times review of 1985 .. a year of calamity  
and hope,” Times, 30 December 1985; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Tan, See Seng and Ramakrishna, Kumar. (2004). “Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics  
in Southeast Asia’s War on Terror.” SAIS Review 24:1, pp. 91-105. 
 
Tarakan Chamber of Commerce, “Hasil-Hasil Pertemuan BIMP-EAGA,” 18  
December 2009 available at http://kadintarakan.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/hasil-
hasil-pertemuan-kesr-bimp-eaga/. Last accessed 1 July 2013.  
 
Terminal Peti Kemas Surabaya, “Company Overview,” 11 May 2013 available at  
http://www.tps.co.id/Default.aspx?bahasa=ENG. Last accessed 11 May 2013. 
 
Tempo, “Indonesia Tengahi Konflik Thailand Selatan,” 20 September 2008 available  
at http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2008/09/20/078136582/Indonesia-Tengahi-
Konflik-Thailand-Selatan. Last accessed 3 July 2013.  
 
Times, “Leading Article: Truck with Terrorists - Achille Lauro hijacking incident”, 14  
October 1985; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Tiribelli, Carlo. (2006). “Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the  
299 
 
Suppresion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.  Oregon 
Review of International Law 8:1, pp. 133-156. 
 
UN. (1988). “Treaty Series: Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against  
the safety of maritime navigation & Protocol to the above mentioned Convention 
for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on 
the continental shelf,” available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv8-
english.pdf. Last accessed 2 February 2012.  
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat (UNCTAD). 2008.  
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2008. Available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2008_en.pdf. Last accessed 20 October 2010. 
 
UNCTAD. (2004). UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1 Container Security: Major  
Initiatives and Related International Developments, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20041_en.pdf. Last accessed 25 January 
2012. 
 
UNCTAD. (2007). UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2007/1 Maritime Security: ISPS Code  
Implementation, Costs and Related Financing, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20071_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2012. 
 
UNCTAD. (2012). Review of Maritime Transport, available at  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2012_en.pdf. Last accessed 16 July 
2013. 
 
United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN DOALOS).  
(1990). The Law of the Sea: Archipelagic States Legislative History of Part IV of 
the United Nations Convention in the Law of the Sea. New York: United Nations. 
 
United Nations Economic and Social Comission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP),  
“Facilitating Efficient and Secure Trade in BIMP EAGA,” available at 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/tfforum11_gms_ciqs.pdf. Last accessed 11 
November 2013. 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2010). UNHCR  
Statistical Yearbook 2009 available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ce531e09.html. Last 
accessed 20 March 2011.  
 
UNHCR. (2011). UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010 available at  
http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c8139.html. Last accessed 1 June 2013. 
 
USAID and Senada. (2008). Indonesian Port Sector Reform and The 2008 Shipping  
Law. Jakarta: SENADA. Available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADN188.pdf. Last accessed 7 June 2013. 
  
United States Coast Guard. (2002). “Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,”  
available at http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/uscgmaritimestrategy2002.pdf. 
Last accessed 20 October 2009. 
 
U.S. Coast Guard, “Press Release: Coast Guard to Begin International Port Security  
300 
 
Visits,” 15 April 2004 available at 
https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?contentTypeId=2&chan
nelId=-
18389&contentId=55243&programId=50389&programPage=%2Fep%2Fprogram
%2Feditorial.jsp&pageTypeId=0&BV_SessionID=@@@@0102172244.13504761
51@@@@&BV_EngineID=ccceadfidgdflkdcfngcfkmdfhfdfgo.0. Last accessed 17 
October 2012. 
 
U.S. Coast Guard, “Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) No. 02-05,” 15  
February 2005 available from https://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi-
bin/st/portal/uscg_docs/MyCG/Editorial/20061012/NVIC2-
05_2.pdf?id=9f75e3fedc14830306cc2ce463770be203bec5cd&user_id=f3e0323a04
8c9c4431fa1032dc4787d5. Last accessed 17 October 2012. 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (U.S. CBP). (2006). Container Security Initiative  
2006-2011 Strategic Plan.US. Washington D.C.: Customs and Border Protection 
Office of Policy and Planning and Office of International Affairs Container 
Security Division, available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/...security/.../csi_strategic_plan.pdf. 
Last accessed 7 May 2010. 
 
U.S. CBP, “CSI Fact Sheet,” 2 October 2007, available at  
http://www.cbp.gov/sp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/cis_in_brie
f.xml. Last accessed 26 October 2009.  
 
U.S. CBP, “CSI In Brief,” available at  
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml. Last 
accessed 8 May 2010. 
  
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 2005. Annual Report to Congress: The Military  
Power of the People’s Republic of China. Available at 
www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf - 2005-07-19 -. Last accessed 
17 November 2010. 
 
U.S. DoD. 2006. Annual Report to Congress Military Power of the People’s Republic  
of China. Available at www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf 
- 2007-03-30. Last accessed 17 November 2010. 
 
U.S. DoD. 2007. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s  
Republic of China. available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-china-
military-power-final.pdf. Last accessed 17 November 2010 
 
U.S. DoD, “Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Lieutenant General  
Benjamin Mixon, Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific Via teleconference Subject: 
Cobra Gold 10 in Thailand,” 2 February 2010, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/blog_files/blog_assets/20100202_mixon.pdf - 2010-02-02. 
Last accessed 10 March 2010. 
 
U.S. DoD, “Instruction Number 5111.19: Section 1206 Global Train and Equip  
301 
 
Authority,” 26 July 2011, available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511119p.pdf. Last accessed 5 
October 2012.  
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2010). CBP’s Container Security Initiative  
Has Proactive Management and Oversight but Future Direction Is Uncertain (Letter 
Report). Washington: Department of Homeland Security. Available at 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-52_Feb10.pdf. Last accessed 25 
April 2012.  
 
U.S. Department of the Homeland Security, “The National Strategy for Maritime  
Security,” 20 September 2005, available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html. Last accessed 13 
March 2011. 
 
U.S. Department of State (DoS), “Chairman's Statement at the 1st Anniversary PSI  
Meeting, Krakow, Poland,” 1 June 2004, available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/33208.htm. Last accessed 10 July 2013. 
 
U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction  
Principles,” 4 September 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm. 
Last accessed 15 February 2012. 
 
U.S. Department of State Archieve, “Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently  
Asked Questions, 26 May 2008,” available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105217.htm. Last accessed 17 February 2012. 
  
U.S. Department of State, “DoD- funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System,”  
18 November 2011, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177382.htm. Last accessed 21 March 
2012. 
 
U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” available at  
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm. Last accessed 16 July 2013. 
 
U.S. Department of State, “Ship Boarding Agreement,” available at  
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm. Last accessed 15 July 2013.  
 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca,”  
22 August 2012, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/world_oil_transit_chokepoints/malacca.html. Last 
accessed 31 May 2013.  
 
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, “U.S. Coast Guard Issues Advisory to Indonesia on Port  
Security,” 26 February 2008, available at 
http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/pr_02262008.html. Last accessed 20 September 2011. 
 
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, “U.S. donates patrol boats to Indonesian National Police to  
support maritime security,” 3 June 2011, available from 
http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/embnews_06032011.html. Last accessed 5 November 
2013. 
302 
 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. (2003). GAO-03-770 Container security: Expansion  
of key Customs Programs will require greater attention to critical success factors. 
Available at http://www.gao.gov. Last accessed 25 January 2012. 
 
U.S. House of Representatives, “H.A.S.C. No. 108–21: Hearings on National Defense  
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005-H.R. 4200 and Oversight of Previously 
Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services House of 
Representatives,” 31 March 2004 available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has091000.000/has091000_0.HT
M. Last accessed 5 February 2011.  
 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). (2004a) “The Regional Maritime Security  
Initiative,”  available at http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/. Last accessed 5 October 
2009. 
 
USPACOM. (2004b). “United States Pacific Command Strategy for Maritime  
Security,” available at 
http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/RMSI%20Strategy%20Nov%2004.pdf. Last accessed 
5 October 2009. 
  
USPACOM. (2004c). ““Blue Top” Document on the Regional Maritime Security  
Initiative,” available at http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/. Last accessed 21 October 
2009.  
 
USPACOM. (2004d). ““Trifold” Document on the Regional Maritime Security  
Initiative,” available at http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/. Last accessed 21 October 
2009.  
 
Urquhart, Donald, “New 16-nation anti-piracy campaign soon in Asia - S'pore ready  
to play its part in the new initiative to enhance security,” Business Times, 19 
November 2004; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Urquhart, Donald. “Malacca straits needs US support - Having US Marines as an anti- 
piracy force may not be a bad idea since the littoral states seem hamstrung in 
dealing with the problem,” Business Times, 10 April 2004; accessed from the 
Newsbank database.   
 
Urquhart, Donald, “Time to close the piracy gap - The fight against piracy is seriously  
hampered by the non-participation of Malaysia and Indonesia,” Business Times, 29 
November 2006; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Urquhart, Donald, “S'pore acts on piracy info centre plan - Coastal Command head Lt  
Col Teo to lay ground work, say sources,” Business Times, 19 January 2006; 
accessed from the Newsbank database.  
  
Vagg, Jon. (1995). “Rough Seas: Contemporary Piracy in South East Asia.” British  
Journal of Criminology 35:1, pp. 63-80. 
 
Valencia, Mark J. (2005).The Proliferation Security Initiative Making Waves in Asia.  
Adelphi Series 45. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
303 
 
 
Valencia, Mark J. (2006a). “Security Issues in the Malacca Straits: Whose Security  
and Why It Matters?” in Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the 
Straits of Malacca: Proceeding of the MIMA International Conference on the 
Straits of Malacca, 11-13 October, 2004. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of 
Malaysia. 
 
Valencia, Mark J. (2006b). “The Politics of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Terrorism  
Responses in Southeast Asia,” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the 
Malacca Straits. Singapore:ISEAS. 
 
Vermonte, Philips J. (2005). “Demokratisasi dan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia:  
Membangun Citra Diri,” in Mencari Desain Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia. 
Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.  
 
Vorbach, Joseph.E. (2001). “The Vital Role of Non-Flag State Actors in the Pursuit of  
Safer Shipping.” Ocean Development & International Law 32:1, pp. 27-42. 
 
Wagner R. Harrison. (1974). “Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on  
International Relations,” International Organization 28:3, pp. 435-466. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York:McGraw-Hill,  
Inc. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1986). “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A  
Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics. Robert Keohane (ed.). New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000). “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security   
25:1, pp. 5-41.  
 
Wanandi, Jusuf. (2005). “Tantangan Internasional Indonesia: Masukan Untuk Desain  
Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia,” in Mencari Desain Baru Politik Luar Negeri 
Indonesia. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.  
 
Wallander, Celeste A. and Keohane, Robert O. (1999). “Introduction”. Imperfect  
Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. 
Keohane & Celeste A. Wallander (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. 
  
Watson, Adam. (2001). “Foreword.” Review of International Studies 27:3, pp. 467-470. 
Williams, John. (2005). “Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in  
English School Theory.” International Relations 19:1, pp, 19-38. 
 
Weinstein, Franklin. (1976). Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of  
Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
Weiss, Meredith L. (2007). “What a Little Democracy Can Do: Comparing  
Trajectories of Reform in Malaysia and Indonesia.” Democratization 14:1, pp. 26-
43. 
304 
 
 
Wendt, Alexander. (1992). “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction  
of power politics.” International Organization 46:2, pp. 391-425. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. (1994). “Collective Identity Formation and the International  
State.” The American Political Science Review 88:2, pp. 384-396. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. (1995). “Constructing International Politics.” International  
Security 20:1, pp. 71-81. 
 
Westhuizen, Janis Van Der. (1998). “South Africa’s Emergence As A Middle Power.”  
Third World Quarterly 19:3, pp. 435-455. 
 
Wibisono, Makarim. (2006). Tantangan Diplomasi Multilateral. Makmur Keliat &  
Mohtar Mas’oed (eds.). Jakarta: LP3ES. 
 
Wilkinson, Claire. (2007). “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is  
Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?” Security Dialogue 38:1, pp. 5-25. 
 
Williams, Michael C. (2003). “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International  
Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 47:4, pp. 511-531. 
 
Winanti, Poppy S. (2011). External pressures or domestic politics: explaining change  
in developing countries’ intellectual property legislation- PhD Thesis, available at 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2794/01/Winanti.pdf. Last accessed 2 February 2012. 
 
Wiseman, Geoffrey. 1992. “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region.” The  
Pacific Review 5:1, pp. 42-59. 
 
Wisnumurti, Nugroho et al. (1986). Perjuangan Indonesia di Bidang Hukum Laut.  
Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Departemen Luar Negeri. 
 
Wisnumurti, Nugroho. (2009). “Maritime Security Issues in Southeast Asia: An  
Indonesian Perspective.” Indonesian Journal of International Law 6:3, pp. 333-
352.  
 
WCO. (2007). WCO SAFE Framework of Standards. Available at  
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Procedure
s%20and%20Facilitation/safe_package/safe_package_I.pdf. Last accessed 11 
August 2011. 
 
WCO. (2010). “Members who have expressed their intention to implement the WCO  
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade,” available from 
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Enforceme
nt/FOS_bil_03.pdf. Last accessed 11 August 2011. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesian Army Sets Terms for Defence Deals with Singapore,” 23 June 2007;  
accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesia, Malaysia to address border dispute,” 27 August 2010; accessed from  
the Newsbank database. 
305 
 
 
Xinhua, “India for joint naval patrols with Indonesia, Malaysia,” 11 August 2004; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesia-Singapore defense cooperation to benefit regional stability:  
Susilo,” 27 April 2007a; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Xinhua, “Indonesia-Singapore extradition treaty effective for bringing back fugitive  
corrupters,” 27 April 2007b; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesian government urged to cancel Singapore defense pact,” 18  
September 2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesia calls for talks on military deal with Singapore,” 14 June 2007; accessed  
from the Newsbank database. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesian House factions oppose military deal with Singapore,” 12 June  
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database. 
 
Xinhua, “Indonesia may let Singapore bring in friend in military training,” 23  
February 2007; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Xinhua, “Indonesian province rejects military exercise with Singapore,” 24 May  
2007; accessed from the Newsbank database.  
 
Yasin, Mat Taib. (2007). The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian  
Ocean Region. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. 
 
Young, Adam J. and Valencia, Mark J. (2003). “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in  
Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25:2, pp. 
269-283. 
  
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang. (2002). Selamatkan Negeri Kita dari Terorisme.  
Jakarta: Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs. 
 
Yussof, Ishak and Kasim, Mohd Yusof. (2003). “Human Resources Development and  
Regional Cooperation Within BIMP-EAGA: Issues and Future Directions.” Asia 
Pacific Development Journal 10:2, pp. 41-56. 
 
Yusuf, Ibrahim [Kepala Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Departemen  
Luar Negeri]. (2004). “Sambutan,” in Forum Dialog ke XI Kerjasama Maritim 
ASEAN. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Departemen 
Luar Negeri, pp. 24-26.  
 
Anonymous. (2007). Indonesian Criminal Code [Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum  
Pidana]. Jakarta: Permata Press. 
 
 
